Lecture 1 — The nature of memory
About memory (For a discussion of the key terms mnēmē (memory) and anamnēsis (recollection), see the Translator’s Introduction in Commentaries on Aristotle’s “On Sense and What is Sensed” and “On Memory and Recollection” (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 169–82.) and remembering we must say what it is, and owing to what cause it comes about, and in which of the parts of the soul this affection (Greek: to pathos: Lat. passio. See Webster’s Third International Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam, 1964), s.v. “[1] passion . . . 4 a: the state of being subjected to or acted on by what is external or foreign to one’s true nature. . . . b: a capacity of being affected or acted upon by external agents or influences . . . 5 a (1): EMOTION, FEELING.” An Aristotelian pathos expresses any way of being affected, and also, more specifically, the ways the soul can be affected by an exterior mover, including emotionally. The entry “[3] affection” gives the generic sense “an action of affecting or state of being affected,” and “[1] affection” touches on the way that being affected plays out in the present context: “4 psychol a: the feeling aspect of consciousness . . . b: [1] AFFECT”—here mainly in its obsolete sense of “feeling or emotion” rather than in its narrower psychological sense of “the conscious subjective aspect of an emotion considered apart from bodily changes.” Broadly speaking, the Greek pair of terms (poiein and paschein) provides the point of analogy for the usage found both in Latin (agere and pati), and in English (acting and being affected) where the pairs of terms are used analogously.) occurs; and we must do the same about recollecting.
For those who are good at remembering are not the same as those who are good at recollecting; rather, as frequently happens, those who are slow to learn are more able to remember, while those who are quick and learn easily are able to recollect.
Since the question “What sort of things are memorable?” is frequently misleading, this is the first point to be taken up.
For the future is not remembered, but it can be thought about and expected. Moreover, there will also be a science of expectation, (Epistēmē . . . elpistikē: on “elpis,” see Karl M. Woschitz, Elpis-Hoffnung: Geschichte, Philosophie, Exegese, Theologie eines Schlusselbegriffs (Wien: Herder, 1979).) which some call divination.
Nor is memory of the present, but sense is. For by sense we know neither the future nor what’s been done, but only the present.
But memory is of what has been: now no one will say that the present is being remembered while it is at hand, e.g., this white object while someone is seeing it, no one will say he is remembering it;
nor will he say that he is remembering what is being considered while he is considering or understanding it; but they generally call the first act sense and only the second knowing.
But since one may have knowledge and sense without the
acts, (In the last paragraph of his commentary on this paragraph, Aquinas will contrast these acts of knowing and sensing with habitual knowledge and having a sensed power without actually using it (see 449b15).) one may remember that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles in this way: this occurs in the one case since he has learned or speculated upon it, and in the other since he has heard or seen it or some other such thing. For when one acts according to memory, one always speaks thus in one’s soul—that one has heard or felt or understood it before.
Therefore there is a thing called memory, and it is neither sense nor opinion, but with any of these there is a habit or an affection once time has passed. But of the now itself there is no memory in the now itself, as has been said. Rather sense is of the present; expectation, of the future; and memory, of the past. For this reason, only those animals that sense time remember, and they do so by the very thing by which they sense it.
298. As the Philosopher says in the seventh book on the Histories of Animals, (Aristotle, History of Animals 8.1, 588b4–17. Aquinas’s text refers to “the seventh book of the History of Animals”; more recent editors use “eighth.” Greek authors will be cited according to the abbreviations given in Henry G. Liddell, Robert Scott, and Henry S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940). Father René Gauthier compiled a massive collection of notes for the Leonine edition; his notes to the De sensu et sensato commentary (Leonine “Tractatus 1”) will be cited hereafter according to treatise, chapter, and Leonine edition line (e.g., Gauthier’s final note on the De sensu is given at 1.18, Leonine ed., p. 101, lines 313–14); those to the De memoria et reminiscentia commentary (Leonine “Tractatus 2”) will be cited similarly (e.g., his final note to the De memoria is at 2.8, Leonine ed., p. 133, lines 162–63).) nature proceeds from inanimate to animate things little by little, so that the genus of inanimate things comes before the genus of plants. For plants, when compared to other bodies, seem to be animate, even though when they are compared to the genus of animals they seem to be inanimate. In the same way, nature proceeds from plants to animals in a continuous order; for certain immobile animals—those that adhere to the earth—seem to differ little from plants. So, too, in the order of progression from animals to man, some animals are found in which something like reason appears. For although prudence—“the right reason of things one can do,” as it is called in the sixth book of the Ethics (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.1, 1144b26–28; 6.7, 1141b22–1142a32; 7.10, 1152a6–36; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Ethics, bk. 6, lect. 7; bk. 7, lect. 10. Cf. Gauthier’s note to the De sensu commentary: Tractatus 1, ch. 1 (Leonine ed., p. 15, line 298), for a broader notion of “prudence” found in Albert the Great.)—is a virtue proper to man, some animals are found to participate in a sort of prudence. (Cf. ST II-II.47.15, arg. 3. See Gauthier’s note to De sensu commentary, tract. 1, ch. 1 (Leonine ed., p. 169), for references to History of Animals 8. Modern editors refer to Book 9 rather than Book 8.) This is so not because they can reason, but because they are moved to act by a natural instinct. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Ethics, bk. 3, lect. 19 (Leonine ed., p. 182, lines 205–6), with Gauthier’s note on the terms “instinctus naturae” and “instinctus naturalis.” See George Klubertanz, The Discursive Power (St. Louis, Mo.: Modern Schoolman, 1952), pp. 150 and 160–61.) Such acts result from an apprehension by the sensitive part (Since the soul is not divisible into quantitative parts, the term “part” is used in some other sense, e.g., a “virtual” part, i.e., the soul as distinguished according to its various capacities for action, its “virtues” or active powers.) of the soul, as if they were done from reason.
The role of prudence is to direct the prudent man to do what ought to be done by considering not only the present but also the past. This is why Cicero (M. Tullius Cicero, Rhetorici Libri duo De inventione 2.53, 160 (ed. Stroebel, pp. 147b–148b); also cited by Augustine, On the Trinity 14.11, 14 (ed. Mountain, CCL, t. 50A, p. 441); cf. Aquinas, De veritate, q. 10, a. 2, s.c. 2 (Leonine ed., vol. 22, p. 300, lines 67–71).) sets down as the parts of prudence not only foresight, through which future things are attended to, but also understanding, through which present things are considered, and memory, through which past things are apprehended. Accordingly, even other animals that seem to have something like prudence must have not only a sense awareness of present things but also a memory of past things. Therefore, at the beginning of the Metaphysics (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 980a27–981a1; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Metaphysics, bk. 1, lect. 1, nn. 10–14.) the Philosopher says that in the case of certain animals memory comes from sensation, and for this reason they are prudent.
299. Just as these animals have an imperfect sort of prudence compared to that of man, so is their memory likewise imperfect. For other animals only remember, while men both remember and recollect. (Cf. 2.2, 453a6–14; ch. 8.) Now Aristotle proceeds step by step, and, after the book in which he treats sensation, (Aristotle, On Sense and What is Sensed, 436a1–449b3; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Sense and What is Sensed, nn. 1–297.) which is common to all the animals, he now treats of memory and recollection, the latter of which is found only in men, and the former both in men and in the perfect animals. (Perfect animals have three parts—a receptor for nourishment, a part for expelling wastes, and an intermediate part, viz. a “chest” or something analogous. Aristotle, De juventute et senectute 2, 468a13–17; Posterior Analytics 2.10, 655b28–32. Gauthier’s cross-reference to 2.2 at 450a18–22 makes no explicit mention of “perfect animals” but speaks of non-human animals that sense time.)
300. Accordingly, this book is divided into two parts.
In the first place Aristotle gives his prologue, in which he presents what he sets out to do;
in the second, he begins to treat the things he has in mind, where he says since the question (449b9; [303]).
As to the first point, he says that there are two things to be discussed.
The first is concerned with memory and its activity, remembering. About this he promises to discuss three points, namely what memory or remembering is, what its cause is, and to which part of the soul the affection of remembering belongs. For all the operations of the sensitive part of the soul are affections, (Latin: passiones.) inasmuch as sensing is somehow to be affected. (Latin: pati. Cf. Aristotle, On Sense and What is Sensed, ch. 1, where Aquinas says Aristotle calls sensing (sentire) an affection (passio) with Gauthier’s note citing Aristotle, On the Soul 2.10, and 2.23.)
301. In the second place, he promises to discuss recollecting. Now lest recollecting and remembering appear to be identical, he indicates their difference: they are each found in different sorts of men. For we do not find that the same men have good memories and good powers of recollection. Rather, as frequently happens, those who are slow at discovering and learning have better memories; whereas those who are quick-witted at discovering things on their own and in learning things from others are better at recollecting.
302. The reason for this is that the diversity of man’s capacity to perform various acts of the soul arises from the diverse dispositions of the body. We see that those bodily things that receive an impression slowly and with difficulty, such as stone, retain the impression well; while those, such as water, that take an impression easily, do not retain it well. (Cf. 2.1, 450a32–b11; ch. 3, as well as Avicenna, De anima 1.5 (ed. Van Riet, p. 88, 25–29): “You ought to know that receiving proceeds from one power which is other than the one from which there is retaining; and consider this in water, which has the power of receiving ‘insculpations,’ depictions, and figure in general, and has no power for retaining them”; 4.2 (p. 32, 48–51): “For although he who is of a dry constitution retains things well, he does not receive them so well; but though he who is of a humid temperament quickly receives one, he quickly loses it and it is as though he had never received it.” Cf. Averroes, Compendium libri De memoria (ed. Shields-Blumberg, pp. 69–70); Albert the Great, De anima 2, tr. 4, ch. 7 (ed. Col., 7.1, p. 157, 22–25): “We know that the power that retains well is other than the power that receives well, since one who retains well is perfected by the cold and the dry while one who receives well is perfected by the moist”; Albert the Great, De memoria 1.1 (p. 98a): “In the De anima we have established that it is impossible for the same organic power to receive well and to preserve well”; Aquinas himself, Disputed Questions on the Soul, q. 13: “For in bodily things the principle of receiving is other than that of preserving; for the things that are able to be received well are sometimes badly preserved”; ST I.78.4: “In bodily things receiving and retaining are reduced to diverse principles: for moist things receive well and keep badly, whereas the opposite holds for dry things”; cf. ch. 2 (Leonine ed., p. 108, lines 87–92, p. 110, lines 171–179, with annotations).) Since remembering is merely keeping in good condition the things that have once been received, it follows that those who are slow to receive an impression retain it well once they have accepted it, and this is to remember it well; whereas those who accept something with ease often lose it just as easily. Recollecting, on the other hand, is a sort of rediscovery of things that were previously accepted but no longer preserved, and so those that are quick to discover things and to receive instruction are also good at recollecting.
303. Then, when he says since the question (449b9), he pursues what he set out to do.
First, he treats of remembering;
second of recollecting, at it remains, however, for us to talk about recollecting (451a18; [350]).
In regard to the first topic, he does three things.
In the first place, he shows what remembering is;
second, he shows to what part of the soul it belongs, at we have spoken however, about imagination (ch. 2, 449b30; [311]);
third, he shows the cause of memory, at one might perhaps wonder (ch. 3, 450a25; [327]).
Since operations, habits, and powers are specified by their objects, (Albert the Great, De memoria, 1.2 (p. 99b): “But since one has to learn the powers (virtutes) and acts of the soul . . . from their objects.” Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 1, lect. 8, n. 111 (Leonine ed., p. 38, lines 47–48), with notes; Commentary on Aristotle’s On Memory, ch. 1 (Leonine ed., p. 105, line 99, note).) he does two things concerning the first topic.
First, he asks what the object of memory is;
second, he concludes with a definition of memory, at therefore there is a thing called memory (449b24; [309]).
As to the first, he does two things.
First, he tells us what he wishes to discuss;
second, he explains what he has set out to do, at for the future is not (449b10; [304]).
As to the first of these points, he says that to explain memory one must, to begin with, grasp what sort of things are remembered, because objects are prior to acts, and acts prior to powers, as has been observed in the second book of On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415a18–22; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 6, nn. 304–8.) It is necessary to settle this matter since it is frequently deceiving: some think that there is memory of things about which actually there is not. (See 2.1, 451a2–12; 2.2, 452b24–26; cf. ch. 3; ch. 7. Gauthier reports an alternative explanation from Adam of Bocfeld, In De memoria, 2a rec. (Vat. lat. 5988, f. 26va): “Since every cognition is of some presently beheld object of cognition, one might believe that memory is either not a cognition at all, or else it is the cognition of something present.”)
304. Then when he says for the future is not (449b10), he explains what he has set out to do.
First, he says that memory is not of future things;
second, he says it is not of the present, at nor is memory of the present (449b13; [306]);
third, he says it is of the past, at but memory is of what has been (449b15; [307]).
Accordingly, in the first place, he says that future things are not remembered, but of them there is opinion. Such things belong to the cognoscitive power of opinion, as when one thinks (Latin: opinatur. The cognoscitive power, then, would seem to aim at expressing some truth, in contrast with the appetitive power, which anticipates some good. (Cf. De veritate 1.1, Leonine ed., vol. 22.1, p. 5, lines 155–61.)) that something is going to happen, or to the appetitive power of hope or expectation, (Neither Aristotle nor the Stoics included “hope” or “expectation” (spes, Gk. elpis) among the passions, and so the source of this doctrine is obscure; cf. R. Gauthier, Magnanimité (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951), p. 33; p. 195, n. 2; p. 321, n. 1. This issue is not addressed in K. M. Woschitz, Elpis. Hoffnung Geschichte, Philosophie, Exegese, Theologie eines Schlusselbegriffs (Wien: Herder, 1979).) as when expectation extends to something in the future.
He says that there can also be a sort of science of future things, something that can be called a science of expectation. (Latin: sperativa scientia.) Some call this divination, because through it certain persons can know what is going to happen in the future; for expectation is concerned with the future.
But since expectation is of future things that can be acquired by man, and since such things are future contingents, about which there cannot be any science, (Compare Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.44, 88b30–35; Ethics 6.3, 1139b20–24; and Aquinas, ST I.86.3, arg. 1.) it seems that there can be no science of expectation about future things.
305. So we must say that there cannot be a science of future contingents considered in themselves. When they are considered in their causes, however, there can be a science about future contingents inasmuch as some sciences know that there may be inclinations to such-and-such effects. In this sense, there is a natural science dealing with things subject to generation and corruption. This is how astronomers are able, through their science, to foretell certain future events, like fertility or sterility, (Compare Aristotle, Politics 1.9, 1259a10–12.) because of the disposition of the heavenly bodies toward such effects.
306. Then, when he says nor is memory of the present (449b13), he shows that memory is not concerned with the present, for that, he says, pertains to sensing, through which we apprehend neither the future nor what’s been done, i.e., a past thing, but only what is present right now.
307. Then, when he says but memory is (449b15), he shows that memory is concerned with past things. He proves this claim from the common way of speaking.
For while something is actually at hand, e.g., while someone is actually seeing something white, no one would say that he is remembering the white thing; similarly, too, no one would say that he is remembering that which is actually being considered by the intellect, while he is actually considering and understanding it; but when people are seeing something white they commonly call it sensing; and they use this “considering” something actually only when they are knowing it right now.
While one has habitual knowledge (Latin: scientiam.) or a sensitive power without their acts or operations, one is said to remember past acts. For example, when one has considered with one’s intellect that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles and perhaps at the level of sense has seen a diagram of the figure, then, in the one case from the standpoint of the intellectual operation one also remembers either that he learned something from another or that he thought it up for himself; while in the other from the standpoint of sense-apprehension one remembers that he has heard or seen or perceived something by one of the other senses. For whenever the soul remembers, it always judges that it heard or felt or understood something before.
308. From this it is obvious that it is not the Philosopher’s intention to say that there can be no memory of those things that exist in the present but only of those that existed in the past. For one can remember not only men who have died but also those who are living now, just as one is said to recollect oneself, according to the dictum of Vergil: neither was Ulysses unmindful of such things nor in such a pass did the Ithacan forget himself. (Vergil, Aeneid 3, 628–29: . . . nec talia passus Vlixes / Oblitusue sui est Ytacus discrimine tanto. Aquinas does not cite the authority of St. Augustine, On the Trinity 14.11, 14 (ed. Mountain, CSEL 50A, 442.15–23), who uses the same Vergilian text to show that there is a memory of the present. Compare the standard medieval theological textbook of Peter Lombard, the Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, 3rd ed. (Rome: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventure ad Claras Aquas, 1971–1981), bk. 1, 3, 2, n. 5 (1.73, 17–20): “It is also known that memory is not only of things absent or past, but also of things present, as Augustine says in Book 14 On the Trinity; otherwise it would not grasp itself.” Augustine’s criticism does not refer to Aristotle by name but only to “the secular literature (in ipsis saecularibus litteris).” A more literal-minded criticism of Aristotle’s mode of expression than that of Aquinas can be found in Norman Malcolm, Memory and Mind (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1977), pp. 13–14: “A little reflection on our actual use of language reveals that Aristotle was mistaken in supposing that ‘no one would say that he remembers the present, when it is present.’ . . . I may, . . . if I spot a familiar face . . . think to myself, ‘I remember that man.’” Neither Aquinas nor Malcolm offers a counter-example to Aristotle’s dictum based on Greek usage, which might not coincide with “our actual use” of English. Yet by appealing to Aristotle’s “intention,” Aquinas can make Aristotle agree with Augustine and Malcolm. Compare Aquinas, De veritate q. 10, a. 2, s.c. 2 (Leonine ed., v. 22, p. 300.67–71): “But, memory, even taken in its proper sense, is equally related to every time, as Augustine says in 14 On the Trinity and proves through remarks of Vergil, who used the name memory and forgetfulness in their proper sense.” An Aristotelian defense might go something like this: even sentences such as “remember to take out the garbage” demand that the addressee recall an antecedent resolution or obligation to take out the garbage, even though this obligation may be past only relative to a future act of remembering. Though the act of taking out the garbage is itself future with respect to the act of remembering one’s intention to do so, the remembering here properly marks the antecedent obligation and only incidentally involves the future act consequent on one’s past resolution. The primary meaning of remembering accordingly points to some thing as experienced before the now in which remembering occurs. Other uses can be expanded by pros hen equivocation (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1003a34–b5, and Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd ed. [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978], pp. 118–23).)
By this he meant it to be understood that Ulysses remembered himself. So the Philosopher’s intention is to say that memory is of things that are in the past as far as our apprehension of them goes, i.e., that we have sensed or known certain things before, regardless of whether or not those things, considered in themselves, exist in the present.
309. Then, when he says therefore there is (449b24), he draws a conclusion from the premises on the nature of memory. It is neither sense, because this is only of things present, nor is it opinion, which can also deal with things future. But it must pertain to something belonging to both of these—either as a habit, if there is a permanent power, (Latin: vis permanens.) or as an affection, if there is a transient impression. Memory pertains to sense or opinion in this way when some time shall have intervened between the prior apprehension of the sense or of the intellectual opinion and the subsequent memory, (Gauthier’s note (185–95) cites Averroes’s Compendium libri De memoria (ed. Shields-Blumberg, p. 59, Versio Parisina): memoria proprie dicta est continua conservacio intencionis forme ymaginabilis, rememoratio uero est intercisa conservatio eiusdem intentionis, i.e., properly speaking, memory is the continuous preservation of the intention of the imaginable form, whereas recollection is an interrupted preservation of the same intention. (See also p. 65 of the Averroes text.) Peter of Spain, Sciencia libri De anima, 7.5 (ed. Alonso, 2nd ed., p. 271, 23–32): Set uirtus retentiua formarum et intentionum est duplex: quedam est eas continue retinens; alia est retinens intercise, et prima dicitur simplex conseruativa, secunda uero memoria. . . . Est enim rememoratio intentionis in preterito comprehense, cuius intercisa est retentio, reuersio in presenti .* . . , i.e., there are two sorts of power for retaining forms and intentions, one power “retaining things continually” and the other “retaining them interruptedly. The first is called the simple power of conservation; the second, memory. . . . For recollection is a returning in the present of a notion that has been grasped in the past when the retention of
310. From this he concludes that only those animals that can sense time remember, and they remember by means of that very part of the soul by which they also sense time. About this he inquires in the sequel. (2.1, 450a18–22; cf. ch. 2, nn. 311–326.)
Chapter 1 of 8