Chapter 112 — That rational creatures are governed for their own sake, and other creatures as directed to them

In the first place then, the very condition of the rational creature, in that it has dominion over its actions, requires that the care of providence should be bestowed on it for its own sake. But the condition of other things that do not have dominion over their actions shows that they are cared for not for their own sake, but as being directed to other things. For that which acts only when moved by another is like an instrument; but that which acts by itself is like a principal agent. Now an instrument is required not for its own sake, but that the principal agent may use it. Hence whatever is done for the care of the instruments must be referred to the principal agent as its end, but any such action directed to the principal agent as such, either by the agent itself or by another, is for the sake of the same principal agent. Accordingly, intellectual creatures are ruled by God as though he cared for them for their own sake, while other creatures are ruled as being directed to rational creatures.

Again. That which has dominion over its own act is free in its action, because he is free who is cause of himself: (Metaphysics 1.2.) whereas that which by some kind of necessity is moved by another to act is subject to slavery. Therefore, every other creature is naturally under slavery; the intellectual nature alone is free. Now, in every government provision is made for the free for their own sake, but for slaves that they may be useful to the free. Accordingly, divine providence makes provision for the intellectual creature for its own sake, but for other creatures for the sake of the intellectual creature.

Moreover. Whenever certain things are directed to a certain end, if any of them are unable of themselves to attain to the end, they must be directed to those that attain to the end, which are directed to the end for their own sake. Thus the end of the army is victory, which the soldiers obtain by their own action in fighting, and they alone in the army are required for their own sake; but all others to whom other duties are assigned (such as the care of horses and the preparing of arms) are requisite for the sake of the soldiers of the army. Now, it is clear from what has been said (Ch. 17.) that God is the last end of the universe, whom the intellectual nature alone obtains in himself, namely, by knowing and loving him, as was proved above. (Ch. 25. seqq.) Therefore, the intellectual nature alone is requisite for its own sake in the universe, and all others for its sake.

Further. In every whole, the principal parts are requisite on their own account for the completion of the whole, while others are required for the preservation or betterment of the former. Now, of all the parts of the universe, intellectual creatures hold the highest place, because they approach nearest to the divine likeness. Therefore, divine providence provides for the intellectual nature for its own sake, and for all others for its sake.

Besides. It is clear that all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole, since the whole is not on account of the parts, but the parts on account of the whole. Now, intellectual natures are more akin to the whole than other natures, because the intellectual substance is all things in a sense, inasmuch as by its intellect it is able to comprehend all things; but every other substance has only a particular participation of being. Consequently, God cares for other things for the sake of intellectual substances.

Besides. Whatever happens to a thing in the course of nature happens to it naturally. Now, we see that in the course of nature the intellectual substance uses all others for its own sake: either for the perfection of the intellect, which sees the truth in them as in a mirror; or for the execution of its power and development of its knowledge, in the same way as a craftsman develops the conception of his art in corporeal matter; or again to sustain the body that is united to an intellectual soul, as is the case in man. It is clear, therefore, that God cares for all things for the sake of intellectual substances.

Moreover. If a man seek something for its own sake, he seeks it always, because what is of itself is always: whereas if he seek a thing on account of something else, he does not of necessity seek it always, but only in reference to that for the sake of which he seeks it. Now, as we proved above, (Bk. 2, ch. 24.) things derive their being from the divine will. Therefore, whatever is always is willed by God for its own sake; and what is not always is willed by God not for its own sake, but for another’s. Now, intellectual substances approach nearest to being always, since they are incorruptible. Moreover, they are unchangeable, except in their choice. Therefore, intellectual substances are governed for their own sake, as it were, and others for the sake of intellectual substances.

The fact that all the parts of the universe are directed to the perfection of the whole is not in contradiction with the foregoing conclusion, since all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole, insofar as one part serves another. Thus in the human body it is clear that the lungs belong to the body’s perfection, in that they serve the heart: hence there is no contradiction in the lungs being for the sake of the heart and for the sake of the whole animal. In like manner, that other natures are on account of the intellectual is not contrary to their being for the perfection of the universe: for without the things required for the perfection of the intellectual substance, the universe would not be complete.

Nor again does the fact that individuals are for the sake of the species militate against what has been said. Through being directed to their species, they are directed also to the intellectual nature. For a corruptible thing is directed to man not on account of only one individual man, but on account of the whole human species. Yet a corruptible thing could not serve the whole human species, except as regards its own entire species. Hence the order whereby corruptible things are directed to man requires that individuals be directed to the species.

When we assert that intellectual substances are directed by divine providence for their own sake, we do not mean that they are not also referred to God and for the perfection of the universe. Accordingly, they are said to be provided for on their own account, and others on account of them, because the goods bestowed on them by divine providence are not given them for another’s profit. But those bestowed on others are in the divine plan intended for the use of intellectual substances.

Hence it is said: Beware, lest you lift up your eyes to heaven, and when you see the sun and the moon and the other stars, (Vulgate: the stars of heaven.) you be drawn away and worship them and serve them, things which the Lord your God has allotted to all the peoples under the whole heaven (Deut 4:19); and: You have put all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen, and also the beasts of the field (Ps 8:6–7); and: You who are sovereign in strength do judge with mildness, and with great forbearance you do govern us (Wis 12:18).

Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is sinful for a man to kill dumb animals: for by divine providence they are intended for man’s use in the natural order. Hence it is no wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any other way whatever. For this reason the Lord said to Noah: As I gave you the green plants, I have delivered all flesh to you (Vulgate: delivered them all to you.) (Gen 9:3).

And if any passages of Sacred Scripture seem to forbid us to be cruel to dumb animals—for instance, to kill a bird with its young (Deut 22:6)—this is either to remove man’s thoughts from being cruel to other men, and lest through being cruel to animals one become cruel to human beings; or because injury to an animal leads to the temporal hurt of man, either of the doer of the deed, or of another; or on account of some signification: thus the Apostle expounds (1 Cor 9:9) the prohibition against muzzling an ox when it treads out the grain (Deut 25:4).