Chapter 14 — Solution of the foregoing objections against the divine generation

Since, then, truth excludes all error and banishes all doubt, it will be easy to solve the objections which seemed to raise difficulties in the matter of the divine generation.

For it is clear from what has been already established that in God we place an intelligible begetting, but not such as obtains in material things, the engendering of which is a kind of change and the opposite of corruption. For even the word of our intellect is conceived without change, nor is there a corruption that is opposite it; and we have already explained how the begetting of the Son of God is like to the conception of that same word.

In like manner, the word conceived in our mind does not pass from potency to act except insofar as our intellect passes from potency to act; and yet the word is not begotten of our intellect until the latter is in act; and as soon as it is in act, the conceived word is there. But the divine intellect is never in potency, but only in act, as we have proved above. (Bk. 1, ch. 55.) Therefore, it begets the Word without passing from potency to act, just as one act gives rise to another (as, for example, light to brightness, and the intellect in act to the idea). Therefore, it is clear also that by being begotten the Son of God is none the less true God or eternal; rather, in fact, he must be coeternal with God whose Word he is, since the intellect in act is never without its word.

And because the Son of God is not begotten materially but intelligibly, it is foolish to doubt whether the Father gave him his nature wholly or in part. For it is evident that if God understands himself, the whole fullness of him must be contained in the Word. And yet the substance given to the Son does not cease to be in the Father, for even with us the thing understood does not cease to have its proper nature, although the idea is the intelligible image of the very nature of the object understood.

From the fact that the divine begetting is not material, it is clear that there is no need to distinguish in the Son of God the recipient and the nature received. In material generations it must be otherwise, inasmuch as the matter of the being begotten receives the form of the begetter. It is not so, however, with intelligible generations, because the word does no arise from the intellect in such a way that a part of it is presupposed as receiving, while a part flows out of the intellect. Rather, it originates entirely from the intellect, even as in us one word wholly arises from another as a conclusion from principles. Now, when a thing in its entirety arises from another, it is impossible to indicate a recipient and a thing received, because all that arises issues from the source whence it arises.

In like manner, it is plain that the unity of the divine begetting is not destroyed, because there cannot be a distinction of several subsistent beings. For the divine essence, though subsistent, cannot be severed from the relation that we must ascribe to God insofar as the conceived Word of the divine mind proceeds from the divine utterance. For the Word is the divine essence, as we have proved, and God who speaks the Word that proceeds from him is also the divine essence; nor are they distinct but identical. Moreover, these relations are not accidents in God but subsistent, for nothing can be accidental to God, as we have proved above. (Bk. 1, ch. 23.) Accordingly, there are several subsistent beings if we consider the relations; but one subsistent being if we consider the essence. Hence we say that there is one God because there is one subsistent essence, and that there are three persons on account of the distinction between the subsistent relations. In human beings, the distinction of persons regards not the specific essence, but certain things that are in addition to the specific nature; for in all human persons there is one specific nature, and yet there are many persons, since men are distinguished by things that are in addition to the nature. In God, therefore, we must not say that there is but one person by reason of the unity of the subsistent essence, but that there are several on account of the relations.

Hence it is clear that whatever is the principle of individuality in one is not necessarily in another, since neither is the divine essence in another God, nor paternity in the Son.

And although two persons, namely Father and Son, are distinct not in essence but by relation, nevertheless this relation is not really distinct from the essence, seeing that relation in God cannot be an accident. Nor shall we find this impossible if we consider carefully our conclusions in the first book, (Ch. 28.) where we proved that in God are the perfections of all things, not by a kind of composition, but by the unity of his simple essence. For the various perfections, which in the creature are manifold in form, are one in God owing to the simplicity of his essence. Thus man is a living being by one form, wise by another, and just by another; these all belong to God by his essence. Hence as wisdom and justice are accidents in man, whereas in God they are identified with the divine essence, so a relation such as paternity or sonship, though an accident in man, in God is the divine essence.

Now we assert that God’s wisdom is his essence, while our wisdom is something additional to the essence, not as though the Divine Wisdom falls short of ours, but because God’s essence so transcends ours that such things as wisdom and justice (which in us are not essential to our being) belong to God perfectly by reason of his essence. Consequently, whatever belongs to us in respect of our essence and wisdom as mutually distinct must be ascribed to God in respect of his essence as identical; the same applies to other matters. Accordingly, since the divine essence is identical with the relations of paternity or sonship, it follows that whatever belongs to paternity must belong to God, although paternity is in the essence. Now it is proper to paternity to be distinguished from sonship, because a father is related to his son as to some other man, and the notion of ‘father’ is that he is the father of a son. Therefore, although God the Father is the divine essence, and so too is God the Son, he is distinct from the Son insofar as he is the Father, although he is one with him insofar as each is the divine essence.

From which it is also evident that though in God relation is not apart from something absolute, yet in God it is compared to the absolute otherwise than in creatures. Relation in creatures is compared to the absolute as accident to its subject, but this is not so in God, in whom they are identical even as in other things that are predicated of God. Now the same subject cannot have in itself contrary relations; for instance, a man cannot be both father and son in the same respect. The divine essence, however, on account of its absolute perfection, is identical with wisdom, justice, and other like things which in us belong to various species. And so nothing hinders the one essence being identical with both paternity and sonship, and Father and Son being one God, although the Father is not the Son, because it is the same essence that has being naturally, and its own intelligible Word.

From what has been said we may also conclude that relations in God are real and not merely logical. For every relation which results from a thing’s proper operation, power, quantity, or the like, exists in that thing really; otherwise it would be merely a logical relation. Take, for example, knowledge and the thing known. The relation of knowledge to the thing known results from the action of the knower, and not from any action of the thing known, because the object known is unchanged in itself when it is understood and when it is not understood. Consequently, the relation is really in the knower, and only logically in the object known, because that which is understood is said to be known in relation to knowledge as a consequence of the relation which knowledge bears to it. The same is to be observed in right and left: for in animals there are distinct functions, from which arise the relations of right to left. Therefore, that relation is really in the animal; thus whichever way the animal turns, the relation always remains the same, for its right side can never be called its left side. On the other hand, inanimate beings which are devoid of such functions have no such relationship really in them; the relationship of right and left is ascribed to them in reference to some animal; thus the same pillar is said to be now on the right, now on the left, according to the different positions of the animal. Now the relation of the Word to God speaking (whose Word he is) is in God insofar as God understands himself; and this operation is in God, or rather is God himself, as we have proved. (Bk. 1, ch. 47.) It follows, then, that the aforesaid relations are really and truly in God, and not only according to our way of thinking.

Although there is relationship in God, it does not follow that in God there is something having a dependent existence. In us relations have a dependent existence because their being is distinct from that of substance; therefore, they have their own mode of existence in accordance with their own nature, as other accidents have. For, since all accidents are forms superadded to a substance, and caused by the principles of that substance, it follows that their existence is something additional to the existence of the substance and dependent on it. Moreover, each one of them will derive its order of precedence according as, in its proper nature, it is nearer to the substance, or more perfect. Hence a relation that is really adventitious to a substance in point of existence comes last and is most imperfect. It comes last because it presupposes not only the existence of the substance, but also that of other accidents, by which the relation is caused: thus oneness in quantity causes equality, and oneness in quality causes likeness. It is also most imperfect, because the proper notion of a relation consists in a habitude to something else: its proper being, which it adds to the substance, depends not only on the being of the substance, but also on the being of something extraneous. Now this cannot occur in God, because in him there is no other being besides his substance, since all that is in God is substance. Accordingly, as in God the being of wisdom is not dependent on the substance, because it is the being of his substance, so the being of relation is dependent neither on his substance nor on something extraneous, because even the being of relation is the being of his substance. Therefore, the fact that there are relations in God does not argue the presence of dependent being in him, but only of a certain habitude in which the essence of relationship consists. Thus it does not follow that there is something accidental in God because we ascribe wisdom to him, but only that there is a perfection corresponding to our notion of wisdom.

Hence it is also evident that although created relations are found to involve imperfection, it does not follow that the divine persons, who are distinguished by relations, are imperfect, but it follows that this distinction is the least of all.

From what has been said, it is also manifest that, although God is predicated of Father and Son substantially, it does not follow, if Father and Son are two persons, that they are two gods: for they are two by reason of the distinction of subsistent relations, yet they are one God on account of the unity of the subsistent essence. But among men it is not the case that several are one man, because the essence of human nature is not numerically one in both, nor is the essence of human nature subsistent so that human nature be called man.

Since, then, in God there is unity of essence and distinction of relations, it clearly follows that there is no reason why there should not be opposites in the one God, but only such as result from the distinction of relations—such as begetter and begotten, which are mutually opposed relatively, and begotten and unbegotten, which are mutually opposed as affirmation and negation. For wherever there is distinction, there must be opposition of affirmation and negation. For there is no distinction where there is no difference of affirmation and negation because in all respects one must be the same as the other, and thus they are absolutely the same, and in no way distinct.

We have now treated sufficiently of the divine generation.