Article 6 — Whether God can do things that are possible to others

The sixth point of inquiry is whether God can do things that are possible to others: for example, can he sin, walk, and so forth? (Parallel texts: ST I.25.3, ad 2; SCG II.25; In I Sent. 42.2.1.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that he can. Augustine says that it is a better nature that can sin than that which cannot. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity 1.105 (PL 40:281).) Now, whatever is best should be ascribed to God. Therefore, God can sin.

Obj. 2: We should not withhold from God anything that is praiseworthy. Now, it is said in praise of a man that he could have transgressed and has not transgressed (Sir 31:10). Therefore, the power to transgress and not to transgress should be ascribed to God.

Obj. 3: The Philosopher says that both a god and a serious man can do base things. (Aristotle, Topics 4.5, 126a35.) Therefore, God can sin.

Obj. 4: To consent to a mortal sin is to sin mortally, and he who commands the commission of a mortal sin consents to it; in fact, in a certain respect he is the principal. Since, then, God commanded Abraham to commit a mortal sin, namely, to slay his innocent son, (Cf. Genesis 22:2.) and Hosea to take a wife of fornication and have of her children of fornication, (Cf. Hosea 1:2.) and Semei to curse David, although he sinned by so doing, since we find that he was punished for the deed, (2 Samuel 16:7; 1 Kings 2:36.) it would seem that he sinned mortally.

Obj. 5: It is a mortal sin to cooperate with one who sins mortally. Now, God cooperates with him who commits a mortal sin, since he operates in every deed and, consequently, in every man who commits a mortal sin. Therefore, God sins.

Obj. 6: Augustine says that God acts within the hearts of men by inclining their wills toward whatever he wills, be it good or evil. (Augustine, On Grace and Free Will 21 (PL 44:907–9); cf. Glossa ordinaria 6, 14–32, at Romans 1 (PL 114:469–74).) But it is a sin to incline a man’s will to evil. Therefore, God sins.

Obj. 7: Man was made to God’s image (Gen 1:26). Now, whatsoever is found in the image must be found in the original. But man’s will is open to opposites. Therefore, God’s will is also and, consequently, he can sin and not sin.

Obj. 8: Whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can do also. Now, man, whose power is inferior to God’s, is able to walk, to sin, and so forth. Therefore, God also can do these things.

Obj. 9: Someone neglects something when he does not do the good he is able to do. But God is able to do many good things that he does not do. Therefore, he omits them and so sins.

Obj. 10: It seems that he sins who can prevent the commission of sin and does not prevent it. Now, God can prevent all sins being committed. Since, then, he does not do so, it would seem that he sins.

Obj. 11: It is written: shall there be evil in a city that the Lord has not done? (Amos 3:6). But this cannot refer to the evil of punishment, since it is written: God did not make death (Wis 1:13). Therefore, it must refer to the evil of sin, such that God is the author of the evil of fault.

On the contrary (1) it is said: God is light, and in him there is no darkness (1 John 1:5). Now, sin is spiritual darkness. Therefore, in God there can be no sin.

Furthermore (2), a sovereign is not bound by his own laws. And every sin is contrary to the divine law, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee 22.27 (PL 42:418–19).) Therefore, God cannot be subject to sin.

I answer that, as already stated, there are two ways in which God may be said to be unable to do a thing absolutely: in respect of his will and in respect of his power. (Q. 1, a. 5.)

On the part of his will, God cannot do what he cannot will. Now, since no will can will the contrary of what it naturally wills—for example, a man’s will cannot will misery—it is certain that the divine will cannot will what is contrary to its own goodness, since it wills this naturally. Now, sin is a certain lapse from divine goodness: hence, God cannot will to sin. Therefore, we must grant absolutely that God cannot sin.

On the part of his power, God is said in two ways to be unable to do a thing:

in one way, in the account of the power itself;

in another way, in the account of the possible thing.

His power in and of itself is found to lack nothing that appertains to power, since it is infinite. There are certain things, however, which in name denote power but denote a lack of power in reality, as there are many negations that are included in affirmations: for example, when we say that someone is able to fail, according to the manner of speaking it seems that a certain power is being indicated, although more a lack of power is being indicated. For this reason, according to the Philosopher, a power is said to be perfect when it is unable to do such things. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15–1020a6.) For just as such affirmations are the force of negations according to the reality, so too such negations have the force of affirmations. Hence, we say that God is not able to fail and, consequently, that he is not able to be moved (since movement and failing imply a certain imperfection), and therefore, that he cannot walk nor perform any other bodily actions, since these are inseparable from movement.

In the account of the possible thing, God is said to be unable to do a thing when it implies a contradiction, as stated above; (Q. 1, a. 5.) in this way, we say that God cannot make another God equal to himself. For a contradiction is implied by the fact that what is made must be in some way in potency, because it receives its being from another, and consequently cannot be pure act, which is proper to God himself.

Reply Obj. 1: This comparison must not be taken universally, but only as between man and brute animals.

Reply Obj. 2: That which is said in praise of man is not always becoming to the praise of God; it might even be a blasphemy, as if I were to say that God repents and the like. For, as Dionysius says, what is praised in a lower nature is blamed in a higher. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 4 (PG 3:698–735).)

Reply Obj. 3: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as conditional to the will. For this conditional statement is true, “God can do base things if he will,” for nothing prevents a conditional from being true while both its antecedent and consequent are impossible. In the same way, it is clear that if a man flies, he has wings.

Reply Obj. 4: Nothing prevents an act that in itself would be a mortal sin from becoming virtuous through the addition of a circumstance. Thus, absolutely speaking, it is a mortal sin to kill a man, yet it is not a sin but an act of justice for the judge’s minister to put a man to death for justice’s sake on the judge’s command. Now, even as the ruler of the city holds the authority over men in matters of life and death and whatever else pertains to the end of his regime (which is justice), so God holds all things at his disposal to direct them to the end of his own regime (which end is its goodness). And therefore, though it would be able to be, in itself, a mortal sin to slay an innocent son, yet if this be done at God’s command for an end foreseen and set in order by God, even though it be unknown to the man, it is not a sin but a meritorious act. The same applies also to the fornication of Hosea, for it is certain that God is the orderer of all human generation. Some, however, assert that this did not happen in reality but only in a prophetic vision.

As to the command given to Semei, we must give a different reply. For God is said to give a command in two ways:

In one way, by speaking either spiritually or in a bodily way through a created substance; and in this way he commanded Abraham and the prophets.

In another way, by inclining him, as he is said to have commanded a worm to consume the ivy (Jonah 4:7). In this way, he commanded Semei to curse David, by inclining his heart; and this is in the manner we shall explain in the reply to the sixth objection.

Reply Obj. 5: The sinful act, insofar as it has being and actuality, is to be referred to God as its cause; but insofar as it has the deformity of sin, it must be referred to the free decision and not to God, just as all that there is of movement in limping comes from the power of walking, but its deformity comes from the curvature of the leg.

Reply Obj. 6: God is said to incline man’s will to evil not as though he infused malice into it or helped move it toward malice, but rather by permitting and setting it in order—for instance, those who consent to the exercise of cruelty God judges to be deserving of the things that they do to others.

Reply Obj. 7: Although man is made to God’s image, it does not follow that whatever is found in man is also found in God. Nevertheless, as to the point raised, God’s will is open to both things because it is not determined to one object. For he is able either to do a thing or not to do it, to do this or to do that; yet it does not follow that in either case he can do evil, which is to sin.

Reply Obj. 8: This argument applies to those things that pertain to the perfection of power but not to those that indicate a lack of power.

Reply Obj. 9: Though God is able to do many good things which he does not do, he does not neglect them, for he is not obligated to do those things, which latter is required for the account of neglect.

Reply Obj. 10: The same answer applies here, since a man is not guilty of a sin through failing to prevent it unless he is obligated to do so.

Reply Obj. 11: The words of Amos are understood with respect to the evil of punishment. Moreover, the words of the Book of Wisdom, God has not made death, (Wisdom 1:13.) refer either to the cause of death (which is the merit of fault) or to the original formation of nature, whereby he made man in his own way immortal.