Chapter 92 — That immediately after death the souls of the just have their will fixed unchangeably on the good

It follows from what we have said that the soul, as soon as it is separated from the body, becomes unchangeable in its will, so that it can no more be changed from good to evil, or from evil to good.

As long as the soul can be changed from good to evil, or from evil to good, it is in a state of conflict and warfare, since it needs either to be watchful in resisting evil, lest it be overcome by it, or to strive to be delivered from it. As soon as it is separated from the body, however, it will no longer be in a state of warfare or conflict, but of receiving the reward or punishment according as it has striven rightly or wrongly; for it has been proved (Ch. 91.) that it will receive its reward or punishment at once. Therefore, the soul will no longer have a changeable will as regards good and evil.

Again. It has been proved (Bk. 3, cc. 61-62.) that happiness, consisting in the vision of God, is everlasting. It has also been proved that eternal punishment is due to mortal sin. Now the soul cannot be happy if its will is not right, for it ceases to be right through being turned away from its end, and it is right by enjoying its end. It cannot be turned away from it and enjoy it at the same time. Therefore, the rectitude of the will in the beatified soul must be everlasting, and cannot turn away from good to evil.

Further. The rational creature naturally desires to be happy. Hence it cannot desire not to be happy; yet it can, by its will, turn from that in which true happiness consists, and then its will is perverse. The reason for this is because instead of apprehending that in which true happiness consists as being happiness, it takes for happiness something else, to which the disordered will turns as though that thing were its end. Thus, for instance, the man who places his end in bodily pleasures takes them to be the best thing, and this is what is meant by happiness. On the other hand, the blessed apprehend that in which true beatitude consists as being their happiness and last end: otherwise their appetite would not rest in it, and they would not be truly happy. Therefore, whoever is in the state of heavenly bliss cannot turn his will away from that in which is true happiness. Consequently, his will cannot be perverse.

Again. Whosoever has sufficient for himself seeks for nothing else. Now that in which true happiness consists is enough for each of the blessed: otherwise his desire would not be fulfilled. Therefore, every one of the blessed seeks nothing that does not pertain to that in which true happiness consists. But no one has a perverse will unless he desires something incompatible with that in which true happiness consists. Therefore, the will of the blessed cannot be changed to evil.

Further. There is no sin in the will without ignorance in the intellect, for we will nothing but what is either really good or seemingly good. Hence it is said: They err that devise evil (Prov 14:22); and the Philosopher declares that every wicked man is ignorant. (Nicomachean Ethics 3.3.) But the truly beatified soul cannot be ignorant, since it sees whatever pertains to its own perfection in God: consequently, by no means can it have an evil will, especially seeing that the beatific vision is always actual, as we proved in the third book. (Cc. 59-60)

Moreover. Our intellect can err about conclusions before tracing them back to first principles, but when this has been done, its knowledge of the conclusion is scientific, and in such knowledge error is impossible. Now, the end in matters relating to the appetite is like the principle of demonstration is in speculative matters. Therefore, as long as our will has not obtained its last end, it can be perverse, but not after it has attained to the enjoyment of the last end, which is desirable for itself even as the first principles of demonstration are evident in themselves.

Again. The good, as such, is lovable. Therefore, that which is apprehended as supremely good is most lovable. Now in seeing God, the beatified rational substance apprehends him as supremely good; therefore, it loves God above all things. Moreover, it is a part of love that those who love each other should be of one will. Therefore, the will of the blessed is perfectly conformed to God, since the divine will is the supreme rule of all wills: and consequently the will of those who see God cannot be perverse.

Further. As long as a thing can acquire something else it has not reached its final end. Therefore, if a beatified soul can be changed from good to evil, it has not reached its ultimate end: and this is inconsistent with beatitude. Consequently, the soul that is beatified immediately after death becomes unchangeable in its will.