Lecture 5 — How recollection occurs

Recollections happen since this motion is now naturally apt after this one; for if it is of necessity, it is manifest that, when it is moved with that one, it will be moved by this; but, if not of necessity but from custom, it will be moved as it were much. It comes about, however, that certain ones have become accustomed more quickly once, than others moved several times. Hence we remember some things more on seeing them once, than others many times.

Hence, when we recollect we are moved according to one of the prior motions, until we be moved after that one was customary. Hence, too, we are made to come to what is subsequently by meditating from now or some other point and from the similar, the contrary, or the proximate.

Recollection comes about because of this: for the motions are of these, of these, the same; of others, however, at the same time; of others, they have a part, so that the remainder is little which has been moved after that one. Therefore they seek in this way, and, not seeking, they still recollect in this way, when that motion comes into being after the other one; but it used to come about when the other motions such as we have spoken of had come about, as it were, much.

It is not at all necessary to attend to how we remember those that are distant but not those that are near; for it is obvious that the method is somehow the same. Now I say how it says “that consequently,” neither inquiring in advance nor recollecting; but this motion is by custom consequent after this one; and therefore when he may want to recollect, this is what he does: he tries to grasp the starting point of a motion after which there will be that one.

Hence recollections come about in the quickest and best way from the starting point: for as things are related to each other in that which is consequently, so too are the motions.

And whatever things have an ordering, such as mathemes, are more recollectible; but those that are badly, with difficulty.

359. Recollections happen (451b10). After the Philosopher has inquired into how recollection is related to the other things that pertain to cognition, here he begins to explain the manner in which recollecting takes place.

First, he explains the manner of recollecting.

Second, he points to the difference between memory and recollection where he says now, then, that those with good memories (Ch. 8, 453a4; [398]).

Concerning the first topic he does two things.

He shows how recollecting takes place first with regard to the things one remembers;

and second, with regard to the time (for recollection is concerned with time, just as memory is), where he says it is most necessary, however, to know time (Ch. 7, 452b7; [386]).

With respect to the first topic he does two things.

First, he sets out the cause of recollecting.

Second, he points out the manner in which one proceeds in recollecting where he says hence, when we recollect (451b16; [362]).

The cause of recollecting is the order of the motions that remain in the soul from the first impression of what we first apprehend.

360. Accordingly, in setting out this cause, he states that recollections happen because one motion is naturally disposed to occur to us after another. This may happen in two ways.

In one way, when the second motion follows the first of necessity, as apprehending “animal” of necessity follows on apprehending “man”; and thus it is manifest that, when the soul is moved by the first movement, it will be moved by the second, too.

In the other way, the second motion may follow after the first not of necessity but from custom, since one is accustomed to think, say, or do that thing after this one, and then the second motion follows after the first not always but as it were much, i.e., for the most part, as natural effects also follow from their causes for the most part, not always.

361. The custom under discussion is not, however, established equally in all men, but it comes about that some more quickly establish the custom within themselves on thinking once, than do others if they think this after that several times (which can happen either because of greater attention and deeper cogitation or because of a nature that is better able to receive and retain an impression). Hence, too, it may come about that we remember some things more seeing them once than others seen many times (since those things that we are more vehemently intent upon remain more in the memory, whereas those that we see or think of superficially or lightly slip quickly from the memory). (A memoria labuntur: cf. Pseudo-Cicero, Ad Herennium, 3.22, 35, e memoria elabuntur: “slip out of the memory.”)

362. Then, on the supposition of this order of motions, he shows how recollection proceeds, where he says hence, when we recollect (451b16). Concerning this point, he does two things.

In the first place, he shows the manner of proceeding in recollecting.

In the second place, he points out whence a recollector ought to proceed, where he says a beginning-point, however (Ch. 6, 452a12; [376]).

With regard to the first topic he does two things.

In the first place, he shows the manner in which one proceeds in recollecting.

In the second place, from this he points out how recollecting and relearning differ, which is a matter he had left unsettled above; he does this where he says recollecting also differs from relearning (Ch. 6, 452a4; [373]).

With regard to the first topic he does three things.

In the first place, he sets out how recollecting occurs.

In the second place on the basis of this he resolves a difficulty, where he says it is not at all necessary to attend (451b25; [367]).

In the third place, he uses examples (Latin: signa.) to clarify what he had set out to show, where he says hence recollections come about (451b31; [369]).

Accordingly, in the first place, he concludes from the premises (451b10–16) that, since one motion follows after another either of necessity or by custom, it must be that, when we recollect, we are moved according to some one of the prior movements, until we come to the point that we are moved by the movement to be apprehended, which is accustomed to be after the first, namely, the movement that we intend to rediscover by recollecting, since recollection is nothing other than a search for something that has fallen from memory. (Note that for Aquinas recollection seems to presuppose the interruption of memory. Thus Averroes, Compendium libri De memoria (ed. Shields-Blumberg, p. 59, Versio Parisina): reminiscencia est uoluntaria inuestigatio intentionis eiusdem cum fuerit per obliuionem amissa (“recollection is the voluntary search for the same notion when it was lost through forgetfulness”); Petrus Hispanus, Sciencia libri De anima 7.5 (ed. Alonso, 2nd ed., p. 270): reminisci est motus requisitionis formarum et intentionum a memoria interuentu obliuionis lapsarum (“recollection is the movement of searching after forms and intentions that have slipped from the memory by the intervention of forgetfulness”); Albert the Great, De memoria 2.1 (Borgh. 134, f. 220va): . . . omnes concorditer dicunt quod reminiscencia nichil aliud est nisi inuestigatio obliti per memoriam (“everyone unanimously says that recollection is nothing but the search through memory for what has been forgotten”). Cf. the definition of anamnēsis in G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961), p. 113a, cited from Nemesius, De natura hominis 13 (Migne, PG, 40, 661B–C). “It is called ‘recollection’ when forgetfulness (lēthē) interrupts (mesolabēsēi) the memory. For recollection is the refreshment or recovery (anaktēsis) of a memory that has become feeble or evanescent (exitēlou). . . .” The verb mesolabeō (Lampe, 846b) was originally a wrestling term, “grip around the waist,” and thence came to mean intercept, interrupt, impede, separate, etc.) Hence in recollecting we hunt, i.e., we search, for what is consequently from something prior that we do remember (for just as he who searches through demonstration proceeds from something prior, which is known, from which he is made to come to something posterior, which was unknown; so too the one who recollects proceeds from something prior, which he remembers, to rediscover what had fallen from his memory).

363. The “first” from which a recollector begins his search, however, is sometimes a time that is known and sometimes a thing that is known. With respect to the time, he sometimes begins from now, i.e., from the present time proceeding into the past, the memory of which he is seeking (e.g., if he is seeking to remember what he did four days ago, this is how he meditates on the matter: “I did this today, that yesterday, and something else the day before,” and in this fashion he arrives at what he did three days ago by tracing things back according to the sequence of the customary motions). Sometimes, however, he begins from some other time (e.g., if someone remembers what he did a week ago and has forgotten what he did three days ago, he will proceed by coming down to the sixth day and will proceed in the same way until he reaches the third day before, or he may also go up to a day two weeks ago also starting from a week ago, or to any other past time).

364. Sometimes, in like fashion, one may also recollect beginning with something that he remembers and from which he proceeds to another one for three reasons: (1) sometimes one recollects by reason of similitude (e.g., when one remembers Socrates, and from this Plato, who is like him in wisdom, comes to mind); (2) sometimes, by reason of contrariety (as when one remembers Hector, and Achilles therefore comes to mind); (3) and sometimes one recollects by reason of some proximity (as when the son comes to mind when one remembers the father, and the same reason holds for any other sort of proximity, whether of association, of place, or of time). (There is some resemblance of this passage to David Hume’s famous doctrine of the “association of ideas”: see Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1902), section 3, par. 18–19: “To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect.” Cf. the fuller treatment in his Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford, 1888), book 1, section 4, “Of the connexion or association of ideas,” pp. 10–13. The epigraph to the present volume is of interest. Coleridge’s claim about the order of treatment does not seem to be precise, or else he had some other passage of the Parva naturalia in mind. But his explicit claim that there are annotations to Aquinas in Hume’s own hand calls for a closer doctrinal study comparing, contrasting, and evaluating the two philosophers.)

And recollection comes about because the motions corresponding to these cases follow them.

365. For the motions of some of the aforementioned items are the same, as is especially so of the similars; of others, viz. the contraries, however, at the same time, since when one of the contraries is known, the other is known at the same time; and sometimes certain motions have a part of others, as happens in things that are in proximity to each other, since something is considered in one of the neighbors which pertains to the other; and so, although the residue that is missing from one’s apprehension be small, it follows the motion of the prior one, so that, once the first has been apprehended, the second consequently comes to mind.

366. There is, however, a further point to consider: sometimes those who seek to rediscover a consequent lost motion arrive at a later motion from a prior one in the manner described: this is properly recollecting just when one intentionally (Latin: ex intentione.) seeks for the memory of a thing. Sometimes, however, it happens that even those who do not seek to remember come upon the memory of a thing when they proceed unintentionally (Following Gauthier’s suggested reading praeter ; at Leonine ed., p. 122, line 130.) from the prior to the posterior movement in the manner described (451b16–18): when that movement of the forgotten thing comes into being in the soul after the other and this was unintentional (Latin: praeter intentionem.) but as it were much, i.e., as that motion which occurs arises in many other motions such as we have spoken of, viz. the like, the contrary, or the proximate; but the latter unintentional movement is called recollecting by way of a departure from proper usage; it is rather a chance remembering with a certain resemblance to recollection.

367. Then, when he says it is not at all necessary to attend (451b25), he solves a certain difficulty on the basis of these premises (451b16–25). For one could come to wonder why we frequently remember the things that are distant, i.e., those that happened many years ago, and we do not remember the ones that are near, i.e., those that were a few days ago.

368. But he claims that it is not necessary to attend to this, i.e., to take the question seriously, since it is obvious that it somehow happens in the same way as was set out before (451b16–25). He explains this by reviewing what he had said, namely, that sometimes it happens that the soul may say what it had forgotten by apprehending something that exists consequently and do so without inquiring in advance or intentionally recollecting. The reason for this is that one motion follows on another by custom, and so when the first motion arises the second follows even if the man does not intend it; and just as this happens unintentionally from custom, so, too, will one do this when he intentionally wills to recollect: for he tries to grasp the first motion, at which the later motion follows. Since it sometimes happens that the motions of the thing that are remote are by custom more established, we sometimes remember them either with or without seeking for them.

369. Then, when he says hence recollections come about (451b31), he shows how this is so by means of two examples.

He presents the first of these signs by saying that since one customarily proceeds from the prior toward the subsequent motion either by inquiring or by not inquiring for it, recollections come about in the quickest and best manner when one begins meditating from the starting point of the whole business. The reason for this is that it is according to the order in which the things follow each other that their motions are engendered in the soul with this order; thus, when we are looking for a particular verse of a psalm, we begin at the top.

370. He presents the second example where he says and whatever things have an ordering (452a2). He states that whatever things are well ordered, such as mathemes, i.e., the theorems of mathematics, are more recollectible; the second of these is concluded from the first, and so on for the rest; but those that are badly ordered, we recollect with difficulty.

371. Accordingly, we can in this way learn four results useful for remembering or recollecting well: (Aquinas also gives a summary of his thought on the art of memory at ST II-II.49.1, ad 2, which is tabulated by Macierowski in Commentaries on Aristotle’s “On Sense and What is Sensed” and “On Memory and Recollection” (CUA Press, 2005), pp. 253–55.) first to strive to reduce what one wants to retain into some order; (Reduction to some order: 2.2, 452a2–4. Cf. Pseudo-Cicero, Ad Herennium 3.17–18, 30: Item putamus oportere ex ordine hos locos habere . . . (“Again, we think we ought to have these places in orderly fashion”); Cicero, De oratore 2.76, 353–354: . . . inuenisse fertur ordinem esse maxume qui memoriae lumen adferet (“he is said to have discovered that it is mostly order that sheds light on the memory”).) second to set one’s mind upon them deeply and intently; (Second: cf. above, Leonine ed., p. 121, lines 39–40 and 44–47, Aquinas’s last paragraph under 451b10. In ST II-II.49.1, ad 2, Aquinas appeals to an erroneous MS reading of Ad Herennium 3.19, 31, calling for “care” (sollicitudo) rather than “isolation” (solitudo); the latter is the correct reading: Item commodius est in derelicta quam in celebri regione locos conparare, propterea quod frequentia et obambulatio hominum conturbat et infirmat imaginum notas, solitudo conseruat integras simulacrorum figuras (ed. Caplan, p. 210). “It is more effective to prepare one’s ‘places’ or ‘topics’ in an abandoned rather than in a crowded area, since having many men wandering about disturbs and weakens the marks of the images, whereas solitude keeps the shapes of the likenesses coherent.” One is reminded of Plato’s Phaedrus, where the title character has gone out of the city to memorize a speech of Lysias. At any event, Albert the Great cites the text correctly in De bono, tr. 4, q. 2, a. 2, arg. 11 (ed. Col., t. 28, p. 247, 37–41).) third to meditate frequently according to the order; (Third: cf. above, Leonine ed., p. 122, lines 149–64 and Aquinas’s citation of Aristotle 2.1, 451a12–14, in ST II-II.49.1, ad 2. See also Quintilian, Inst. or. 11.2, 40 (ed. Cousin, p. 218): Si qui tamen unam maximamque a me artem memoriae quaerat, exercitatio est et labor. Multa ediscere, multa cogitare, et si fieri potest cotidie, potentissimum est: nihil aeque uel augetur cura uel neglegentia intercidit—“But if someone wants from me the single greatest art of memory, it is practice and work. The most powerful thing is to get to know many things thoroughly, to reflect on many things, daily, if possible; nothing grows so well with care or fails so much by neglect.”) fourth to begin to recollect from the starting point. (Aristotle, above at 451b31–452a2; see below in ch. 6 at 2.2, 452a12.)