Chapter 29 — Reply to arguments about the lack of hindrance to the state of perfection in those with the ability to resign duties

We must next point out that they argue with great inconsistency who say that archdeacons and parish priests, in spite of their being able to resign their office, are in a state of perfection equal to that of the episcopate or of the religious life.

With regard to this point, it must be remembered that whoever leaves a state of perfection for one less perfect is considered an apostate. Hence the Apostle writes concerning widows: for when they have grown wanton in Christ they will marry; having damnation, because they have made void their first faith (1 Tim 5:11). On these words, the Gloss says that violation of a vow is damnable, and that all such are like the wife of Lot, who looked back; (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, on 1 Tim 5:11 (PL 192:353D).) for this is apostasy. (Augustine, De bono viduitatis, ch. 9, para. 12 (CPL 0301; CSEL 41:317-318; PL 40:437-438).) Hence, if archdeacons or parish priests were in a state of perfection, they would, by renouncing the archdiaconates or parishes, put themselves in a state of damnation by becoming apostates.

Those who argue against us maintain, first, that archdeacons and parish priests can embrace the religious life, not because the religious state is more perfect than that in which they have been living, but because it is safer. This, however, is eminently untrue. For it says in causa 19, question 1, canon 1: such of the clergy as desire to become religious, in order that thus they may be able to lead a better life, shall be permitted by their bishops to enter monasteries. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 19, q. 1, ch. 1 (Friedberg, 1:839).) Hence, it is clear that their desire of embracing the religious state must be on account of its greater perfection, not by reason of the security which it offers. Archdeacons and parish priests may not only resign their archdiaconates or parishes in order to go into monasteries, but they are free to resign them and stay in the world. This is done by those who become prebendaries of a cathedral. Likewise, if they be not in holy orders, they are free to marry. We thus have an incontestable proof that they are not in a state of perfection.

The second argument brought against us is, that if the inability of a religious man to leave his order be a proof that he is in a state of perfection, a married man must also be in a perfect state because he may not forsake his wife. The absurdity of this reasoning is made clear by what we have already said. The religious life and the wedded life have this one circumstance in common, that they both entail a perpetual obligation. But while obligations of matrimony are not undertaken with a view to the accomplishment of works of perfection but to render a carnal debt, the ties of the religious life bind men solely to works of perfection, i.e., to poverty, chastity, and obedience. Hence, the religious state is one of perfection.

The third argument is partly true and partly false. It embodies the proposition that, as David laid aside his armor for a sling and stones, so likewise it is permissible for men to abandon a more perfect state for one more lowly. A religious may, by reason of his weakness and with a dispensation, quit his order for one less severe. But the Church never allows a religious to leave the religious life for that of a secular priest, be it as archdeacon or as parish priest. Hence, we see that there is far more difference between the excellence of the religious state and the state of the archdiaconate or of parish priests, if theirs is to be called a state, than there is between the superiority of the more severe religious orders and that of the less rigorous ones.

The fourth objection, to wit, that if immutability be essential to the perfection of a state, it cannot be permissible to pass from one state to another, is absolutely frivolous. It is lawful to pass from a lower to a higher state, but not vice versa (Extra 18.3.31). (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii Papae IX), bk. 3, tit. 31, ["De regularibus"], ch. 18 (Friedberg, 2:575).) For a more perfect state embraces all that is contained in that which is less perfect; but the less perfect state does not contain what is included in a state of greater perfection. Therefore, a man who has bound himself to that which is less cannot be blamed for embracing that which is greater.

The fifth assertion, that a bishop can recall one of his clergy from the religious life to resume the charge of his parish, is untrue and is contrary to the sacred canons. The following words occur in Extra, de Renuntiatione, Admonet: you are strictly to forbid the priests belonging to your see to enter, to hold, or to leave, without your permission, the churches of your diocese, coming under your jurisdiction. Should any priest dare to come to one of your churches without your license, he will incur canonical penalties. (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii Papae IX), bk. 1, tit. 9, ["De renunciatione"], ch. 4 (Friedberg, 2:104).) In like manner it is laid down in de Privilegiis, Cum et plantare, § In ecclesiis, that religious who are in churches which do not absolutely belong to them, must present to the bishops, for ordination, the priests who shall be responsible for the care of such churches. Further, they must render to such priests an account of the temporal concerns of these churches. Nor must they presume, without consulting the bishop, to remove these priests from their charge. (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii Papae IX), bk. 5, tit. 33, ["De privilegiis et excessibus privilegiatorum"], ch. 3, sect. 2 (Friedberg, 2:850).)

`These words are only tantamount to saying that parish priests who resign their cures without consulting their bishop render themselves liable to canonical penalties. But it is illogical to apply this general rule to a particular case and to say that priests cannot leave their parishes to enter religion. For in causa 19, question 1, canon 2, it is expressly stated that even against the desire of their bishop, secular priests may quit their churches and enter monasteries. (The text is in reality found in q. 2: Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 19, q. 2, ch. 2, "Epicsopus de loco, etc." (Friedberg, 1:840).) Hence the words which occur in causa 7, question 1, canon 37 manifestly apply to the passing of the clergy from one church to another, not from the secular to the religious life. (Cf. Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 7, q. 1, ch. 37 (Friedberg, 1:580).)

The sixth objection does not touch the point in question. It is urged that religious pass from the religious life to a secular church, to which the care of souls is attached. This is true. But they do not, in undertaking charge of a church, abandon the religious state. For it is established by causa 16, question 1, canon 3: Concerning monks who, having lived a long while in religion, are admitted to holy orders, do not on that account relinquish their former state. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 16, q. 1, ch. 3 (Friedberg, 1:762).) But an archdeacon or parish priest can resign his office and embrace the religious life, since he is thereby passing from a less to a more perfect state under the guidance of the Spirit of God (Decretals 2.19.1). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 19, q. 2, ch. 2, "Duae" (Friedberg, 1:839).)

The seventh argument is too foolish to need an answer. It is urged that because a man who was in charity can fall from charity, therefore it does not follow that he who falls from a state of perfection was not in a state of perfection. No one falls from charity except by sin; and by sin, likewise, a man falls from a state of perfection. For as men are bound by a common law to the love of charity, they are also bound to a state of perfection by particular vows.

The eighth proposition, that by ecclesiastical constitution no bishop can become a religious without the permission of the pope, from the practice of the Church, is evidently untrue. The obstacle is, rather, on account of the perpetual obligation whereby bishops bind themselves to the care of their flocks. Hence the Apostle says: necessity is laid upon me; for woe is unto me if I preach not the Gospel (1 Cor 9:16). He adds the cause of this necessity, when he says: for whereas I was free unto all, I made myself the servant of all. (1 Cor 9:19.) Hence this prohibition is not laid down in the Decretals as a statute, but as a fact approved by reason.

The ninth objection is worthless. It is certain, as a general rule, that no one who has not received holy orders according to the ecclesiastical statute, is eligible to a bishopric, an archdiaconate, or to the care of a parish. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 60 (Friedberg, 1:226-227).) But the pope has in this matter power of granting dispensation, a power which at times he exercises. In such a case those in charge of an archdiaconate or parish, or even of an episcopal see, can resign their office and marry. By so doing they are not breaking any contract. A religious, however, who marries, breaks his vow or contract of celibacy.