Lecture 1 — The primacy of substance

The term “being” is used in many senses, as we have explained in our discussions on the different meanings of words (1017a7).

For in one sense it signifies the whatness of a thing and this particular thing, and in another sense it signifies of what sort a thing is or how much or any one of the other things that are predicated in this way.

But of all the senses in which “being” is used, it is evident that the first of these is the whatness of a thing, which indicates substance.

For when we state of what sort a thing is, we say that it is good or evil, and not that it is three cubits long or a man. But when we state what a thing is, we do not say that it is white or black or three cubits long, but that it is a man or a god. And other things are called “beings” because they belong to such a being; for some are qualities of it, others quantities, others passions, and so on.

Hence one may even be puzzled as to whether each of the following terms—“to walk,” “to be healthy,” and “to sit”—is a being or a non-being. And it is similar in the case of other things such as these, for no one of them is fitted by nature to exist of itself or capable of existing apart from substance. But if anything is a being, it is rather the thing that walks and sits and is healthy.

Now, these appear to be beings to a greater degree, because there is some subject which underlies them, and this is substance or the individual, which appears in a definite category (for the term “good” or “sitting” is not used without this). Evidently, then, it is by reason of this that each of the other categories is a being. Hence the first kind of being, and not being of a special sort, but being in an unqualified sense, will be substance.

Now, there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first, but substance is first in every respect: in definition, in the order of knowing, and in time. For none of the other categories can exist separately, but only substance. And it is first in definition, because in the definition of each thing it is necessary to include the definition of substance. And we think that we know each thing best when we know what it is (for example, what a man is or what fire is), rather than when we know of what sort it is or how much it is or where it is. For we know each of these things only when we know what the quality or quantity is.

And the question which was raised formerly and now and always, and which always causes difficulty, is “What is being?” This is the same as the question “What is substance?” For some say that it is one, and others more than one; some say that it is limited, and others unlimited. And for this reason we must investigate chiefly and primarily and solely, as we might say, what this kind of being is.

Now it seems that substance is found most evidently in bodies. Hence we say that animals and plants and their parts are substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water, earth, and particular things of this kind, and all things that are either parts of these or composed of these, either of parts or of all (for example, the heaven and its parts, such as the stars, the moon, and the sun). But whether these alone are substances, or other things also are, or none of these but certain other things, must be investigated.

Again, it seems to some that the limits of a body, such as surface, line, point, and unit, are substances to a greater degree than a body or solid. And some are of the opinion that there is nothing of this sort apart from sensible substances, while others think that there are eternal substances which are more numerous and possess being to a greater degree.

Thus Plato claimed that there are two kinds of substances: the separate forms and the objects of mathematics. Also a third kind, the substances of sensible bodies.

And Speusippus admitted still more kinds of substances, beginning with the unit; and he posited principles for each kind of substance: one for numbers, another for continuous quantities, and still another for the soul. By proceeding in this way, he increased the kinds of substances.

And some say that the separate forms and numbers have the same nature, and that other things, such as lines and surfaces, depend on these, and so on until one comes to the first substance of the heavens and sensible bodies.

Regarding these matters, then, it is necessary to investigate which statements are true and which are not; and what things are substances; and whether there are or are not any substances in addition to sensible ones; and how these exist; and whether there is any separable substance (and if so, why and how), or whether there is no such substance apart from sensible ones. This must be done after we have first described what substance is.

1245. Having dismissed from the principal study of this science both accidental being and being which signifies the true, here the Philosopher begins to establish the truth about being per se, which exists outside the mind and constitutes the principal object of study in this science.

This is divided into two parts, for this science discusses both being as being and the first principles of being, as has been stated in book 6 (1025b3; [1145]).

Thus, in the first part (1028a10; [1245]), he establishes the truth about being;

in the second (1069a18; [2416]), about the first principles of being. He does this in book 12, at the study.

But, since being and unity accompany each other and come within the scope of the same study, as has been stated at the beginning of book 4 (1003b22; [548]), the first part is therefore divided into two sections.

In the first, he establishes the truth about being as being;

and in the second (1052a15; [1921]), about unity and those attributes which naturally accompany it. He does this in book 10, at it was pointed out.

Now, being per se, which exists outside the mind, is divided in two ways, as has been stated in book 5 (1017a22; [889]). For it is first divided into the ten categories, and second into the potential and the actual.

Accordingly, the first part is divided into two sections.

In the first, he establishes the truth about being as divided into the ten categories;

in the second (1045b27; [1768]), about being as divided into the potential and the actual. He does this in book 9, at we have dealt.

1246. The first part is divided again into two sections.

In the first, he shows that in order to establish the truth about being as divided into the ten categories, it is necessary to establish the truth about substance;

in the second (1028b33; [1270]), he begins to do this, at the term “substance.”

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First (1028a10; [1247]), he shows that it is necessary to settle the issue about substance.

Second (1028b8; [1263]), he indicates the things that have to be discussed about substance, at now it seems.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

He shows that one who intends to treat being should investigate substances separately, and he does this, first, by giving an argument;

second (1028b2; [1260]), by considering what others have been accustomed to do, at and the question.

Hence, in the first part, his aim is to give the following argument. That which is the first among the kinds of being, since it is being in an unqualified sense and not being with some qualification, clearly indicates the nature of being. But substance is being of this kind. Therefore, to know the nature of being, it suffices to establish the truth about substance. In regard to this, he does two things.

First, he shows that substance is the first kind of being;

second (1028a31; [1257]), he shows in what way it is said to be first, at now, there are several.

In regard to the first he does two things.

Metaphysics is about substance

1247. First, he explains his thesis. He says that the term “being” is used in many senses, as has been stated in book 5 [885] where he distinguished the different senses in which terms of this kind are used.

For, in one sense, “being” signifies the whatness of a thing and this particular thing, that is, substance, inasmuch as by the whatness of a thing is meant the essence of a substance, and by this particular thing, an individual substance. The different senses of substance are reduced to these two, as has been stated in book 5 (1017b10; [898]).

And in another sense, it signifies quality or quantity or any one of the other categories. And since being is used in many senses, it is evident that being in the primary sense is the whatness of a thing, that is, the being which signifies substance.

1248. For when we state (1028a15). Second, he proves his thesis by using the following argument. In every genus of things, that which exists of itself and is a being in an unqualified sense is prior to that which exists by reason of something else and is a being in a qualified sense. But substance is a being in an unqualified sense and exists of itself, whereas all genera of beings other than substance are beings in a qualified sense and exist by reason of substance. Therefore, substance is the primary kind of being.

1249. He makes the minor premise clear in two ways.

He first does this by considering the way in which we speak or make predications. He says that it is evident from this that substance is the primary kind of being, because when we state of what sort a thing is, we say that it is either good or evil, for this signifies quality, which differs from substance and quantity. Now, “three cubits long” signifies quantity and “man” signifies substance. Therefore, when we state of what sort a thing is, we do not say that it is three cubits long or a man. And when we state what a thing is, we do not say that it is white or hot, which signify quality, or three cubits long, which signifies quantity, but we say that it is a man or a god, which signifies substance.

1250. From this it is clear that terms signifying substance express what a thing is in an unqualified sense, whereas those signifying quality do not express what a thing is in an unqualified sense, but what sort of thing it is. The same is true of quantity and the other genera.

1251. From this it is clear that substance itself is said to be a being of itself, because terms which simply signify substance designate what this thing is. But other genera of things are said to be beings not because they have a quiddity of themselves (as though they were beings of themselves, since they do not express what a thing is in an unqualified sense), but because they belong to such a being, that is, because they have some connection with substance, which is a being of itself. For they do not signify quiddity, since some of them are clearly qualities of such a being—that is, of substance, other quantities, other passions, or something of the sort signified by the other genera.

1252. Hence one may (1028a20). Second, he proves the same point by means of an example. The other kinds of beings are beings only inasmuch as they are related to substance. Therefore, since other beings, when signified in the abstract, do not designate any connection with substance, the question can arise of whether they are beings or non-beings—for example, whether to walk, to be healthy, to sit, or any one of these things that are signified in the abstract is a being or a non-being. And it is similar in the case of other things such as these, which are signified in the abstract, whether they designate some action, as the foregoing do, or whether they do not, as is the case with whiteness and blackness.

1253. Now, accidents signified in the abstract seem to be non-beings, because no one of them is fitted by nature to exist of itself. In fact, the being of each of them consists in their existing in something else, and no one of them is capable of existing apart from substance. Therefore, when they are signified in the abstract as though they were beings of themselves and separate from substance, they seem to be non-beings. The reason is that words do not signify things directly according to the mode of being which they have in reality, but indirectly according to the mode in which we understand them. For concepts are the likenesses of things, and words the likenesses of concepts, as is stated in On Interpretation 1.

1254. Moreover, even though the mode of being which accidents have is not one whereby they may exist of themselves, but only in something else, still the intellect can understand them as though they existed of themselves, for it is capable by nature of separating things that are united in reality. Hence, abstract names of accidents signify beings which inhere in something else, although they do not signify them as inhering. And non-beings would be signified by names of this kind, granted that they would not inhere in something else.

1255. Further, since these accidents signified in the abstract appear to be non-beings, it seems rather to be the concrete names of accidents that signify beings. And if anything is a being, it seems rather to be the thing that walks and sits and is healthy, because some subject is determined by them by reason of the very meaning of the term, inasmuch as they designate something connected with a subject. Now, this subject is substance. Therefore, every term of this kind which signifies an accident in the concrete appears in a definite category; that is, it seems to involve the category of substance—not in such a way that the category of substance is a part of the meaning of such terms (for white in the categorical sense indicates quality alone), but such that terms of this sort signify accidents as inhering in a substance. And we do not use the terms “good” or “sitting” without this, without substance. For an accident signifies something connected with substance.

1256. Again, since accidents do not seem to be beings insofar as they are signified in themselves, but only insofar as they are signified in connection with substance, evidently it is by reason of this that each of the other beings is a being. And from this it also appears that substance is the first kind of being and being in an unqualified sense and not being of a special sort, that is, with some qualification, as is the case with accidents. For to be white is not to be in an unqualified sense, but with some qualification. This is clear from the fact that, when a thing begins to be white, we do not say that it begins to be in an unqualified sense, but that it begins to be white. For when Socrates begins to be a man, he is said to begin to be in an unqualified sense. Hence it is obvious that being a man signifies being in an unqualified sense, but that being white signifies being with some qualification.

1257. Now, there are several (1028a31). Here he shows in what respect substance is said to be first. He says that, since the term “first” is used in several senses, as has been explained in book 5 [936], “substance” is the first of all beings in three respects: in the order of knowing, in definition, and in time.

He proves that it is first in time by this argument: none of the other categories is capable of existing apart from substance, but substance alone is capable of existing apart from the others. For no accident is found without a substance, but some substance is found without an accident. Thus it is clear that an accident does not exist whenever a substance does, but the reverse is true. For this reason substance is prior in time.

1258. It is also evident that it is first in definition, because, in the definition of any accident, it is necessary to include the definition of substance. For, just as nose is given in the definition of “snub,” so too the proper subject of any accident is given in the definition of that accident. Hence just as animal is prior to man in definition, because the definition of animal is given in that of man, in a similar fashion, substance is prior to accidents in definition.

1259. It is evident too that substance is first in the order of knowing, for that is first in the order of knowing which is better known and explains a thing better. Now each thing is better known when its substance is known, rather than when its quality or quantity is known, for we think we know each thing best when we know what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know of what sort it is, or how much it is, or where it is, or when we know it according to any of the other categories. For this reason too, we think that we know each of the things contained in the categories of accidents when we know what each is. For example, when we know what being this sort of thing is, we know quality; and when we know what being how much is, we know quantity. For just as the other categories have being only insofar as they inhere in a substance, in a similar way, they can be known only insofar as they share to some extent in the mode according to which substance is known, and this is to know the whatness of a thing.

1260. And the question (1028b2). Here he proves the same point (namely, that it is necessary to treat substance separately) by considering what other philosophers have been accustomed to do. He says that when one raises the question of what being is (and this is a question which has always caused difficulty for philosophers, both formerly, that is, in the past, and now, that is, in the present), this is nothing else than the question or problem of what the substance of things is.

1261. For some, such as Parmenides (986b17; [138]) and Melissus (986b17; [140]), said that this being, that is, substance, is one and immobile.

Others, such as the ancient philosophers of nature, who maintained (987a2; [145]) that there is only one material principle of things, said that it is mobile. And they thought that matter alone is being and substance. Hence, when they claimed that there is one being because there is one material principle, they obviously understood “one substance” by “one being.”

Other men maintained that there are more beings than one—namely, those who posited (987a2; [145]) many material principles, and consequently many substances of things.

And some of this group held that these principles are limited in number, such as Empedocles, who posited (987a13; [148]) four elements.

Others held that they are unlimited in number, as did Anaxagoras, who posited (984a11; [90]) an unlimited number of like parts, and Democritus, who posited (985b4; [113]) an unlimited number of indivisible bodies.

1262. If, then, the other philosophers, in treating of beings, paid attention to substances alone, we too should investigate what this kind of being is, that is, what substance itself is. And I say we must do this chiefly, since this is our principal aim; and primarily, since by means of it, the other kinds of being are known; and solely, as we might say, because, by establishing what is true about substance by itself, one acquires a knowledge of all the other kinds of being.

Thus, in one sense, he deals with substance separately, and in another sense, not. He indicates this when he says as we might say or inasmuch as we might speak in this way, as we are accustomed to say of things that are not true in every respect.

1263. Now it seems (1028b8). Here he indicates the things that have to be discussed about substance; and in regard to this, he does two things.

First (1028b8; [1263]), he gives the opinions that other men have held about substance.

Second (1028b27; [1268]), he states that it is necessary to determine which of their opinions are true, at regarding these matters.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First (1028b8), he indicates the things that are evident about substance. He says that substantial being is found most obviously in bodies. Thus we say that animals and plants and their parts are substances, and also natural bodies such as fire, earth, water, and particular things of this kind (that is, such elemental bodies as earth and fire, according to the opinion of Heraclitus (984a7; [87]), and other intermediate entities, according to the opinions of others. We also say that all parts of the elements are substances, as well as the bodies composed of the elements, whether of some of the elements, as particular compounds, or of all the elements, that is, the whole of the various elements, as this whole sphere of active and passive beings. This is just as we also say that a heaven, which is a natural body distinct from the elements, is a substance, and also its parts, such as the stars, the moon, and the sun.

1264. But whether these sensible substances are the only substances, as the ancient philosophers of nature claimed, or whether there are also some substances that differ from these, as the Platonists claimed, or whether these too are not substances, but only certain things that differ from these, must be investigated.

1265. Again, it seems (1028b16). Second, he describes the philosophers’ opinions about those substances which are not evident. He says that it seems to some philosophers that the limits of bodies are the substances of things—in other words, that surface, line, point, and unit are substances to a greater degree than a body or solid. And those who held this opinion differed in their views.

Some, the Pythagoreans, thought that no limits of this kind are separate from sensible bodies.

Others thought that there are certain eternal beings which are separate from and more numerous than sensible things and have being to a greater degree. I say, “have being to a greater degree,” because they are incorruptible and immobile, whereas sensible bodies are corruptible and mobile; and “more numerous” because, while sensible bodies belong only to one order, these separate beings belong to two, inasmuch as Plato claimed that there are two kinds of separate substances, or two orders of separate substances, namely, the separate forms or ideas and the objects of mathematics. He also posited a third order—the substances of sensible bodies.

1266. But Speusippus, who was Plato’s nephew and his successor, posited many orders of substances, and in each order, he also began with the unit, which he posited as the principle in each order of substance. But he posited one kind of unit as the principle of numbers, which he claimed to be the first substances after the forms, and another as the principle of continuous quantities, which he claimed to be second substances; finally, he posited the substance of the soul. Hence, by proceeding in this way, he extended the order of substances right down to corruptible bodies.

1267. But some thinkers differed from Plato and Speusippus, not distinguishing between the forms and the first order of mathematical objects, which is that of numbers. For they said that the forms and numbers have the same nature, and that all other things depend on these, that is, are related successively to numbers—namely, lines and surfaces—until one comes to the first substance of the heavens and the other sensible bodies, which belong to this last order.

1268. Regarding these matters (1028b27). Here he explains what should be said about the foregoing opinions. He says that it is necessary to determine which of the above opinions are true and which are not; and what things are substances; and whether the objects of mathematics and the separate forms are substances in addition to sensible ones, or not; and if they are substances, what mode of being they have; and if they are not substances in addition to sensible ones, whether there is any other separate substance, and why and how; or whether there is no substance in addition to sensible substances.

1269. For he will settle this issue below and in book 12 (1071b3; [2488]) of this work. But, before this is done, it is first necessary to posit and explain what it is that constitutes the substance of these sensible bodies in which substance is clearly found. He does this in the present book (1028b33; [1270]) and in book 8 (1042a25; [1687]), which follows.