Chapter 97 — How there is a reason for divine providence

From what has been said, one can see clearly that things are arranged by divine providence for a definite reason.

For we have proved that God, by his providence, directs all things to his goodness as their end (Ch. 64.)—not indeed as though his goodness gained anything from the things that are made, but in order that the likeness of his goodness may be impressed on things as far as possible. (Ch. 18. seq.) And since every created substance must fall short of the perfection of the divine goodness, it was necessary, in order that the divine goodness might the more perfectly be bestowed on things, that there should be diversity among them, so that what could not be perfectly represented by one single thing might be more perfectly represented in various ways by things of various kinds. Thus when man finds that he cannot adequately express an idea by one word, he uses several words so as to express his idea in several ways. In this too we are able to consider the eminence of the divine perfection, since perfect goodness, which in God exists in a united and simple manner, cannot be in creatures otherwise than in many ways and many subjects. Now things are diversified through having diverse forms whence they derive their species. Consequently, the reason for diversity in the forms of things is taken from the end.

Again, the reason of the order in things is taken from the diversity of forms. For, as it is from the form that a thing has its being, and as a thing insofar as it has being approaches to a likeness to God, who is his own simple being, it follows of necessity that the form is nothing else than a participation of the divine similitude in things. Hence Aristotle, speaking of the form, rightly says that it is something godlike and desirable. (Physics 1.9.) Now likeness to one simple thing cannot be diversified except through the resemblance being more or less close, or more or less distant. And the closer a thing approaches to the divine resemblance, the more perfect it is. Consequently, diversity of forms must be according as one is more perfect than another. For this reason Aristotle (Metaphysics. bk. 8, D. 7. ch. 3.) likens definitions, whereby the natures and forms of things are indicated, to numbers, in which species are diversified by addition or subtraction of unity—thus giving us to understand that diversity of forms requires diverse degrees of perfection.

This is evident to anyone who studies the natures of things. For, if he consider carefully, he will find that the diversity of things is made up of degrees (since above inanimate bodies he will find plants, and above these irrational animals, above these intelligent substances), and in each one of these he will find diversity according as some are more perfect than other: so much so that the highest members of a lower genus appear to be close to the higher genus, and conversely. Thus animals that cannot move are like plants. Hence Dionysius says that divine wisdom has joined together the last things of higher degree to the first things of lower degree. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7.) Therefore, it is clear that the diversity of things requires that all be not equal, and that there be order and degrees.

From the diversity of forms, from which things derive their specific differences, there follows the difference of operations. For, since things act according as they are actual (because those that are in potency, as such, are devoid of action), and since a thing is actual by its form, a thing’s operation must follow its form. Accordingly, if there be diverse forms, these must have diverse operations.

Again, since each thing attains to its proper end by its proper action, it follows that there must be diverse proper ends in things, although there is one common end of all.

Moreover, from the diversity of forms there results in matter a diversity of habitude in relation to things. For, since forms are diverse according as some are more perfect than others, some of them are perfect to the extent of being subsistent and complete in themselves, having no need of matter as a support. But some are unable to subsist perfectly by themselves, and require matter to uphold them, so that what subsists is not a form only, nor matter only—which by itself is not an actual being—but something composed of both.

Now matter and form would be unable to concur in making one thing unless they were mutually proportionate. And if they need to be proportionate, it follows that diverse matters correspond to diverse forms. Consequently, certain forms require simple, while others require complex matter; and to diverse forms there must correspond diverse composition of parts, in keeping with the species and operation of the form.

From the diverse habitudes in relation to matter, there results diversity of agents and patients. For, since a thing acts by reason of its form, it follows that things which have more perfect and less material forms act on those that are more material and have more imperfect forms.

Again, from diversity of forms, matters, and agents there results diversity of properties and accidents. For, since substance is the cause of accident (as the perfect of the imperfect), it follows that diverse proper accidents must result from diverse substantial principles. Moreover, since diverse agents produce diverse impressions on patients, it follows that a diversity of agents must result in a diversity of accidents resulting from their activity.

From what has been said then, it is clear that it is not without reason that divine providence has appointed to creatures diverse accidents, actions, passions and orders. Therefore, Sacred Scripture ascribes the formation and government of things to the divine wisdom and prudence. Thus it is said: The Lord by wisdom founded the earth; by understanding he established the heavens; by his knowledge the deeps broke forth, and the clouds drop down the dew (Prov 3:19–20). Again, it is said that divine wisdom reaches mightily from one end of the earth to the other, and she orders all things sweetly (Wis 8:1). And: You have arranged all things by measure and number and weight (Wis 11:21), where by measure we are to understand the quantity, mode, or degree of perfection in each thing; by number, the multitude and diversity of species resulting from the various degrees of perfection; and by weight the various inclinations of things to their respective ends and operations, agents and patients, and such accidents as result from diversity of species.

In this same order wherein we find the reason of divine providence, we have stated that the first place (as being the last end) must be assigned to the divine goodness, which is the first principle in practical matters; after this comes the multiplicity of things, and this cannot result but from a diversity of grades in forms and matters, agents and patients, actions and accidents. Accordingly, as the fundamental reason of divine providence, absolutely speaking, is the divine goodness, so the fundamental reason in creatures is their multiplicity, to the making and preservation of which all other things are apparently subordinate. In this sense Boethius, it would seem, rightly said that number seems to have been the aim of nature in the original formation of things. (Boethius, On Arithmetic, bk. 1, ch. 2.)

We must, however, observe that practical and speculative reason partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this: as speculative reason starts from a principle, and employs means to reach the intended conclusion, so the practical reason begins from some first principle and through certain means arrives at the intended operation or product of operation. In speculative matters the principle is the form and what a thing is; but in practical matters it is the end, which sometimes is a form, at other times something else. Moreover, the principle in operative matters must always be necessary, whereas in practical things it is sometimes necessary and sometimes not: thus it is necessary that man desire happiness as his end, but it is not necessary that he desire to build a house. Likewise, in demonstrations, that which follows is always a necessary sequel to that which precedes, but in practical matters not always, and only when the end cannot be obtained except by the way indicated: thus he who would build a house must get some wood, but it depends on his simple will, and not on his will to build a house, that he gets pine wood.

Accordingly, that God love his own goodness is something necessary, but it does not necessarily follow from this that it should be reflected in creatures, since the divine goodness is perfect without this. Consequently, although the divine goodness is the reason why creatures were originally brought into being, yet this depends on the simple will of God. Supposing, however, that God wishes to communicate his goodness to his creatures by way of likeness as far as it is possible, this is the reason why creatures are of diverse kinds—although there is no necessity for this diversity being according to this or that degree of perfection, or this or that number of things. And supposing it to be God’s will to establish a particular number in things, and to bestow on each thing a particular measure of perfection, this is the reason why a particular thing has such and such a form and such and such matter. And so on in like manner.

It is, therefore, clear that the dispensations of providence are according to a certain reason, and yet this reason presupposes the divine will.

Accordingly, a twofold error is refuted by what we have said. First, there is the error of those who maintained that all things are the result of God’s simple will without any reason. This is the error of the Muslim theologians in the law of the Mohammedans, as Rabbi Moses relates, (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, bk. 3, ch. 25.) according to whom the sole reason why fire heats, rather than chills, is because God wills thus. Second, we refute the error of those who assert that the ordering of causes proceeds from divine providence by way of necessity. (See above, ch. 72. seq.; ch. 94.) Both of which are false, as is clear from what has been said.

There are certain expressions of Scripture that would seem to ascribe all things to God’s simple will. But such things are said not to remove reason from the dispensations of providence, but to show that God’s will is the first principle of all things, as we have already shown. Such are the words of the Psalm: Whatever the Lord pleases he does (Ps 135[134]:6), and of Job: Who can say: ‘Why do you do so?’ (Job 9:12). And: Who can resist his will? (Rom 9:19). Augustine likewise says: God’s will alone is the first cause of health and sickness, reward and punishment, grace and retribution. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, cc. 3–4.)

Accordingly, if we be asked for the account of a particular natural effect, we can assign the reason to some proximate cause; provided, however, that we refer all things to the divine will as their first cause. Thus if it be asked: Why was the wood heated at the presence of fire? we reply it is because to heat is fire’s natural action; and this, because heat is its proper accident; and this results from its proper form, and so on until we come to the divine will. Hence if we reply to the question: Why was the wood made hot? by saying: Because God so willed, we shall answer rightly if we intend to trace the question back to its first cause, but incorrectly if we intend to exclude all other causes.