Chapter 10 — Arguments against the divine generation and procession

Now that we have considered the whole question carefully, we see clearly that Sacred Scripture requires us to believe that the Father and Son, though distinct in person, are nevertheless one God, having one essence or nature. Since, however, it is far removed from the nature of creatures that any two things should be distinct supposita and yet have but one essence, human reason, which takes its principles from the properties of creatures, encounters many difficulties in this mystery of the divine generation.

For, seeing that the generation which comes under our observation is a kind of change, and that corruption is contrary to it, it seems that there can scarcely be generation in God who is unchangeable, incorruptible, and eternal, as we have proved above. (Bk. 1, cc. 12, 15.)

Again. If generation is a change, then whatever is generated must be changeable. Now, that which is changed passes from potency to act, because movement is the act of that which is in potency, as such. Accordingly, if the Son of God is begotten, seemingly he is not eternal, for he would pass from potency to act. Neither would he be God, because he would not be pure act, but something with an admixture of potency.

Further. That which is begotten receives its nature from the begetter. Therefore, if the Son is begotten of God the Father, it follows that he receives his nature from the Father. But it is impossible that he received from the Father a nature numerically distinct from the Father’s, yet specifically the same, as happens in univocal generations (for instance, when man begets man, or fire generates fire). For it has been shown above (Bk. 1, ch. 42; Bk. 4, ch. 9.) that there cannot be several divinities in number. Also, it seems impossible that he received a nature numerically the same as the Father’s, since if he received a part of it, it would follow that the divine nature is divisible. If he received the whole, seemingly it would follow that the divine nature would cease to be in the Father if it were wholly transfused into the Son, since he would be corrupted in begetting. Nor could it be said that the divine nature overflows from the Father into the Son by way of superabundance—as the spring water flows into the stream and yet the spring does not run dry—because the divine nature not only cannot be divided but also cannot increase. It would seem to follow, therefore, that the Son received from the Father a nature neither numerically nor specifically the same as the Father’s, but altogether different in kind, as happens in equivocal generation—for instance, when animals begotten of putrid matter are engendered by the power of the sun, without attaining to the specific nature of the sun. It follows, then, that God’s Son is neither his true Son, since he does not have his Father’s nature, nor true God, since he does not receive the divine nature.

Besides. If the Son receives his nature from God the Father, we must distinguish in him the receiver and the nature received: for nothing receives itself. Therefore, the Son is not his own essence or nature. Consequently, he is not true God.

Moreover. If the Son of God is not distinct from the divine essence, since the divine essence is subsistent (as we have proved), (Bk. 1, ch. 22.) and it remains clear that the Father is the divine essence, it would seem to follow that Father and Son are identical with the same subsistent thing. Now a person is a subsistent intellectual nature. Therefore, if the Son is the divine nature, it follows that Father and Son are identical in person. On the other hand, if the Son is not the divine essence, he is not true God, for we have proved that God is the divine essence. (Bk. 1, ch. 21.) It seems, then, that either the Son is not true God, as Arius stated, or he is not personally distinct from the Father, as Sabellius asserted.

Again. That which is the principle of individuality in A cannot be in B, if A and B are individually distinct from each other, since what is common to many things cannot be a principle of individuality. Now it is by his own essence that God is individualized, because it is not a form in matter, so that it could be individualized by matter. Consequently, there is nothing in God the Father to individualize him, except his essence. Therefore, his essence cannot be in any other suppositum. Either, then, it is not in the Son, and consequently the Son is not true God, as Arius asserts; or the Son is not personally distinct from the Father, and both are the same person, as Sabellius contends.

Further. If Father and Son are two supposita or persons, and nevertheless one in essence, there must be in them, besides the essence, something whereby they are mutually distinct. For the essence is stated to be common to both, and what is common cannot be a principle of distinction. Hence that whereby Father and Son are distinct must be distinct from the divine essence. Consequently, the person of the Son is composed of two things, and likewise the person of the Father—namely, the common essence and a principle of distinction. Both, therefore, are composites, and neither of them is true God.

Someone, however, might say that they are distinguished solely by relation, because one is the Father, and the other the Son; and that relative predication seemingly implies not some other thing in the subject, but only a relation; and consequently that we cannot conclude that there is composition in the divine persons. But this reply would seem insufficient to solve the above objection.

For there can be no relation without something absolute, because in every relative term there must be an absolute foundation besides the notion of relativity: thus a servant is something absolute besides his relationship to his master. Accordingly, the relation whereby Father and Son are mutually distinct must be founded on something absolute. Either, then, this absolute something is one only, or there are two absolute things. If there is but one, it cannot be the foundation of a twofold relation unless we except the relation of identity, which cannot cause a distinction: thus A is the same as A. If, then, the relation be such as to require distinction, we must presuppose a distinction of absolutes. Therefore, it would seem impossible for the persons of Father and Son to be distinguished by relations alone.

Moreover, it must be admitted that the relation which distinguishes Father from Son is either real or merely logical. If it be real, it is not, seemingly, to be identified with the divine essence, since this is common to Father and Son. Consequently, there will be something in the Son that is not his essence, and so he will not be truly God—for we have proved (Bk. 1, ch. 23.) that there is nothing in God besides his essence. On the other hand, if this relation be merely logical, it cannot effect a personal distinction between Son and Father, since distinction of persons implies a real distinction.

Again. Every relative depends on its correlative. But that which depends on another cannot be true God. Consequently, if the persons of Father and Son are distinguished by their relations, neither will be true God.

Further. If the Father be God, and if the Son be God, it follows that ‘God’ is predicated substantially of Father and Son, since the divinity cannot be an accident. Now, a substantial predicate is truly that about which it is predicated: for when I say ‘man is an animal,’ the thing that is truly a man is an animal; so, too, when I say: ‘Socrates is a man,’ that which is really Socrates is a man. Hence it would seem to follow that there cannot be plurality of subjects, since there is unity on the part of the substantial predicate: for Socrates and Plato are not one man, though they are one in point of human nature, nor are man and ass one animal, though they are one in animality. Therefore, if Father and Son are two persons, it is seemingly impossible that they be one God.

Moreover. Opposite predicates indicate plurality of the things about which they are predicated. Now, opposites are predicted of God the Father and God the Son. Thus the Father is God unbegotten and begetting, but the Son is God begotten. Therefore, it seems impossible that Father and Son be one God.

From these and similar arguments certain men, presuming to measure the mysteries of God by their own reasoning, endeavor to impugn the doctrine of divine generation. Since, however, truth is mighty in itself, and is not weakened by any assault, we must proceed to show that the truth of faith cannot be overthrown by reason.