Chapter 11 — The meaning of generation in God, and of the scriptural references to the Son of God

To carry out this purpose we must begin by observing that where things differ in nature, we find different modes of emanation, and further, that from the higher nature things proceed in a more intimate way.

Now, of all things the inanimate obtain the lowest place, and from them no emanation is possible except by the action of one on another: thus, fire is engendered from fire when an extraneous body is transformed by fire, and receives the quality and form of fire.

The next place to inanimate bodies belongs to plants, whence emanation proceeds from within insofar as the plant’s intrinsic humor is converted into seed, which, being committed to the soil, grows into a plant. Accordingly, here we find the first traces of life, since living things are those which move themselves to act, whereas those which can only move extraneous things are wholly lifeless. It is a sign of life in plants that something within them is the cause of a form. Yet the plant’s life is imperfect, because, although emanation proceeds from within it, that which emanates comes forth by little and little, and in the end becomes altogether extraneous. Thus the humor of a tree gradually comes forth from the tree and eventually becomes a blossom, and then takes the form of fruit distinct from the branch, though united to it. And when the fruit is perfect it is altogether severed from the tree, and falling to the ground, produces by its seminal force another plant. Indeed, if we consider the matter carefully we shall see that the first principle of this emanation is something extraneous, since the intrinsic humor of the tree is drawn through the roots from the soil, whence the plant derives its nourishment.

There is yet above that of the plants a higher form of life, which is that of the sensitive soul, whose proper emanation terminates within, though beginning from without. Also, the further the emanation proceeds, the more does it penetrate within; for the sensible object impresses a form on the external senses, from which it proceeds to the imagination and, further still, to the storehouse of the memory. Yet in every process of this kind of emanation, the beginning and the end are in different subjects, for no sensitive power reflects on itself. Therefore, this degree of life transcends that of plants insofar as it is more intimate; yet it is not a perfect life, since the emanation is always from one thing to another.

Therefore, the highest degree of life is that which is according to the intellect: for the intellect reflects on itself, and can understand itself. There are, however, various degrees in the intellectual life, because the human mind, though able to know itself, takes its first steps to knowledge from without: for it cannot understand apart from phantasms, as we have already made clear. (Bk. 2, ch. 20.) Accordingly, intellectual life is more perfect in the angels whose intellect does not proceed from something extrinsic to acquire self-knowledge, but knows itself by itself. Yet their life does not reach the highest degree of perfection because, though the intelligible species is altogether within them, it is not their very substance, because in them to understand and to be are not the same thing, as we have already shown. (Bk. 2, ch. 52.) Therefore, the highest perfection of life belongs to God, whose understanding is not distinct from his being, as we have proved. (Bk. 1, ch. 45.) Therefore, the intelligible species in God must be the divine essence itself.

By intelligible species I mean that which the intellect conceives within itself of the thing understood. Now, in us, this is neither the thing itself that is understood, nor the substance of the intellect, but is an intelligible image of the thing understood, and is expressed by external speech. Therefore, the intelligible species is known as the inner word that is signified by the outward word. That this same intelligible species is not the thing which we understand is evident from the fact that to understand a thing is quite distinct from understanding its intelligible species. The intellect does this when it reflects on its action, for which reason sciences that treat of things are distinct from those that treat of ideas. Again, it is clear that in us the intelligible species is not the intellect itself, because the being of the idea as understood consists in an act of understanding, whereas the being of our intellect does not, seeing that its being is not its act.

Hence as in God to be is to understand, the intelligible species in him is his act of understanding; and since in him the act of understanding is the thing understood (for by understanding himself he understands all other things, as we have proved), (Bk. 1, ch. 49.) it follows that in God understanding himself, understanding, the thing understood, and the intelligible species are all one and the same.

With these principles before our eyes, we can to some extent understand the meaning of generation in God. For it is clear that in God generation cannot possibly have the same meaning as in inanimate beings, where the generator impresses its likeness on extraneous matter. For, as our faith declares, the Son begotten of God must have true divinity and be true God, and the divinity is not a form adhering to matter, nor is God a material being, as we have proved. (Bk. 1, ch. 17.)^ ^Again, generation in God cannot be of the same kind as that which we observe in plants; or again in animals, which have the powers of nutrition and generation in common with plants, because something that was in the plant or animal is severed so as to engender a being of like species and, when finally engendered, is wholly extraneous to the generator. But nothing can be severed from God, since he is indivisible; and the Son begotten of God is not extraneous to the Father who begets him, but is in him, as proved by the authorities quoted above. Nor again can the divine generation be taken to signify an emanation such as we find in the sensitive soul, for God does not receive from without the ability to cause an impression on another thing, since otherwise he would not be the first agent. Again, the operations of the sensitive soul are performed by means of bodily instruments; but God is manifestly incorporeal. Consequently, generation in God must be understood to indicate an intellectual emanation. We must explain this as follows.

It is evident from what has been already proved (Bk. 1, ch. 47.) that God understands himself. Now every understood thing, as such, must be in the one who understands, because to understand means the apprehension of the object understood by the intellect. Hence our intellect, in understanding itself, remains within itself not only as essentially one with itself, but as understanding the object of its apprehension. Therefore, God must be within himself as the understood object is in the one who understands. Now the understood object in the one who understands is the intelligible species and word. Accordingly, in God understanding himself is God’s word, or God understood, even as in the intellect the idea of a stone is a stone understood. Hence it is said: The Word was with God (John 1:1).

But, since the divine intellect does not pass from potency to act, but is always in act, as we proved above, (Bk. 1, ch. 56.) it follows of necessity that God has always understood himself. Now for the very reason that he understands himself, his Word must be in him, as we have shown. Therefore, God’s Word must have been in him always. Consequently, his Word is co-eternal with him, and does not come to him in course of time, as the word that we conceive within ourselves—namely, the intelligible species—comes into our intellect in course of time. Hence it is said: In the beginning was the Word (John 1:1).

And since the divine intellect is not only always in act, but is also pure act, as we have proved, (Bk. 1, ch. 16.) it follows that the very substance of the divine intellect is its own understanding, or act of the intellect. Now the being of the word conceived within the mind (or of the intelligible species) consists in its being understood. Therefore, the same being is that of the divine Word and of the divine intellect, and therefore of God himself, since he is his own act of intelligence. Now God’s being is his essence or nature, which is God himself, as we proved above. (Bk. 1, ch. 22.) Therefore, the Word of God is the divine being and essence, and God in very truth. It is not so with the word of the human intellect. For when our intellect understands itself, the being of the intellect is not identified with its act of understanding, because the substance of the intellect was in potency to the act of understanding, ere it understood actually. Consequently, the being of the intelligible species is distinct from the act of understanding, since its being consists in its being understood. Therefore, in the man who understands himself, the inwardly conceived word is not a real man, having the natural being of a man, but is merely a man understood—that is, the likeness of a true man apprehended by the intellect. But the Word of God, for the very reason that it is God understood, is true God having by nature the divine being, because the natural being of God is not distinct from his act of understanding, as we have already stated. Hence it is said: The Word was God (John 1:1); which shows, since the statement is absolute, that the Word of God signifies God in very truth. For man’s word cannot be called a man simply and absolutely, but only with a qualification, namely, a man understood. Hence this statement would be untrue, ‘The word is a man,’ whereas this may be true, ‘The word is a man understood.’ Accordingly, when it is stated: The Word was God, this shows that the divine Word is not merely an intelligible species as our word is, but that it is indeed a real and subsistent being, because the true God is subsistent, since he is supremely being by his essence.

Nevertheless, the divinity is not in the Word so as to be the same in species and distinct numerically, because the Word has the nature of God inasmuch as God’s understanding is his being, as we have said. Now understanding is the very being of God. Therefore, the Word has the divine essence itself—identical not merely in species, but even in number.

Again, a nature that is one specifically is not divided numerically save by reason of matter. But the divine nature is wholly immaterial. Therefore, it is impossible that the divine nature be one in species and be differentiated in number. Consequently, the divine Word has the one identical nature in common with God; thus the Word of God and God, whose Word he is, are not two gods, but one God. That two having human nature are two men with us is because human nature is divided numerically in two subjects. Now it was shown above (Bk. 1, ch. 31.) that things which in creatures are divided are simply one in God. Thus in creatures essence and existence are distinct; and in some, that which subsists in its essence is distinct from its essence or nature (for an individual man is neither his humanity nor his existence); but God is his essence and his existence.

And, though these two in God are one, yet whatever pertains to his subsistence, essence, or existence, is most truly in God: for it befits him not to be in another, inasmuch as he is subsistent; to be a particular thing, inasmuch as he is an essence; and to be in act, by reason of his existence. Consequently, as in God intelligent being, the act of intelligence, and the intelligible species, which is his Word, are all one and the same thing, whatever pertains to the intelligent subject, or to the act of intelligence, or to the intelligible species or Word must be most truly in God. Now it belongs to the interior word or intelligible species to proceed from the intelligent being through the latter’s act of intelligence, since it is the term of its intellectual operation; for the intellect by understanding conceives and forms the understood species or idea which is the interior word. Therefore, God’s Word must proceed from him by reason of his act of intelligence. Hence God’s Word stands in relation to God understanding, whose Word he is, as to him from whom he proceeds; for such a relation is implied by the very nature of a word. Since, then, in God the intelligent subject, the act of intelligence, and the intelligible species or word are essentially one, and since for this reason each one of these must be God, it follows that there is only a distinction of relation between them, insofar as the Word is referred to the cause of his conception as to the source whence he proceeds. Hence the evangelist, lest the phrase the Word was God should seem to remove any distinction whatsoever between the Word and God (the speaker and conceiver of the Word), added: The same was in the beginning with God, as though to say: This same Word, whom I have stated to be God, is in some way distinct from God the speaker of the Word, and thus may be described as being with God.

Now the inwardly conceived word is a kind of form and image of the thing understood: for when the likeness of a thing exists in something else, it is either an exemplar, if it is by way of being a principle; or else it is an image, if it be compared to the thing of which it is a likeness as to its principle. We have an example of both cases in our own intellect, because in the mind of the craftsman there is the image of his handiwork. This image is the principle of the operation that produces the handiwork, and is compared to that handiwork as the exemplar to the exemplate. On the other hand, the image which our mind conceives of a natural thing is compared to the thing of which it is an image as to its principle, because our act of intelligence takes its principle from the senses, which are impressed by natural things. Now, since God understands both himself and other things, as we have shown, (Bk. 1, ch. 49.) his act of understanding is the principle of the things understood by him, because they are caused by him through his intellect and will. But to that intelligible being, which is himself, he is compared as a thing to its principle, since this intelligible being is identical with the intellect understanding it, and the Word conceived is an emanation of it. Consequently, the Word of God is compared to other things understood by God as their exemplar, and to God himself whose Word he is, as his image. Hence it is said of the Word of God that he is the image of the invisible God (Col 1:15).

There is, however, this difference between intellect and sense: the latter apprehends the external accidents of things, such as color, taste, quantity, and the like, whereas the former penetrates within. And since all knowledge is effected by reason of a likeness between knower and known, it follows that there must be in the senses a likeness of the accidents of the sensible object, and in the intellect a likeness of the essence of the object understood. Hence the word conceived in the intellect is the image or exemplar of the substance of the thing understood. And as the Word of God is the image of God, as we have shown, he must be God’s image in respect of the essence. Therefore, the Apostle says that he is the figure of his substance (Heb 1:3).

Now the image of a thing is twofold. There is the image that has not the same nature as that which it represents, whether it represent it as to its external accidents—thus a bronze statue is the image of a man, yet it is not a man—or whether it represent it as to its substance, for the intellect’s idea of a man is not a man, because, as the Philosopher says, not a stone, but its image, is in the soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul, bk. 3,* text. 38.)* But an image that has the same nature as the thing it represents is like the king’s son, in whom we see his father’s image, and who has the same nature as his father. Now it has been shown that God’s Word is the image of the speaker in his very essence, and that he has the same nature in common with him. Consequently, God’s Word is not only his image but also his Son, because it is not possible to be both the image of another and of the same nature as that other without being this other’s son, so long as we speak of living beings, because that which proceeds from a living being in likeness of nature is said to be its son. Hence it is said: the Lord said to me: ‘You are my son’ (Ps 2:7).

Since, then, the Word of God is called the Son of God, we must also observe, seeing that in every nature the procession of son from father is natural, that the Son of God is begotten of and proceeds from the Father naturally. This is in keeping with what we have been saying, and may be understood from the operation of our own intellect. For our intellect knows certain things naturally, such as the first principles of matters intelligible, of which the intelligible concepts, or interior words, exist in it and proceed from it naturally. There are also certain intelligible matters which our intellect does not know naturally, but comes to know by reasoning. The concepts of these things are not in our intellect naturally, and it has to make an effort to seek them. Now it is evident that God understands himself naturally, even as he exists naturally, since his act of intelligence is his being, as we have proved. (Bk. 1, ch. 45.) Hence the Word spoken by God understanding himself proceeds from him naturally; and as the Word of God is of the same nature with God speaking and is his image, it follows that the term of this natural procession is the image of that from which it proceeds in identity of nature. Now the essence of true generation in living things is that the thing begotten proceeds from the begetter as its image and with the same nature. Therefore, God’s Word is truly begotten of God’s utterance; and his procession may be called a ‘begetting’ or ‘birth.’ Hence it is said: Today I have begotten you (Ps 2:7); that is to say, in eternity, which is ever present, and contains no trace of past or future. It is therefore clear how false was the assertion of the Arians that the Father begot the Son by his will. For that which is done voluntarily is not natural.

We must also take note that the thing generated, so long as it remains in the generator, is said to be conceived. Now, God’s Word is generated of God in such a way that he does not depart from God but abides in him, as stated above. Rightly, therefore, may God’s Word be described as conceived of God. Hence the Wisdom of God says: When there were no depths I was already conceived (Prov 8:24). There is, however, a difference between the conception of God’s Word and the material conception which we observe in animals. For the offspring, during the period of conception and gestation, is as yet imperfect, and unable to subsist by itself apart from its generator. Hence when an animal’s body is begotten, the conception of the offspring is distinct from its birth, when it is severed from its generator by being brought forth from the womb. On the other hand, God’s Word, abiding in God the speaker, subsists perfectly in himself, and distinct from God the speaker—for no distinction of place is needed where there is only a distinction of relationship (as stated above). Accordingly, in the generation of the Word of God, conception is the same as birth. And hence, after wisdom had said: I was already conceived, the text, after a few words, continues: Before the hills I was brought forth (Prov 8:25).

Yet because conception and birth in corporeal beings include movement and consequently some kind of succession—since the term of conception is the existence in the conceiver of that which has been conceived, and the term of birth is the separate existence of the offspring apart from the parent—it follows that in corporeal beings what is being conceived is not as yet, and that the offspring while in the womb is not distinct from the parent. On the other hand, when an intelligible word is conceived and brought forth, there is no movement or succession; hence it exists as soon as it is conceived, and it has a separate existence as soon as it is brought forth. Thus the illuminated object is lit up as soon as there is light, since there is no succession in the diffusion of light. (At the time of St. Thomas it was thought that the movement of light was instantaneous.)

And if this is the case with our intelligible word, much more does it apply to the Word of God, not only because his conception and birth are in the intelligible order, but also because both are in eternity, where there can be nothing prior nor posterior. Hence after the words of wisdom: Before the hills I was brought forth (Prov 8:25), lest this might seem to imply that he did not exist until he was brought forth, the text continues: When he established the heavens, I was there (Prov 8:27). Accordingly, whereas in the carnal generation of animals there is first conception, then gestation, and association without separate existence of offspring with parent, in the divine generation all these things are simultaneous, since the Word of God is at once conceived, begotten, and present. And since that what is begotten is brought forth from the womb, even as the generation of God’s Word is called birth, in order to indicate his perfect distinction from his begetter, so in like manner it is called generation from the womb, according to the Psalm: From the womb, before the day-star, I have begotten you (Ps 110[109]:3).

Yet, because the distinction between word and speaker is not such as to hinder the word from being in the speaker, as already stated, just as the Word is said to be begotten or brought forth from the womb, so as to indicate distinction, so is he said to be in the bosom of the Father (John 1:18), to show that this distinction does not prevent the Word being in the speaker.

Now we must observe that the carnal generation of animals is effected by an active and a passive function. The father takes an active part, while the mother’s part is passive, so that the begetting of offspring belongs to the father as regards certain conditions, and to the mother as regards others. It belongs to the father to give his offspring its nature and species, while conception and gestation belong to the mother, whose part is passive and receptive. Accordingly, since (as we have stated) the procession of the Word lies in the fact that God understands himself, and God understands himself not by a passive power, but by an quasi-active power (because the divine intellect is not in potency but in act only), it follows that there is no place for a mother but only for a father in the generation of God’s Word. Consequently, the parts which belong severally to father and mother in carnal generation are all ascribed by Scripture to the Father in the generation of the Word. Thus the Father is said to give life to the Son, and to conceive and beget him.