Chapter 80 — Objections against the resurrection

Belief in the resurrection encounters a certain number of objections.

In nature, that which is destroyed does not return to existence identically the same as before, just as the habit that one acquires after losing it is not identically the same habit as before. And for this reason the purpose of nature is to preserve the species of that which is destroyed, by means of generation. Accordingly, since death deprives man of life, and the human body is resolved into the primary elements, it would seem impossible for the same identical man to come back to life.

Again. A thing cannot be identically the same if any of its essential principles be not identically the same, since the change of an essential principle always induces a change in a thing’s essence, whereby a thing is, and is one. Now, when a thing is utterly annihilated, it cannot resume existence as identically the same thing. Indeed, a new thing will be created, but the same thing will not be restored. And seemingly death annihilates several of man’s essential principles. In the first place, his corporeity and the form of the mixture of elements, since the body is evidently dissolved. Second, the sensitive and nutritive parts of the soul, which cannot exist without the organs of the body. In fact, there would seem to be nothing left of humanity, which is the form of the whole, after the soul has left the body. Therefore, it would seem impossible for the same man to rise again.

Moreover. It would seem that continuity is an essential condition of identity not only in quantities and movements, but also in qualities and forms. Thus when a healthy person falls sick and is restored to health, the health which he recovers is not identically the same as his previous health. Now death clearly deprives man of being, since corruption is the change of being into non-being. Therefore, it is impossible for man to recover the same identical being as he had before. Consequently, he will not be the same man, because things that are identical have the same being.

Moreover. If the same human body returns to life, it follows that whatsoever was in the body must be restored to it. But this leads to most unseemly consequences, not only as regards the hair on the head and distributed about the body, and the nails, all of which clearly are frequently cut away, but also other parts of the body which are dissolved by the hidden action of natural heat. If all these things were to be restored to man when he rises again, the result would be most unseemly. Therefore, it seems that man will not rise again after death.

Further. There are to be found men who eat human flesh and nothing else; and men thus nourished have children. Consequently, the same flesh will be in several men. But it cannot possibly rise again in several men: yet the resurrection would surely not be universal and entire if each one did not regain what he had before. Therefore, it would seem impossible that men will rise again.

Again. That which is common to all the individuals of one species would seem to be natural to that species. But the resurrection is not natural to man, because no natural agent is of sufficient power to cause the resurrection of all mankind. Therefore, all mankind will not rise again.

Further. If we are delivered by Christ from sin, and from death the result of sin, seemingly only those are to be delivered from death by rising again who have partaken of the mysteries of Christ, by which they are delivered from sin. But this does not apply to all men. Therefore, it would seem that not all men will rise again.