Chapter XXVI. Question 49

THE Cause oF Evin

BWABBWBAAAABARARAASBBAABAASA SBBABBBBABAABAREBRRREBRREBBERBREEREEEE EE

HUS far we have determined the definition of evil, the privation of an owing good; the subject of evil; and the division of evil. We now turn to the cause or origin of evil.

In the second article of the preceding question we stated that God could impede evil, and that He nevertheless wills to allow it because of some greater good. We thus assigned the final cause of the divine permission of evil, but not the cause of evil itself. In treating of the cause of evil itself, St. Thomas asks three things: 1. whether good can be the cause of evil; 2. whether the highest good, which is God, is the cause of evil; 3. whether there is some supreme evil which is the cause of all evils. In this last article he refutes the Manichaeans.

First ARTICLE

WHETHER GOOD CAN BE THE CAUSE OF EVIL

State of the question. In this title cause is understood in its most general sense, without any determination of the kind of cause.

It seems that good cannot be the cause of evil: 1. because “a good tree cannot bear evil fruit,” as our Lord said; 2. because one contrary cannot be the cause of another contrary, for every agent acts in a manner similar to itself, that is, it acts in accord with its own determination; 3. because evil is a deficient effect; which can proceed only from a deficient cause as such, that is, from a cause that is not good but evil, for the cause that is deficient is evil; 4. finally, Dionysius declared, “evil does not have a cause.” ?

But on the other hand, St. Augustine said: “There was absolutely nothing from which evil could arise except out of good.” ?

t St. Thomas on Dionysius, De div. nom., chap. 4, lect. 22.¹

Reply. The reply has four parts: 1. it is necessary to point out that every evil has some kind of cause; 2. evil has neither a formal nor a final cause; 3. evil has a material cause, namely, the good in which it is; 4. evil has an efficient cause per accidens, which is some good. Thus good is the material cause and the accidental efficient cause of evil.

First conclusion. It is necessary to point out that evil has some kind of cause. In his proof St. Thomas enunciates first the minor; but we begin with the major as follows:

The fact that anything is deficient in its natural and due disposition can arise only from some cause that draws the thing outside its disposition; for example, an agent does not defect in its action except by reason of some impediment. But evil is the deficiency of some good that is due. Therefore evil has some kind of cause, and nothing can be a cause unless it is being and good in some way.

The major of this syllogism illustrates the entire article, as we shall see. Up to this point there is no difficulty, and the foregoing argument will appear even clearer at the end of the article when we distinguish between evil in action and evil in effect.

Second conclusion. Evil has neither a formal nor a final cause; this is evident because evil is the privation of form and the privation of the right ordination to an end.

The divine permission of evil takes place because of a greater good, but the evil itself is not useful nor is it of itself ordered to the greater good; if it were, it would be something good as matter ordered to the form. Evil, however, is only the occasion and the condition sine qua non of some greater good, as, for example, persecution is the occasion of the great constancy of the martyrs. A condition and an occasion differ from a cause inasmuch as they have no influence on the effect, neither efficiently nor finally nor formally nor materially.

Third conclusion. That evil has a material cause is evident because evil is privation in an apt subject, and thus it is in good as in a subject.

Fourth conclusion. This conclusion is more difficult. Evil cannot have an efficient cause per se but only an efficient cause per accidens, and this is something good.

The proof is rather complex. The following synopsis may be helpful.

Obviously evil does not have an efficient cause per se, for such a cause is in some way being and good, which per se produces some good, for example, fire produces fire and motor power produces movement." Hence evil can have an efficient cause only per accidens. But accidental causes are of many kinds; likewise evil is of manv kinds, and therefore this subdivision is necessary.

Not per se; for a cause per se is some being and some good, which per se produces something like itself, that is, something good; for example, fire produces fire, motive power produces motion.

Good is the ss principal: e.g., weakefficient cause in action, from : lki f evil the defect of S S OL EN1 instrumental: the agent lameness. from the power of the agent per accidens per se producing an opposite form; thus the sun dries up some fruits. . of the agent and in the . the action: effect e.g., poor by defect speech; of the matter: eg., a monstros- ity. 1. Evil in action, for example, weakness in walking or lameness is caused by the defect of the principal cause (a weakness of the motive power) or by a defect of the instrumental cause (curvature of the leg bones). 2. Evil in anything is of three kinds: a) from the power of a contrary agent, for example, the form of wood or of a house is destroyed

1. Since everything that is desirable has the nature of good, evil cannot be intended per se; that which is not intended per se is an effect per acctdens. Thus no one does any evil without intending some good, at least a sensible good.

2. Because every agent acts in a manner similiar to itself and thus tends to produce per se a good similar to itself. Thus fire produces fire, heat produces heat, but the conflagration follows per accidens.

3. Because every cause per se has a certain and definite order to its effect, and that which results according to this order is not evil. Thus the weight of bodies is good for the cohesion of the universe, although per accidens it may happen that someone falls from a roof.²

by the power of fire; b) from the defect of an action followed by a proper deficient effect, for example, poor hearing is the effect of poor pronunciation; c) from the indisposition of the matter, for example, the birth of a monstrosity.

This enumeration is complete because evil in a thing cannot be produced except by the agent or the matter as considered with regard to the form and the end. Thus the four kinds of causes are included. And evil cannot come from the agent except by reason of the power of a contrary agent or from the defect of the proper agent.

Finally it is clear that in these three cases the efficient cause is only an accidental cause, but the difficulty arises from the fact that causes are said to be accidental in different ways.

It is accidental that a proper agent be defective, for example, that a man speaks poorly because of the presence of some impediment. The deficiency happens to a good thing which per se has the power to act.

So also it is accidental that matter be indisposed to properly receive the action of an agent. Lastly it is only by accident that the privation of a form takes place, for example, the destruction of wood or of a house by the force of a contrary agent, namely, fire. Per se this contrary agent tends to induce its proper form; fire produces something similar to itself, it produces fire, and it does not per se tend to the privation of an opposite form. This privation, however, follows necessarily. It is true that this is not the first but the second acceptation of the term “accidental cause,” as explained by Aristotle.*

Aristotle divides accidental causes as follows."

The division of quasi per accidens and not contingently will appear obscure to many. It is difficult at first to conceive of a contrary agent producing a physical evil per accidens and of necessity ; the terms “per accidens” and “necessarily” seem to be irreconcilable to those who do not clearly understand the difference between a cause that is absolutely per accidens, like chance, and an accidental cause that always produces the accidental effect. Such a cause is nevertheless a cause per accidens even though the accidental effect follows always and of necessity, because this cause is not per se ordered to this effect. Fire acts in a way similar to itself; per se it does not tend to the destruction of wood or of a house, but to the production of fire. The terms “per

• Aristotle, Metaphysica, Bk. V, chap. 2, lect. 3. 5 St. Thomas, De malo, q.1, a.3 ad 14.

accidens” and “of necessity,” at first sight irreconcilable, can be reconciled.

a proper cause per accidens: a musi- on the part cian makes a statue. of the cause a less proper cause per accidens: per se Polycletus makes a statue. rarely and altogether contingently: chance and fortune, as when a man digging a grave finds a treasure. Causes . per accidens a) A O ventive is the cause on the part of a stone’s fall. of the effect 4 alwaysand |b) as an agent per se per se not contin- |producing a proper gently but +form, produces the quasi per _|privation of the op- accidens. posite form, as fire producing fire destroys the form of a house.

Doubt. With regard to a voluntary agent, is the accidental effect separated from the intention of the agent? “Sometimes the accidental effect is connected with the principal effect rarely and in few instances, and in this case when the agent intends the effect per se it is not necessary that the agent intend the accidental effect. But sometimes the accidental effect accompanies the principal effect at all times or in the majority of instances, and then the accidental effect cannot be said to be separate from the intention of the agent. If therefore the good intended by the will is joined to some evil in rare instances, the will can be excused from sin, as in the case of accidental homicide which occurs beyond the intention of the will. But if at all times or in most instances the evil is joined to the good which the will intends per se, it is not excused from sin, even though the will does not intend this evil per se. Even though the sinner does not will the evil in itself, yet he wills to fall into this evil rather than go without the connected good.” ê

3. Thus good is the material cause and per accidens the efficient cause of evil. For this reason we say, for instance, of a conflagration or of a fractured bone, it was an accident.

The conclusion of the body of the article will appear clearer in the light of this principle, “The fact that a thing is deficient in its natural and proper disposition can arise only from some cause that draws it away from that disposition.” 7

The evil of an action arising from the defect of the agent and the evil in a thing arising from the defect of the agent or from the defect of the matter in the final analysis arise from some cause that draws the thing or the agent away from its disposition. This disturbing cause is a cause per accidens because per se it tends to its proper effect; for example, fruits are dried up owing to an excessive influence from the sun, and on the other hand fruits do not ripen from an insufficient influence from the sun. Physical evil, as Leibnitz says, happens because of the interconcurrence of the laws of nature. But each of these laws is good. The evil follows accidentally, and it is the condition of a greater good according to the disposition of Providence. And while we deplore these accidental evils, we unconsciously confess that the things that happen ordinarily are well ordered by divine Providence.

SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS IN THE ARTICLE ®

First objection. Good is like a good tree. But a good tree cannot bear evil fruit. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.

Reply. I distinguish the major: a good tree is a figure of the will that is morally good, I concede; of the natural will that is physically good, I deny. I distinguish the minor: the good tree, or the will that is morally good, cannot bear evil fruit, I concede; the natural will that is physically good cannot bear evil fruit, I subdistinguish: per se, I concede; per accidens, I deny. Hence good can be the cause of evil per accidens.

Second objection. One of two contraries cannot be the cause of the other. But evil is contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.

7 “Tt happens that the evil which is a defective good is the cause of evil; but this is so because the first cause of evil is not evil but good. Therefore there are two ways in which evil is caused by the good. The first way is when the good is the cause of evil inasmuch as it is defective; the second way is inasmuch as the good is a cause per accidens, or when it produces an opposite form” (De malo, q.1, a.3). 8 Ibid., q.1, a.3.

Reply. One of two contraries cannot per se be the cause of the other, I concede; per accidens, I deny. Thus the goodness of fire can cause the evil of the wood’s destruction or the burning of a house.

Third objection. An evil or deficient effect does not proceed except from a deficient cause. But a deficient cause is evil. Therefore evil comes only from evil.

Reply. I distinguish the major: in voluntary things, I concede; in physical things, I deny, because sometimes evil proceeds from the power of a contrary agent. Moreover, a deficient cause is not evil as cause but only as deficient.

In his reply to the third difficulty, St. Thomas points out that the defect of a voluntary action proceeds “from the fact that the will does not subject itself in act to its rule. This defect is not indeed a fault or guilt, but it is followed by guilt because the will operates with this defect or fault.”

In his work, De malo, St. Thomas says: “The fact that the will does not in act attend to such a rule considered in itself is not evil and it is neither guilt nor penalty, because the soul is not bound nor can it attend to a rule of this kind always in act. But it takes on the first aspect of guilt when without actual consideration of the rule it proceeds to a particular election. . . . Man sins by the fact that he does not have a rule, or does not attend to one, and thus proceeds to making a choice. For this reason St. Augustine said that the will is the cause of sin inasmuch as it is deficient.” ® And the will is deficient inasmuch as it recedes from a worthy good under the influence or attraction of some delectable unworthy good. Thus even in moral matters the major of the first argument of this article is verified: “The fact that anything departs from its natural and due disposition comes only from some cause that draws the thing away from its proper disposition.” Hence evil always has some cause per accidens in the good.*°

The fifteenth objection in De malo. An accidental cause does not intend the effect that follows per accidens. But evil has only an accidental cause. Therefore no one who does evil sins.

Reply. An intelligent cause does not contemplate the accidental effect that rarely follows, I concede; the accidental effect that is always joined to the principal effect, I deny.

The seventeenth objection. Whatever follows accidentally happens in rare instances. But evil follows in many instances, as we read, “The number of fools is infinite.” 1 Therefore the cause of evil is per se and not per accidens.

Reply. A thing is said to follow per accidens not only if it follows in rare instances but because it follows, though not intended per se, even if it follows in the majority of instances. St. Thomas says: “The accidental thing does not always take place in rare cases, sometimes it follows in all cases or most cases, for example, the adulterer intends a certain sensible good to which an evil is always joined and he always falls into that evil... . The evil of guilt happens so often in the human race (and in it alone) because there are so many more ways to deviate from the middle than holding the middle path, as we read, ‘the sensible goods are better known by many than the goods of the mind.’ ” 1°

On a higher plane and with clearer distinction St. Thomas proposes this doctrine in a manner that seems to oppose the theory of optimism: “The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature occurs in most instances, and the defect from this good occurs in fewer instances. But the good that is above the common state of nature is found in fewer instances. . . . It is evident that many men have sufficient knowledge to govern their own lives . . . : but very few men attain to a profound knowledge of intelligible things.” 1°

This limitation of optimism is owing to the human composite and to original sin.

1. The lowest kind of intelligence has for its object the lowest of intelligible things, namely, the intelligible thing in sensible things, and thus this intelligence must be united with sensible things. First, therefore, we know sensible things and we live according to the senses, and many men are attracted rather to the good of the senses than to the good according to right reason.

2. “Some signs of original sin probably appear in the human race. Since God takes cognizance of human acts in such a way that He fixes a reward for good acts and penalties for evil acts, . . . we can

12 Cf. Summa theol., la, a.49, a.3 ad 5; q.63, a.9 ad 1; Ia Iac, q.71, a.2 ad 3; de malo, q-1, a.5 ad 16; and the references under malum, no. 37 in the Tabula aurea.

certify the guilt from the penalty. It is evident that the human race suffers various kinds of penalties, both corporal and spiritual. . . . Among the spiritual penalties the greatest is the weakness of reason, and because of this penalty man has difficulty in knowing the truth, he easily falls into error, he cannot entirely overcome his bestial appetites, and he is often overwhelmed by these lower impulses. Someone might say that these defects are not penal, but natural defects arising necessarily from matter. . . . But if we study the matter carefully, we can conclude with sufficient probability that divine providence, which has conjoined congruous perfectibles to the particular perfections, united the higher nature (the soul) to the lower (the body) so that the soul would be dominant, and if any impediment should arise against this dominion from the defect of nature, God would have removed it by a special and supernatural act of beneficence.” ™

Pascal said: “Without this mystery man would be more incomprehensible than this mystery is incomprehensible to man.” The doctrine of original sin offers the solution to the puzzling problem of the coexistence in man of such great weakness and misery and such strong aspirations to the sublime. But, as St. Thomas says, “God permitted evil to happen that something better might come of it.” ** Hence we read, “And where sin abounded, grace did more abound,” ** and in blessing the paschal candle we chant, “O happy fault that merited so great a Redeemer!”

Indeed, according to revelation: “For if by one man’s offense death reigned through one; much more they who receive abundance of grace, and of the gift, and of justice, shall reign in life through one, Jesus Christ.” 1° Thus the motive of the Incarnation was formally a motive of mercy, for the reason behind mercy is the alleviation of misery.’® God predestined Christ to the glory of the Redeemer and permitted Adam’s sin that Christ might be the Redeemer of the human race.

But while we clearly see the sensible existence of evil in the world, the existence of the concupiscence of the flesh and of the eyes, and

15 Bossuet, Sermon pour la profession de Mad. de la Vallière. 16 Summa theol., Ia, q.1, a-3 ad 3.

the pride of life, we do not clearly understand the spiritual heights and the infinite value of the mystery of the redemptive Incarnation, and we do not appreciate the price of all the graces that flow invisibly from this mystery to the souls of all generations. “We have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency may be of the power of God, and not of us, . . . that the life also of Jesus may be made manifest in our mortal flesh.” °

The solution of this problem, that God permits evil only for some greater good, is at once clear and obscure; it is clear in the abstract and in general but obscure in the concrete and in particular, because only in heaven shall we see this greater good because of which God permits evil. We are loved by God much more than we think, just as St. Anne, the mother of the Blessed Virgin Mary, did not understand the greatness of the blessing which her daughter had received. Grace is the seed of glory, and our trials and tribulations can obtain for us the eternal reward of glory.

But this solution of the problem of evil will not bring peace and quiet to anxious souls in this life without the influence of the gifts of the Holy Ghost and without the special inspiration of the gifts of understanding and wisdom, from which we obtain a quasi-experimental knowledge of the good things promised to those who believe. Hence St. Thomas says that these gifts are necessary for salvation.”*

It is true, therefore, that good is the efficient cause of evil only per accidens. And if this occurs frequently, it is only so in the human race because of the union of the soul with the body and because of original sin. Such is not the case with the angels. St. Thomas says that the multitude of angels is very great,” like the multitude of the stars,”* and that more angels remained constant than sinned. In the angels there is only the intellectual nature; there is no attraction to sensible things, and there is no original sin in them. St. Thomas wrote these words in explanation of the passage, “Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him.” ** Thus the number of all the elect, if the angels are included, is greater, according to St. Thomas, than the number of the damned.

WHETHER THE HIGHEST GOOD, WHICH Is GOD, Is THE CAUSE OF EVIL

State of the question. It seems that God is the cause of evil because: 1. We read in the Scriptures, “I am the Lord and there is none else: I form the light, and create darkness, I make peace, and create evil” (that is, the evil of penalty); °° 2. If good is the cause of evil, as we have said, God, who is the cause of all good things, is also the cause of evil; 3. Aristotle says that the cause of the ship’s safety and the cause of the shipwreck are the same, that is, the pilot according as he is vigilant or negligent. But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore it seems that He is the cause of every loss and every evil, that is, because of insufficient care or lack of help. This last objection implies negligence in God, but divine negligence is a contradiction in terms and a denial of providence.

On the other hand, St. Augustine says: “God is not the author of evil (that is, of guilt), because He is not the cause of the tendency to non-being.” ?°

The conclusion of the article is in two parts: 1. God is not the cause of the evil that consists in defect of action, that is, the evil of guilt; 2. God is per accidens the cause of the physical evil of natural things and of the evil of penalty.

First conclusion. God is in no way the cause of the evil of guilt.”

a) Proof from Scripture. We read, “The works of God are perfect, and all His ways are judgments: God is faithful and without any iniquity, He is just and right”; 7° “Is there injustice with God? God forbid”; ?? “Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God. For God is not a tempter of evils, and He tempteth no man”; *° “He that committeth sin is of the devil”; ** “For thou hatest none of the things which Thou hast made”; ** “But to God the wicked

26 St. Augustine, Liber octoginta trium quaest., q.21. 27 Summa theol., Ia Iae, q.79, a1.

and his wickedness are hateful alike”; ** “Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is only in Me.” *4

Against the Calvinists the Council of Trent declared: “If anyone shall say that it is not in man’s power to go his evil ways, but that God does the evil works as He does the good works, not only permissively but properly and per se, so that the treason of Judas and the calling of Paul are equally God’s work, let him be anathema.” *° Against the Predestinationists the Council of Carisiac declared: “When some are saved it is because of the gift of salvation; when some are lost it is because of those who are lost” °° “Destruction is thy own, O Israel.” And the Third Council of Valencia clearly affirmed against Scotus Eriugena that God is the author of penalties but not of guilt.°”

From these definitions it is clear that God is neither the direct nor the indirect cause of sin. He is not the direct cause of sin, by moral or physical movement to sin; nor indirectly, that is, by negligence, because of insufficient assistance, as the negligent pilot is the indirect cause of the shipwreck. This last point has been expressly defined by the Church against the Protestants and the Jansenists, who held that God is in some way the cause of sin because of insufficient assistance. In its definition,’ the Council of Trent quotes the words of St. Augustine: “God does not command the impossible, but when He commands He admonishes us to do what we can and to petition for that which we cannot do.” "° We learn the same from the condemnation of the first proposition of Jansenius: “Some of God’s precepts are impossible for just men who will and try (to fulfill them) with the powers that they now have: besides they lack the grace that would make these precepts possible of fulfillment.” *°

St. Thomas explains the divine permission of sin by enumerating the various ways in which the term “permission” is understood.** His enumeration may be reduced to the following synopsis.

39 St. Augustine, De natura et gratia, chap. 43.

of a simple good: the permission of a licit concession; for example, for a religious to visit his parents. permission of indulgence; for ex- of good ample, second marriages.

of a lesser ae ood | Permission of dispensation; for 8 example, for a Dominican to

Permission eat meat.

ofalesser permission of tolerance; for exevil ample, giving a bill of divorce to avoid homicide. ofevil of a simple moral evil: the permission of support, in this way God permits even serious sins for some greater good.

We see that permission is not used univocally in all these instances. In the last case the will of the one permitting intervenes to a much smaller degree than in the first, and the will to permit is the same as the will not to impede. Hence God is in no way the cause of sin.

b) Proof from reason. The evil which consists in the defect of the action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But God is the agent who is absolutely indefectible and never deficient. Therefore God can in no way be the cause of the evil of action or of guilt.

The major is clear from the preceding article, where it was shown that the evil of action does not have a cause per se but only per accidens, as coming from the defect of the agent, whether it be the principal agent, as weakness in walking, or the instrumental agent, as lameness on account of a curvature of the leg bone. In physical things, of course, this defect of the agent comes from some disturbing cause or from some impediment, that is, from some power of a contrary agent.

But in free agents the evil of a voluntary action comes only from the defect of the operator. “In voluntary things the defect of the action proceeds from a will deficient in act, inasmuch as the will does not subject itself in act to its rule. This defect is, however, not guilt, but guilt follows upon it because the will operates with this defect.” That is to say that the non-consideration of the rule is only a negation before the agent operates, but it becomes privation and is called incon- sideration when the agent begins to operate without consideration of the rule. As St. Thomas says: “The will takes on the first aspect of guilt from the fact that the will proceeds to this kind of choice without actual consideration of the rule.” +? Further, this inconsideration becomes at least virtually voluntary and culpable when a man in a state of alertness should and could consider the rule of right reason in his operation. God does not command the impossible. Therefore every venial sin is avoidable, although without a very special help all venial sins cannot be avoided continuously.

The minor is clear. God is absolutely indefectible, that is, He cannot be the author of a defect either directly or indirectly. Not directly, because He cannot move either morally or physically to sin as sin, that is, to something inordinate under the aspect of privation; not indirectly, that is, through neglect or carelessness, because divine negligence implies a contradiction. This is quite clear in the abstract and in general, although in concrete and particular cases it is difficult to explain the divine movement in the direction of sin.

Therefore, if God were to command the impossible, sin would be unavoidable, and then it would not be sin, nor could man be justly punished especially for all eternity; that would be the greatest injustice. For this reason Jansenius eventually arrived at the denial not only of mercy but also of divine justice.

Moreover, if by an impossible hypothesis God were to wish to be the cause of sin, He could not be because sin is outside the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, which is indefectible and cannot produce what is the privation of being and goodness but can produce only what has the nature of being and goodness. Thus when God moves toward the physical entity of sin He necessarily prescinds from the malice involved. Nothing is more exactly defined than the adequate object of a potency or power; as sight cannot see sounds, so God cannot be either the direct or the indirect cause of sin.**

In another place St. Thomas explains this conclusion more clearly in two ways by distinguishing between direct and indirect causality.**

1. God cannot be the direct cause of sin. To be the direct cause of sin is to incline one’s own will or that of another to sin. But God can-

+2 St. Thomas, De malo, q.1, a. 3. 43 Cf. replies to second and third difficulties in this article. 44 Summa theol., la Iae, q.79, a.1.

not incline His will or that of another to sin. Therefore God cannot be the direct cause of sin.

The major is clear.

Proof of the minor. God inclines and converges all things to Himself as to their last end, for every agent acts for a proportionate end, and the order of actions corresponds to the order of ends. Hence God cannot be the direct cause of any sin, since every sin is a departure from the order to God as to an end.

This reason is in conformity with the reason given above in the article, whether God wills evils: “God cannot be author of the evil of guilt, . . . because the evil of guilt is directly opposed to the uncreated good; it is contrary to the fulfillment of the divine will.” *° “Evil is never desired except per accidens, that is, when the good to which the evil is joined is desired more than the good that is deprived by the evil. But God wills no good more than His own goodness. . . Hence God in no way wills the evil of guilt, which denies the order to the divine good.” +°

To put it briefly : God, as the indefectible cause, cannot be the cause of the evil of guilt, because this evil denies the order to the divine good, which God wills above all things. Otherwise God would be a defective cause and He would depart from Himself, from truth and goodness, which is obviously impossible since God is essential goodness itself.

What, then, is the direct cause of sin? It is the sinner, inasmuch as he tends to an object out of harmony with the rules of morals; the sinner wills per se some changeable good and consequently he wills the inordination of his act.

2. God cannot be the indirect cause of sin. To be the indirect cause of sin is to refrain from preventing it when we can and should prevent it. But according to His wisdom and justice God is not bound to prevent the sins which He permits. Therefore, when God does not provide the help to avoid sin, He is not the indirect cause of the sin.

The major is certain; it is the definition of the indirect voluntarium; for example, the pilot is the indirect cause of the shipwreck when he neglects to guide the ship and is able and obliged to do so.

The minor is proved as follows: “The universal provider allows a certain defect to occur in some particular instance lest the good of the whole be impeded. . . . The corruption of one individual is

the generation of another and so the species is preserved. Since God is the universal provider of all being, it pertains to His providence that He permit certain defects in particular things lest the perfect good of the universe be impeded. If all evils were to be impeded, the universe would lose many good things; it would lose the life of the lion, the patience of the martyrs, if animals would not be killed or if tyrants would not persecute.” *7

Before we consider the second conclusion concerning physical evil, we reply to the objections to the first conclusion.

In the solution of these objections we must keep in mind the manner in which God moves toward the physical act of sin.*® These points should be carefully noted.

1. We presuppose that there is in God an eternal positive and effective decree with regard to the entity of sin, and a permissive decree with regard to the defect of sin proceeding solely from the deficient cause. Hence from eternity there was a twofold decree with regard to the sin of Christ’s enemies at some determined hour.

2. The divine motion is previous, since God is the cause of the act of sin and not only of the sin as being. The cause always precedes the effect, at least by nature and causality; the will needs to be moved so that it can act, because the will is not its own action just as it is not its own being.

3. This divine motion is predeterminative, but not in the same way as the divine motion by which we are moved to a good act; in the case of evil the divine motion is predeterminative as executing the divine will, but for an evil act there is a twofold decree instead of a single decree: the positive decree with regard to the entity of the sin and the permissive decree with regard to the lack of moral rectitude, or with regard to the malice.

4. This divine motion in its execution follows upon, at least by nature if not in time, the moral or objectively defective motion, which as such is not from God but from the devil, from an evil man, or from concupiscence. On the other hand, the moral motion which is a prerequisite to a good act is from God, at least as from the first cause, because it is good.

Once this defective moral motion is posited and after the intervention of some inconsideration on the part of man, the physical influx of God begins to flow into the will itself and effects the entity of the act of the will, but it prescinds from the malice; the freedom remains as in other acts because God moves not only toward the act but also that the act be free.

5. God does not determine the material part of the sin before the creature has in some way determined itself to the formal part of the sin. As the universal provider, God moves only that will to sin which is in itself evilly disposed and which thus disposed needs to be moved. Thus Christ said to Judas: “That which thou dost, do quickly.” 4° That which on the part of God precedes the determination of the will to the formal part of sin is only the permission to sin, which is a penalty, not for the first sin but for the other sins.

6. The inconsideration, which is the beginning of the sin, is voluntary and culpable, at least virtually, inasmuch as a rational agent can and should consider the rule of right reason in his action, and if he does not consider it, he is culpable; this is the beginning of the sin. Finally, since the will is naturally inclined to the good, it does not turn to the evil or the apparent good without first virtually turning itself away from the true good, at least by not considering the law when it could and should. This predetermination to the act of sin is not something primary in Thomism; it is secondary, something consequent and merely philosophical.

First objection. (The second objection in the article.) This objection, which attempts to show that God is the direct, although not the immediate, cause of sin, is stated as follows: The effect of a second cause is referred to the first cause. But the evil of guilt is sometimes the effect of a second cause. Therefore the evil of guilt is referred to the first cause.

Reply. I distinguish the major: with regard to the entity and perfection, I concede; with regard to the effect, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: as a defect, I concede; as being, I deny; for example, whatever there is of motion in lameness is caused by the motive power, but whatever there is of deformity is not of the motive power but from the curvature of the bone. That is to say, the divine motion prescinds from malice.

I insist. But God moves the will to the act as it issues from the will itself. But the act of sin as it issues from the will does not prescind from malice. Therefore God in moving to this act does not prescind from malice.

Reply. I distinguish the major: as the act issues effectively from the will, I concede; defectively, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: as it issues from the will defectively, I concede; effectively, I deny.

I insist. The cause of anything is also the cause of that which essentially belongs to it. But some physical acts are essentially evil in a moral sense, as hatred of God. Therefore in moving toward these acts God cannot prescind from their malice.

Reply. I distinguish the major: the cause of anything in the physical order is also the cause of that which essentially belongs to it in the same order, I concede; in the moral order and outside the adequate object of its causality, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: and the malice is in the physical order and is within the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, I deny; and the malice is in the moral order and outside the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, I concede.

Thomists commonly point out that nothing is more clearly delimited than the causality of a potency or power, which is so completely concerned with its object that it touches on nothing else, no matter how closely anything else may be conjoined to its object. Thus in the same apple three things, color, taste, and smell, are intimately connected, and yet sight takes in the color but not the taste and smell. Sight cannot see sounds. Indeed, a distinction of reason is sufficient to delimit a potency; thus the good and true are distinguished only by reason, for example, in the true goodness of virtue, and yet the true is known and the good is loved. The intellect touches the good under the aspect of truth but not under the aspect of the good. Similarly, in God the paternity is distinguished from the divine nature only by reason, and the divine nature alone is communicated to the Son, without the communication of the paternity. In sin, however, the act taken physically and the moral malice are much more distinct from each other; these things pertain to two different orders, and the malice is outside the adequate object of the divine omnipotence, for every agent acts in a manner at least analogically similar to itself, and between God and the malice of guilt there is not even an analogical similarity. Hence, even if God willed to be the cause of sin, He could not, just as a man who willed to see sound could not.

I insist. But the formal constituent of a sin of commission is a positive element, according to St. Thomas and many Thomists. But God causes whatever is positive in sin. Therefore God causes the formal constituent of a sin of commission.

Reply. I distinguish the major: it is a positive element under the aspect of defectible being, or as forming the basis of the inordination, I concede; under the aspect of effectible being, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: God causes whatever is positive under the aspect of effectible being, I concede; under the aspect of defectible being, I deny. Thus, as defectible being the sin does not come within the adequate object of the divine omnipotence.

I insist. Whatever causes a form, per accidens produces the annexed privation. But the privation of moral rectitude is annexed to the act of sin. Therefore God, causing the act of sin, per accidens produces the privation of rectitude.

Reply. I distinguish the major: if this privation follows from the very nature of this form, I concede; in this way God is the cause per accidens of the physical evil of penalty or of the death of an animal because He wills the life of the lion; but if the privation proceeds from a defective principle, I deny. In this latter instance the privation is not even per accidens from an indefectible principle.

Thus we say that the sinner himself is per accidens the cause of the malice of his act, inasmuch as he tends per se to some unworthy good; but God is not even per accidens the cause of this malice, because this malice is outside the adequate object of omnipotence.

Other objections attempt to prove that God is at least indirectly the cause of sin.*°

The same pilot is the cause of the safety of the ship and of the shipwreck. But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore God is the cause of moral shipwreck, or sin. .

Reply. I distinguish the major: inasmuch as the pilot is defective, or does not guide the ship when he can and should, I concede; otherwise, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: and God is deficient in doing what is necessary for salvation, I deny; and God is still indefectible, I concede.

I insist. But he who does not prevent a sin when he can do so is still the indirect cause of the sin. But God does not prevent sin when He is able. Therefore God is the indirect cause of sin.

Reply. I distinguish the major: when he can and should, I con-

50 Cf. third objection of this article.

cede; when he can and is not obliged to do so, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: God is able not to prevent, or permit, that a defectible agent fails, or sins, because of a greater good which is occasioned by a sin.°? Thus God is not obliged to prevent sin.

I insist. St. Thomas says: °? “If affrmation is the cause of afirmation, negation is the cause of negation, as Aristotle says; for example, the rising of the sun is the cause of the day, and the non-rising of the sun is the cause of darkness. But the conferring of grace is the cause of a salutary act. Therefore the non-conferring of grace, included in the permission of even the first sin, is the cause of the omission of the salutary act.”

We see that St. Thomas was not ignorant of this objection with which Thomists have been always confronted in almost the same terms.

Reply. I distinguish the major: if we are dealing with one cause alone, as the sun rising or not rising, or the pilot watching or not watching, I concede; but if we are dealing with two causes of which one is indefectible and the other defectible, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: and the omission of the salutary act proceeds from one and the same cause as that which confers grace, I deny; from another defectible and deficient cause, I concede.’

I insist. He who denies grace apart from antecedent guilt is the indirect cause of sin. But God, by permitting the beginning of the first sin (for example, in a baptized person), denies grace apart from antecedent guilt. Therefore God is the indirect cause of the beginning of the first sin.

Reply. The reply is contained in St. Thomas’ words concerning the principle, “mutual causes are causes in different genera,” which is applied inversely in justification and the loss of grace by sin. I distinguish the major: apart from guilt antecedent by a priority of nature, I concede; by a priority of time, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: apart from guilt antecedent by a priority of time, I concede; by a priority of nature, I deny.

53 “Tt must be said that the effect does not follow unless all the causes concur; by the defect of one a negation of the effect follows. I say therefore that the cause of grace as active is God, and as receiving is the soul itself, after the manner of subject and matter. . . . It is not necessary that every defect occur on the part of the agent; it may occur on the part of the recipient, and such is the case in this proposition” (Liber Sententiarum, |, d.40, q. 4, a.2 ad 3).

Explanation. The denial of grace is indeed a penalty, which can be inflicted only for guilt. Thus the denial of grace implies more than the simple divine permission of sin, which simply antecedes sin as a condition sine qua non. It is true that the permission of the second sin is a penalty for the first sin, as St. Thomas says,* but the permission of the first sin, for example, in the angels, or in the innocent Adam, or in a baptized person, does not have the nature of penalty.

God does not deny grace except for some antecedent guilt, but this guilt can be antecedent by a priority not of time but of nature only, in the genus of material cause, or of a defectible and deficient cause.

This is illustrated by the principle proposed by St. Thomas,** mutual causes are causes in different genera, without there being a vicious circle. Thus in the same instant, on the part of the sun, illumination is prior to the removal of darkness, but on the part of the atmosphere to be illuminated the removal of darkness is first in the order of nature, although the two things are simultaneous. Since the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt are considered on the part of God as justifying, the infusion of grace is prior to remission of guilt in the order of nature. But if these things are considered on the part of man who is justified, the converse is true: liberation from guilt (we do not say remission of guilt) is prior in the order of nature to the attainment of justifying grace (we do not say infusion of grace because this expression views the matter from the viewpoint of God and not from the viewpoint of man, who is justified).

Speaking absolutely, the infusion of grace is prior to the remission of guilt, because these things are predicated on the part of God.

On the other hand, the loss of grace and the commission of sin are predicated of man sinning, and absolutely speaking from the viewpoint of the material cause, or of man losing grace, it is true that the beginning of the first sin is prior to the denial of divine grace, that is, at least initial guilt is absolutely prior to penalty. The only thing that precedes this beginning of the first sin is the divine permission, which is a condition sine gua non of the sin. The denial of grace implies more than the simple permission of sin, which is not a penalty especially in the case of the first sin.

I insist. The Council of Trent declared: “God does not desert by His grace those who are once justified unless He is first deserted by them.” °°

Reply. This statement was made by St. Augustine, who nevertheless solved the problem of evil.*" The statement means that God does not withdraw habitual grace except for some antecedent sin. In the case of actual grace, however, there is a desertion properly so called, which is the denial of actual grace by God. But this is not true of the simple divine permission for the beginning of the first sin, because God is not bound to preserve even the just man from sin by a special and efficacious help which is not due to man. But God does not refuse sufficient grace by which, if man does not resist it, he can attain to good; but if man resists sufficient grace, God can justly deny him efficacious grace.

I insist. As the best friend, God should always give man efficacious grace to avoid sin. But God is the best friend of every man. Therefore God should always give all men efficacious grace to avoid sin.

Reply. I ask you to prove the major, namely, that God as Adam’s best friend was bound to offer him at all times not only sufficient grace but also efficacious grace, that is, by preventing Adam’s resistance to sufficient grace.

I insist. But sufficient grace is required for the fulfillment of the commandments. And God because of the abundance of His goodness owes it to Himself to give us more help than is required to make the commandments possible of fulfillment.®® Therefore because of the abundance of His goodness God owes it to Himself to give us more than sufficient grace, namely, efficacious grace.

Reply. I distinguish the minor: frequently for the human race and also for the just man, I concede; always unto the end, this I ask you to prove.

I insist. God owes it to Himself at all times to unite mercy and justice in all His works.

Reply. I distinguish: by abundant sufficient graces, by sermons, good examples, let it pass; by graces that are always efficacious, this I ask you to prove. Even when God punishes, His mercy is united to justice, because even in hell the punishment is less than condign.

56 Denz., no. 804. 57 St. Augustine, op. cit., chap. 26, no. 29. 58 Summa theol., la, q.21, a.4.

I insist. He who does not preserve a man in good is the indirect cause of the sin of a man who needs this preservation. But, by permitting the beginning of the first sin, God does not preserve a man in good. Therefore God is the indirect cause of sin.

Reply. I distinguish the major: he who does not preserve a man in good when he is able and obliged to do so, I concede; when he is able but not obliged to do so, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor. God is not obliged to preserve all defectible things in good, otherwise defectible things would never fail, and preservation from sin would not have been a most special privilege for the Blessed Virgin, but it would be something most common. God actually gives more than justice demands because of the superabundance of His goodness; °° He does this even for each person frequently, but not always to the end, that is, He does not conduct each person to his last end.

If it is said that man needs to be preserved in good so that he might remain in the good, the reply is: that man requires and has a right to be preserved in good and that God owes it to Himself to preserve man in good, this I deny; that man requires this preservation without having the right to it, I concede. In himself man is defectible and from this it follows that he sometimes fails; he fails sometimes physically and without guilt, like the agents inferior to him, and sometimes he fails morally and voluntarily with guilt, and God is not obliged to prevent this guilt. If God were so bound, no sin would ever be committed and defectible things would never fail. To no one, not even to the elect, is owing the efficacious election to glory, otherwise all men would be saved.

St. Thomas expresses this thought in these words: °° “It happens that God does not extend to some that help to avoid sin which, if it were extended, would prevent them from sinning. But God does all this according to the order of justice and wisdom, since He Himself is justice and wisdom. Hence it cannot be imputed to God that someone sins, as if He were the cause of sin, just as the pilot is not the cause of the shipwreck because of the fact that he does not steer the ship, unless when he withdraws his guidance he could and should be steering the ship.” The pilot is blamed only for negligence, and divine negligence is a contradiction in terms. This objection is indeed diffi-

‘cult, but it is not cogent.

I insist. St. Thomas says: “Out of the abundance of His goodness God dispenses those things that are owing to some creature more generously than the importance of the thing demands.” *?

Reply. This is often true, but God does not always lead every man to the last end, preserving him and elevating him above sin. We are here face to face with a profound mystery, indeed the mystery of iniquity is more obscure than the mystery of grace since it is obscure not only with regard to us but also in itself. But the apparent contradiction will be obviated if we keep clearly in mind the following two most certain principles:

1. “God does not command the impossible, but when He commands He admonishes you to do what you are able and to ask for what you cannot do.” °° This principle was invoked against the Protestants by the Council of Trent.**

2. In the article, “Whether God loves all things equally,” °* St. Thomas formulated this principle: “Since the love of God is the cause of the goodness of things, one thing would not be better than another if God had not willed a greater good for one thing than for another.” This is the principle of predilection as found in revelation: “For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will,” * “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received ?” °°

These two principles were promulgated by the Council of Carisiac in the words of St. Prosper: “The omnipotent God wills all men without exception to be saved, even though all are not saved. The fact that some are saved is owing to the gift of Him who saves them; the fact that some are lost is owing to themselves.” °?

Taken separately, these two principles are most certain according to revelation; even in the natural order they are evident. But their intimate reconciliation remains obscure, and no created intelligence by its own powers can make this reconciliation, because it would be necessary to see how the infinite mercy, the infinite justice, and supreme liberty are intimately reconciled in God. No one can see God

in this way except in the light of glory. In the words of Bossuet: “In this state of captivity we must humble our intelligence before the divine mystery and admit these two graces, one that leaves our will inexcusable before God, the other that prevents us from glorying in ourselves.” 65

Hence St. Paul says: “He that glorieth, may glory in the Lord”; °° “For by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not of works, that no man may glory. For we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God hath prepared that we should walk in them.” 7°

An article could be written comparing false evidence with the obscurity of true faith to illustrate why so often, especially in this question of evil, the objections at first sight seem clearer than the replies. This matter might at least be considered in a chapter on faith as illumined by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The principal reason is that the objections are taken from the superficial appearances of reality, whereas the replies are taken from that highest reality which is with God and which is so profound for us because of our defectibility and therefore remains so obscure.

Indeed in this present problem there are two obscurities opposed to each other: the higher obscurity of the divine reality which is translucent and the lower obscurity of sin itself, which is itself the privation of light, truth, and goodness. Between these two opposing obscurities is the true clarity of these certain principles: “God does not command the impossible,” and “no one would be better than another if he were not loved more by God.” The reconciliation of these principles is a mystery, but the evidence of the principles themselves indicates that the objections are superficial and false. In the objections we always find some sophistic falschood, and none of the objections is either cogent or necessary.

These objections are useful because they arouse in the just a desire to contemplate the mystery of the Deity on a plane above every distinct idea. Such contemplation when it proceeds from faith illumined by the supernatural gifts with a certain experimental knowledge of

68“) faut captiver nos intelligences devant l'obscurité divine du mystère de la grace, et admettre deux graces, dont lune (la suffisante) laisse notre volenté sans excuse devant Dieu, et dont l'autre (l'efficace) ne lui permet pas de se glorifier en elle-meme.” Bossuet, Euvres complètes (Paris, 1845), 1, 643.

God remains obscure with a translucent obscurity of which St. John of the Cross spoke so eloquently.”*

Second conclusion. God wills and causes per accidens physical evil and the evil of penalty.

An agent that by its power per se produces some form as a consequence and quasi per accidens causes the privation of the opposite form. But God wills and causes per se and principally the good of the universe, which requires defectible things that are sometimes deficient, and God wills and causes the order of justice, which requires that penalty be inflicted on sinners. Therefore God wills and causes as a consequence and quasi per accidens physical evil and the evil of penalty.

It should be noted that St. Thomas bases this proof not only on efficient causality but also on the divine intellect and will, because whatever God causes per accidens He also wills in the same manner; from eternity God willed and foresaw whatever He would do even per accidens in these or other circumstances. We, however, sometimes produce per accidens certain evils which we do not will or foresee. Such is not the case with God.

St. Thomas returns to the proof which he had already given above in the article, “Whether the will of God is concerned with evil,” where he says: “God wills the evil of natural defect or the evil of penalty by willing some good to which such evil is joined.” 7”? But God can in no way will the evil of guilt, which negates the order to the divine good willed by God above all things.

Doubt. Is the following proposition true: “While evils are not good, nevertheless it is good that there be evils, because those things that are evil in themselves are ordered to some good”? If this proposition is true, then the following is also true: “It is good that there are sins.”

St. Thomas replies in the negative: “Some say that, although God does not will evils, nevertheless He wills that evils should be and should come into being. . . . But this is not a correct statement, because evil is not per se ordered to good but only per accidens. The fact that some good ensues from a sin is beyond the intention of the sinner, just as it is beyond the intention of tyrants that the patience of martyrs is glorified in persecution.” ** Hence we should say that

71 St. John of the Cross, The Dark Night, II, chap. 17 £. 72 Summa theol., Ia, q.19, a.9. 13 Ibid., ad 1.

per accidens and as a consequence God wills physical evil and the evil of penalty, and that He wills to permit sin by not preventing them and occasionally deriving some good from them. Only in this sense do we say, “O blessed fault which merited so great a Redeemer!”

This entire article can be reduced to the following synopsis. God in no way wills or causes the evil of guilt, neither on the part of the end, because sin negates the order to the divine good loved by God above all things; nor on the part of the efficient cause, because sin is from a deficient voluntary agent, at least by inconsideration, and this defect cannot be predicated of the indefectible God. God wills physical evil and penalty per accidens, on the part of the end, because He wills the good of the universe and justice, and from this evils sometimes follow; on the part of the efficient cause, because these evils proceed from the power of the agent producing a form which entails the privation of the opposite form.

WHETHER THERE IS ONE SUPREME EVIL WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF ALL EVIL

State of the question. This article is in direct opposition to the Manichaeans, Albigenses, and other heretics who taught a system of dualism. The title inquires directly about the efficient cause of evil. It was in the thirteenth century that the Albigenses were spreading their doctrines in southern France. In the beginning of his article St. Thomas collected the arguments that might be proposed in support of dualism.

First objection. In things we almost everywhere find contraricty; for example, life and death, good and evil, true and false, noble and base. Therefore two contrary principles must be postulated. The reply will be that contraries agree in being.

Second objection. If one of the contraries is in the nature of things, so also is the opposite. But the supreme good exists. Therefore supreme evil also exists. Reply: evil opposes that good which it negates, not that good in which it is.

Third objection. Grades of perfection are judged according as they approach the best or that which is good by essence. So also it should be with grades of evil with regard to the supreme evil. The reply will be that bad and worse are judged according as they recede from good, not as they approach the supreme evil.

Fourth objection. Evil by participation must eventually lead to evil by essence. Reply: there is no evil by participation, but beings that are deprived of some due good.

Fifth objection. Everything that is per accidens is ultimately reduced to that which is per se, and since evil exists in many instances, it must have a cause per se, namely, the supreme evil. The reply will be that, although evil occurs in many instances in the human race, it is not intended per se.

Sixth objection. The evil of an effect is traced to the evil in the cause, namely, a deficient cause. But there cannot be an infinite process, and we must eventually come to the first evil cause. The reply will be that evil is traced to some good cause from which the evil ensues per accidens.

Conclusion: there is not nor can there be a first principle of evil.

This proposition is of faith. (Cf. Denz., nos. 234 ff.) St. Thomas’ argument sed contra refers to the dogma of the creation, according to which God is the cause of all being.

The body of the article contains two parts: the first is strictly theological and proves the conclusion; the second is historical, explaining why the Manichaeans postulated two principles.

The conclusion is proved in three ways: 1. from the notion of good; 2. from the notion of evil; 3. from the notion of the first principle.

r. From the notion of good. Good and being are convertible. But the first evil principle would be evil in essence and in no way good. Therefore this first principle of evil would not be being and would not exist.

The proof of the major was given above.”* Every being as being in act is a certain perfection and a good desirable to itself, and thus every being strives to preserve its being. As matter is being in potency, so it is good in potency. Hence no being is said to be being inasmuch as it is evil but inasmuch as it lacks some being. And therefore evil exists only in the good as in a subject.”°

2. From the notion of good. If evil were integral being, or if it completely corrupted the good in which it is, it would destroy itself, as

Aristotle pointed out, for evil cannot be except in a subject.*® But the supreme evil would be integral being.

3. From the notion of first principle. A first principle cannot be caused per accidens by another, nor can it be a mere accidental cause. But evil is caused per accidens by good, that is, by a defective agent or by a contrary agent, and evil can be a cause only per accidens, that is, by reason of an annexed good. Therefore the notion of evil is repugnant to the notion of a first principle. And therefore the dualistic position of Manichaeism involves contradictions on all sides.

In the second, historical part of the article St. Thomas explains how the Manichaeans arrived at this solution of this problem of evil. These heretics failed to consider the most universal cause of being as being, that is, the creative cause, and only considered particular efficient and final causes. They did not understand that what is harmful with regard to some particular being, as a viper with regard to man, may be useful with regard to the universal good of the entire universe. Nor were they able to rise above mutually contrary causes to the most universal cause.

In his reply to the fifth difficulty St. Thomas says that the corruptible beings in which there is an evil of nature are a small part of the universe. He reasoned in this way because he thought that the heavenly bodies were incorruptible, but today spectral analysis has shown the opposite to be true. At any rate, after the resurrection of the dead there will be no more corruption.”* In this reply he affirms that only in men does evil seem to be in the majority of instances, because there are more who follow the senses than follow reason.

This concludes the questions on evil: what evil is, its kinds, and its cause.

APPENDIX

THE TRIALS OF THE JUST AND THEIR MOTIVES "°

In the Gospel our Lord said: “I am the true vine; and My Father is the husbandman. Every branch in Me, that beareth not fruit, He will take away; and every one that beareth fruit, He will purge it,

76 Aristotle, Ethica, Bk. IV, chap. 5.

78 Cf. St. Thomas, Commentarium in Joan., XV, 2; in Matt., X, 38; in Job; see also Tabula aurea, under tribulationes. St. Gregory, in Job; St. John Chrysostom, Homilia I.

that it may bring forth more fruit.” "° Commenting on this, St. Thomas says: “In order that a vine may be more fruitful, the growers cut away the superfluous shoots. So it is in man. For when a man who is well disposed and united with God allows his affections to incline to other things, his power to do good is weakened and made less efficacious. Hence it is that God, in order that man may be more fruitful, often cuts away such obstacles and purges him, sending him trials and temptations, by which he becomes stronger. And therefore our Lord says, “He will purge it,” even though the man is pure, because no one in this life is so pure than he cannot be made purer. St. John says: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.” 8° God tries a man “that he may bring forth more fruit,” that is, increase in virtue, that being purer he may be more fruitful, as the Scripture says: “He that is just, let him be justified still; and he that is holy, let him be sanctified still”; °* The word of the truth of the Gospel “bringeth forth fruit and groweth”; $° “they shall go from virtue to virtue.” $°

Thus the just man who is purified brings forth more fruit. St. Thomas explains: “He bears a threefold fruit in this life. The first is to abstain from sin. . . . The second is to give himself to works of holiness. . . . The third is to work for the sanctification of others. He brings forth a fourth fruit in eternal life.” The reason for this efficacy is that the just man remains in Christ, who said, “without Me you can do nothing.” This is the first reason for the trials of the just.

The second reason for these trials is that the just man is united with Christ, and by the same means as Christ used he cooperates in the salvation of others. St. Paul said: “And if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and joint-heirs with Christ: yet so, if we suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified with Him. For I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us.” **

Commenting on the words, “yet so, if we suffer with Him,” St. Thomas says: “Christ, who is the principal heir, came into the inheritance of glory by His sufferings. ‘Ought not Christ to have suf- fered these things, and so to enter into His glory ? *° We cannot come into the possession of our inheritance by an easier way, and so we also must attain our inheritance by suffering. In the Acts of the Apostles we read, ‘through many tribulations we must enter into the kingdom of God.’ ** Hence he says, “yet so, if we suffer with Him, that is, suffering with Christ, we undergo the tribulations of this world that we may be glorified with Christ. ‘For if we be dead with Him, . . . we shall also reign with Him.’ ” *

Therefore our Lord said: “If any man will come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow Me”; 5° and, “he that taketh not up his cross, and followeth Me, is not worthy of Me.” 5° In his commentary St. Thomas says: “This was said because he who loves father and mother more than Me is not worthy of Me. So also he who loves himself more than Me is not worthy of Me, because God alone can completely satisfy man’s affections. . . . Hence he who is not prepared to suffer death for the truth, and especially that cruelest death, the death of the cross, is not worthy of Me. Indeed a man should glory in the cross, as St. Paul said, ‘God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ.’ °° He takes up the cross who mortifies his flesh, as we read again, ‘And they that are Christ’s, have crucified their flesh, with the vices and concupiscences.’ °! The cross is also borne in the heart when a man is contrite for his sins, as the Apostle says, “Who is scandalized, and J am not on fire? ” °?

This was verified in the apostles. St. Paul wrote: “With Christ I am nailed to the cross. And I live, now not I; but Christ liveth in me”; °? and, “God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ.” °* Commenting on these words, St. Thomas writes: “Behold, where the philosopher of this world is ashamed, the Apostle found a treasure. What appeared to be foolishness to the philosopher, became wisdom and glory for the Apostle, as said St. Augustine.

Everyone glories in that by which he becomes great, for example, riches. The Apostle gloried in nothing except in Christ, especially in the cross of Christ, because in the cross are found all things about which men glory. Some men glory in the friendship of the great, but in the cross is the sign of divine friendship. Some glory in knowledge, but the Apostle found the most sublime science in the cross: ‘For I judged not myself to know anything among you, but Jesus Christ, and Him crucified.’ ®* For in the cross is the perfection of the whole law and the complete art of living well. Some men glory in power, and St. Paul found the greatest power in the cross: ‘For the word of the cross, to them indeed that perish, is foolishness; but to them that are saved, that is, to us, it is the power of God.’ °° So the Apostle glories in the cross for the liberty he has received, for his acceptance into the heavenly kingdom, and for the victory over the devil and sin.” °

According to St. Thomas, therefore, the tribulations of the just are explained by two reasons: 1. that the just may be purified and bring forth more fruit; 2. that they may cooperate with Christ in the salvation of souls.®® Tribulation is the fire that tries the elect; in this fire evils are confounded because the temporal allurements are destroyed, but not the elect.®® The tribulations of the impious, however, are more grievous, because the impious do not have the love of God to support them.’

Some philosophers have objected that this doctrine of the cross and of the trials of the just is not only above reason but contrary to reason.

To this we reply that this doctrine contains something that is entirely in agreement with good reason, namely, tribulation shows the absolute insufficiency of a life lived according to the senses and passions, as Spinoza explains in his Ethics. Man, he says, living according to the senses and his passions wants to be the center of all things, and he becomes the slave of all, he becomes a slave, and finds himself in contradiction with himself and with others. The tribulation which we find in the sensual life arouses the desire to live according to right reason, and there we find freedom. The sensual man becomes the

29 Cf. St. Thomas, Commentarium in Ps. 36. 100 Cf, St. Thomas, Commentarium in Job, chap. 21.

slave of external circumstances, of his passions, and of other men. On a higher plane, the tribulations which we find in the rational, intellectual, and moral life, excite the desire of living according to the divine life.

The philosophy of pessimism, according to Spinoza, is the result of sensualism, whereas right reason rising above the senses disposes us to optimism, for the senses know nothing but particulars, but reason considers the good of the universe on account of which evils are permitted. But a higher optimism is found in the supernatural life, according to St. Paul, “To them that love God, all things work together unto good.” 1°! Better than the ancient Greek philosophers, Christianity knows that perfect happiness is not found in this valley of tears but in the life to come.

On the other hand, he who does not wish to live supernaturally descends from the spiritual life to a merely intellectual life. There he is met with difficulties and if wishes to overcome them he must ascend. If he does not ascend, he descends to bitter pride and a sensual life. He who does not conquer is conquered; he who does not ascend, falls.

St. John Chrysostom enumerates these eight reasons for the trials of the just, taken from St. Paul.

1. The remedy against pride: “Lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me, there was given me a sting of my flesh.” 1°

2. The remedy against vainglory: “Lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth from me.” 103

3. That the virtue and power of God might shine forth in weak men: “Gladly therefore will I glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may dwell in me.” °

4. That the patience of the just might be manifested in persecution and that the purity of their intentions might be made known, as in the case of Job."

5. That the just man might fix his thoughts on the life to come and his eternal reward when he sees that he has almost no reward in this life. Amid persecution and incessant contradictions, St. Paul wrote:

“If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.” 1°°

6. That those who mourn may have consolation when they see the tribulations of the saints and their steadfastness. In his Epistle to the Hebrews, St. Paul exhorts the Hebrews to remember the heroic examples of faith in adversity in the Old Testament.'””

7. That we might understand that the saints, whom we are to imitate, had natures like ours: “Elias was a man passible like unto us.” °

8. That we might distinguish the true evils and the true good from the false: “For whom the Lord loveth, He chastiseth; and He scourgeth every son whom He receiveth”; *°° “We are reviled, and we bless; we are persecuted, and we suffer it. . . . We are made as the refuse of this world, the offscouring of all even until now.” *7°

109 Heb. 12:6. 110 ] Cor. 4:12 £.; cf. St. John Chrysostom, Consolationes ad Stagir., Il.

Footnotes

1. St. Augustine, Contra Julianum, Bk. I, chap. 9. 493 ↩

2. Cf. De malo, q.2,.a.3. St. Thomas gives these three reasons why evil cannot have a cause per se. ↩