Lecture 8 — The difference between memory and recollection

Now, then, that those with good memories and those with good recollections are not the same, has been said before. But remembering differs from recollecting not only with respect to time, but also since even many of the other animals take part in remembering, whereas not one of the known animals, so to speak, except the human being, takes part in recollecting. The cause for this is that recollecting is, as it were, a sort of reckoning. For the one who is recollecting reckons that he saw or heard or was affected by some such thing before, and it is something like a search. (Some manuscripts gloss the word quaestio with the word inquisitio. Inquisitio better renders the notion of a search or a quest in the Greek word ζήτησις.) But this affection accrues only to those animals in which the deliberative element in addition is present by nature; for deliberating, too, is a sort of reckoning.

A sign that this affection, viz. recollection, is something bodily and an inquiry for an image within such a thing is the fact that some people get very upset whenever they cannot recollect. And, even though they strain intensely to hold back their thought from cogitating and are no longer trying to recollect, they are none the less distressed—especially those of melancholic temperament, since images move these persons most of all.

The cause for recollecting’s not being in their own control is that, just as in the case of those who throw something have no longer within themselves the stopping of it, so too one who is recollecting and tracking something down is moving something bodily in which the affection exists.

Those in whom there happens to be moisture around the seat of sensation are the ones most upset; for moisture on the move is not easily put to a stop until it reaches what it is in quest of and the motion proceeds in a straight line.

This is also why, when instances of anger and fear move against each other, and these in turn engender a counter-movement, they do not settle down, but rather engender another movement contrary to the same.

This affection is related to names, tunes, and discourse whenever any of these comes from the mouth a lot. For those that stop singing or speaking may involuntarily go to it again.

Moreover, those who have their upper parts too large and also dwarves are of inferior memory to those of contrary disposition because they have a lot of weight on their sensitive organ and because the motions are from the beginning unable to move easily in a straight line in their recollecting. Whereas those that are utterly new to the world and the very old are devoid of memory owing to motion; for the old are waning and the young waxing greatly. And furthermore, such children as are dwarf-like are so for a long period.

So then concerning memory and remembering we have said what their nature is, and by which of the parts of the soul it is that animals remember, and concerning recollecting, we have said what it is and how it comes to be and owing to what cause.

398. Now, then, that those with good memories (453a4). After the Philosopher has shown how recollecting takes place, he now shows the difference between memory and recollection.

He refers to three differences. The first of these stems from one’s aptitude for each of the other two. For it was said above (2.1, 449b6–8; cf. ch. 1, n. 301; ch. 3, nn. 330–34; cc. 5–6, 370–83.) that the same men are not good rememberers and good recollectors.

The second difference stems from time, since recollection, because it is a path to memory, precedes it in time, as is apparent from what has been said already. (Gauthier’s note at Leonine ed., p. 130, lines 8–9 cites several other medieval and modern interpretations of “preceding in time”; Aquinas’s reference is to ch. 7, n. 386.)

The third difference stems from the subject in which each of them can be found. For many other animals besides man participate in remembering, as was also noted above; (2.1, 450a15–18; cf. ch. 2, nn. 323–25.) but no animal that is known to us recollects except man; he says this because some people are in doubt whether some animal besides man might be rational.

399. But the cause why recollecting belongs to man alone is this—since recollection bears a likeness to a sort of syllogism: for just as in the syllogism one arrives at a conclusion from some principles, so also in recollecting one syllogizes, in a way, that he has seen something before, or in some other manner perceived it, arriving at it from some starting point. And recollection is, as it were, a search, since the one recollecting does not go by way of chance from one thing to another; rather he proceeds with the intention of arriving at a memory of something. But this, namely that one should be in quest of something else, comes about only in those in whom there is a natural power for deliberating, since deliberation also comes about in the manner of a syllogism. Deliberation however belongs to human beings alone; the other animals work not from deliberation, but from a natural instinct. (Cf. above, ch. 1.)

400. Then when he says but that it is a bodily affection (453a14), he shows what sort of affection recollection is. For since he had said that recollection is, as it were, a sort of syllogism, and since moreover to syllogize is an act of the reason, which is not an act of a body, as is proved in the second book of On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 413a6–7; 2.5, 417b19–29; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 2, nn. 242–32 (Leonine ed., p. 76, lines 139–57); lect. 12, nn. 377–80.) hence it might seem to some that recollection is not an affection of the body, that is, an operation exercised through a bodily organ, but the Philosopher shows the contrary.

401. And firstly he does this through something that happens to those who recollect;

second through those who have something that obstructs their recollection where he says moreover, those who have their upper parts (453a31; [406]).

In regard to the first, he does three things.

First, he introduces the happenstance just mentioned.

Second, he assigns the cause for the happenstance where he says the cause for recollecting’s not being in their own control (453a20; [402]).

Third, he explains it by means of an example where he says this is also why, when instances of anger and fear (453a26; [404]).

Accordingly, he says first that a sign that recollection is a bodily affection, and is a search of a phantasm existing in such—that is, in some particular—or in such, in some bodily organ, is this: that when some people cannot recollect, they are agitated, that is, they are made restless with a kind of uneasiness, and with a great effort they apply their mind to recollecting, and if it should happen that as if ceasing from what they had set out to recollect, that uneasiness of thought remains in them. This happens especially in melancholiacs, (See Gauthier’s rich note in Leonine ed., p. 131, lines 63–65, citing Galen’s De complexionibus 1.3. For a valuable study of the problem of the four humors or temperaments (sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic, and melancholic) focusing on the interpretation of Albrecht Dührer’s famous wood-cut of Melancholia, see E. Panofsky, F. Saxl, and R. Klibansky, Saturn or Melancholia: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art (New York: Basic Books, 1964).) who are to the greatest degree moved by phantasms, since, in them, because of their earthy nature, the impressions of the phantasms are more fixed.

402. Then, when he says the reason that recollection is not within them (453a20), he assigns the cause for the happenstance under discussion.

First, he gives the cause.

Second, he points out those in whom it most especially has its place, when he says now those people are especially disturbed (453a23; [403]).

In regard to the first point, it must be observed that the activities that belong to the intellective part of the soul aside from any bodily organ fall within one’s own choice, so that one can cease from them whenever one wishes to do so, but such is not the case with the activities that are performed through a bodily organ, since it is not in the power of man that his being affected—precisely insomuch as the organ is purely corporeal—should cease at once.

Thus he says that the cause of the fact that recollecting does not seem to be in the recollectors themselves, that is, in their power, such that they could cease whenever they wanted, is this—since, just as it happens with those who throw something, after they have set in motion the body that they have thrown, it is no longer in their power that it stop, so also the recollector and anyone else tracking something down by using a bodily organ moves the bodily organ, in which the affection exists; hence the movement does not cease as soon as the man wishes it to.

403. Then, when he says those people are especially disturbed (453a23), he shows those in whom the cause under discussion especially has its place. He says that in recollecting those in whom there is an abundant moisture around the place where the organs of the senses are located, namely around the brain and around the heart, are especially disturbed, that is, they are made to share in the movement, since moisture that has been set in motion is not easily brought to rest until the thing that is being sought presents itself, and the movement of the search proceeds in a straight line up to its endpoint.

This does not contradict what was said above (453a18–19), that this happens especially in melancholiacs, who are persons of a dry nature, since in them it takes place owing to a violent stamping of an impression, while in these others it happens because of the ease with which they are moved.

404. Then, when he says this is also why, when instances of anger and fear (453a26), he clarifies what he had said by means of examples. He sets down two similar instances.

The first of these is concerned with the affections of the soul, by which the bodily organ undergoes a certain corresponding movement. He says that when anger or fear or desire or something else of this sort is moved against a given object, even if men want to move in the contrary direction by holding themselves back from anger or fear, the affection is not put to rest, but keeps being moved against the same object. This happens because the corresponding movement (The phrase “corresponding movement” is used to bring out the force of the prefix in- in incommotio.) of the bodily organ is not quieted at once.

405. Then, when he says this affection is related to names (453a28), he sets down the second point of similarity. He says that this affection that comes about in recollecting is related to names and melodies and arguments, when one of them is uttered through the mouth intentionally, as happens to those who recite or name or sing with great intensity, since when they wish to stop it nevertheless happens that, in spite of their intention, they sing or utter something anyway because the corresponding movement of the original imagination still remains in the bodily organ.

406. Then, when he says but those whose upper parts are larger (453a31), he clarifies his point by stating that recollection is hindered by a bodily disposition. He refers to two bodily dispositions that hinder recollection.

He presents the first of these, saying that those whose upper parts are larger than their lower parts—which is the disposition of dwarves since they have short legs, and the upper part of their body is proportionately larger (Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals 4.10, 686b4–6; Progression of Animals 11, 710a9–15. Alternative explanations are found in Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 2 vols., ed. Peter K. Marshall (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), 19.13, 2–4, pp. 581–82, and Isidore of Seville, Etymologiarum sive Originum, 2 vols., ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford: Clarendon, 1911), 11.3, 7.)—are worse at remembering than those who have the opposite disposition, because of this—that the sensitive organ, which is in the upper part, is oppressed by a surplus of matter, and because of this the motions of sensible objects can not remain in them for very long, but are quickly dissipated owing to a confusion of humors; this disposition pertains to a failure of memory, nor can they easily proceed rightly in recollecting, since they are not able to control the motion of matter, which pertains to a failure of recollection.

407. The second hindrance is that those who are completely new, such as newborn children, and the very old are lacking in memory because of the movement of growth that is in children and that of decay that is in the old, as was said above. (2.1, 450b5–7; cf. ch. 3, n. 332.) This disposition is in partial agreement with the first, to the extent that it refers to children who for a rather long period are dwarf-like, as having an unusually large upper part of the body.

408. Thus it is clear that recollection is a bodily affection and it is not an act of the intellective, but of the sensitive part of the soul, which in man is nobler and more powerful than in the other animals, because of its conjunction with the intellect. For that which is of an inferior order always becomes more perfect by being joined to its superior, as partaking of its perfection. (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 18, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4; ST I.78.4; ST I.85.1, ad 4; Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul 2.13, and the prologue to On the Memory; De malo, q. 16, a. 1, arg. 4; ST I-II.74.3, ad 1.)

409. Finally, by way of epilogue, he concludes that it has been said of memory and remembering, what their nature is, (Cf. ch. 1, nn. 298–310.) and through what part of the soul the animals remember; (Cf. ch. 2, nn. 311–26.) and likewise of recollecting what it is, (Cf. ch. 4, nn. 350–58.) and how it comes into being and because of what cause. (Cf. cc. 5–8, nn. 359–408.)