Chapter XLIV. Man’s elevation to the supernatural state
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First ARTICLE
WHAT IS MEANT BY THE SUPERNATURAL
HIS subject is treated at length in another place.’ Here we will consider only the essentials.
According to the nominal definition, supernatural denotes that which is above nature. The term “nature” commonly has two meanings: it means either the essence of a thing considered as the root of the specific activity (in this sense we speak of the nature of gold, of silver, of a man), or the complexus of all things in the universe as they are interdependent according to certain laws. Supernatural therefore commonly means that which is above nature taken collectively, that is, what is above the laws of nature. Hence a supernatural effect is one that cannot be produced according to the laws of nature, and a supernatural truth is one that cannot be known according to the natural laws of our intellect.
For the Catholic Church, as we see from her definitions, the supernatural is that which is above every created nature, as exceeding the powers and exigencies of every created nature, although it does not exceed the passive and perfectible capacity of our nature, nor is it incongruous to our nature.
Moreover, according to the Church, supernaturalness is at least twofold: 1. the supernaturalness of miracles, which exceed the efficient powers (or causality) and exigencies of any created nature, but do not exceed the cognitive powers of man’s nature; 2. the supernaturalness of mysteries strictly so called, and the supernaturalness of grace1 and glory, which exceed not only the efficient powers and exigencies of any created nature but the cognitive and appetitive powers of any created intellectual nature as well.”
Hence the supernatural is that which exceeds the properties (the powers and exigencies) of nature and is able to perfect nature gratuitously. The relative supernatural is that which exceeds the properties of only some particular created nature, but not of all created nature, for example, that which is natural and specific for an angel is relatively supernatural for man. Such would be the cunning and tricks of the devils, which are imitations of miracles. The absolute supernatural is that which exceeds the properties of all created and creatable nature, namely, that which exceeds the powers and exigencies of every created nature.
How is the absolutely supernatural divided? According to the Church, as we said above, supernaturalness is at least twofold: a) the supernaturalness of the miracle, which exceeds the efficient powers and exigencies of every created nature but does not exceed the cognitive powers of human nature; b) the supernaturalness of mysteries strictly so called and of the life of grace and glory, which exceeds not only the powers and exigencies of every created nature but also the cognitive powers, and consequently exceeds also the appetitive powers and the natural merit of every created intellectual nature. We see this distinction in the miracle of resurrection, in which natural life is supernaturally restored to a corpse, but in which there is no restoration of life that is essentially and intrinsically supernatural.
To explain this distinction the Thomists point out that the absolutely supernatural is that which exceeds the powers and exigencies of every created nature. But this transcendency can be founded only on the intrinsic formal cause of the thing that is called supernatural, and then the thing is substantially (or entitatively or intrinsically) supernatural, or on causes extrinsic to the thing that is said to be supernatural, and then the thing is supernatural with regard to mode. This transcendency cannot be founded on the material cause since the material cause is the subject in which the supernatural forms are received, namely, the soul and its faculties.’
8 Cf. John of St. Thomas, De gratia, disp. XX, a.1; Salmanticenses, De gratia, disp. III, no. 24; Suarez, De gratia, II, chap. 4.2
With regard to the formal cause, a being is said to be supernatural as to essence or substance, whether it be the uncreated supernatural, namely, God, the Trinity, the person of the Word subsisting in the human nature of Christ, or a created supernatural being by reason of the specifying formal object, such as the light of glory, habitual grace, the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and actual graces of this order.
With regard to the efficient cause, a being is said to be supernatural as to the mode of its production, namely, a miracle. But miracles are divided into those that are supernatural as to the substance, for example, the glorification of the body, which can in no way be effected by nature, and those that are supernatural with regard to the subject in which they happen, for example, a resurrection that is not glorious, since nature can produce life but not in the dead, and those that are supernatural as to mode, for example, the sudden cure of a fever, since a fever can be cured by nature or by science but this cannot be done suddenly.
We should try to avoid the confusion arising from the terms “supernatural as to substance” and “miraculous as to substance,” since in the first term “substance” means formal and intrinsic, but in the second it means efficient and extrinsic. With regard to the preternatural privileges of the state of innocence, it should be noted that the preservation or immunity from death implies a miracle of the same order as a resurrection that is not glorious, for just as nature cannot restore life to a corpse so it cannot permanently preserve man’s body from death.
With regard to the final cause, a being is said to be supernatural as to the mode of its ordering, for example, the act of natural acquired temperance directed to a supernatural end, that is, to life eternal, under the influence of charity. This act of acquired temperance differs essentially from the act of infused temperance, which is supernatural as to substance and essence by reason of the specifying formal object.
This classic division may be presented as follows:
Supernatural knowledge can be either supernatural as to substance, as the act of infused faith, or supernatural as to mode, and this latter, like miracles, has three divisions: 1. the prophetic knowledge of some future, natural, contingent event, which is distant in time; 2. the knowledge of a natural object already existing but remote in space;
- the instantaneous knowledge of some language, which can be learned naturally but not in a moment.
God under the aspect of the Deity, uncreated 4 the Trinity, the person of the Word united to human nature.
as to substance the light of glory. erated habitual and actual grace, infused the virtues, the gifts of the Holy absolutely Ghost. supernatural on the part of a natural act supernaturally ortheend dered to a supernatural end. as to , mode a miracle as to substance (as the ante glorification of the body). part of the] ° miracle as to the subject (as nonagent glorious resurrection).
a miracle as to mode (the sudden cure of a fever).
What is the natural order? In general, order is the disposition of things with regard to before and after in relation to some principle.‘ The natural order therefore is the disposition of the various created natures with regard to before and after in relation to God as the author and end of these natures. This natural order comprises, on the part of the efficient cause, creation, conservation, and the divine cooperation necessary for the natural acts of creatures. In the case of man the natural final end is the possession of God, not in the beatific vision, but as known discursively through reason and loved naturally above all things.
What is the supernatural order? It is the fitting disposition of those things that exceed the properties of created nature in relation to God as He is their author and end. We must distinguish between the essentially supernatural order, which is purely supernatural, from that which is only effectively supernatural, as for example, a miracle, and which is often referred to as preternatural.
For man the essentially supernatural order is constituted by the
4 St. Thomas, Metaphysica, V, lect. 13.
following: 1. the end, or the possession of God by intuitive vision; 2. the first agent, or God the author of grace and glory, and the second agent, or man elevated by grace; 3. the objective means, such as the external revelation proposed by the Church and the sacraments; 4. the subjective means, such as the infused virtues, the gifts, actual grace; 5. the law, or the system of precepts by which the supernatural end is to be reached.
God, therefore, can be considered in two ways: 1. as the author and end of the natural order; 2. as the author and end of the supernatural order.®
First corollary. That which is only effectively supernatural (as a miracle) can be produced by God as the author and lord of nature, but not that which is supernatural as to substance or essence.
Second corollary. No opposition, but rather harmony exists between the order of nature and the order of grace because both have their origin in the same immutable font of truth, God the best and greatest being. “Thus,” says St. Thomas, “faith presupposes natural knowledge just as grace presupposes nature, and perfection presupposes the perfectible.” ë
THE DIFFERENT STATES OF HUMAN NATURE IN RELATION TO GRACE
This question is generally considered at the beginning of the treatise on grace. We present here the principal truths relating to this matter.
Theologians commonly distinguish several states of nature.”
By the state of pure nature is meant nature itself with its intrinsic principles and those that follow or are due nature, but without grace and the preternatural gifts. In this state man would have a natural end, the natural means to attain this end, helps of a natural order sufficient for all and efficacious for some. He would also have the natural law, but he would be subject to ignorance, concupiscence, infirmities, and death.®
The state of integral nature, besides including the perfections of pure nature, consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the
T Cf. Billuart, De gratia, diss. II, praeambula, a.1. 8 Cf. Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 52.
soul by reason of the immunity from infirmities and death and in the perfect subjection of the sensitive appetite to reason because of the immunity from concupiscence and ignorance. Nature is said to be integral when there is no division between its parts or any defection from its perfection. Integrity is a certain perfection of nature in the natural order which, though it does not elevate the nature to the supernatural order of grace, is still gratuitous and preternatural. In Adam, however, this state of integrity was joined with his elevation to the order of grace.®
The state of holiness and original justice is that in which grace and the preternatural gifts of integrity are conferred together; it is the state in which Adam existed de facto."®
The state of unredeemed fallen nature is that in which human nature was, by Adam’s sin, despoiled of sanctifying grace, and the infused virtues together with the gift of integrity, the state that bears the four wounds of ignorance in the intellect, malice in the will, concupiscence in the concupiscible appetite, and weakness in the irascible appetite.**
The state of redeemed nature is that in which we now find the just man redeemed by Christ, endowed with sanctifying grace, the infused virtues, and the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, but without the gift of integrity in the present life.** Human nature will not be completely repaired until it is in glory, when it will again receive the gift of integrity in the resurrection from the dead.
WHETHER OUR FIRST PARENTS WERE CONSTITUTED IN THE STATE OF HOLINESS AND JUSTICE, AND WHETHER THIS STATE WAS SUPERNATURAL
State of the question. The supporters of naturalism deny the existence of truly supernatural grace in Adam; among these are the Pelagians, and in modern times the Unitarians, the liberal Protestants, the positivists, and also the Modernists, who speak of a principle of religious immanence because of which even the Christian religion 1s not above the exigencies of our nature and which, according to some,
is merely a development of a germ seated in our nature.’* Naturalism also denies original sin and therefore, especially in its pantheistic form, it exaggerates the powers of nature to such an extent that nothing is beyond the capacity or powers of human nature. This is a form of absolute optimism.
Pseudo-supernaturalism, on the other hand, has a pessimistic bent and exaggerates the consequences of original sin and also succeeds in confusing the orders of grace and nature. It holds that grace and the gifts conferred in the state of innocence are essentials of human nature (Luther), or were owing to nature (Baius and Jansenius), or that they were complements of human nature (Calvin).
With regard to the terminology used in this question it should be noted that, while the word “natural” means the same as “original,” it has been used in an improper sense to designate a truly supernatural gift connected with man’s origin. For example, some of the Fathers have called the original holiness given to Adam when he was created natural; similarly, the gift of integrity, which perfects nature in the natural order, has been called natural although it is gratuitous. This improper use of terms should be avoided because of the danger of confusion.
The Catholic doctrine is above these extreme and mutually opposed positions of naturalism and pseudosupernaturalism. The Church teaches that our first parents were constituted in the state of holiness and justice and that this state was entirely gratuitous and supernatural. The Council of Trent declared, “If anyone does not confess that Adam the first man . . . lost that holiness and justice in which he was constituted, let him be anathema,” and “that he lost (this state) for himself alone and not for us, let him be anathema.” 14
These two propositions of Baius were condemned: “The sublimation and exaltation of human nature to fellowship with the divine nature was owing to the integrity of the first condition and therefore it should be considered natural and not supernatural”; 1 “The integrity of the primary creation was not an undeserved exaltation of human nature but its natural condition.” +°
From these declarations it follows that the first man was created
28 Denz., nos. 2074, 2103. 14 bid., no. 788; cf. ibid., nos. 316, 793. 15 Tbid., nos. 1021, 1026. 16 Ibid., nos. 1008, 1023 ff., 1385, 1516.
without sin, that he had free will, that he was endowed with the supernatural gifts of integrity’? and immortality; ** it follows too that God could have created man without supernatural grace,!® such a man as is born now.”° To preserve his primitive state man needed grace,”* and his merits were not purely human and natural.?**
This doctrine is revealed in Sacred Scripture. From the Old Testament it is clear: r. that prior to sin a certain familiarity existed between God and man; ** 2. that man was made to the image of God,* an expression that is clarified later; 3. that man was created righteous in a state of friendship with God, that is, loving God above all things, otherwise there would be no righteousness or rectitude. These texts must be understood according to the analogy of faith; their meaning becomes clearer in the light of the New Testament.
In the New Testament, however, when men are justified by sanctifying grace they are said to be regenerated, renewed, and restored to the state of the first man, who therefore was created and constituted in the same grace.”* Lastly, the grace we receive is truly supernatural, for by it “we are made partakers of the divine nature,” adopted sons of God, and enabled to see God as He is.” Therefore Adam too was created in the same supernatural grace.
This truth is confirmed in tradition. De Journel has collected the important texts in which it is expressly stated that prior to the Fall our first parents were endowed with gifts beyond the requirements of nature, such as original justice, immunity from concupiscence, freedom from the necessity of dying, and brilliant knowledge, and that they lived a most happy life.**
20 To be understood in the sense in which Baius’ proposition was condemned, namely, “In the beginning God could not have created a man such as is now born,” that is, without grace and the gift of integrity. Cf. Denz., nos. 1055, 1516.
27 Rouet de Journel, op. cit., index theol., 229-34: a collection of texts from St. Irenaeus, St. Athanasius, St. Jerome, St. Augustine. St. Irenaeus says that Adam “by disobedience lost that holiness which he had received from the Spirit” (Adv. haeres., III, xxiii, 5); St., Augustine says: “How can we therefore be said to be renewed if
This doctrine is proved by theological reason, as St. Thomas shows.”® According to the Scriptures, “God made man right,” ”* that is, just, for in the Scriptures the righteous are called just.° This righteousness or justice in which man was created consisted in this: that reason was subjected to God, by reason of the immunity from concupiscence the lower powers were subject to reason, and because of the immunity from pain and death the body was subject to the soul. St. Augustine explains that the first subjection was the cause of the second and the third, and that these were not natural otherwise they would have remained after sin.* Hence the first subjection was not natural but gratuitous, because the effect cannot be greater than the cause.
Nor can it be said that this first subjection referred only to the higher part of the gift of integrity, since it is called holiness and justice, in which the just are now regenerated by a truly supernatural grace. This will be made clearer in the following article, when we treat of the gift of integrity and the twofold subjection which this integrity implies and of the threefold harmony of the state of original justice,
Besides this, it seems repugnant that the entire human race should be deprived of the perfection necessary to attain its natural end by the sin of one man. Hence this perfection was not owing to nature but was supernatural, as defined by the Church.
Corollary. As St. Thomas shows,? Adam consequently had all the virtues in the state of innocence, that is, all the virtues by which reason is ordered to God and by which the lower powers are disposed according to the rule of reason. For sanctifying grace, in which the first man was created, is the root of all virtues, which flow from it as properties from the essence; and by these infused virtues our first parents were elevated to elicit supernatural acts and, with the help of actual grace, to merit their last end.* The Holy Trinity dwelt in their souls and they received the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are derived we do not receive that which the first man lost, in whom all die? . . . We receive justice from which man fell by sin” (De Gen. ad litt., VI, 24, 35). Cf. Denz., no. 105 (Council of Carthage); nos. 175, 192 (Second Council of Orange).
from charity. As St. Augustine said of the angels, “For them God at the same time established their nature and granted grace.” *4
THE GIFT OF INTEGRITY
State of the question. Besides sanctifying grace our first parents received the gift of integrity, by which they were perfected beyond the requirements of the order of nature. This gift of integrity comprises four preternatural gifts, namely, with regard to the body immunity from death and pain and some dominion over animals and the forces of nature, and with regard to the soul immunity from concupiscence and ignorance. We shall consider these four gifts separately with regard both to their essence and to their gratuitousness, beginning with those that are more certain according to revelation, that is, with the immunity from death and pain and then ascending to the higher gifts, for if God made the body of the first man perfect, He certainly also perfected his soul. Gradually we shall see the threefold harmony found in the state of original justice, namely, the threefold subjection of the soul to God by grace, of the lower powers to the soul illumined by faith and to the will clevated by charity, and of the body to the soul. We shall also see, as St. Augustine and St. Thomas have shown, how the two other subordinations depend on the higher harmony between God and the soul, and how, when the first is destroyed by sin, the other two also are lost.
By a privilege our first parents were constituted immune from death. Although they were naturally mortal, they were immune from the necessity of dying, that is, they would be preserved from death if they remained in grace and after the period of their probation they would have entered alive into heavenly bliss, as would also their posterity.
This doctrine is of faith according to various councils.°* The Council of Trent declared that the first man had incurred “the anger and indignation of God and consequently that death which God had threatened.” *°
Sacred Scripture explicitly affirms the existence of this gift. We
86 bid., no. 788; cf. declarations against Baius on the gratuity of this gift, :bid., nos. 1006, 1078, and the Synod of Pistoia, ibi., no. 1517.
read that the death of the body is the punishment for sin: “For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death”; ° “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return to the earth, out of which thou wast taken: for dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return.” 3° We read further: “For God created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him. But by the envy of the devil, death came into the world.” 3° Finally, the New Testament frequently affirms that death is the penalty for sin.*° Sacred Scripture emphasizes this privilege more than the other privileges since its loss is more keenly felt by all, and thus this privilege throws light on the other privileges.
Tradition also unanimously affirms that our first parents were immune from the necessity of dying.*? St. Augustine says of the first man: “He was therefore mortal because of the condition of his animal body, but he was immortal through the beneficence of the Creator.” 4?
St. Thomas explains the congruity and gratuity of this gift as follows: As long as the soul remained perfectly subject to God “it was fitting that in the beginning a power should be given the soul by which the body could be preserved better than the nature of corporeal matter.” As a material composite the body was by nature mortal, like the bodies of the animals; death would follow naturally either from some extrinsic cause or by age or natural corruption. Hence corporeal immortality was gratuitous and not owing to the nature of the body. Hence St. Thomas says: “His (Adam’s) body was not indissoluble by some force of immortality existing in him, but there was in the soul a certain supernatural power, divinely given, by which the soul was able to preserve the body from all corruption as long as the soul remained subject to God.” **
Perpetual preservation from bodily death was a miracle like the resurrection of the body, by which the natural life of the body is supernaturally restored; nature can of course produce life by genera-
41 Cf. Rouet de Journel, op. cit., index theol., 231 for texts from St. Theophilus of Antioch, St. Cyprian, St. Methodius, St. Athanasius, St. Hilary, St. John Chrysostom, and St. Augustine.
tion but it cannot preserve the body, in itself corruptible, from death. This immunity from death, however, was not as perfect as in the glorified body, for Adam still required nourishment, which the glorified body does not need.
The gratuity of this gift is more explicitly affirmed in the condemnation of many of Baius’ propositions.**
By a privilege our first parents were immune from pain and the miseries of this life. This teaching is generally regarded as theologically certain.*®
We find it expressed in Sacred Scripture, according to which our first parents enjoyed an abundance of good things in the terrestrial paradise, were active without becoming weary, ruled over animals and inferior beings,‘ and were untouched by all those sorrows that are explained as the penalty of sin.*7 Moreover, immortality presupposes the immunity from the pain and disease that dispose to death.
This teaching is affirmed by tradition.*®
The congruity of this doctrine is explained by St. Thomas as follows: Man’s body, since it is a material composite, is by its nature passible and mortal, like the bodies of brute animals, but as long as the soul remained subject to God “divine providence protected his body so that nothing unforeseen should occur to harm it.” *°
According to St. Thomas °° it is sufficiently clear from the first chapter of Genesis that the first man had dominion over all animals, not only with regard to right and power but also with regard to the exercise and use of that power, so that he was able to command them and they would obey. As less perfect beings, all animals are naturally subject to man. But now, after sin, the exercise and use of this dominion has been greatly weakened, and man is able to rule over only a few animals, and these obey only with difficulty.
By a special privilege our first parents were immune from inordinate concupiscence. This is theologically certain. The Council of
48 St. Augustine in particular explains this gift, De civitate Det, Bk. XIV, chap. 26. Cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Ep. ad Rom., V, 18; Rouet de Journel, op. cit., nos. 1762, 1962, 2013, 2122.
Trent declared that the Apostle often calls concupiscence sin,°* because “it comes from sin and inclines to sin,” but that concupiscence is not truly and properly a sin in those who are reborn.”
Sacred Scripture tells us that our first parents did not blush before the Fall, but afterward they were aware of their nakedness because of their disobedience.**
The Fathers of the Church, especially St. John Chrysostom, St. Augustine, and St. Cyril of Alexandria, explain these passages from Holy Scripture as follows: Before the Fall our first parents were immune from concupiscence and from the tumult of inordinate passions.°*
St. Thomas explains the congruity and gratuitousness in these words: “As long as reason remained subject to God, the lower powers were subject to it, as Augustine says.” It is clear however that the subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural, otherwise this subjection would have remained after man sinned.” °° The gratuitousness of this gift is made more manifest by the fact that “reason is influenced by the political dominion of the irascible and concupiscible parts, because the sensitive appetite has its own nature and is therefore able to resist the command of reason. The sensitive appetite is moved not only by the knowledge that is under the direction of universal reason but also by the imagination and the senses. Hence we have the experience that the irascible and concupiscible parts oppose reason because we feel and imagine something delectable, which reason forbids, or something unpleasant, which reason commands.” °?
Hence it is a privilege if man is preserved from the inordinate movements of sensibility.
By a special privilege our first parents were immune from ignorance. This too is theologically certain.*®
State of the question. Ignorance is the privation of that knowledge that one should have in view of his age and state in life. From the
54 Rouet de Journel, op. cit., index theol., no. 230. 55 De civitate Det, Bk. XIII, chap. 13.
preceding article it is clear that Adam had infused faith and the necessary supernatural knowledge to attain his supernatural end. We now ask whether he had natural knowledge proportionate to his state for the perfect government of himself and for the easy instruction of his children. In other words, did he have, as one created in adult age and as the head of the human race, adequate natural knowledge, acquired not by experience and study but infused per accidens, although such knowledge is per se acquirable? That he had such knowledge is commonly admitted.
From its mode of speaking, Sacred Scripture indicates that Adam was created not as an infant but as an adult, and therefore with a formed intellect. We read, “And the Lord God . . . brought them (all the animals and birds) to Adam to see what he would call them: for whatsoever Adam called any living creature the same is its name. And Adam called all the beasts by their names.” 5° At least, therefore, Adam had sufficient knowledge to distinguish the various animals and give them a fitting name. He did not, however, acquire this knowledge gradually by experience; it was therefore infused.
Similarly Adam knew the meanings of the parts of speech, the proper meaning of noun, verb, and adjective, and thus he had rather advanced knowledge not only of grammar but also of philosophy if he was able to make the distinction between the meaning of the verb “to be” and “to have,” and so he could understand that God alone is His own being and subsisting being itself, whereas a creature, no matter how perfect, Aad being but was not its own being. He would also have had a rather advanced knowledge if he understood the meaning, the necessity, and universality of the first principles of reason and being, namely, the principles of contradiction, efficient causality, and finality, by which the human mind naturally ascends to the knowledge of the supreme cause and the ultimate end.
Finally, as the head of the human race, and living in familiar friendship with God, as the biblical narrative tells us, he should have had a certain knowledge of moral and religious matters in order to impart the necessary instruction to his children. Sacred Scripture tells us, “He gave them counsel, . . . and a heart to devise: and He filled them with the knowledge of understanding. He created in them the science of the spirit, He filled their heart with wisdom, and showed them both good and evil. He set his eye upon their hearts to show
them the greatness of His works, that they might praise the name which He hath sanctified: and glory in His wondrous acts.” °°
Tradition affirms the truth that Adam’s knowledge was of the highest order."
St. Thomas explains the congruity and gratuitousness of this gift in this way: “Since the first things were established by God not only so that they might exist in themselves but that they might be the principles for other things, they were produced in such a perfect state that they might be the principles for other things. Therefore the first man was established in a perfect state with regard to his body . . . and with regard to his soul, so that he would be able immediately to instruct and rule... . The first man received such knowledge of supernatural things as was necessary to govern the human race in that perfect state.” °* This knowledge was beyond what was owing to nature. But Adam did not see God or the angels in their essences, nor did he know future contingents or the secrets of hearts.
St. Thomas says further: “The righteousness of that first state was not compatible with any deception in the intellect,” ** and “the seduction (or deception) of the woman, even though it preceded the sin in deed, nevertheless followed the sin of internal elation” which the woman conceived immediately after hearing the words of the serpent.** Further, if the innocent Adam was created so perfect with regard to his body as to be preserved from death, it is all the more true that he was created perfect with regard to his intellect.
According to St. Thomas, Adam foreknew the incarnation of God, although he did not know he was to sin; he had a more excellent knowledge of God and the angels than we have; his knowledge was midway between our knowledge and that of the blessed. In his knowledge Adam needed the phantasm.”
Conclusion. With regard to the gratuitousness of these four privileges of the state of innocence we can easily understand why the following propositions of Baius were condemned: “The integrity of
61 Cf. Rouet de Journel, op. cit., Index theol., no. 232 for texts from St. Augustine, St. Cyril of Alexandria, and St. John Damascene.
the first creation was not an undeserved exaltation of human nature but its natural condition”; “God could not have created such a human being in the beginning as is now born.” °° This second proposition was condemned in Baius’ sense, that is, a human being without grace and the gift of integrity. By this the Church affirms that God could have created a man without grace and the gift of integrity, that is, with some ignorance, concupiscence, certain weaknesses, and subject to death.
Corollary. A state of nature, without grace, without the gift of integrity, and without sin, is therefore possible. This follows from the condemnation of Baius’ propositions.” Theological reason supports this conclusion, as Billuart explained at great length.®* St. Thomas explains, “In the beginning, when God made man, He could also have made another man out of the slime of the earth, leaving him in the condition of his nature, so that he would be passible and mortal, knowing the war of concupiscence against reason; and in this man there would be no derogation of human nature, because these things follow from the principles of his nature.” °° God was not obliged to give man anything more, because grace and the preternatural gifts are not owing to man.”
The Augustinians Noris and Berti were akin to Baius when they said that the state of pure nature is possible by God’s absolute power but not God’s power as ordered by wisdom and goodness. If this were true, the grace given our first parents was due them from the Creator in propriety. This teaching has not been condemned by the Church, but it seems to approach too closely to Baius’ doctrine.
We conclude with St. Thomas: “If anyone considers this matter carefully, he can at least probably conclude that if there is a divine providence that adapts suitable perfectibles to each of the perfections, God joined the higher nature of the soul to the lower nature of the body that the soul might rule the body, and, if some obstacle to this rule should arise from the defect of nature, it would be removed by God’s special and supernatural beneficence.” 77
68 Billuart, De gratia, diss. II, a.2.
THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE
With regard to the body, children born in the state of innocence would enjoy perfect subjection of the body to the soul and they would be equipped for the acts suitable to childhood, because their parents would transmit human nature as they had received it.
With regard to the soul, if men persevered in the state of innocence, would they be born with original justice and sanctifying grace even though neither the soul nor grace are carried over by generation?
St. Thomas replies by quoting these words of St. Anselm: “If man did not sin, those whom he generated would be just at the same time that they received a rational soul.” 7?
St. Thomas explains: “I reply by saying that man naturally generates a being similar to himself in species. Hence in the case of whatever accidental things follow upon the nature of the species it is necessary that the children resemble their parents, unless some error take place in the operations of nature, which would not have happened in the state of innocence. In particular accidents however, it is not necessary that the children be like the parents. But original justice, in which the first man was established, was an accident belonging to the nature of the species, not indeed caused by the principles of the species but as a certain gift divinely conferred on the entire nature. This is clear when we recall that opposites belong to the same genus. But original sin, which is the opposite of that original justice, is said to be the sin of the nature, and hence is carried on by the parents to the offspring. Because of this the children were like the parents with regard to original justice.”
“In replying to the second objection, in which some say that the children were not born with gratuitous justice (grace), which is the principle of meriting, but only with original justice: since the root of original justice, in whose righteousness man was created, consists in the supernatural subjection of reason to God, which makes man pleasing by grace, it is necessary to say that if the children are born in original justice, they are also born in grace, as we said above about the first man, who was established in grace. But this did not make it a
natural grace, because it was not transmitted by virtue of the seed but was conferred on man as soon as he received a rational soul, just as, when the body is disposed, God infuses the rational soul, which similarly is not passed on by the parents.”
In the state of innocence men were not confirmed in grace when they were born, because the children at the time of their birth had no more in the way of perfection than their parents.** Children born in the state of innocence were not perfect in knowledge, but in time they easily acquired perfect knowledge.”
WHETHER SANCTIFYING GRACE WAS A GIFT OF NATURE OR A PERSONAL GIFT IN ADAM
Some modern writers hold that in Adam sanctifying grace was not an endowment of nature but purely a personal gift.” They admit that the gift of original justice was an “accident of nature,” to be transmitted with nature itself by generation, but they say that sanctifying grace has no intrinsic connection with original justice and was only the efficient cause or a condition sine qua non of original justice. From this it would follow that sanctifying grace was not transmitted with the nature and original justice by generation but that God immediately granted this grace to the person when he was generated, because of the disposition of the integrity of human nature. Finally, it would be inferred from this that original sin is not the privation of sanctifying grace but only the privation of integrity of nature.
Indeed, according to these writers, this doctrine is found not only in the works of many Scholastics who before the time of St. Thomas held that Adam received sanctifying grace after his creation and in view of his personal disposition, but these writers say that this is the definitive teaching of St. Thomas himself as found in the Theological Summa.
15 Cf. Kors, O.P., La Justice primitive et le péché originel d'après S. Thomas, Bibliothèque thomiste, Kain 1922, p. 139; Bittremieux, “La distinction entre la justice originelle et la grace sanctifiante d'après S Thomas d'Aquin,” Revue Thomiste, April-June, 1921; Michel, “La grace sanctifiante et la justice originelle,” Revue Thomiste, 1922, p. 424; Jos. van der Meersch, “De distinctione inter justitiam originalem et gratiam sanctificantem,” Collationes Brugenses, XXII; P. E. Hugon, O.P., “De gratia primi hominis,” Angelicum, 1927, pp. 361-81; Dict. théol. cath., “Justice originelle.”
We shall inquire first whether this thesis is true according to the obvious sense of the Church’s definitions, and secondly whether it is the teaching of St. Thomas.
I. THE CHURCH’S TEACHING ON THE GIFT OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE AND ON ORIGINAL SIN
I. The Council of Trent declared: “If anyone shall assert that Adam’s sin injured himself alone and not his posterity, and that Adam forfeited for himself alone and not for us also the holiness and justice which he had lost; or that the sin of disobedience transmitted to the whole human race only death and the punishment of the body but not the sin which is the death of the soul, let him be anathema, because he contradicts the Apostle, who said, ‘Wherefore as by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.’ ” *®
The words “holiness and justice which he had lost” clearly indicate not only integrity of nature but also sanctifying grace, and therefore we may construct the following argument against the aforesaid thesis.
Adam lost for himself and for us “holiness and justice,” that is, sanctifying grace and not merely the integrity of nature. But what he lost for himself and for us he had not received purely as a personal gift. Therefore Adam received sanctifying grace not only as a personal gift but also as a hereditary gift of nature.
If it should be objected that Adam lost the integrity of nature directly for us and indirectly lost sanctifying grace, this would no longer be the obvious meaning of the Council, for the obvious meaning is that which is understood apart from any implied distinction. Indeed what the Council primarily proposes as received for us and lost for us is holiness itself, which in the accepted language of the Church most certainly means more than the integrity of nature, and specifically means sanctifying grace. Hence the doctrine that holds that grace in Adam was a gift of nature is at least more conformable to the declarations of the Council of Trent than the other.
II. A similar argument may be drawn from the definition of original sin given by the Council. The Council of Trent declared that original sin is the “death of the soul.” ™ But in the language of the Church the “death of the soul” is essentially the privation of the
76 Rom. 5:12; Denz., no. 789. TT Loc. cit.; cf. Council of Orange, Denz., no. 175.
spiritual life of grace. Therefore original sin is the privation of original justice, since sanctifying grace is intrinsically related to this justice.
In the thesis which we are opposing, original sin cannot be called the death of the soul except dispositively, for in that thesis original sin is only the privation of the integrity of nature and the disposition for the privation of sanctifying grace. But this is not the obvious sense of the Council. According to the fathers of the Council, the holiness which Adam lost for himself and for us was grace, and original sin is transmitted in generation with human nature and without God’s grace.*®
III. This doctrine is confirmed by the Church’s teaching about the principal effect of baptism. By baptism original sin is remitted. But baptism directly and immediately confers grace but it does not restore the integrity of nature. Therefore if original sin consisted formally in the privation of the gift of integrity, it would not be forgiven in baptism, because concupiscence remains in those who are reborn in baptism.*®
If it should be said that the gift of integrity is restored with regard to the subjection of the mind to God through the healing effect of grace, we reply that even in the will of the baptized person the good is still difficult and the inclination to evil remains, and this was not true of man in the state of integral nature.®° Here again this thesis departs from the obvious sense of the Council of Trent.
IV. In the schema of the Vatican Council we read: “Under anathema we proscribe the heretical doctrine of those who have dared to say that in Adam’s posterity original sin is not truly and properly a sin unless by actual consent they approve this sin by sinning, or who deny that the privation of sanctifying grace belongs to the nature of original sin, which grace our first parent lost for himself and his posterity by voluntary sin.” ** Later on the Council explained as follows: “It is not said that this privation of grace is the essence itself of original sin, . . . but that it pertains to the nature or original sin, which is still true as long as it is not denied that this privation is necessarily connected with original sin.” ** This explanation was added in view of the opinion of certain ancient Scholastics, which was not rejected as
erroneous. But according to the obvious sense of the Council of Trent the Vatican Council declared, “Adam . . . by his voluntary sin lost grace not only as it was personal to himself but as it was to be derived from God’s institution by all of his posterity. That which is said to pertain to the nature of original sin is not only the negative lack of sanctifying grace but the privation of grace, that is, the lack of holiness, which according to God’s ordination was to be in all of Adam’s posterity, since in the beginning it elevated the whole human race in its root and in its head to the supernatural order of grace; now however Adam’s descendants are deprived of this grace.” **
This is saying equivalently that in the innocent Adam sanctifying grace was not only a personal gift but a gift to human nature to be transmitted with that nature, and this grace Adam lost for himself and for his posterity, as the Council of Trent has declared.
Otherwise Catholic theologians of almost every school who at least since the time of Baius taught this doctrine would have been in error about the very definition of original sin and original justice. This would be hard to admit, but this is precisely what is affirmed in the defense of the aforesaid thesis.**
- THE DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS ON THIS MATTER
St. Thomas was certainly not ignorant of the second canon of the Council of Orange, in which original sin is called the death of the soul, that is, the privation of the spiritual life of grace.” He must also have read similar expressions in the works of St. Augustine, when St. Augustine explained that prior to baptism there is in concupiscence the guilt of sin, although concupiscence is not in itself culpable, nor does it remain culpable in the baptized. Nor was St. Thomas unaware of the teaching of St. Anselm, who wrote: “( Adam) lost that grace which he had been able to preserve for those who were to descend from him,” “he lost that grace which he had always been able to preserve for his descendants.” *° “Because therefore, having been
85 Cf. Denz., no. 175: “If anyone shall assert that Adam’s transgression harmed himself alone and not his progeny, or say that only the death of the body, which is the penalty of sin, and not the sin, which is the death of the soul, was transmitted to the whole human race by one man, he does an injury to God by contradicting the Apostle, who said, ‘By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned’ (Rom. 5:12).” 86 De conceptu virginali, chap. 10.
placed in the high position of such a great grace, he of his own will abandoned the good things which he had received to be preserved for himself and them (his posterity), and thus his children lost what the father might have given them by preserving it and what he abandoned by not preserving it.” 57
Some of the aforesaid writers think that St. Anselm is here speaking of grace in the broadest sense, inasmuch as creation itself is a certain grace.** From the context, however, it is clear enough that St. Anselm is speaking of grace in the proper sense and of preternatural gifts.°®
St. Thomas’ definitive doctrine on this question is found not in the Commentary on the Sentences, but in the works that he wrote toward the end of his life, especially in the Theological Summa. The opinion St. Thomas gives in the Commentary on the Sentences was regarded by himself as less probable, and later he receded from it more and more. No clear text to support it can be found in the Theological Summa; indeed in the work De malo many opposing passages can be found.
In the Commentary on the Sentences St. Thomas does present the opinion that in the innocent Adam sanctifying grace was only a personal gift and not a gift to human nature, but even then he considered the opposite opinion probable, and later in the Theological Summa he defends only this opposite opinion.
In the Commentary on the Sentences St. Thomas asks, Whether in the state of innocence children are born in grace? The holy doctor then presents two opinions: “Some say that the first man was created with only natural gifts and not with gratuitous gifts, and from this it seems that for such justice some preparation by personal acts would be required. Hence according to this view such grace would be a personal property belonging to the soul, and thus it would be in no way transmitted, except as an aptitude. Others, however, say that man was created in grace, and according to this view it seems that the gift of gratuitous justice was conferred on human nature itself, and hence grace would be infused at the same time that human nature was transmitted.” °°
In the Commentary on the Sentences St. Thomas defends this sec-
89 St, Anselm, op. cit., chap. 10; PL, CLVIII, 444. 90 St. Thomas, Sent., II, d.20, q.2, a.3.
ond opinion as more probable: “This however is more probable: since man was created with integral natural gifts, which could not have been given without a purpose, turning to God in the first instant of his creation, man obtained grace, and this opinion should be sup- ported.” °! In the Theological Summa St. Thomas speaks more confidently: “Some say that the first man was not created in grace. . . . But as others say, he was established in grace, and this seems to be required by that righteousness of man’s first state in which God made him, according to the words, ‘God made man right.’ °* This righteousness consisted in the fact that reason was subject to God, the lower powers were subject to reason, and the body was subject to the soul. The first subjection is the cause of the second and the third. As long as reason remained subject to God, the lower powers were subject to reason, as St. Augustine said. It is clear, however, that this subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural. . . . Hence it is also clear that that first subjection of reason to God was not only according to nature but according to the supernatural gift of grace, for the effect cannot be more powerful than the cause.” °?
As St. Thomas’ teaching developed, the corollary of the opinion referred to earlier became more firmly established: “Others say that man was created in grace, and from this it seems that the gift of gratuitous justice was conferred on human nature itself, and hence grace would be infused at the same time as human nature was transmitted.” °*
In the Theological Summa, considering the same question, whether men were born with justice, he says, “Original justice, however, in which the first man was established, was an accident of the nature of the species; not as if it were caused by the principles of the species but only as a gift divinely conferred on the whole nature.” “In reply to the second difficulty, in which some say that children were not born with gratuitous justice, which is the principle of meriting, but with original justice: since the root of original justice, in whose righteousness man was created, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which by grace makes man pleasing to God, it is necessary to say that, if children were born in original justice, they were
also born with grace, just as we said above °” that the first man was established with grace.” °°
Nor can it be said, according to St. Thomas’ definitive teaching, that sanctifying grace was the extrinsic root of original justice.
In De malo St. Thomas says, “Original justice includes grace gratum faciens.” ™ In the same work, replying to the objection: “But the divine vision is not owing to one who has original justice, since he is able not to have grace. Therefore the perpetual lack of the divine vision does not correspond to original sin,” St. Thomas replied: “In reply to the thirteenth difficulty I say that this reasoning is in accord with those who say that grace gratum faciens is not included in the idea of original justice. This I believe to be false, because, since original justice consists primordially in the subjection of the human mind to God, which subjection cannot be permanent without grace, therefore original justice cannot be without grace.” °*
Hence, according to St. Thomas grace gratum faciens is included in the idea of original justice. But what is included in the idea of a thing is not an extrinsic efficient cause, otherwise God would be included in the idea of the creature. Nor is this grace merely an extrinsic condition sine qua non, because the subjection of the mind to God “cannot be permanent without grace.” Thus grace and charity, which flows from grace, are more than conditions sine qua non of this primordial subjection because they positively influence it. This habitual primordial subjection is the formal effect of infused charity.
Moreover, according to this text, original justice implies the subjection of the mind to God as the author of grace, because from the integrity of nature with proportionate natural helps alone there results the efficacious love of God as the author of nature.* If therefore the subjection of the mind to God required for original justice “cannot be permanent without grace,” it must be a subjection of the mind to God as the author of grace and not of nature alone. .
This conclusion reached in De malo +°" is the same as that found in the Theological Summa: “Since the root of original justice, in whose
righteousness man was created, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which by grace makes man pleasing to God, as we said above,’®? it is necessary to say that if children were born in original justice, they were also born in grace, just as we said above that man was established in grace.” ° Because, as he had said earlier,° “man was created in grace, and according to this view it seems that the gift of gratuitous justice was conferred on human nature itself, and hence grace would be infused at the same time as human nature was transmitted.”
Nor can it be said that sanctifying grace in the innocent Adam was only the intrinsic root of original justice, as infused faith is the root of sacred theology, which is acquired by human study. St. Thomas says: “Original justice belonged primordially to the essence of the soul, for it was a divine gift conferred on human nature, which refers rather to the essence than to the potencies of the soul. The potencies seem to belong rather to the person inasmuch as they are the principles of personal acts. Hence the potencies are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are personal sins.” 1°% If therefore “original justice belonged primordially to the essence of the soul,” there was nothing primordially besides the entitative habit of sanctifying grace. For there were not in the essence of the soul two entitative habits, namely, the habit of the integrity of nature and the habit of sanctifying grace, just as there are not two distinct habits of healing habitual grace and elevating habitual grace.
Nor is the aforesaid opinion supported by the fact that St. Thomas frequently said that grace gratum faciens is the root of original justice. A root is not necessarily extrinsic, for example, the root of a tree is a part of the tree. Moreover, as the essence of the soul is the root of the faculties, so sanctifying grace is the root of the infused virtues, and a fortiori sanctifying grace, which is included in original justice, is the root of original justice, inasmuch as “original justice belonged primordially to the essence of the soul,” ° and consisted in the threefold subjection of the mind to God, of the lower powers to reason, and of the body to the soul (by the privilege of immunity from pain and death).
This was Cajetan’s understanding of the word “root.” 1°? Cajetan also remarked: “According to him (St. Thomas), grace gratum faciens belongs to the idea of original justice.” 2°*
Capreolus pointed out against Durandus: “Grace gratum faciens alone was not original justice, which included something more than grace; baptism restores this grace but not those other things that belong to this kind of justice. Hence baptism does not restore original justice completely but only a part of it.” 1°°
Ferrariensis wrote: “From this we can see that original justice included grace as its root because, just as the subjection of the body and the lower powers was supernatural through original justice, which was a grace gratis data, so the subjection of reason to God had to be supernatural, through grace gratum faciens, whose function it is to subject the soul supernaturally.” *7°
We see, therefore, that there are no texts, at least no clear texts in the Theological Summa, to support the contention that the aforesaid opinion represents the definitive doctrine of St. Thomas. Indeed there are many contrary texts. Perhaps for this reason one of the recent exponents of this theory cited no texts from the Theological Summa, but instead injected his theory of adoption, according to which sanctifying grace can only be personal and not a gift to human nature to be transmitted with that nature.*’?
This theory, however, is without any foundation. When a rich man adopts a poor man he can give him a hereditary title of nobility. Why cannot God do the same for Adam and in him elevate the human race to the order of grace, as the Vatican Council declared, “God in the beginning elevated the whole human race in its head to the supernatural order of grace”? *?® This is what St. Thomas said: “Others say that man was created in grace, and according to this view it seems that the gift of gratuitous justice was conferred on human nature itself, and when human nature is transmitted grace is transmitted at the same time.” *** At that time St. Thomas held this view to be the more probable and in his later works he defended it more and more.
112 Vatican Council, Collectio Lacensts, VII, 549. 118 St, Thomas, Sent., II, d.20, q.2, a.3.
Objection may be made that St. Thomas wrote: “The first sin of the first man not only deprived the sinner of his own personal good, namely, grace and the proper order of the soul, but also of the good that belonged to the common nature.” *** From this and similar passages it seems at first that in the innocent Adam sanctifying grace was only a personal gift. But if we study these texts carefully we see that sanctifying grace was a personal gift as conferred on a person, but not to one single person alone, but to that person as a part and the head of the community which is the human race. This is clear from what St. Thomas says in De malo when he asks, whether any sin is contracted by origin: “We must say absolutely that sin is transmitted from the first parents to his posterity by origin. In support of this we must consider that an individual man can be considered in two ways. In the first place a man is a certain single person; in the second place he is part of a group (collegium). Thus the entire multitude of men receiving human nature from the first parent should be considered as one group, or as the one body of one man, and in this multitude each man, even Adam himself, can be considered as one individual person or as a member of this multitude, which by natural origin is derived from one man. To the first man at the time of his creation God gave a certain supernatural gift, original justice, by which the reason was made subject to God, the lower powers were subjected to the reason, and the body was made subject to the soul. This gift, however, was not given to the first man as a single person alone but as the principle of all human nature, which was to be derived from him through origin by his posterity. Having received this gift, the first man, when he sinned voluntarily, lost it under the same aspect as that under which he had received it, namely, for himself and for all his posterity.” 11°
From all this it is sufficiently clear that sanctifying grace was, according to St. Thomas and also according to reason, not merely a personal gift to the innocent Adam, but an endowment of nature, since “original justice includes grace gratum faciens.”
114 Contra Gentes, Bk. IV, chap. 52. 115 Bittremieux, art. cit., Revue Thomiste, April-June, 1921, p. 127. ue De malo, q.4, a.2 ad 1; Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q.81,0a.2; q.85, a.3.
Footnotes
Chapter 45 of 46