Chapter 107 — That the intellectual substance whose assistance is employed in the magic arts is not evil in its nature

It is impossible that there be natural malice in the intellectual substances whose assistance is employed in the practice of the magic arts.

For if a thing tends to something by its nature, it tends to it not accidentally but essentially, as a heavy body tends downwards. Now if these intellectual substances are evil essentially, they tend to evil naturally: consequently, this is not accidentally but essentially. But this is impossible: for we have proved (Ch. 3. seqq.) that all things tend essentially to good, and nothing tends to evil except accidentally. Therefore, these intellectual substances are not naturally evil.

Again. Everything that exists must be either cause or caused: otherwise there would be no order between it and other things. Hence the substances in question are either causes only, or are also caused. If they be causes, since evil cannot cause a thing save accidentally (as proved above), (Ch. 14.) and since whatever is accidental must be traced to something essential, (Aristotle, Physics 2.6.) it follows that there must be in them something preceding their malice by which they are causes. Now in each thing it is the nature and essence that comes first. Therefore, these substances are not evil by nature.

The same follows if they be caused. For no agent acts except with a good purpose. Therefore, evil cannot be the effect of a cause except accidentally. Now that which is caused only by accident cannot exist naturally, since every nature has a definite mode of coming into being. Therefore, it is impossible for the substances in question to be evil by nature.

Besides. Every being has its proper existence proportionate to its nature. Now existence, as such, is good: a sign of which is that all things desire existence. (Nicomachean Ethics 9.7.) Consequently, if these substances were evil by nature, they would have no existence.

Moreover. We have proved (Bk. 2, ch. 15.) that nothing can exist that has not existence from the first being: and that the first being is the highest good. (Bk. 1, ch. 41.) Since, then, every agent, as such, produces its like, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.7.) whatever proceeds from the first being must be good. Therefore, the aforesaid substances cannot be evil insofar as they exist and have a certain nature.

Further. There cannot possibly exist a thing that is altogether deprived of a participation of good, for, since the good and the appetible are the same, if a thing were utterly void of good, there would be nothing appetible in it; and its own existence is appetible to everything. Consequently, if anything be described as evil in its nature, this must be not because it is simply evil, but because it is evil to some person, or in some respect. Thus poison is not evil simply, but to one to whom it is harmful. Hence one man’s poison is another man’s meat. Now, this happens because the particular good that is proper to one is contrary to the particular good that is proper to another: thus heat, which is the good of fire, is contrary to cold, which is the good of water, and destroys it. Accordingly, that which by its nature is directed not to this or that good, but to good simply, cannot possibly be called evil by its nature, even in this way. And such is every intellect, because its good is in its own operation, the object of which is the universal, and things that exist simply. Therefore, no intellect can be evil in its nature, either simply or in relation to something else.

Again. In every intellectual subject, the intellect moves the appetite in the natural order; for the proper object of the will is the good understood. Now the good of the will consists in its following the intellect: thus, in us, good is that which is according to reason, and whatever is beside this is evil. In the natural order, therefore, the intellectual substance wills the good. Consequently, it is impossible that the intellectual substances whose assistance is employed by magical arts be naturally evil.

Besides. Since the will tends naturally to the good understood as its proper object and end, it is impossible for an intellectual substance to have a will naturally evil, unless its intellect err naturally in its judgment of good. Now, there can be no such intellect, because false judgements in the acts of the intelligence are like monstrosities in natural things, for they are not according to nature, but beside it, since the good and natural end of the intellect is the knowledge of truth. Therefore, there cannot be an intellect that is naturally deceived in its judgment of truth. Consequently, neither is it possible for an intellectual substance to have a will naturally evil.

Further. No cognitive faculty fails in the knowledge of its object, save on account of being defective or corrupted, since by its very nature it is directed to the knowledge of that object: thus the sight does not fail in the perception of color unless the sight itself be injured. Now, every defect and corruption is beside nature, because nature aims at the being and perfection of a thing. Therefore, no cognitive faculty can fail in the right judgment of its object. Now, the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore, there cannot be an intellect that errs naturally in the knowledge of truth. Neither, therefore, can any will stray naturally from the good.

This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For it is said: Everything created by God is good (1 Tim 4:4); and: God saw everything that he had made, and they were very good (Gen 1:31).

Hereby also we refute the error of the Manicheans who held that these intellectual substances, whom we are wont to call demons or devils, are naturally evil.

We also exclude the error described by Porphyry in his letter to Anebontes, where he says that some are of opinion that there is a genus of spirits whose speciality it is to grant the prayers of magicians: spirits naturally deceitful, appearing under all kinds of forms, pretending to be gods, or demons, or souls of the departed. It is they who cause all these effects that seem either good or evil. As to those that are really good, they give no assistance; in fact they know nothing about them. But they counsel evil, and impugn and sometimes hinder those who are intent on leading a virtuous life: they are full of presumption and arrogance; they delight in vanities, and are fascinated by flattery. (Augustine, On Heresies, ch. 46.) These words of Porphyry indicate clearly enough the malice of the demons, whose assistance the magic arts employ. His words are reprehensible only in that he states this malice to be natural to the demons.