Chapter 81 — Solution of the foregoing objections

In order to solve these difficulties, we must observe that in fashioning human nature, God, as we have already stated, (Ch. 52.) bestowed on the human body something in addition to that which was due to it by virtue of its natural principles. This was a kind of incorruptibility, the result of the body being so proportioned to its form that, as the soul’s life is everlasting, so was it possible for the body, through the soul, to live forever.

This incorruptibility, although it was not natural in relation to a natural principle, was nevertheless natural (so to speak) in relation to the end, inasmuch as the matter was proportioned to its natural form, which is the end of matter.

Accordingly, when the soul, against the order of its nature, turned away from God, the body was deprived of that God-given disposition which made it proportionate to the soul, and death was the result. If, then, we consider the state in which human nature was created, death is incidental to man through sin.

But this accident was removed by Christ, who, through the merits of his Passion, destroyed death by dying. We conclude, then, that the body is restored from death to life by the same divine power that created the body incorruptible.

Accordingly, we reply to the first objection thus. The power of nature falls short of the divine power even as the power of the instrument falls short of that of the principal agent. Hence, although nature is unable to restore a dead body to life, this can be done by the power of God. The reason why nature cannot do this is that nature always works through a form, and that which has a form already exists. Therefore, a thing cannot generate itself, but it generates something else that is its like in species. And when it has been destroyed, it has lost its form, by which it could be a principle of action. Consequently, that which has been destroyed cannot be restored to its identity by the operation of nature. But the divine power, which brought things into being, so works through nature that, without it, it can produce an effect of nature, as we have proved above. (Bk. 3, ch. 99.) Therefore, since the divine power does not change, though things themselves be destroyed, it can restore integrity to things which have been corrupted.

The second objection does not prove that the same man cannot rise again. None of man’s essential principles is utterly annihilated by death, because the rational soul, which is man’s form, remains after death, as we have shown. (Bk. 2, ch. 79.) The matter also, which was subject to that form, remains under the same dimensions that individualized it. Accordingly, the same man will be restored as a result of the union of the same identical matter with the same identical form.

As to corporeity, it can be taken in two ways. In one way it signifies the substantial form of the body, considered as a substance; thus the corporeity of any body whatever is its substantial form, whereby that thing belongs to such and such a genus and species, and owing to which a body has the three dimensions. For there are not several substantial forms in one and the same thing, by one of which it belongs to a supreme genus (substance, for example), and by another to its proximate genus (such as bodies or animals), and by yet another to its species (such as man or horse). For if the first form makes it a substance, the subsequent forms would be additions to that which is already an actual individual, subsisting in nature, so that they would not be constituents of that individual, but like accidental forms would be in the subject which is that individual. Consequently, corporeity (taken as meaning the substantial form in man), is nothing else but the rational soul, which requires the three dimensions in its matter, since it is the actuating principle of a body. In another sense, corporeity signifies an accidental form in regard to which a body is said to be in the genus of quantity, so that corporeity is identified with the three dimensions that enter into the definition of a body. Therefore, although this corporeity returns to nothingness when the body is corrupted, this cannot prevent a man from being identically the same when he rises again, since corporeity, taken in the first sense, does not return into nothing, but remains the same.

The form of a mixture can also be taken in two ways. In one way, it signifies the substantial form of a mixed body; and thus, since in man there is no other substantial form besides the rational soul, as we have proved, (Bk. 2, ch. 58.) neither can it be said that the form of the mixture, considered as his substantial form, is annihilated when a man dies. In another way, when a number of simple qualities are mixed and attempered so as to form a composite quality, this latter may be called the form of the mixture, and stands in the same relation to the substantial form of the mixed body as a simple quality does to the substantial form of a simple body. Therefore, if the form of the mixture, thus understood, comes to nothing, this is no proof against the identity of the body that rises again.

This same applies to the sensitive and nutritive parts of the soul. If by these we mean the sensitive and nutritive powers, which are natural properties of the soul (or rather of the composite), they cease to be when the body ceases to be, and this does not interfere with the body’s identity in the resurrection. If, however, by these parts we mean the very substance of the sensitive and nutritive soul, each of these is identical with the rational soul: for man does not have three souls, but one only, as we have proved. (Bk. 2, ch. 58.)

As to the humanity, we must not imagine this to be a form resulting from the union of the form with the matter, and distinct from both, because, since the form makes the matter to be something actually, (Aristotle, On the Soul, bk. 2, text 8.) this additional form would not be substantial, but accidental. There are some who say that the form of the part is also the form of the whole; but that it is said to be the form of the part inasmuch as it actuates the matter, and the form of the whole inasmuch as it completes the species. Thus humanity is really nothing else but the rational soul; thus, clearly it is not annihilated when the body is destroyed. But, seeing that humanity is the essence of man, and that the essence of a thing is indicated by the definition, and that the definition of natural thing indicates not the form only, but the form and the matter, it follows that humanity signifies something composed of matter and form, just as man does, but not in the same way. ‘Humanity’ signifies the essential principles of the species, both formal and material, with abstraction of the individualizing principles: for humanity is that by which someone is a man. But it is not by the principles of individuality, but only by the essential principles of the species that someone is a man. Therefore, ‘humanity’ signifies nothing else besides the essential principles of the species, so that its signification is only partial. On the other hand, ‘man’ signifies the essential principles of the species without excluding the principles of individuality from its signification, since man signifies one having humanity, and this does not exclude his having other things. Therefore, its signification is complete, because it signifies the essential principles of the species actually, and the individualizing principles potentially. But ‘Socrates’ signifies both actually, even as the genus includes the difference potentially, whereas the species includes it actually. From this it follows that both the very same man and the very same humanity rise again, by reason of the survival of the rational soul and the unity of matter.

The third objection is based on a false premise in stating that identity of being depends on continuity. For it is evident that matter and form have one being, since matter does not have actual being except through a form. In this respect, however, the rational soul differs from other forms, because the being of other forms is nothing else but their adherence to matter, for they do not transcend matter, either in being or in operation. But it is clear that the rational soul transcends matter in operation, since by its operation of understanding it is independent of any bodily organ: consequently, its being is not merely adherence to matter. Therefore, the soul’s being, which was that of the composite, remains after the dissolution of the body; and when the body is restored at the resurrection, it receives again the same being which has remained in the soul.

The fourth objection proves nothing against the identity of those who rise again. That which is not an obstacle to man’s identity in this life is clearly no obstacle to his identity when he rises again. Now, while a man lives, the parts of his body do not always remain the same as to matter, but only as to species: in fact, as regards matter, the parts come and go. Yet this does not prevent a man from retaining his identity from the beginning of his life to the end. Take fire for an example; as long as it continues to burn, we say that it is the same fire, because its species remains: and yet the logs have been consumed, and fresh ones have been put on. It is the same with the human body, since each single part retains its form and species during the whole of a lifetime, though their matter is both dissolved by the action of natural heat and renewed by means of nourishment. Now a man remains the very same man as to his various parts and stages of life, although the matter of his body changes from one stage to another. Accordingly, for a man to rise again identically the same as before, there is no need that he should have restored to him all the matter that was in him during his whole lifetime, but only as much as would suffice for the quantity due to him (and especially such matter as is closely connected with form and species). If there be anything lacking to a man’s proper quantity, whether because he died before reaching maturity, or because he has lost a limb, the divine power will supply the deficiency. Nor will this prevent the identity of the rising body; seeing that nature too, makes additions to a child’s body from extraneous sources, so that the body attains to maturity; such an addition does not change its identity, since the child and the adult are the same man.

Hence we gather that even if some people partake of human flesh, this is no proof against identity in the resurrection; as the fifth objection argued. In fact, as we have already proved, there is no need that whatever was in man materially should rise again in him; and that if anything be lacking, it can be supplied by God’s power. Accordingly, the flesh consumed will rise again in the man in whom it was first perfected by a rational soul; the second man—if he partook of other food besides human flesh—will rise again with only such matter as he acquired from this other food, and in such quantity as is required for the proper size of his body. But if he partakes of no other food, he will rise again with what he received from his parents, and the deficiency will be supplied by the omnipotence of his Creator. And if his parents also partook of none but human meat, so that this seed would also be engendered from it, their children will rise again with that seed, and he whose flesh was consumed will be supplied from another source. In the resurrection it will be the rule that if any matter belong to several in common, it will rise again in him to whose perfection it most intimately belonged. Thus if it were in one as the radical seed from which he was generated, and in another as the result of nourishment, it will rise again in the man who was generated from it as from seed. But if it were in one as belonging to the perfection of the individual, and in another as directed to the perfection of the species, it will rise again in him to whom it belonged as a perfection of the individual. Hence the seed will rise again in the begotten and not in the begetter, and Adam’s rib will rise again in Eve, and not in Adam, in whom it was as in the principle of nature. And if it be in both on the same count, it will rise again in the one to whom it first belonged.

The reply to the sixth objection is clear from what we have already said. Resurrection is natural if we look at its final cause, inasmuch as it is natural for the soul to be united to the body, but its efficient cause is not natural, since it is caused by the power of God alone.

Nor should we deny that all will rise again, although all men do not believe in Christ nor are partakers in his mysteries. The Son of God took human nature that he might restore it. Accordingly, the natural defect that is shared by all will be repaired, and the dead will rise again. But this defect will not be repaired perfectly save in those who adhere to Christ, either by their own action in believing in him, or at least by the sacrament of faith.