Article 4 — Whether we ought to judge of a thing’s possibility or impossibility in reference to its lower or its higher causes

The fourth point of inquiry is whether we ought to judge of a thing’s possibility or impossibility in reference to its lower or its higher causes. (Parallel texts: ST I.25.3, ad 4; In I Sent. 42.2.3.)

Obj. 1: And it would seem that we should consider its higher causes. For the Gloss on 1 Corinthians 1:20 (Glossa interlinearis, at 1 Corinthians 1:20 (in Glossa ordinaria 6, 201–4).) says that the folly of the wise men of the world consisted in their judging of possibility and impossibility by observing the nature of things. Therefore, we should judge a thing to be possible or impossible in reference not to its lower but to its higher causes.

Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher, that which is first in any genus is the measure of all things that belong to that genus. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b19–1053a14.) Now, God’s power is the first power. Therefore, a thing should be deemed possible or impossible in reference to it.

Obj. 3: The more a cause influences its effect, the better it serves as a guide to our judgment of the effect. Now, the first cause influences the effect more than does a secondary cause. Therefore, we should judge of an effect more by referring to the first cause. Consequently, we should deem a thing possible or impossible in relation to the higher causes.

Obj. 4: To give sight to a blind man is impossible with respect to the lower causes, and yet it is possible since sometimes it is done. Therefore, we should judge of a thing’s impossibility not according to the lower but according to the higher causes.

Obj. 5: Before the world existed, it was possible that it would exist. But it was not possibility in relation to lower causes. Therefore, the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary (1), an effect should be deemed possible in reference to the cause on which its possibility is based. But an effect derives its possibility, contingency, or even necessity from its proximate and not from its remote cause; for example, merit receives a contingency from free decision, which is its proximate cause, and not a necessity from divine predestination, which is its remote cause. Therefore, one should judge of a thing’s possibility or impossibility by referring to its lower causes, which are proximate.

Furthermore (2), what is possible in regard to lower causes is also possible in regard to higher causes, and therefore in every way possible. But that which is possible in every way is possible simply speaking. Therefore, in order to judge whether a thing be simply possible, we must refer to the lower causes.

Furthermore (3), higher causes are necessary. If, then, we are to consider effects in the light of higher causes, all effects will be of necessity, but this is impossible.

Furthermore (4), all things are possible to God. Therefore, if we must judge of a thing’s possibility or impossibility in reference to him, nothing will be impossible, but this is incongruous.

Furthermore (5), in the employment of terms we should follow how most people speak. Now, the way people speak about power uses “disposition,” “necessity,” and “act” as being related to one another. But these are to be found in the lower and not the higher causes. Therefore, we should judge of the possibility or impossibility of a thing in reference to the lower and not the higher causes.

I answer that judgment as to the possibility or impossibility of a thing may be considered in two ways: with reference to the one who judges, and with reference to the thing being judged.

As regards the first, it must be observed that if there are two sciences, one of which considers the higher causes and the other the less high, judgment in each must not be formed in the same way but in reference to those causes that each science considers. Take, for instance, the physician and the astrologer: the astrologer considers the highest causes, and the physician the proximate causes; the physician will form his judgment about a sick man’s health or death according to the proximate causes, namely, the strength of the nature and the strength of the disease, but the astrologer will judge according to the remote causes, namely, the position of the stars.

It is thus with the point at issue. For there are two kinds of wisdom:

worldly wisdom, which is called “philosophy,” which considers lower causes (that is, caused causes) and bases its judgements on them;

and divine wisdom, which is called “theology,” which considers the higher causes (that is, the divine) and judges according to them. Now, the higher causes are the divine attributes, such as wisdom, goodness, the divine will, and the like.

It must be noted, however, that there is no point in referring this question to those effects which belong exclusively to the higher causes, that is, those that God alone can produce, since it would be incongruous to say that they are possible or impossible in relation to lower causes. Rather, this question is about effects produced by lower causes, for such effects may be produced by both lower and higher causes, and it is about them that a doubt may occur.

Again, the question at issue does not concern things that are called possible or impossible not with respect to a power but in their very selves. However, the effects of secondary causes with which this question is concerned are judged by the theologian to be possible or impossible in reference to the higher causes but are called possible or impossible by the philosopher in reference to the lower causes.

If, however, this judgment is formed with respect to the nature of the thing in question, it is clear that the effects’ possibility must be judged in reference to their proximate causes, since the action of their remote causes is determined according to their proximate causes, which those effects imitate chiefly; and therefore with respect to them chiefly one’s judgment about the effects should be formed. This is clear from a comparison with passive power. For, properly speaking, matter is not said to be in potency to something when the matter is remote (as earth is to becoming a goblet) but when the matter is proximate, capable of going into act by a single mover, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.1, 1046a4–29; 9.7, 1049a3–34.) Thus, gold is a goblet in potency by art alone accomplishing that act. In like manner, an effect, so far as its nature is concerned, is said to be possible or impossible in respect of its proximate causes alone.

Reply Obj. 1: The wise men of the world are said to be foolish because they judged things that are impossible with regard to lower causes to be absolutely and simply impossible, even to God.

Reply Obj. 2: The possible is compared to power not as the thing measured is compared to its measure but as object to power. And yet it happens that the divine power is the measure of all powers.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the first cause influences the effect most of all, nevertheless its influence is determined and specified by the proximate cause; and therefore the effect imitates its likeness.

Reply Obj. 4: Although to make the blind see is possible to God, it cannot be said to be possible in every way.

Reply Obj. 5: That the world will exist was possible with respect to the higher causes; hence this does not pertain to the question at issue. Therefore, the statement “the world will exist” is possible not only as regards the divine power but also in its very self, because the terms do not contradict each other.

Reply Sed Contra 1: This argument considers the nature of the effect that is in question.

Reply Sed Contra 2: Although what is possible with respect to inferior causes is also possible with respect to higher causes, this does not apply to the impossible; rather, it is the other way around. Consequently, we must not form a universal judgment on the matter or judge that a thing is possible or impossible in every case with respect to lower causes.

Reply Sed Contra 3: We do not judge certain things to be possible or impossible in reference to certain causes because they are like those causes in their possibility or impossibility, but rather because they are possible or impossible for those causes.

Reply Sed Contra 4: The theologian would say that whatever is not impossible in itself is possible, according to Mark 9:22, all things are possible to him that believes, and Luke 1:37, no word shall be impossible with God.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Though none of those things are found in the higher causes, they are subject to those higher causes; hence, this argument considers passive power, and not active power, of which we are now speaking.