Chapter XXII. Question 103

SBABCAWABBBBSRSBRRERER ED REREER ERE BREE EERE EER EER EERE EEE BREE EEE SE EE

FTER considering creation and the distinction of things in general, we consider the divine governance before taking up creatures in particular. As was said earlier in treating of divine providence,’ the governance of things is the execution of providence. It is part of divine providence to order things to their end, and the execution of this order is divine governance. Similarly, in human affairs we distinguish the executive power from the legislative power.” St. Thomas considers the divine governance according to the four kinds of causes: 1. whether there is divine governance and what it is formally; 2. what is its end; 3. why the divine governance must proceed from one supreme efficient cause alone; 4. what the divine governance effects and how (that is, its efficacy). In this way we consider whatever belongs per se to the divine governance. Human society, and the Church as well, ought to be studied according to these four causes if we wish to know everything that pertains to them of necessity.

First ARTICLE

WHETHER THE WORLD IS GOVERNED BY ANYONE

State of the question. The materialists, pessimists, and all who reject divine providence deny any governance of the world. They hold, as we shall see in the third difficulty, that in their movements the principal parts of the world are determined to one end by some necessity and therefore do not need any governance.

Reply. Nevertheless the reply is that the world is governed, and this truth is of faith. All the texts of Scripture that affirm the existence¹ of divine providence can be offered as proof. St. Thomas cites the text, “But Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.” * God is considered the Father who gives life, and who nourishes, elevates, and governs His children with knowledge and benevolence.

The divine governance is proved a posteriori as follows: Means are not ordered to an end except by a governing intellect which understands the nature of the means. But in the world there are many means excellently ordered to a good end. Therefore the world is governed by one intelligence. Moreover, in opposition to Kant, this intelligence must be its own being and intellection, wisdom and truth itself, for otherwise this intelligence itself would be ordered to intellection and to truth by some higher governor.

The existence of the divine governance can also be proved a priori to a certain extent from a consideration of the divine goodness inasmuch as it produces things in being, so it also pertains to it to lead things to their end, which is to rule. To govern, properly speaking, is to lead things conveniently to their proper end as the arrow is directed by the archer.*

Reply to third objection. In natural things we find a certain necessity by which they are determined to one end; thus the eye is determined to seeing, the ear to hearing, the foot to walking, so that this end constitutes the reason for the existence of these means that are ordered to itself. But this ordering presupposes an ordering intellect in the Author of nature. Otherwise the intelligibility in things would come from non-intelligence, from a blind and material necessity; order would come from the privation of order, the more perfect from the less perfect in opposition to the principle of causality, and all things would be without a reason for their existence, that is, without any reason for being rather than not being.

WHETHER THE END OF THE GOVERNANCE OF THE WORLD IS SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE WORLD

State of the question. It seems that the end of the world is its order and peace, that is, something intrinsic to the world for the good of the multitude is its peace.

3 Wisd. 14:3. 4 CË, reply to the first difficulty.

436 GOD THE CREATOR Reply. Nevertheless the reply is that God Himself is the final end of the governance of the world.

Proof from Scripture. “The Lord hath made all things for Himself”; ° “To make thee higher than all nations which He hath created, to His own praise and name and glory.” ê This thought is frequently repeated in the psalms, namely, that God made all things to manifest His goodness. This truth was defined by the Vatican Council: “If anyone shall deny that the world was established for the glory of God, let him be anathema”; 7 and in another chapter, “God, by His goodness and omnipotent power, not to increase His happiness or to acquire it, but to manifest His perfection by the goods which He imparts to creatures, by His most free counsel made all things.” $

Proof from reason. Since every agent acts for a proportionate end, the end corresponds to the principle. But the efficient principle of the world is a cause extrinsic to it. Therefore the final end of the world is also some good extrinsic to it. In other words, and this is a corollary of the principle of finality (every agent acts for a proportionate end): the order of subordination among agents must correspond to the order of ends. Therefore corresponding to the supreme and most universal agent we have a most universal ultimate end, namely, the manifestation of the supreme goodness through the good imparted to things.

Reply to second objection. “To this one thing every thing tends, namely, to partake of the good and to be assimilated to the supreme good as much as is possible.”

Reply to third objection. The order of the universe is its proximate end, but its ultimate end is God Himself, or the manifestation of the divine goodness. Similarly, the order of an army is ordered to something higher, to victory and the defense of the country. Inferior creatures cannot know and possess God, but intellectual creatures can, especially when they are elevated to the order of grace.

“God wills Himself as the end; He wills other things as the means to the end.” ° If God were to act on account of a created good as His ultimate end, the act would be inordinate and absurd, something like a mortal sin in God, and the creature thus inordinately desired would be most unfortunate because it would be ordered to itself and not to

God the highest good. Here we see the inanity of the doctrine according to which God created us ultimately for ourselves and not to manifest His own goodness. Evidently, if every agent acts for a proportionate end, the subordination of agents must correspond to the subordination of ends.

WHETHER THE WORLD IS GOVERNED BY ONE

State of the question. The second objection states the difficulty of the Manichaeans: created things often are opposed to each other as if some proceeded from a good principle and some from an evil principle.

Reply. The reply is in the affirmative and of faith according to the words of St. Paul: “Yet to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto Him.” *°

Proof from reason. It is necessary that the governance of the world ordered to the supreme good should be the best. But the best governance is that which is through one being. Why? Because governance is the direction of those who are governed to a good, which supposes unity as against dissolution. The cause of unity, however, is one per se, since several beings cannot agree unless they are united in some way. Therefore the governance of the world, since it is the best, is by one governor.”*

This is a strict demonstration and it is found to be true even in human affairs. And this best kind of government by one supposes a wise and good governor, capable of leading his subjects to unity and to their end.’

Such governance is necessary particularly when the end to be attained is arduous and involves a complexity of problems that are difficult of solution, and when the multitude is incapable of attaining its end, as often happens in great masses of people where it is difficult to establish order. If, however, those who are ruled are close to perfection, there is less need of a strong rule, for here the words are verified, “these . . . are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts.” 1° Thus an imperfect rule suffices for perfect subjects, but a perfect rule is needed for the imperfect and

11 Cf, Aristotle, Metaphysica, Bk. XII, chap. 10. 12 Cf. Summa theol., la Ilae, g.105, a.1 ad 2. 13 Rom. 2:14.

for the multitude, which in itself remains imperfect. We read in the Scripture: “Where there is no governor, the people shall fall; but there is safety where there is much counsel.” ** Therefore a king should have about him the wisest counselors, reserving the final judgment to himself. Hence we see that the same principles by which the universe is ruled are applied, with some modifications, to human society.

Reply to second objection. In reply to the objection of the Manichaeans, St. Thomas says: “Contrary things, although they are in disagreement with regard to proximate ends, nevertheless agree inasmuch as they are coordinated in the one order of the universe and ordered to the final end.” That is, created things frequently are at variance with one another with regard to proximate ends, but this does not prove the existence of some evil principle, for, as St. Augustine says: “God, who is the highest good, would in no way allow anything evil in His works unless He were so omnipotent and so good that He could make good things even from evil.” **

WHETHER THE EFFECT OF DIVINE GOVERNANCE IS ONE ONLY OR PLURAL

Reply. The principal effect of the divine governance, through the conservation and movement of things, is that creatures are assimilated to God through the participation in good and inasmuch as creatures move other creatures to good. The particular effects of the divine governance, however, are innumerable.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE DIVINE GOVERNANCE

State of the question. It appears that all things are not subject to God’s governance, for, as we read in Ecclesiastes, many things are fortuitous. Moreover, we read, “Doth God take care for oxen?” 1° and even of the rational creature Sacred Scripture says: “God made

man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." =

Reply. It is of faith that all things are subject to the divine governance. The Vatican Council declared: “All things that He established God guards and governs by His providence, ‘reaching from end to end mightily, and ordering all things sweetly.’” 1° “All things are naked and open to His eyes,” ?° even those things that are in the future by the free action of creatures.

Proof from reason. “Just as there can be nothing that is not created by God, so there can be nothing that is not subject to His governance.” Again, “as there is nothing that is not ordered to the divine goodness as to its end, so it is impossible that any being should be outside the divine governance.”

Therefore, both from the viewpoint of the supreme agent and from the viewpoint of the ultimate end it is clear that all things are subject to the divine governance. The opposite opinion is rightly called “stupid,” since stupidity makes a judgment about things on the basis of the lowest kind of cause, that is, chance, and opposes wisdom, which judges all things on the basis of the highest cause and the ultimate end.

Reply to first objection. Many things, indeed, happen beyond the intention of nature and are said to happen by chance. But in these cases chance would not exist beyond the intention of nature if the things of nature did not tend to an end under the divine governance. “By the very fact that something casual is found in these things it is demonstrated that these things are subject to the divine rule.” Moreover, nothing happens by chance or fate from God’s viewpoint; the casual takes place only in view of other causes.

Ecclesiastes °° does not teach the opposite. The sacred writer also holds that many things are hidden from us: “As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit, nor how the bones are joined together in the womb of her that is with child; so thou knowest not the works of God, who is the maker of all.” *? Hence Ecclesiastes concludes: “Let us all hear together the conclusion of the discourse. Fear God, and keep His commandments: for this is all man. And all things that

are done, God will bring into judgment for every error, whether it be good or evil.” ??

Reply to second objection. When it is said that “God does not have care for oxen,” this means that He does not care for them in the same way that He cares for rational creatures, to whom He gives precepts, counsel, and rewards, and whom He punishes.

Reply to third objection. The rational creature as a secondary cause governs itself, but over and above this it is governed by God, the first cause.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE DIRECTLY GOVERNED BY GOD

State of the question. It seems that God governs all things directly because through Himself without mediate causes He can govern all things. In this God differs from an earthly ruler, who because of the imperfection of a creature cannot do all things or be present everywhere and therefore needs helpers.

Reply. Providence, which is the plan or order of divine governance, extends directly to all things, but with regard to the execution of divine providence God governs inferior beings through superior beings.

The reason is as follows: “The most desirable thing in all practical knowledge is that every particular which is effected should be known, as, for instance, in the science of medicine. Hence God knows even the smallest things. But on the other hand, that government is better which communicates to certain things the dignity of causality with regard to other things, just as that teacher is better who not only makes his students learned but also develops teachers. It is therefore pertinent to God’s dignity as the supreme governor that He govern inferior beings through superior beings although His providence directly knows and orders even the lowest beings.

WHETHER ANYTHING CAN HAPPEN BEYOND THE ORDER OF DIVINE GOVERNANCE

Reply. The reply is in the negative and of faith according to the Scriptures, where we read: “O Lord, Lord, almighty king, for all 22 Ibid., 12:13 f.

things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will, if Thou determine to save Israel.” **

The reason is that, since God is the first and most universal cause (without whom second causes cannot act), it is impossible that anything can happen beyond the order of the divine governance.

Evil cannot happen without the divine permission, and God permits evil for some greater good, as He permits persecution for the sake of the patience and glory of martyrs. Moreover, from God’s viewpoint nothing happens by chance, for from eternity God willed or permitted the accidental conjunctions of second causes. Similarly, two servants of the same master meet each other by chance, but it is not a matter of chance for the master who sent the servants to the same place.

WHETHER ANYTHING CAN WORK AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE GOVERNANCE

Reply. Nothing can resist the order of the divine governance as it proceeds from God, the most universal cause of the good of the whole universe, but a being may well resist this order as it proceeds from a particular cause. Thus those who sin oppose some determined good according to the law of God and therefore they are justly punished by God. Cajetan points out in connection with the reply to the first objection that “those who sin mortally look at two things: first, what they intend to do, and this is good in a sense; and secondly, something beyond their intention, and this is the deformity of the act, consisting in the privation of the proper order. Here sinners depart from a certain order of good and act against this order.” But even this deformity is permitted by God for the sake of a greater good, at least with regard to the end of the whole universe, and thus sinners do not oppose the divine governance in general but only in a particular instance.

Footnotes

1. Summa theol., la, q.22, a.1 ad 2. ? On these questions about the divine governance, cf. the Commentarium of Dominic Bannez. 434 ↩