Lecture 7 — Generation is of the composite, not of the form

Now, since that which comes to be comes to be by something (and by this I mean the principle of generation), and from something (and by this let us understand not the privation, but the matter, for this has already been defined [1032a17] in our discussion about these things);

and it becomes something (such as a sphere or a circle or whatever else it may be), just as the agent does not produce the underlying subject, the bronze, neither does he produce a sphere except accidentally, because a brazen sphere is a sphere and he produces the former. For to make this particular thing is to make it out of the subject totally.

I mean that to make the bronze round is not to make round or sphere but something else, that is, to cause this form in something else. For if he makes a form, he makes it out of something else (as was assumed above)—for example, he makes a brazen sphere. And he makes this in the sense that he makes this thing which is a sphere out of this thing which is bronze. Hence, if he also produces the underlying subject itself, evidently he will produce it in the same way, and processes of generation will then proceed to infinity.

Hence, it is evident that neither the form nor anything else which we term the form in a sensible thing comes to be. In other words, the form or essence is not generated, for this is what comes to be in something else either by art, by nature, or by power.

But he does make a brazen sphere to be. For he makes it from bronze and a sphere, because he makes this species in this, and this constitutes a brazen sphere. And this is the being of a sphere. But if the being of sphere in general is to be produced, something will be produced from nothing; for that which comes to be must be divisible, and this is this and that is that.

And by “this,” I mean the matter, and by “that,” the form. Therefore, if a sphere is a figure everywhere equidistant from a center, one part of this will be that in which the thing produced exists, and the other will be what exists in this. But this is all that has been produced, as in the case of a brazen sphere.

It is evident from what has been said, then: that it is not the thing which is called the form or substance that is generated, but the concrete whole which gets its name from this; that there is matter in everything which is generated; and that this is this and that is that.

The problem, then, is as follows. Is there a sphere apart from these particular spheres, or a house apart from bricks, or one that has never been produced?

Now if this were true, no particular thing would exist. But since “house” means what is such and such, it is not a definite thing, yet the agent makes and generates something that from this is such and such a particular thing.

And when this has been generated, it is such and such a particular thing; but this is a whole this, as Callias or Socrates is like a brazen sphere, but man and animal are like brazen sphere in general.

It is evident, then, that the cause which consists of the forms, in the sense in which some are accustomed to speak of them—that is, supposing that they do exist apart from singular things—is useless so far as processes of generation and substances are concerned. Nor will the forms be, for this reason, substances existing by themselves.

And in some cases it is evident that the thing which generates is of the same kind as the thing which is generated, although they are not the same numerically, but specifically—for example, in the case of natural generations, such as when man begets man—unless something contrary to nature is generated, as when a horse begets a mule. And even these cases are alike, for what is common both to horse and ass as their proximate genus has no name, but perhaps both might be something like mule.

Hence, there is evidently no need to furnish a form as an exemplar; for men would have searched for forms especially in sensible things, since these are substances in the highest degree. But the thing which generates is adequate for producing the thing and for causing the form in the matter. And when the whole is such and such a form in this flesh and these bones, this is Callias or Socrates. They differ in their matter (for the matter of each is different), but are the same in form, because form is individual.

1417. The Philosopher posited above certain points about processes of generation in the world as prerequisites for proving his thesis, namely, to show that the causes of the generation of things must not be held to be separate forms. And, since two of these have already been made clear in the foregoing discussion—that every process of generation is from matter, and that everything which is generated is generated by something similar to itself—he now aims to prove his thesis from the questions which were investigated above. This is divided into three parts.

In the first (1033a2; [1417]), he shows what things are generated.

In the second (1033b19; [1427]), he shows that the cause of generation is not a separate form, at the problem, then.

In the third (1034a9; [1436]), he clears up certain things that could be considered as problems pertaining to the points already established, at however, someone.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First (1033a2), he shows that a form is generated only accidentally;

second (1033b8; [1424]), that it is a composite thing which is generated, at but he does make.

He accordingly first says (1033a2) that the points explained above are true.

The first of these is that everything which comes to be comes to be by something, and this is the agent or generator, which is the principle of generation.

The second is that everything which comes to be comes to be from something, and by this something from which generation takes place, we mean the matter, and not the privation. For it was said above that something comes to be from matter in a different way from how it does from a privation.

The third point is that, in every process of generation, there must be something which comes to be, and this is either a sphere or a circle or something else.

1418. From the things that have been posited, it ought to be evident that, just as an agent does not produce the matter or subject of generation—for example, the bronze—when he generates something, so too neither does he produce the form, namely, the thing itself which is a sphere, except perhaps accidentally. For he makes a brazen sphere, which is a composite. And since a brazen sphere is also a sphere, he therefore accidentally produces a sphere.

1419. Now the fact that the agent does not produce the matter is evident of itself, because matter is prior to the act of making. Hence, it was not necessary for Aristotle to prove that matter is not generated. However, regarding forms, there could be a difficulty, because a form is found only at the termination of an action; therefore, it was necessary for him to prove that a form is produced only accidentally. And the reason is that forms do not have being, properly speaking, but are rather the principles by which things have being. Hence, if the process of coming to be is the way to being, only those things properly come to be which have being by their forms, and forms begin to be in the sense that they exist in the things generated, which have being by these forms.

1420. The proof that forms are not generated is as follows. To make this particular thing is to make it from a subject, and this is totally or universally true of every generation. For to make the bronze round is not to make round itself (or roundness), or sphere itself (namely, the form of a sphere), but to make something else (namely, a form) not in any way whatever, but in something else (namely, in matter)—which is to make the composite.

This is made evident as follows. If an agent makes something, he must make it from something else as its matter. And this was assumed above, namely, that every process of generation is from matter, because of the proof adduced above (as an agent, for example, is said to make a brazen sphere). And this is true because he makes the thing which is a brazen sphere from bronze. Hence, if he also makes the form itself, it is clear that he will make it in the same way, namely, from some matter. And thus, just as a brazen sphere will be composed of matter and form, so also will the form of brazen sphere be composed of matter and form, and the same question will be raised in turn about the form of this form, and so on to infinity. And, in this way, processes of generation will proceed to infinity, because everything generated has matter and form.

It is evident, then, that the form of the thing generated does not come to be; and neither does any other thing, whatever it may be, which must be called a form in sensible things—for example, order, combination, or shape—which has the character of a form in some things, especially in those made by art.

1421. And since generation pertains to the thing generated, it is evident that it is not the form that is generated, but the composite. And, so too, the essence of the thing generated is not itself generated, except accidentally. For the form or essence is what comes to be in something else, namely, in matter, but not of itself. And I say that it comes to be either by art, by nature, or by power, that is, by anything that acts by violence [841].

1422. Now he says that the essence of a thing is not generated, even though it is the same as the thing generated; for it was shown above (1031a28; [1362]) that each thing is the same as its own essence. But the essence of a thing refers properly to its form. Hence, individual conditions, which pertain to a form accidentally, are excluded from it. And species and other universals are generated only accidentally when singular things are generated.

1423. Yet it must be noted that, even though it is said in the text that form comes to be in matter, this is not a proper way of speaking, for it is not a form that comes to be, but a composite. For a form is said to exist in matter, although a form does not exist alone, but a composite exists by its form. Thus, the proper way of speaking is to say that a composite is generated from matter according to such and such a form. For forms are not generated, properly speaking, but are brought from the potency of matter inasmuch as matter, which is in potency to form, becomes actual under some form. And this is to produce a composite.

1424. But he does make (1033b8). Here he shows that composite things are what are generated. He says that an agent does make a sphere to be, for he makes it from bronze, which is the matter, as the principle of generation, and from sphere, which is the form and terminus of generation. For he makes this species, that is, the figure of a sphere, in this, that is, in this matter, in the sense that he changes this bronze into a sphere, and this is a brazen sphere, or the form of a sphere in bronze.

1425. But this, namely, the figure of a sphere, is the being of a sphere, or the whatness of a sphere. But of the being of sphere in general, that is, of the whatness of the form, there is no generation whatever, because if it were generated, it would have to be generated from something as its matter. For everything which comes to be must be divisible, so that this is this, or one part of it is this, and that is that, or another part is that. He explains this by saying that one part of it is matter and the other is form. Hence, if the whatness of a sphere in reference to the form itself is that it is a figure everywhere equidistant from a center—or that it is a certain solid figure of which all lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal—then one part, the matter of this (a brazen sphere), must be that in which the thing produced exists, namely, the matter, and the other will be what exists in this, namely, the form (which is the figure everywhere equidistant from a center), and this is all, or the whole, that has been produced, namely, a brazen sphere.

1426. Hence, it is evident from our remarks that, if everything which comes to be must be divisible, the part which is called the form or substance, that is, the essence, does not come to be; but it is the concrete whole, or the composite, which is spoken of and gets its name from such a form or quiddity or whatness which comes to be.

Again, it is evident that matter is found in everything which is generated, and that, of everything which is generated, this is this and that is that—one part is matter and the other is form.

1427. The problem, then (1033b19). Since it is not forms which are generated but composite things, he shows that it is not necessary to posit separate forms as the causes of generation in these lower bodies.

And it must be understood that the Platonists claimed that separate forms cause generation in two ways: first, after the manner of a generator; second, after the manner of an exemplar.

Hence, he first shows (1033b19) that separate forms are not causes of generation after the manner of a generator;

second (1033b29; [1432]), that they are not causes after the manner of an exemplar, at and in some cases.

He accordingly first says (1033b19) that it is necessary to consider whether there is a form which is universal and exists apart from singular things of this kind. In other words, whether there is a sphere without matter apart from these spheres found in matter, or again whether there is a universal house without matter apart from the bricks of which these particular houses are made.

Now he raises the question with reference to artificial things in order to throw light on natural ones, whose forms the Platonists claimed to be separate from matter. Thus, the question is understood to be whether there is a universal man apart from the flesh and bones of which individual men are composed.

1428. And for the purpose of answering this question, he posits here that, if any substance is produced in this way, it will not be a particular thing in any sense, but will only signify such and such a thing, which is not a definite individual. For “Socrates” signifies this particular thing and a definite individual, but “man” signifies such and such a thing, because it signifies a common and indefinite form, since it signifies without the definiteness of a this or a that. Hence, if there should be a man separate from Socrates and Plato and other individuals of this kind, it will still be a particular or definite thing.

But in processes of generation, we see that the thing which makes and generates something from this, that is, from some particular matter, is such and such a particular thing, that is, this definite thing having a definite form. For just as the thing generated must be a particular thing, so also must the thing which generates it be a particular thing, since the thing generated is similar to the thing which generates it, as was proved above (1032a22; [1390]).

Now, that the thing generated is a particular thing is clear from the fact that it is a composite. And this being, the composite, when it is this, a definite thing, is like Callias or Socrates, just as when we speak of this brazen sphere. But “man” and “animal” do not signify this matter from which generation proceeds, and neither does “brazen sphere,” taken universally.

Therefore, if the composite is generated, and it is generated only from this matter whereby it is this particular thing, then what is generated must be a particular thing. And since the thing generated is similar to the one generating it, the latter must also be a particular thing. Hence there is no universal form without matter.

1429. It is therefore evident from what has been said that, if there are any forms separate from singular things, they are of no use for the generations and substances of things, just as some are accustomed to speak of the cause which consists of the forms, intending thus to posit such forms. For one reason why the Platonists posited separate forms was that they might be the cause of processes of generation in the world. Hence, if separate forms cannot be the cause of generation, it is evident that forms will not be certain substances existing by themselves.

1430. And it must be noted that all those who have failed to consider what the Philosopher proved above—that forms do not come to be—face the same difficulty with regard to the production of forms, because it was for this reason that some men were compelled to say that all forms are created. For while they held that forms come to be, they could not hold that they come from matter, since matter is not a part of form; therefore, they concluded that forms come from nothing, and consequently that they are created. But because of this difficulty, on the other hand, some men claimed that forms actually preexist in matter, and this is to suppose that forms are hidden, as Anaxagoras maintained.

1431. Now, the view of Aristotle, who claimed that forms are not generated but only composite things, excludes both of these other opinions. For it is not necessary to say that forms are caused by some external agent or that they will always be present in matter actually, but only potentially, and [it is necessary only to say] that, in the generation of the composite, they are brought from potency to act.

1432. And in some cases (1033b29). He shows that separate forms cannot be the cause of the generation of things after the manner of an exemplar. He says that, even though, in some cases, one may encounter the problem of whether the generator is similar to the thing generated, still, in the case of some things, it is evident that the generator is of the same kind as the thing generated: not numerically the same but specifically, as is clear in the case of natural beings. For man begets man, and similarly a horse begets a horse, and each natural thing produces something similar to itself in species, unless something beyond nature happens to result, as when a horse begets a mule. And this generation is beyond nature, because it is outside of the aim of a particular nature.

1433. For the formative power, which is in the sperm of the male, is designed by nature to produce something completely the same as that from which the sperm has been separated; but its secondary aim, when it cannot induce a perfect likeness, is to induce any kind of likeness that it can. And since, in the generation of a mule, the sperm of a horse cannot induce the form of a horse in the matter, because it is not adapted to receive the form of a horse, it therefore induces a related form. Hence, in the generation of a mule, the generator is similar in a way to the thing generated. For there is a proximate genus, which lacks a name, common to horse and to ass, and mule is also contained under that genus. Hence, in reference to that genus, it can be said that like generates like—for example, if we might say that that proximate genus is “beast of burden,” we could say that, even though a horse does not generate a horse but a mule, still a beast of burden generates a beast of burden.

1434. Hence it is evident that everything which is generated receives the likeness of its form from the power of the thing generating it. And for this reason it is obviously not necessary to posit some separate form, as the exemplar of the things that are generated, from whose image the things generated receive a similar form, as the Platonists claimed. For exemplars of this kind are especially necessary in the case of the natural substances mentioned above, which are substances to a greater degree when compared with artificial things. Now, in the case of the foregoing substances, the generator is sufficient to cause a likeness of form, and it is enough to maintain that the generator causes the form in the matter, or that the thing which causes the thing generated to receive such a form is not some form outside of matter, but a form in matter.

1435. The whole, however, is a form, which is in the matter, namely, in this flesh and these bones, is some singular thing, such as Callias or Socrates. And this form which causes a likeness in species in the process of generation also differs numerically from the form of the thing generated because of difference in matter. For material diversity is the principle of diversity among individuals in the same species; the matter containing the form of the man who begets and that of the man who is begotten are different. But both forms are the same in species, for the form itself is individual, that is, it does not differ in the one who generates and in the one who is generated. Hence it follows that it is not necessary to posit a form apart from singular things that causes the form in the things generated, as the Platonists claimed.