Article 1 — Whether there is power in God

The first point of inquiry is whether there is power in God. (Parallel texts: Summa theologiae I, q. 25, a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles I, ch. 16; II, cc. 7‒10; In I Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that there is not. For power is a principle of activity. Now, God’s activity, which is his essence, has no principle, since neither is it begotten, nor does it proceed. Therefore, power is not in God.

Obj. 2: Whatever is most perfect should be ascribed to God, according to Anselm. (Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109 AD), Monologion 14–15 (Patrologia Latina [Migne], 158:161–64). Hereafter, all subsequent Patrologia Latina citations will be designated with PL.) Therefore, that which implies a relation to something more perfect should not be ascribed to God. But all power bears a relation to something more perfect, namely, a passive form and an active operation. Therefore, we should not ascribe power to God.

Obj. 3: Power, according to the Philosopher, denotes a principle of changing into some other thing according to what is other. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15–1020a6.) Now, a principle is a certain relation; and power is the relation of God to created things, insofar as he is signified in his power to create or move them. But no such relation is in God in reality, but only according to reason. (This is the first occurrence in this text of ratio, which is translatable in several very different ways, from “reason” (both the faculty and an explanation) to “notion” to “account,” and, in some specific contexts, “type” or “model” or “cause,” or even “ratio.” It is in most respects parallel in meaning to logos in Greek, although it contains less direct reference to speech. We will usually translate it as “account,” though the translation will depend on context.) Therefore, power is not in God in reality.

Obj. 4: Habit is more perfect than power, since it is closer to the one acting. But there are no habits in God. Neither, therefore, is there power in him.

Obj. 5: No expression should be employed that is derogatory to God’s primacy or simplicity. Now, God, because he is simple and the first agent, acts by his essence. Therefore, we should not speak of him as acting by his power, which (at least in its mode of signifying) connotes something added to his essence.

Obj. 6: According to the Philosopher, in everlasting things there is no difference between what is and what can be; (Aristotle, Physics 3.3, 202a36–b10; 3.7, 207b15–208a4.) much less must this be the case in God. Now, where two realities are the same, they should have one name, taken from the more dignified. But essence is more dignified than power, because power is an addition to essence. Therefore, we should speak only of God’s essence and not of his power.

Obj. 7: As primary matter is pure potency, so is God pure act. Now, primary matter considered in its own essence is entirely void of act. Therefore, God, considered in his own essence, is void of omnipotence.

Obj. 8: Any power apart from its act is imperfect; therefore, as no imperfection may be ascribed to God, such a power cannot be in him. If, then, there is power in God, it must always be united to its act. Consequently, the power to create will always be united to the act of creation, and thus, it will follow that God created things from eternity, which is heretical.

Obj. 9: When one thing suffices for a certain action, it is superfluous to add another. But God’s essence suffices for God to act through it. Therefore, it is superfluous to say that he has power whereby he acts.

Obj. 10: To this you may reply that God’s power does not differ from his essence according to reality but only according to a mode of understanding.

On the contrary, every concept to which there is no corresponding reality is void and senseless.

Obj. 11: The category of substance is nobler than the other categories; and yet, as Augustine asserts, it is not ascribed to God. (Augustine, On the Trinity 7.5 (PL 42:942–43).) Much less, therefore, is the category of quality. Now, power is assigned to the second species of quality. Therefore, it should not be ascribed to God.

Obj. 12: You will say that power as attributed to God is not a quality but the very essence of God, differing only in account.

On the contrary, either there is something real corresponding to this account, or there is nothing. If nothing, the account is empty. If something, then it follows that God’s power is in addition to his essence, just as the account of power is distinct from the account of essence.

Obj. 13: According to the Philosopher, every power and every effective act is for the sake of choosing something else. (Aristotle, Topics 4.5, 125b15–127a15.) But nothing of this kind belongs to God, since he is not for the sake of something else. Therefore, power does not belong to God.

Obj. 14: According to Dionysius, ability is a medium between substance and operation. (Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (5th–6th centuries AD), The Celestial Hierarchy 11 (Patrologia Graeca [Migne], 3:283–92). Hereafter, all subsequent Patrologia Graeca citations will be designated with PG.) But God does not act through a medium. Therefore, he does not act through an ability, nor, consequently, through a power. And thus, it follows that power is not in God.

Obj. 15: According to the Philosopher, active power, which alone can be ascribed to God, is a principle of transmutation terminating in another thing as such. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15–1020a6; 5.17, 1022a4–10; 9.2, 1046a36–b28; 11.1, 1059a18–1060a2.) But God acts without transmutation, as, for instance, in creation. Therefore, active power cannot be attributed to God.

Obj. 16: The Philosopher says that a power of action and a power of being acted upon belong to the same thing. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15–1020a6; 5.17, 1022a4–10; 9.2, 1046a36–b28; 11.1, 1059a18–1060a2.) But a power of being acted upon does not belong to God. Therefore, neither does a power of action.

Obj. 17: The Philosopher says that there for an active power there is a contrary privation. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15–1020a6; 5.17, 1022a4–10; 9.2, 1046a36–b28; 11.1, 1059a18–1060a2.) Now, it is in the nature of contraries to have the same subject. Since, then, there can in no way be privation in God, neither can power be in him.

Obj. 18: The Master says that action is not properly speaking attributable to God. (Peter Lombard (d. 1160 AD), Sentences, bk. 2, d. 1 (PL 192:651–55).) But where there is no action, there can be no power, active or passive. Therefore, no kind of power is in God.

On the contrary (1), it is written: you are powerful, O Lord, and your truth is round about you (Ps 88:9).

Furthermore (2), it is written: God has power from these stones to raise up children to Abraham (Matt 3:9).

Furthermore (3), every activity proceeds from some power. Now, to be active belongs to God most of all. Therefore, power belongs to God most of all.

I answer that, to make the point at issue clear, we must observe that we speak of power in relation to act. Now, act is twofold:

that is, the first act is a form;

and the second act is operation.

And thus, it seems the word “act” was first employed in the sense of operation, for almost everyone understands it this way; and then, second, it was transferred to indicate the form, inasmuch as the form is the principle and end of operation.

Therefore, in like manner, power is twofold:

active power corresponds to that act which is operation (and it seems that it was in this sense that the word “power” was first employed);

and passive power corresponds to the first act, which is a form (to which it seems that the name “power” was given in a secondary sense).

Now, just as nothing suffers save by reason of a passive power, so nothing acts except by reason of the first act, namely, the form. For it has been stated that this first act is so called from “action.” Now, to God belongs pure and primary act; therefore, it belongs to him most of all to act and to pour his own likeness into other things. Consequently, active power belongs to him most of all, since a power is called “active” insofar as it is a principle of action.

We must also observe that our intellect strives to describe God as something most perfect. And seeing that it is unable to come to him save from a likeness with his effects, while failing to find among creatures anything so supremely perfect that it is wholly devoid of imperfection, it consequently endeavors to describe him from the various perfections it discovers in creatures, although each of those perfections is in some way deficient. Therefore, it wholly removes from God whatever of imperfection is connected with any of these perfections. For instance, “being” denotes something complete and simple, yet non-subsistent; and “substance” denotes something subsistent, yet the subject of something else.

Accordingly, we ascribe being and substance to God, but substance in the account of subsistence, not in the account of standing under something else, and being in the account of simplicity and completeness, not in the account of inherence, whereby it inheres in something else. In like manner, we ascribe to God operation in the account of ultimate completion, not in the account of that to which an operation passes. And we attribute power to God in the account of that which abides and is the principle of it, and not in the account of that which is completed by an operation.

Reply Obj. 1: Power is a principle not only of the operation but also of the effect. Hence, it does not follow that, if power be in God as the principle of his effect, that there is also some principle of God’s essence, which is his operation.

Another and a better reply is that there are two kinds of relation in God.

One kind is real, namely, that by which the persons are mutually distinct (for instance, paternity and filiation); otherwise, the divine persons would not be distinct really but only in account, as Sabellius maintained.

The other kind of relation is only one of account and is indicated when we say that the divine operation comes “from” the divine essence, or that God works “by” his own essence. For prepositions indicate some kind of relationship. This happens because, when we attribute to God operation according to its own account, which requires a principle, we attribute to him also the relation of what exists from a principle. Therefore, such relation is only a relation of account. Now, the account of an operation involves a principle, but the account of essence does not; hence, although the divine essence has no principle, neither in reality nor in account, still the divine operation does have a principle according to account.

Reply Obj. 2: Although all that is most perfect should be attributed to God, it does not follow that everything that is attributed to him is the most perfect; rather, it is necessary that it be suitable for designating the most perfect thing. For something might be attributed to what is most perfect by reason of its particular perfection, even though there is something still more perfect which nevertheless lacks the particular perfection in question.

Reply Obj. 3: Power is said to be a principle not as though it were the very relation signified by the name “principle,” but because it is that which is a principle.

Reply Obj. 4: Habit is never in an active power, but only in a passive power, and is more perfect than it; such a power, however, is not attributed to God.

Reply Obj. 5: It is absurd to say that though God works by his essence there is no power in God, for that which is a principle of action is a power. Therefore, the mere fact that God works by his essence implies that there is power in God. Hence, the account of power in God does not derogate from his simplicity or his primacy, since it does not indicate something in addition to his essence.

Reply Obj. 6: The statement that in everlasting things there is no difference between what is and what can be, is understood in terms of passive power. Consequently, it has no bearing on the point at issue, because no such power is in God. Nevertheless, since it is true that active power in God is identical with his essence, we must reply that, although the divine essence and power are the same in reality, nevertheless, since power mostly by its mode of signification indicates something in addition, it requires a special name. For names correspond to ideas, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, On Interpretation 1.1–4, 16a3–17a2; 1.9, 19a23–39.)

Reply Obj. 7: This argument proves that there is no passive power in God, and this we grant.

Reply Obj. 8: God’s power is always united to act, that is, to operation (for the operation is the divine essence); but the effects follow according to the command of his will and the order of his wisdom. Consequently, it does not follow that his power is always united to its effect, or that creatures have existed from eternity.

Reply Obj. 9: God’s essence suffices for him to act by it, and yet his power is not superfluous, because it is understood not as some reality in addition to his essence, but as adding, according to understanding, the mere relation of a principle; for the essence itself, from its being the principle of action, has the account of power.

Reply Obj. 10: Something corresponds to the intellect in two ways.

First, immediately—that is to say, when the intellect conceives the form of something existing outside the soul, such as that of a man or a stone.

Second, mediately—namely, when something follows the act of the understanding, and the intellect considers it by reflecting on itself. Hence the reality corresponds to that consideration of the intellect mediately, that is to say, through a mediating understanding of the reality. For instance, the intellect understands animal nature in a man, a horse, and many other species; consequently, it understands that nature as a genus. To this thought, however, whereby the intellect understands a genus, there does not immediately correspond some external reality that is a genus; rather, yet there is some reality that corresponds to the thought from which this mental process follows. It is the same with the relation of a principle that power adds to essence, since something corresponds to it in reality—not, however, immediately, but mediately. For our intellect understands the creature with a certain relation to and dependence on its Creator; and for this very reason, being unable to understand one thing related to another without, conversely, reciprocally understanding the opposite relation, it understands in God a certain relation of principle, which follows its mode of understanding; and thus he is referred to the reality mediately.

Reply Obj. 11: The power that is in the second species of quality is not ascribed to God. For this belongs to creatures, which do not act immediately through their essential forms but through the medium of accidental forms. But God acts immediately by his own essence.

Reply Obj. 12: Something does indeed correspond in the divine reality to the various accounts of the divine attributes, but that something is one and the same. Because of his incomprehensibility, our intellect is compelled to represent the most simple reality, who is God, by means of various forms; and thus these various forms which our intellect conceives about God are indeed in God as in the cause of truth, insofar as the very reality that is God can be represented by all these forms. But nevertheless, they are in our intellect as their subject.

Reply Obj. 13: The saying of the Philosopher applies to active and effective powers and the like, as applied to the productions of art and human activities; for not even in natural realities is it always true that an active power is for the sake of its effects. For it would be absurd to say that the power of the sun is for the sake of the worms produced by its power. Much less is the divine power for the sake of its effects.

Reply Obj. 14: God’s power is not a medium according to reality, since it does not differ from his essence except in account (and this suffices for our speaking of it as though it were a medium). But God does not work through a medium that is distinct from himself in reality; therefore, the argument fails.

Reply Obj. 15: There are two kinds of action. One is accompanied by transmutation of matter; the other kind presupposes no matter (as in creation). And God can act in either way, as we shall see further on. Hence, active power may rightly be ascribed to God, although he does not always act by causing a change in something.

Reply Obj. 16: The Philosopher’s statement is not universal but particular, namely when something moves its very self, like an animal. When, however, one thing is moved by another, then the power of being acted upon and the power of action are not the same.

Reply Obj. 17: The privation that is contrary to power is lack of power. But we must not speak of contraries in connection with God, because nothing in God has a contrary, since he is not in a genus.

Reply Obj. 18: We do not remove action from God simply speaking, but only action in the manner of natural things, which act and are acted upon simultaneously.