Lecture 6 — Becoming by nature, by art, and by chance

Now, of those things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, and some spontaneously.

And everything which comes to be comes to be by something and from something and becomes something. And this something which I say it comes to be may be in any category; for it may come to be either a this or so much or of such a sort or at some time.

Now natural generations are those which come about by nature.

And that from which a thing comes to be is what we call “matter,” and that by which it comes to be is one of those things that exist by nature. And this something which it comes to be is a man or a plant or some other one of those things that we chiefly claim to be substances.

Now all things that come to be either by nature or by art have matter, for it is possible for each one of them to be and not to be, and this possibility is the matter of each.

And, in general, nature is both that from which they come to be and that according to which they come to be. For the thing generated, such as a plant or an animal, has a nature.

And that by which they come to be—the so-called specific nature, which is specifically the same—is also nature (although this is found in something else). For man begets man. The things that come to be by nature, then, are produced in this way.

But the other kinds of generation are called “productions,” and all productions are a result either of art, of power, or of mind. And some of these are a result of chance and fortune in the same way as things that come to be by nature. For some of these same things are generated both from seed and without seed. Therefore, we shall have to investigate these later on (1034a33).

Now, those things are produced by art whose species exists in the mind, and by species, I mean the essence of each thing and its first substance.

For even contraries have, in a sense, the same form, since the substance of a privation is the same as the substance of its opposite, as health is the substance of sickness, for sickness is made apparent by the absence of health. The health which exists in the mind is the concept in scientific knowledge.

Health comes about, then, as a result of thinking in this manner: since health is such and such, if health is to exist, such and such a condition must exist, for example, regularity; and if this is to exist, there must be heat; and the physician continues to think in this way until he eventually comes to some final thing which he is capable of doing.

Hence, the motion which begins from this, which is ordained to the acquisition of health, is called “production.” Hence it turns out that, in a sense, health comes from health, and a house from a house, and what has matter from what is without matter. For the medical art and the building art are the form of health and the form of a house. And by “substance without matter,” I mean the essence.

Now, of generations and motions, one part is called thinking and the other producing; for that which proceeds from the principle and the form is thinking, and that which proceeds from the terminus of thinking is producing. And each of the other intermediate things is produced in the same way.

I mean that, if health is to be restored, a balance must be achieved. What, then, does a balance involve? Some particular thing. And this will occur if the body is heated. And what does this involve? Something else. And this exists potentially, and it is already present in the physician himself.

The thing which produces the effect, then, and that from which the restoration of health begins if it comes to be by art, is the form in the mind.

But, if it comes to be by chance, the thing which produces it is the starting point of production for the one who acts by art. For instance, in the restoration of health, the starting point may perhaps be the production of heat, which the physician causes by rubbing.

Either the heat in the body is a part of health, then, or it is followed by some such thing as is a part of health, or it comes about through several intermediaries. Now, this last thing is the one producing health, and what is such is a part of health, as stones are parts of a house and other materials are parts of other things.

Hence, as is said, it is impossible for anything to be produced if nothing preexists. Therefore, that some part will necessarily preexist is evident; for the matter is a part, since it exists in the product and becomes something.

Hence it is also one of those things that are contained in the intelligible expression of a thing. And we describe what brazen circles are in both ways, stating the matter, which is bronze, and the species, which is such and such a figure. And this is the genus in which circle is first placed.

Hence a brazen circle has matter in its intelligible expression.

Now, as for that from which as matter a thing is produced, some things when they are produced are not said to be that, but “of that kind.” For instance, a statue is not stone but “of stone.” And a man who is recovering his health is not said to be that from which he has come.

The reason is that, although a thing comes both from its privation and from its subject, which we call matter (for example, what becomes healthy is both a man and one who is sick), we say that it comes rather from its privation (for example, a healthy person comes from a sick one, rather than from a man).

And, for this reason, a healthy person is not said to be a sick one, but to be a man, and the man is said to be healthy.

However, as regards those things of which the privation is not evident and is nameless (like the privation of some figure in bronze or in the bricks and timbers of a house), the thing produced seems to come from these just as a healthy person comes from a sick one.

Hence, just as in the former case a thing is not said to be that from which it comes to be, so too in this case, the statue is not said to be wood, but wooden, not bronze, but brazen, not stone, but of stone. And a house is not said to be bricks, but of bricks.

For if someone were to examine the question carefully, he would not say without qualification either that the statue comes from wood or the house from bricks, because there must be change in that from which something comes to be without remaining. It is for this reason, then, that we speak in this way.

1381. Having shown what essence is and to what things it belongs, and that it does not differ from the thing to which it belongs, the Philosopher now aims to show that the essences and forms present in these sensible things are not generated by any forms existing apart from matter, but by forms present in matter. And this will be one of the ways in which the position of Plato is destroyed. For Plato claimed that there are separate forms, and that these are necessary both in order that an understanding of sensible things may be had and in order that sensible things may exist by participating in them, and that these forms may be responsible for the generation of sensible things.

Now he has already shown, in the preceding chapter (1031b11; [1368]), that separate forms are not necessary to account for either our understanding of sensible things or their being, since these can be adequately explained on the grounds that the whatness of a sensible thing is both present in that thing and identical with it.

Hence it remains to show that separate forms are not required for the generation of sensible things, and he proves this in this chapter. This undertaking is accordingly divided into two parts.

In the first (1032a12; [1381]), he prefaces his discussion with certain points required for the proof of his thesis.

In the second (1033a2; [1417]), he proves his thesis, at now, since that which comes.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he proposes certain divisions regarding the processes of generation which take place in the natural world.

Second (1032a15; [1385]), he explains these, at now natural generations.

He gives two divisions.

The first has to do with things that are generated and with their mode of generation;

the second (1032a13; [1383]), with the conditions necessary for generation, at and everything.

He accordingly first says (1032a12) that, of things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, and some by chance, or spontaneously, that is, by itself without purpose.

The reason for this division is that the cause of generation is either a proper cause or an accidental one. For if it is a proper cause, it is either the principle of motion intrinsic to a thing, and then it is nature, or it is extrinsic to the thing, and then it is art. For nature is a principle of motion in that in which it exists, but art does not exist in the thing produced by art but in something else.

1382. But if it is an accidental cause, then it is chance or fortune. It is fortune in reference to those things that act by mind, but chance occurs in other things also. Both of these come under the spontaneous, that is, what is of itself without purpose; for that is without purpose which is directed to a goal and does not reach it. And both chance and fortune are found among those things that are done for the sake of some goal, when some effect results besides the one intended by some definite proper cause. Hence an effect is said to be proper inasmuch as it has a definite cause, and to be without purpose inasmuch as it occurs apart from the intention of the agent.

1383. And everything (1032a13). Then he gives the second division, which involves the conditions of generation. For everything which comes to be is brought about by some agent, and is produced from something as its matter, and also becomes something, which is the terminus of generation. And since he had said above that this something belongs in the genus of substances, he therefore now informs us that this must be understood in a more general way, inasmuch as by “something” is meant any category in which generation can occur, in an unqualified or qualified sense, per se or accidentally. For the something of which he spoke is either a this, that is, a substance, or a quantity or quality or time or some other category.

1384. And the reason for this division is that, in every generation, something which was formerly potential becomes actual. Now, a thing can be said to go from potency to act only by reason of some actual being, which is the agent by which the process of generation is brought about. Now, potency pertains to the matter from which something is generated, and act pertains to the thing generated.

1385. Now natural generations (1032a15). Then he explains that these three conditions required for generation are found in the three types mentioned, and in regard to this, he does two things.

First (1032a15; [1385]), he explains his thesis.

Second (1032b30; [1412]), he introduces the conclusion which he chiefly intends to draw, at hence, as is said.

In regard to the first he does three things.

First, he makes this clear in the case of natural generations;

second (1032a26; [1394]), in the case of generations resulting from art, at but the other;

third (1032b23; [1410]), in the case of those generations which come about by chance, at but, if it comes.

In regard to the first, he does four things.

First (1032a15), he indicates what generations are natural. He says that those generations are natural whose principle is nature, and not art or any mind—for example, when fire or a plant or an animal is generated as a result of the natural power inherent in things.

1386. And that from which (1032a17). Having posited these three conditions, he now gives examples of natural generations. He says that, in natural generation, there is something from which any natural thing is generated, and this is called “matter”; there is something by which it is generated, and this is called the “agent”; and there is this particular thing (namely, the thing generated), such as a man or a plant or something of this sort. These we chiefly claim to be substances, that is, particular composite substances, which are more evidently substances, as was stated above. But matter and the form, which is the principle of action in the agent, are substances only insofar as they are principles of composite substances.

1387. Now of these three conditions, two have the nature of principles of generation—namely, matter and the agent—and the third has the nature of a terminus of generation—namely, the composite which is generated. And since nature is a principle of generation, both the matter and the form, which is the principle of generation in the agent, are called nature, as is evident in Physics 2. And the composite which is generated is said to be by nature or according to nature.

1388. Now all things (1032a20). Here he proves that one of these three conditions—the principle from which a thing comes to be—is found in every kind of generation, not only in natural generations but also in artificial ones. (For the nature of the other two conditions is evident.)

He says that all the things that come to be by nature or by art have a matter from which they come to be, for everything that is generated by nature or by art is capable both of being and of not being. For since generation is a change from non-being to being, the thing generated must at one time be and at another not be, and this would be true only if it were possible for it both to be and not to be. Now, the potential element which each thing has both for being and not being is matter, for [matter] is in potency to the forms by which things have being, and to the privations by which they have non-being, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, it follows that there must be matter in every kind of generation.

1389. And, in general (1032a22). Here he shows how the three conditions mentioned above are related to nature. He says that, in general, each of the three conditions mentioned above is, in a sense, nature.

For the principle from which natural generation proceeds—namely, matter—is called “nature.” For this reason the generations of simple bodies are said to be natural ones, even though the active principle of their generation is extrinsic to them. This seems to be contrary to the very notion of nature, because nature is an intrinsic principle having a natural aptitude for such a form, and processes of generation which proceed from this principle are said to be natural.

1390. Again, the principle according to which generation comes about—namely, the form of the thing generated—is said to be its nature, as a plant or an animal. For a natural generation is one which is directed toward nature just as the act of whitening is one which is directed toward whiteness.

1391. Again, the principle by which generation comes about as by an agent is the so-called specific nature, which is specifically the same as the nature of the thing generated, although it exists in something else. For man begets man. However, the thing generated and the one generating it are not numerically the same, but only specifically the same.

1392. And, for this reason, it is said in Physics 2 that the form and the goal of the process of generation coincide in one and the same individual. Now, the agent coincides with these insofar as it is specifically the same, but not insofar as it is numerically the same. But the matter is neither specifically the same nor numerically the same.

1393. Another text states that the principle by which they come to be is the so-called specific nature or one conforming to it; for the thing generated and the one generating it are not always specifically the same, although they do have some conformity, as when a horse begets a mule.

Finally, he concludes that the things generated by nature are generated in the manner described.

1394. But the other kinds (1032a26). He now settles the issue of the things generated by art, and in regard to this, he does two things.

First (1032a26), he distinguishes processes of generation arising from art from other processes of generation, namely, natural ones.

Second (1032a32; [1404]), he shows how generation comes about by art, at now, those things.

He accordingly first says that those processes of generation which differ from natural ones are called productions. For even though in the case of natural, things we can use the word “production,” which is equivalent to praxis in Greek (as when we say that what is actually hot produces something which is actually hot), still we use the word properly in reference to those things that come about as a result of mind, in which the mind of the agent has dominion over the thing which he makes inasmuch as he can make it in this way or in that. But this does not occur in the case of natural things, for they rather act with a view to some effect in the definite manner provided for them by a superior agent. Moreover, productions of this kind are a result of art, of power, or of mind.

1395. Now, the term “power” used here seems to be taken in the sense of violence, for certain of those things that do not come about by nature are produced by virtue of the agent’s power alone, in which a minimum of art is required and a minimum of activity directed by mind. This occurs especially in pulling, throwing, or casting out bodies.

1396. Moreover, when the direction of mind is required, this comes about at one time by art and at another by mind alone, as when one does not yet have an artistic habit perfectly. For just as one person may argue with art and another without art (like an unlearned person), so too, in reference to those things that are made by art, one can produce an artistic work by art, and someone else without art.

1397. Furthermore, of those processes of generation which are a result either of art, of power, or of mind, some are a result of chance and fortune. An example is when, by use of intelligence, an agent aims at some goal to be attained by his own action, and a goal is reached which the agent did not intend—such as when someone intends to rub himself vigorously and health comes of it, as is said later [1403].

1398. And the same thing occurs in the case of things produced by art as in that of those produced by nature. For the power contained in the seed, as is said below (1034a33; [1451]), is similar to art, because just as art attains through certain definite intermediates the form at which it aims, so also does the formative power in the seed. And just as an effect produced by art may also occur apart from the intention of art or of mind, and then it is said to happen by chance, so too in the case of natural things, some things are generated both from seed and without seed. And when they are generated from seed, they are generated by nature; but when they are generated without seed, they are generated by chance. These things must also be investigated in this same chapter.

1399. Now the words used here give rise to two problems.

The first is that, since every natural thing has a definite mode of generation, those things that are generated from seed and those which are generated from decay do not seem to be the same. This is what Averroes seems to feel in his commentary on Physics 8, for he says that an animal which is generated from seed cannot be specifically the same as one generated from decay. Avicenna, however, feels that all things that are generated from seed can be generated in the same species without seed, from decay, or by some method of blending terrestrial matters.

1400. Aristotle’s view seems to be a mean between these two opinions, namely, that some things can be generated both from seed and without seed, but not all things, as he says below (1034b4; [1454]). (Likewise, in the case of things produced by art, not all things can be produced by art and without art, but some are produced by art alone, such as a house.) For perfect animals seem to be capable of being generated from seed, whereas imperfect animals, which are akin to plants, seem to be capable of being generated both from seed and without seed. For instance, plants are sometimes produced without seed by the action of the sun on the earth when it is rightly disposed for this effect; yet plants generated in this way produce seed from which plants of a similar kind are generated.

1401. And this is reasonable, because the more perfect a thing is, the more numerous are the things required for its completeness. For this reason, in the generation of plants and imperfect animals, it is sufficient that the power of the heavens alone should act. But in the case of perfect animals, the power of the seed is also needed along with the power of the heavens. Hence it is said in Physics 2 that man and the sun beget man.

1402. The second problem is that animals which are generated without seed from decay do not seem to be produced by chance, but by some definite agent—namely, by the power of the heavens, which supplies in the generation of such animals the energy of the generative power found in the seed. The Commentator is also of this opinion in his commentary on book 9 of this work.

1403. But it must be noted that nothing prevents a process of generation from being a proper process when referred to one cause and an accidental or chance affair when referred to another cause, as is evident in the Philosopher’s example. For when health results from a vigorous rubbing quite apart from the aim of the one doing the rubbing, the process of restoring health, if it is referred to nature (which governs the body), is not accidentally aimed at, but properly. However, if it is referred to the aim of the one doing the rubbing, it will be accidental and a matter of chance.

Similarly, if the process of generation of an animal generated from decay is referred to the particular causes acting here below, it will also be found to be accidental and a matter of chance. For heat, which causes decay, is not inclined by nature to have as its goal the generation of this or that particular animal which results from decay, as the power in the seed has as its goal the generation of something of a particular type. But, if it is referred to the power of the heavens, which is the universal power regulating generation and corruption in these lower bodies, it is not accidental, but is directly aimed at, because its goal is that all forms existing potentially in matter should be brought to act. Thus Aristotle has correctly compared here the things that come to be by art with those which come to be by nature.

1404. Now, those things (1032a32). He now explains the way in which things are generated by art, and he does this chiefly with reference to the efficient principle, for the material principle has already been discussed where he spoke about natural generation. In regard to this, he does two things.

First, he shows what the active principle is in a process of generation resulting from art.

Second (1032b6; [1406]), he shows how the process of generation proceeds from this principle, at health comes about.

He accordingly first says (1032a32) that those things are produced by art of which the productive species exists in the mind. And by “species” he means the essence of anything made by art—for example, the essence of a house, when it is a house that is made. He also calls this the first substance, or the first form. He does this because the form present in the matter of things made by art proceeds from the form present in the mind. In the case of natural things, however, the opposite is true.

1405. Now the form present in the mind differs from the one present in matter, for in matter, the forms of contraries are different and opposed, but in the mind, contraries have, in a sense, the same form. And this is true because forms present in matter exist for the sake of the being of the things informed, but forms present in the mind exist according to the mode of what is knowable or intelligible. Now, while the being of one contrary is destroyed by that of another, the knowledge of one contrary is not destroyed by that of another, but is rather supported by it. Hence the forms of contraries in the mind are not opposed, but rather the substance, that is, the whatness, of a privation is the same as the substance of its contrary, as the concepts of health and of sickness in the mind are the same; for sickness is known by the absence of health. Further, the health which exists in the mind is the concept by which health and sickness are known, and it is found in scientific knowledge of both, that is, in knowing both.

1406. Health comes about (1032b6). He now shows how health is produced by this principle, and in regard to this, he does two things.

First, he shows how the health which exists in the mind is the principle (or starting point) for the restoring of health;

second (1032b15; [1408]), how the term “principle” is taken in different ways in regard to the action of art, at now, of generations.

He accordingly says (1032b6) that, since the health present in the mind is the principle of the health produced by art, health is brought about in a subject as a result of someone thinking in this manner: since health is such and such (either regularity or the balance of heat, cold, moisture and dryness), if health is to exist, it is necessary that this (regularity or the balance of humors) exist; and if regularity or balance must exist, there must be heat, by which the humors are balanced. And thus, by always going from what is subsequent to what is prior, he thinks of the thing which is productive of heat, and then of the thing which is productive of this, until he reaches some final thing which he himself is immediately capable of doing, such as the dispensing of some particular medicine. Finally, the motion beginning from the thing which he can do immediately is said to be the activity directed to the production of health.

1407. Hence, it is evident that, just as in the case of natural things man is generated from man, so too in the case of artificial things, it turns out that health comes to be in a sense from health, and a house from a house—that is, from what exists in the mind without matter, there is produced something which has matter. For the medical art, which is the principle of health, is nothing else than the form of health existing in the mind, and this form or substance which exists without matter is the one which he speaks of above as the essence of the thing produced by art.

1408. Now, of generations (1032b15). He shows how the word “principle” is taken in different ways in regard to the actions of art. He says that, in artificial generations and motions, there is one action which is called “thinking” and another which is called “producing.” For the artist’s planning, which begins from the principle which is the form of the thing to be made by his art, is itself called “thinking,” and this action extends, as was said above, right down to what is last in the order of intention and first in the order of execution. Therefore, the action which begins from this last thing in which the action of thinking terminates is called “producing,” and this is then a motion affecting matter.

1409. And what we have said about the action of art in reference to the form, which is the ultimate goal of artificial generation, also applies in the case of all other intermediate things; for example, in order that one may be healed, the humors of the body must be balanced. Hence, this process of balancing is one of the intermediate things that is nearest to health. And just as the physician, when he aims to cause health, must begin by considering what health is, so too, when he intends to produce a balance, he must know what a balance is—namely, that it is some particular thing, that is, the proportion of humors appropriate to human nature. And this will occur if the body is heated, supposing that someone is sick because of a lack of heat. And again, he must know what being heated is, as if one were to say that being heated consists in being changed by a hot medicine. And this, namely, the administering of a hot medicine, is immediately within the physician’s power: this is already present in the physician himself, that is, it is within his power to administer such a medicine.

1410. Hence it is evident that the principle causing health, from which the process of restoring health begins, is the form existing in the mind, either of health itself or of other intermediate things by means of which health is produced. And I say that this is the case if the process of restoring health comes about by art. But if it comes about in some other way, the principle of health will not be a form existing in the mind, for this is proper to artificial operations.

1411. But, if it comes (1032b23). He shows how chance generations take place. He says that, when the restoring of health comes about by chance, the principle of health is the same as the one from which health comes about for him who causes health by art. But this must be understood of the principle of production, which is last in the order of intention and first in the order of execution, just as in the process of restoring health, the principle of health may at times begin with the patient’s being heated. And the process of restoring health also begins here when someone is healed by chance, because someone may produce heat by rubbing but not intend this as the goal of the rubbing.

Thus, either the heat produced in the body by rubbing or by a medication is a part of health, inasmuch as it is something entering into the substance of health (as when by itself the alteration of being heated is sufficient to promote health), or something which is a part of health may result from heat (as when health is produced as a result of the heat dissolving certain congested humors, whose dissolution constitutes health).

Or it can also be produced by several intermediates, as when heat consumes certain superfluous humors blocking some passage in the body, such that, when these have been removed, the proper movement of spirits to some parts of the body then begins, and this final step is the one then causing health. And what is such, namely, the proximate cause of health, is a part of health, that is, something entering into the make-up of health.

And it is the same with other things produced by art, for the parts of a house are the stones whose bonding in the course of construction goes to constitute a house.

1412. Hence, as is said (1032b30). Then he draws the conclusion at which he chiefly aims, and in regard to this, he does two things.

First, he introduces this conclusion;

second (1033a5; [1414]), he dispels a difficulty, at now, as for that.

He says first (1032b30) that, since everything which comes to be is generated from matter and is also generated by something like itself, it is impossible for anything to be generated unless something preexists, as is commonly said; for the common opinion of the philosophers of nature was that nothing comes to be from nothing.

Further, it is evident that the thing which preexists must be part of the thing generated, and this can be shown from the fact that matter is present in the thing generated and becomes the thing generated when it is brought to act.

And not only the material part of a thing preexists (as is clear from the explanation given), but so also does the part which exists in the mind, namely, the form. For these two principles, matter and form, are parts of the thing generated.

1413. For we can describe what brazen circles are in both ways—or, according to another text, what many circles, that is, particular and distinct circles, are—by stating the matter, which is bronze, and by stating the species, that is, the form, which is such and such a figure. And he is right in saying many particular circles, for a circle is one thing specifically and formally, but it becomes many and is individuated by matter. And this, the figure, is the genus in which brazen circle is first placed. Hence, it is evident from what has been said that “brazen circle” has matter in its definition. And the fact that the form of the thing generated preexists has been made clear above in reference both to natural generations and to artificial productions.

1414. Now, as for that (1033a5). Here he dispels a certain difficulty, for that from which a thing comes to be as its matter is sometimes predicated of it not abstractly, but denominatively. For some things are not said to be that, the matter, but “of that kind”; for instance, a statue is not said to be stone, but “of stone.” And a man who is recovering his health is not said to be that from which, that is, one does not predicate of him the thing from which he is said to come to be. For a person who is recovering his health comes from a sick person. But we do not say that a person who is recovering his health is a sick one.

1415. Now the reason for this kind of difficulty is that one thing is said to come from something else in two ways, namely, from a privation and from a subject, which is matter—for example, when it is said that a man recovers his health, and that a sick person recovers his health. But a thing is said to come from a privation rather than from a subject—for example, a healthy person is said to come from a sick one rather than from a man. But, when one thing becomes another, we say this in reference to the subject, rather than to the privation, for properly speaking, we say that a man, rather than a sick person, becomes healthy. Therefore, a healthy person is not said to be a sick one, but rather a man; in the opposite way, it is a man that is said to be healthy. Hence, the thing that comes to be is predicated of the subject, not of the privation.

1416. But, in some cases, the privation is not evident and is nameless; for example, the privation of any particular figure in bronze does not have a name, and neither does the privation of house in the stones and timbers. Therefore, we use the term “matter” simultaneously to designate both the matter and the privation. Hence, just as we say in the one case that a healthy person comes from a sick one, so too we say in the other case that a statue comes from bronze, and a house from stones and timbers.

And for this reason, too, just as in the one case what comes to be from something taken as a privation is not predicated of the subject, because we do not say that a healthy person is a sick one, neither do we say in the other case that a statue is wood. But the abstract term is predicated concretely by saying not that it is wood, but wooden, not bronze, but brazen, not stone, but of stone. And similarly, a house is not said to be bricks, but of bricks. For, if someone were to examine the question carefully, he would not say in an unqualified sense either that the statue comes from wood or the house from bricks, but that it comes to be through some change.

For the former comes from the latter taken as something which is changed, and not as something which remains, because bronze does not stay formless while it is being made into a statue, nor do bricks stay unbonded while a house is being built. And, for this reason, we speak in this way, that is, predication is made in this way, in the cases mentioned above.