Lecture 3 — The definition of “essence”

And first let us speak logically about the essence of a thing, because the essence of each thing is what each is said to be essentially (per se). For being you is not being musical, because you are not musical essentially. Therefore, your essence is what you are said to be essentially.

But not even all of this is the essence of a thing; for the essence of a thing is not what is predicated of it essentially in the way that white is predicated of surface, because being a surface is not being white.

Nor is the essence of a thing the composite of the two, namely, being a white surface. Why? Because white inheres in surface.

Therefore, the concept that expresses what each thing is but does not contain the thing itself is the concept of its essence. Hence, if to be a white surface is always to be a smooth surface, then being white and being smooth will be one and the same thing.

Now, since there are also composites in the case of the other categories, for there is some subject of each—for example, of quantity, quality, when, where, and motion—it is therefore necessary to inquire whether there is a concept of the essence of each one of them, and whether this essence is found in them—for example, whether the essence of white man is found in a white man. Now, let the name of this composite be “garment.” What is the essence of garment?

But neither is this one of those terms which are predicated essentially. Now, there are two ways in which a term can be predicated of a subject in a non-essential way: one of these is by addition, and the other is not. For, in one case, the term is predicated of the thing defined, because the term is added to something else. For example, if in defining “white,” one might give the concept of “white man.”

And in the other case, it is so predicated because some other term is added to the subject.

For example, if the word “garment” were to signify white man, and someone were to define a garment as white, then a white man would be something white, yet his essence does not consist in being white, but in being a garment.

Therefore, the essence is what a thing of a definite sort is, whether it expresses that thing wholly or not. Now, a thing’s essence is what a thing is. But, when something is predicated of another, this is not some definite thing. For example, white man is not really a definite thing, that is, if being a definite thing belongs to substances alone. Hence essence belongs to those things whose concept is a definition.

Now, there is not a definition if the name signifies the same thing as the concept, for then all concepts would be limiting terms, because the name of any concept would be the same. Hence, even the Iliad will be a definition.

But there is a definition if the concept is of some primary thing. And such things are those which are predicated without predicating something else of the subject. Thus, essence will not be found in any of those things that are not species of a genus, but in these alone; for it seems that these things are not predicated according to participation and passion, or as an accident.

But of each of the other things, if it has a name, there will be a concept of what it means (namely, that this inheres in this subject), or in place of a simple term, one will be able to give a more definite one; but there will be no definition or essence.

1306. Having settled the issue of the order to be followed in treating of substances, the Philosopher now begins to settle the issue of sensible substances, as he had said he would. This is divided into two parts.

In the first part (1029b13; [1308]), he settles the issue of the essence of sensible substances by using logical and common arguments;

and in the second (1042a3; [1681]) by considering the principles of sensible substances. He does this in book 8, at it is necessary, then.

The first part is divided into two members.

In the first, he indicates the kind of essence which sensible substances have.

In the second (1041a6; [1648]), he shows that this kind of essence has the role of a principle and cause, at but let us state.

The first part is divided into two.

In the first, he settles the issue of the essences of sensible substances.

In the second (1038b1; [1566]), he shows that universals are not the substances of sensible things, as some said, at but since our investigation.

1307. The first part is divided into two.

In the first, he shows what kind of substances sensible things have.

In the second (1034b20; [1460]), he shows what parts constitute their substance, at but since the definition.

The first part is divided into two.

In the first, he investigates the kind of essence which sensible substances have.

In the second (1032a12; [1381]), he inquires into the causes of their generation, at now, of those things.

The first part is divided into two.

In the first, he shows what constitutes the essence of sensible substances;

in the second (1031a15; [1356]), he shows how essence is related to sensible substances, that is, whether it is the same as these substances or different, at moreover, it is necessary.

The first part is divided into two.

In the first, he shows what essence is.

In the second (1029b22; [1315]), he indicates to what things it belongs, at now, since there are.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First (1029b13), he dismisses from the essence of a thing any term that is predicated accidentally;

second (1029b16; [1311]), any term that is predicated per se, in the way that properties are predicated of a subject, at but not even all.

1308. He first says (1029b13), then, that it is first necessary to speak of sensible substances and to show what their essence is. Therefore, first let us speak logically about the essence of a thing; for this science has a connection with logic, as was stated above (1004b17; [574]), because both are universal. Hence the logical method is proper to this science, and it is fitting that it should begin with the logical method. He says that he is going to treat of essence in a way that is chiefly logical inasmuch as he investigates what essence is from the manner of predicating terms of a subject, for this belongs properly to logic.

1309. Regarding essence, it should first of all be borne in mind that it must be predicated of a thing essentially; for those things that are predicated of a thing accidentally do not belong to its essence. For by the “essence” of a thing, we mean the proper answer which can be given to the question asking what it is. And when we ask what a thing is, we cannot give a proper answer by mentioning attributes which belong to it accidentally; for, when someone asks what man is, one cannot answer that he is white or sitting or musical. Hence none of those attributes which are predicated of a thing accidentally belong to its essence, for “being you” is not “being musical.”

1310. Now, throughout the whole of the following discussion, it must be noted that, by the phrase “to be this” or “being this,” he understands the essence of a thing. For example, by “to be man” or “being man,” he understands what pertains to the essence of man. Now the whatness of being musical, that is, the very essence of musical, has nothing to do with your whatness. For if one were to ask what you are, one could not answer that you are a musical. Hence it follows that being you is not being musical, because those things that pertain to the quiddity of music are extrinsic to your quiddity, although musical may be predicated of you. And this is so because you are not musical essentially, since musical is not predicated of you per se, but accidentally. Therefore, what you are essentially pertains to your whatness, because it is predicated of you per se, and not accidentally. For example, man, animal, substance, rational, sensible, and other attributes of this kind, all of which belong to your whatness, are predicated of you per se.

1311. But not even (1029b16). He excludes from the quiddity of a thing any attribute that is predicated per se, as properties are predicated of subjects. He says that not even everything that is predicated per se of a thing belongs to its essence. For a property is predicated per se of its proper subject, as color is predicated of surface. Yet the essence of a thing is not something that is found in a thing per se in the way that white is found in surface, because being a surface is not being white. That is, the quiddity of surface is not that of whiteness, for the quiddity of surface differs from that of whiteness.

1312. And not only is being white not the quiddity of surface, but neither is the combination of the two (namely, of surface and whiteness)—to be a white surface, or being a white surface. For the quiddity or essence of white surface is not the quiddity or essence of surface. And if we were asked why, we could answer, because white inheres in surface, that is, because when I say “white surface,” I mean something which adheres to a surface as extrinsic to its essence and not as intrinsic to its essence. Hence, this whole which is white surface is not identical with the essence of surface.

1313. Now properties are predicated of their proper subjects in this way because their proper subjects are given in their definitions, as nose is given in the definition of “snub” and number in the definition of “equal.” And certain attributes are predicated per se in such a way that subjects are not included in their definitions, as animal is predicated per se of man, but man is not included in the definition of animal. Therefore, since those attributes which are predicated accidentally do not belong to a thing’s quiddity, and neither do those which are predicated per se in whose definitions subjects are given, it follows that those attributes belong to a thing’s quiddity in whose definitions subjects are not given. Hence he draws his conclusion, saying that the concept which expresses what each thing is, that is, which describes the predicate but does not contain the thing itself, that is, the subject, will be the concept of the essence in each particular thing. Hence, animal belongs to the essence of man.

1314. By a reduction to absurdity, he proves that those things that are predicated per se of a thing, as a property is predicated of a subject, do not pertain to the whatness of a thing. For many different properties may be predicated per se of the same subject, as the properties “colored,” “rough,” and “smooth,” which are proper attributes of surface, are predicated per se of a subject. And it is for the same reason that all predicates of this kind pertain to the quiddity of their subject. Therefore, if whiteness pertains to the quiddity of surface, so also for a like reason will smoothness, for things identical with some third thing are identical with each other.

Hence, if to be a white surface is always to be a surface, that is, if it is true always and universally that the quiddity of a property is the same as that of its proper subject, it follows that being white and being smooth would be one and the same thing, that is, the quiddity of whiteness and that of smoothness would be one and the same. But this is obviously false. Therefore, it follows that the essence of a property and that of its subject are not one and the same thing.

1315. Now, since there are (1029b22). He inquires concerning to what things essence belongs.

First, he raises the question;

second (1029b28; [1318]), he answers it, at but neither.

He accordingly first says (1029b22) that there are certain composites in the case of the other categories and not merely in that of substance. He says this because he is investigating the quiddity of sensible substances, which are composite. For just as composite sensible substances have matter, which is the subject of substantial forms, so also do the other categories have their own subject. For there is some subject of each of them—namely, of quality, quantity, when, where, and motion—in which are included both action and being acted upon. Hence just as fire is a composite of matter and substantial form, in a similar way, there is a kind of composition of substance and accidents.

1316. Therefore, since there is a definition of substances which are composed of matter and forms, we must also inquire whether there is a concept of the essence of all those things that are composites of accidents and subjects, that is, whether they have a definition which is a concept signifying their essence.

Also, whether this essence, which the definition signifies, is intrinsic to them—that is to say, whether they have a quiddity or something that can answer the question “what?” For example, “white man” is a composite of subject and accident. The question, then, is whether there is an essence of “white man” as such.

1317. And since someone might perhaps say that “white man” is two things and not one, he therefore adds that “white man” might have one name, for example, “garment.” The question about this one thing (namely, garment), then, will be whether it has any whatness, so that we can ask, “What is the essence of a garment?” For then, just as this word “man” signifies some composite, namely, “rational animal,” in like manner, the word garment signifies some composite, namely, “white man.” And, thus, just as “man” has a definition, in a similar way it seems that “garment” can have a definition.

1318. But neither is this (1029b28). Here he answers the preceding question, and this part is divided into two, inasmuch as he gives two solutions.

The second part (1030a17; [1331]) begins where he says, or another solution.

He first says (1029b28), then, that “white man,” or “garment,” which is supposed to stand for “white man,” is not one of those terms which are predicated per se, but is rather one of those which are predicated accidentally. For the quiddity “white man” is one thing accidentally, and not per se, as was stated above [1313–14].

1319. Now, there are two ways in which a thing is said to be one accidentally or non-essentially: first, in the sense that we say “Man is white”; second, in the sense that we say “This white thing is a man.”

For one of these is defined by addition, whereas the other is not. For in the definition of man, it is not necessary to include the definition of white or the word “white,” but in the definition of white, it is necessary to include man, or the word “man,” or his definition, provided that man is the proper subject of white, or whatever its proper subject happens to be.

1320. Now, in order to explain this, he adds that when one thing is predicated of another in a non-essential way, it is added to the other, because an accident is added to the subject given in the definition of that accident when it is defined. For example, if someone were to define “white thing,” he would have to express the concept “white man,” because in the definition of an accident. it is necessary to include its subject. And then the definition includes “white man”; and thus it will be, as it were, the concept of white man and not the concept of white alone. This must be understood to be the case, as has already been said, if “man” is the proper and essential subject of “white.” But the one is added to the other accidentally, not because it is added to the definition of the other, but because the other is added to it in its own definition, as white is added to man accidentally, not because it is placed in the definition of man, but because man is placed in the definition of white. Hence, if by supposition, the word “garment” signifies “white man,” then anyone who defines “garment” must define it in the same way that white is defined; for just as man and white must be given in the definition of garment, so also must each be given in the definition of white.

1321. It is clear, then, from what has been said, that “white” is predicated of a man; for this proposition, “A white man is white” is true, and vice versa. Yet the essence of “white man” is not that of white, and neither is the essence of “garment,” which signifies the composite “white man,” as has been stated. Thus it is evident that the essence of white and that of white man, or “garment,” cannot be the same, because, if “white” is also predicated of “white man,” it is still not its whatness.

1322. It is also evident that, if “white” has an essence and definition, it does not have a different one from that which belongs to “white man,” for since a subject is included in the definition of an accident, “white” must be defined in the same way that “white man” is, as has been stated. This is made clear as follows. “White” does not have a quiddity, but only the thing of which it is predicated, “man” or “white man.” And this is what he means when he says: therefore, the essence is what a thing of a definite sort is, whether it expresses that thing wholly or not. In other words, from what has already been said, it follows that essence belongs only to some definite thing, whether it expresses that thing wholly, that is, the composite, as “white man,” or not, as “man.” But “white” does not signify that it is some definite thing, but that it is of some sort.

1323. The fact that essence belongs only to some definite thing is shown as follows. The essence of a thing is what that thing is, for to have an essence means to be some definite thing. Hence those things that do not signify some definite thing do not have an essence. But when something is predicated of another as an accident is predicated of a subject, this is not some definite thing. For example, when I say, “Man is white,” I do not signify that it is some definite thing, but that it is of some special sort. For to be some definite thing belongs to substances alone. Hence it is clear that whiteness and the like cannot have an essence.

1324. But because someone might say that there are concepts of words signifying accidents as well as concepts of words signifying substance, he therefore concludes that essence does not belong to all things that have any kind of concept at all that explains their name, but only to those whose concept is a definition.

1325. Now the concept of a thing is not definitive if it is merely a concept of the sort which signifies the same thing as a name, as “one bearing arms” signifies the same thing as “arms-bearer,” because it would then follow that all concepts are limiting terms, that is, definitions. For a name can be given to any concept (for example, a name can be given to the concept “walking man” or “writing man”), yet it does not follow for this reason that these are definitions, for according to this it would follow that even the Iliad, that is, the poem written about the Trojan war, would be one definition; for that whole poem is a single account depicting the Trojan war. It is clear, then, that not every concept signifying the same thing as a name is a definition of it, but only if the concept is of some primary thing, that is, if it signifies something that is predicated per se. For that which is predicated per se is first in the order of predication.

1326. But such things—primary ones—are all those which are predicated per se, and such things do not involve predicating one thing of another. For example, “white” is not predicated per se of man as though what white is and what man is are the same, but they are predicated of each other accidentally. For “animal” is predicated of man per se, and in a similar way, “rational” is predicated of animal. Hence the expression “rational animal” is the definition of man.

1327. Thus, it is clear that essence will not be found in any of those things that are not used among the species of some genus, but in these alone, that is, in the species alone. For species alone may be defined, since every definition is composed of genus and difference. But that which is contained under a genus and is constituted of differences is a species, and therefore definition pertains only to species. For species alone seem not to be predicated according to participation and passion or as an accident.

1328. In this statement, he rejects three things that seem to make it impossible for anything to be defined by a genus.

For, in the first place, those things of which a genus is predicated by participation cannot be defined by means of that genus, unless it belongs to the essence of the thing defined. For example, a fiery iron, of which fire is predicated by participation, is not defined by fire as its genus, because iron by its very essence is not fire, but only participates to some degree in fire. However, a genus is not predicated of its species by participation, but essentially; for man is an animal essentially and not merely something participating in animal, because man is truly an animal. Moreover, subjects are predicated of their properties, as “nose” is predicated of “snub,” yet the essence of nose is not the essence of snub; for species are not related to a genus as a property of that genus, but as something essentially the same as that genus. And “white” can be predicated of man accidentally, but the essence of man is not the essence of white, as the essence of a genus is the essence of its species. Hence it seems that only the concept of the species, which is constituted of genus and difference, is a definition.

1329. But, if a name is given to other things, there can be a concept expressing what that name signifies, and this may occur in two ways.

First, this occurs when a name that is less manifest is explained by one that is more known and is predicated of it—for example, when the name “philosophy” is explained by the name “wisdom.” And this is the meaning of his statement that this inheres in this subject, namely, that sometimes the concept explaining the name is taken from a term that is more known, which is predicated of it.

1330. Second, this occurs when a more meaningful phrase is used to explain a simple term—for example, as when the phrase “lover of wisdom” is taken to explain the term “philosopher.” And this is what he means when he says or in place of a simple term, as if, in order to explain a simple term, one might take a more definite one. Yet such a concept will not be a definition, nor will the thing signified by it be an essence.