Chapter 13 — A refutation of the errors against religious vows

Satan, in his jealousy of human perfection, has raised up several foolish and misleading men who by their teaching have shown themselves hostile to the different modes of perfection of which we have been speaking. Vigilantius attacked the first counsel of perfection. St. Jerome thus combats his objections to it, saying: some men hold that they act more virtuously who keep the use of their fortune and divide the fruit of their possessions piecemeal among the poor than they do who sell their goods and at once give all they possess to the poor. The fallacy of this assertion is proved not by my words but by those of the Lord himself: ‘if you would be perfect, go, sell all that you have and give to the poor, and come follow me.’ Christ is here speaking to one who desires to be perfect and who, with the apostles, leaves father, ship, and net. The man who is praised for retaining the use of his possessions is in the second or third degree of perfection; and we know that the first degree is preferable to either the second or the third (Cont. Vigilant. 14). (Jerome, Contra Vigilantium 14 (CCSL 79C; CPL 0611; PL 23:366B-C).) Hence, in order to exclude error on this point, we find in the book De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus the following words: it is good to distribute one’s goods prudently among the poor; but it is better, if it be done with the intention of following the Lord, to give them all away at once and in our dealings with Christ to be free from all earthly solicitude. (Gennadius of Massilia, Liber ecclesiasticorum dogmatum: recensio altera, ch. 38 (CPL 0958A; PL 42:1219).)

Jovinian argued against the second counsel of perfection and declared that marriage was equal in merit to virginity. St. Jerome refuted his opinions in the book which he wrote against him. (Jerome, Contra Iovinianum (PL 23:221-352).) St. Augustine likewise, in his book Retractationum, speaks of his error thus: the heresy of Jovinian asserted that the merit of consecrated virgins was equalled by conjugal chastity. Hence it is said that in Rome certain nuns who had not hitherto been suspected of immorality contracted marriage. Our holy mother the Church has always stoutly resisted this error. (Augustine, Retractionum libri duo, bk. 2, ch. 22, para. 1 (CCSL 57; CPL 0250; CSEL 36:156-157 [labeled ch. 48]; PL 32:639).) Hence in the book De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus we find the following declaration: it is not Christian but Jovinian to set virginity on a level with matrimony or to deny an increase of merit to those who for the sake of mortifying the flesh refrain from wine or flesh meat. (Gennadius, Liber ecclesiasticorum dogmatum, ch. 35 (CPL 0958; PL 42:1219).)

But the devil is not content with these old devices. Even in our own days he has stirred up some men to declaim against the vow of obedience and all other vows and to preach that good works are more meritorious when performed without obedience or vow than when executed under such obligations. Others, again, say that a vow made to enter religion may be broken without danger to salvation and they strive to confirm their opinion by frivolous and empty arguments.

For they contend that an act is meritorious in proportion as it is voluntary, and that if such an act be less voluntary in proportion as it is more necessary, good works done at a man’s pleasure, without the constraint of obedience or vow of any kind, are worth more than such as are performed under the obligation of a vow, either of obedience or of some other nature.

They quote in support of their teaching the words of Prosper: we ought to fast and abstain, not as though forced by necessity, lest by acting reluctantly we should be called unwilling rather than devout (De vita contempl. 2). (Pseudo-Prosper (Julianus Pomerius), De vita contemplativa, bk. 2, ch. 24, para. 1 (PL 59:470B).)

They might also bring forward the words of the Apostle: every one as he has determined in his heart, not with sadness or of necessity; for God loves a cheerful giver (2 Cor 9:7).

We must now show the fallacy of these arguments and confute this foolish reasoning.

First, in order to manifest the error of these arguments we will quote the Psalm: vow and pay to the Lord your God (Ps 75:12); where the Gloss says: we must observe that some vows made to God are common to all men and are necessary to salvation: such are our baptismal promises and the like, which we should be bound to keep even if we had not made them. The verse: ‘vow and pay’ alludes to such vows as these and is addressed to all men. There are also other vows made by individuals such as chastity, virginity, and the like. The psalmist invites us, but does not command us, to make such vows as these and to pay them when we have made them. For the emission of a vow is a decision of the will; but the payment of such a vow is a decided necessity (Lombard, Comment. in Psalmos 75:11). (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at Ps 75:12 (PL 191:708D-709A).) Hence a vow is in one sense a matter of counsel and in another sense a matter of precept. But from whichever point of view we consider it, we shall see plainly that good works performed under vow are more meritorious than those executed without a vow.

For it is clear that in all that is necessary for salvation all men are bound by the precept of God; neither would it be right to think that God would give a command without a purpose. For the end of the commandment is charity, as the Apostle says (1 Tim 1:5). In vain, then, would God have given a commandment concerning the performance of anything, if the execution of such a thing had not tended more towards the increase of charity than its omission would have done. Now we are not only bidden by precept to believe and forbidden to steal, but we are also commanded to make a vow to believe and to abstain from theft. Therefore, believing on account of our vow and abstention from theft on the same account tend more to augment charity than would be the case if we had no vow. Again, the more anything increases charity, the more it is praiseworthy and meritorious. Hence it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to perform any work under vow than without such an obligation.

Once more, the counsel is given to us not only to preserve virginity or chastity, but to make a vow to do so, as is clear from the Gloss. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at Ps 75:12 (PL 191:708D-709A).) But since, as we have said, a counsel is only given concerning that which is the greater good, it must be better to observe chastity under a vow than without one. The same argument holds good concerning the other counsels.

Now, amongst other good works, virginity meets with special commendation. Our Lord speaking of it says: he who can take it, let him take it (Matt 19:12). It is, however, the vow of virginity which renders that state so praiseworthy. St. Augustine says in the book De virginitate: virginity is honorable not because it is virginity but because it is consecrated to God, and because it vows to him, and preserves for him, the continence of piety. (Augustine, De sancta virginitate, ch. 8 (CPL 0300; CSEL 41:241-242; PL 40:400).) And again, he says: we do not praise virgins because they are virgins, but because they are consecrated to God by the holy continence of virginity (De virgin. 11.11). (Augustine, De sancta virginitate, ch. 11 (CPL 0300; CSEL 41:243; PL 40:401).) Hence we see that the fact of their being performed under a vow renders good works the more meritorious.

Again, every finite good acquires additional value by bearing a promise of some other good. There is no doubt that the promise of good is in itself a good. Hence when one man makes a promise to another he is considered to confer some advantage upon him; and he to whom the promise is made returns thanks. Now a vow is a promise made to God, as we see from Ecclesiastes: if you have vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases him (Eccl 5:3). It is better, therefore, to make a vow and to perform it than simply to execute a good work without being bound thereto by vow.

Again, the more one person gives to another, the more he deserves from that other. Now he who does a good work without a vow offers to God only that single act which he performs for love of him: he, on the contrary, who not only accomplishes a good work, but also makes a vow to perform it, gives to God not only that which he does but also the power whereby he does it. For he puts it out of his power not to do such a good work; although before making his vow he might legitimately have omitted it. Hence he who acts under vow merits far more from God than he who is not under any obligation.

Once more, the merit of a good work is increased in proportion as the will is confirmed in good, just as the heinousness of sin is aggravated in proportion to the obstinate malice of the will. Now it is evident that he who makes a vow confirms his will to accomplish that which he promises; and that when he accomplishes the good work which he has vowed to do, its consummation proceeds from the strength which his will has acquired. Just as the gravity of a crime proceeds from the fact that he who commits it acts from a determined purpose or, as is usually said, sins out of malice; so the merit of any good work is enhanced by the fact that it is done under a vow.

Again, the more excellent the virtue from which any action proceeds, the more meritorious does that action become, since an action derives all its merit from the virtue which inspires it. Now it may sometimes happen that an action of inferior virtue may have its origin in a superior virtue. For example, we might do an act of justice from a motive of charity. Hence it is far best to perform acts of inferior virtue from motives of superior virtue; just as an act of justice is enhanced in value if it be performed out of charity. Now we know that the particular good works that we accomplish proceed from inferior virtues; fasting, for instance, is an act of abstemiousness; continence proceeds from chastity, and so of the rest. But on the other hand, a vow is, strictly speaking, an act of worship, which is undoubtedly a higher virtue than abstemiousness, chastity, or any other virtue. For it is more meritorious to worship God than to order ourselves rightly towards either our neighbor or ourselves. Hence chastity, abstemiousness, or any other virtue inferior to worship derives additional value if it be performed under a vow.

This opinion is supported by the pious desire of the Church, which invites men to make a vow to go to the holy land or elsewhere in her defense and grants indulgences and other privileges to such as make this vow. (Council of Clermont (1095), in Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, ed. G. Mansi (Florence and Venice: 1758-98), canon 2, 20:816E; Council of Lateran (1215), Pope Innocent III's address (Mansi, 22:957D, 958D, 1067C); First Council of Lyons (1245), ch. 17 (Mansi, 23:632C-D).) She would certainly not invite the faithful to bind themselves by vow, were good works done without such obligation more meritorious than those done under vow. Did she act thus, she would be disobeying the exhortation of the Apostle: be zealous for the better gifts (1 Cor 12:31). If the good works done without a vow were the most praiseworthy, the Church, far from encouraging her children to bind themselves by vow, would withhold them from so doing, either by prohibition or dissuasion; and as it is her desire that the faithful should be in the most meritorious state, she would absolve them all from their vows, in order as far as possible to enhance the merit of their good works. Hence the opinion that vows detract from the value of good works is repugnant to the spirit of the Church and must be rejected as heretical.

All the arguments alleged in favor of this opinion may be easily answered. First, the proposition that a good work performed under vow is less voluntary than one done without an obligation is by no means universally true. For many persons perform what they have vowed to do so promptly that even had they not already made vows, they would not only have done those same good works, but they would have also vowed to do them.

Second, granted that a deed performed under vow or under obedience be in a sense involuntary, nevertheless, he who accomplishes such a deed does so from the necessity of his vow or of obedience, which he has no desire to violate. Hence he acts in a more praiseworthy and meritorious manner than if he were performing a good work at his own pleasure and without a vow. And even if he have not a will to do some particular thing (e.g., to fast), he nevertheless desires to accomplish his vow or to practice obedience, which is much more meritorious than fasting. Hence he who fasts out of obedience performs a more acceptable work than he who fasts by his own desire. And the will to fulfill a vow or to practice obedience is held to be so much the more perfect in proportion as the deed accomplished for the sake of obedience or of keeping a vow is repugnant to nature. Hence St. Jerome says to Rusticus: my principal exhortation to you is not to be guided by your own judgment. (Jerome, Epistulae 125.15 (CSEL 56:133; PL 22:1080).) Then he adds: nor should you act according to your own will; but you shall eat as you are bidden; you shall have as much as is given you; you shall wear the raiment appointed you; you shall perform the whole task allotted to you; you shall be subject to him to whom you would rather not submit; you shall go weary to bed; you shall fall asleep on your feet and shall be forced to rise before you have slumbered your fill (Epistulae 125.15). (Jerome, Epistulae 125.15 (CSEL 56:134; PL 22:1080-1081).)

The passage just cited shows us that the merit of a good work consists in a man doing or suffering something for the love of God which is contrary to his own will. For alacrity of will and fervor of divine love are chiefly shown when that which we do for God is repugnant to our own inclinations. The martyrs are commended inasmuch as they endured many things repugnant to nature for the love of God. Hence when Eleazar was tortured he said: I suffer grievous pains in body; but in soul I am well content to suffer these things because I fear you (2 Macc 6:30).

Third, it is argued that a man may not perchance retain the will to fulfill his vow or to practice obedience; but God, as we know, judges the heart and will hold such a one unfaithful to his vow and to obedience. If a man perform what he has vowed or obey an order solely out of motives of fear or human respect he gains no merit before God; for he acts not from a desire to please him but solely under compulsion. Nevertheless, his vow, if it were made out of charity, is not unprofitable to him; for he has merited more by making it than others have done by fasting without any vow. Moreover, the merit of his vow remains to him if he repent of the infidelity of his heart.

This is our answer to the authorities adduced. They apply to the cases wherein men keep their vows under the compulsion of human motives such as fear or shame; but they do not speak of the necessity whereby men are constrained from motives of divine love to do or suffer what is naturally repugnant to them in order thereby to fulfill the will of God. This is made clear by the words of the Apostle: not with sadness or of necessity (2 Cor 9:7). For human necessity induces sadness; whereas the constraining of divine love dissipates or lessens it. In support of what we have said we may quote the words of Prosper: lest we should act not devoutly but unwillingly (De vita contempl. 2). (Pseudo-Prosper (Julianus Pomerius), De vita contemplativa 2.24.1 (PL 59:470B).) For the necessity which proceeds from divine love does not diminish love but increases it.

And St. Augustine, in his epistle to Armentarius and Paulina, shows that this necessity is desirable and praiseworthy: (Augustine, Epistulae 127.8 (CPL 0262; PL 33:487).) since, he says, you now have bound yourself, it is not lawful for you to act otherwise. Before you were under a vow you were free to do as you wouldst; now, however, you art subject to your vow. Nevertheless, liberty is not a matter of congratulation, since it renders man debtor for what he cannot repay with money. But now that your promise is made to God, I do not invite you to great justice, namely to the continence which you have vowed, as appears above, but I warn you against great iniquity. For if you do not perform what you have vowed, you will not remain as you were before your vow. Before your vow you were lower than at present, not worse; now, if, which God forbid, you break your faith with him, you will be as much the more accursed as you will be blessed if you keep your vow. Repent not of your promise to God; but rather rejoice that now it is no longer lawful for you to do that which formerly was permissible to you to your detriment. Act firmly and fulfill in deed what you have promised by word. He will help you who asks for your vows. Blessed is the necessity which constrains us to better things (Epistulae 127.8).

From these words we see how erroneous is the doctrine that persons are not bound to keep a vow that they may have made to go into religion.

The perfection of brotherly love