Lecture 4 — The nature of recollection
It remains, however, for us to talk about recollecting; first it is necessary to set out as being whatever things in the argumentative discourses are true.
For recollection is neither the recovery of a memory nor its acquisition.
For when one first learns or is affected, one does not recover any memory at all: for none has come into being before.
Nor does one acquire it from the beginning. For when a habit or an affection is engendered, then there is memory. Hence memory is not engendered along with the affection that is being engendered.
Further, when it has first come to be in the individual and the ultimate, the affection or knowledge already does indeed exist in the one affected, if one must call knowledge a habit or an affection. Nothing, however, prevents us from remembering by accident certain things that we know; but remembering by itself does not exist before time having come into being: for one remembers now what one has heard or seen or been affected by before; one does not remember now what he has experienced now.
Further it is clear that there is remembering for one that is not now recollecting but sensing or being affected from the beginning.
But when one recovers what he had before—knowledge or sense or the habit of that which we called memory—this is recollecting and it exists then, and is not any of the things that have been stated; but remembering is concomitant and memory follows.
Nor then do these come about without qualification if, although they were before, they come about again, but it is so in one way and in another is not. For it is possible for the same
to learn and discover twice; hence recollecting must differ from these, there also being a further principle than that from which they learn for recollecting.
350. It remains, however (451a18). After the Philosopher has settled his determination on memory and remembering, he turns to the topic of recollecting.
First, he states the object of his interest;
second, he pursues the goal set out, where he says for recollection is neither (451a20; [351]).
Accordingly, first he says that after he has spoken (Cf. cc. 1–3, nn. 298–349.) about remembering it remains for us to talk about recollecting, in order that whatever truths might be taken up by means of the dialectical discussions may first be supposed as being true. In this way he excuses himself from a long disputation about things pertaining to recollection. (Gauthier cites other authors to the same effect: Adam of Bocfeld, In De memoria, 1a rec (Urb. Lat. 206, f. 201v); Albert the Great, De memoria 2.1 (pp. 108–9; Borgh. 134, f. 221ra). Other accounts are provided in Anonymous, In De memoria (Milan Ambr. H 105 inf., f. 21rb); Adam of Bocfeld, In De memoria, 2a rec. (Vat. lat. 5988, f. 27vb; Bologna Univ. 2344, f. 55v).)
351. Then, when he says for recollection is neither (451a20), he pursues the goal he had set out. In regard to this he does three things.
First, he shows what recollection is by comparing it to other apprehensions.
Second, he determines the mode of recollecting, where he says recollections happen (ch. 5, 451b10; [360]).
Third, he shows what sort of affection recollection is, where he says now, then, that those with good memories (ch. 8, 453a14; [400]).
In regard to the first of these he does two things.
First, he shows what recollection is not.
Second, he shows what it is, where he says but when one recovers (451b2; [356]).
On the first of these points he does two things.
First, he sets out what he intends to do.
Second, he explains what he set out to do, where he says for when one first learns (451a21; [352]).
Accordingly, first he says that recollection is neither the recovery of a memory, in the sense that recollecting would be nothing but a repeated remembering; nor again is recollection the first acquisition of a knowable object, namely the acquisition that arises through the sense or the intellect.
352. Then when he says for when one first learns (451a21), he explains what he had said. In regard to this he does two things.
First, he shows the difference between the two terms he had set out, namely, the recovery of a memory and the acquisition of one.
Second, he shows that recollection is not the recovery of a memory and also not an acquisition, where he says further it is clear that remembering (451a31; [355]).
On the first point, he does two things.
First, he shows that the acquisition is not memory, since he who acquires is not remembering.
Second, where he says nor does one acquire it from the beginning (451a23; [353]) he shows that the converse is not true either: memory is not acquisition, because he who remembers is not acquiring something new.
Accordingly, he first states that when one first learns something, with respect to one’s intellective apprehension, or is affected by it, with respect to one’s sensitive apprehension, at that point one recovers no memory, because nothing is recovered except something previously existing; but no memory has preceded. Therefore to learn or to sense something for the first time is not to recover a memory.
353. Then, when he says nor does one acquire it from the beginning (451a23), he shows that remembering is not the first acquisition. In regard to this he does two things.
First, he shows that remembering does not consist in acquiring a notion for the first time.
Second, he shows that it does not consist in having been acquired for the first time, where he says further, when it has first come to be (451a25; [354]).
Accordingly, he first says that neither, too, does the one remembering acquire his notion of the remembered thing from the beginning. For, since memory is of the past, as was maintained above, (2.1, 449b15; cf. ch. 1, nn. 307–8.) then there is memory, when a notion is already existing by way of habit or at least of passion as it does in a past existence; but when the affection itself comes into being, i.e., in the very acquiring of the notion, it is not yet in a past existence; hence memory does not yet come into being in the man.
354. Then, when he says further, when it has first come to be (451a25), he shows that there is also no memory in the first instant in which a notion has just come into being, whether by way of habit or of passion, as when the notion has not yet been converted into a habit.
At this point one ought to consider the fact that something is first said to have come into being in the indivisible instant that is the ultimate moment of the measuring time, as is proved in Physics 6. (Aristotle, Physics 6.5, 235b30–236a15. Aquinas, Commentary on Physics, bk. 6, lect. 7.)
Hence he says that when a notion has first come into being in an indivisible instant, which is the last movement of the time of the generation of the notion, in that instant it can indeed be said that the affection and the knowledge is already in the one affected, i.e., in the one acquiring the notion, yet in such a way that we do not give full force to the term “knowledge,” which properly speaking signifies a habit, but rather we take the term in a general sense in the sense of habit as well as that of passion. (The reason for his saying this is that in the last instant of generation it is always true to say that that of which there is generation exists; as in the last instant of the generation of fire, there is already fire.) Given that knowledge exists, however, nothing prevents us from remembering those things inasmuch as we have a knowledge of them in the present. But remembering does not occur in its own right before time having come into being, that is, before some time intervenes between the previously existing notion and the memory itself; for one remembers now what one has heard or seen or in some fashion or other been affected by before, but one does not remember now what he has experienced now. Moreover, it is obvious that one is first said to be “already affected” at the last instant of the affection. Hence there cannot be memory at that instant.
355. Then, when he says further it is clear that there is remembering (451a31), he shows further that recollection is neither recovery of a memory nor an original acquisition. He states that it is clear from what has been said before that one who is not now recollecting may remember, i.e., he does not remember what he is now recollecting, but that which he has sensed or in some fashion or other experienced from the beginning. Thus, recollection is not recovery of a memory but is related to something that someone has apprehended before.
356. Then, when he says but when one recovers (451b2), he shows what recollection is.
First, he says that recollection is the recovery of the first acquisition.
Second, he shows that recollection is not just any such recovery, where he says nor then do these come about without qualification (451b6; [358]).
Accordingly, he first says that recollection is not a recovery of a memory, but is when someone recovers what he has known or sensed before, whether by a proper or by the common sense, the habit of which we say is memory (for just as remembering is related to a previously generated notion, so also is recollecting), and recollecting exists then, viz. when in some way we recover a prior apprehension, but not in such a way that recollection be any of the things that we have stated, whether sense or memory or imagination or knowledge, but through recollection remembering is concomitant, because recollection is a sort of movement toward remembering, and thus memory follows recollection, just as the terminus follows its movement.
357. Or, according to another manuscript, (See Gauthier’s note to Aristotle’s lemma at 451b5 for a discussion of manuscript variant readings. The first version cited is from an old translation; the other, by William of Moerbeke.) recollection follows memory, since, just as the enquiry of reason is the way to know something and yet it proceeds from something known, so too is recollection the way to remember something and yet it proceeds from something that is remembered, as will become clearer later on. (See below: cc. 5–6; cf. 2.2, 453a9–14; cf. ch. 8, n. 399.)
358. Then, when he says nor then do these come about without qualification (451b6), he shows that recollection is not just any recovery of a sensation or of knowledge. He says that it is not universally true that there is recollection wherever an awareness of a knowledge or a sensation that had been there before comes about again, but in one way he who recovers the science or the sensation recollects and in another way he does not.
Chapter 4 of 8