Article 7 — Why God is called omnipotent

The seventh point of inquiry asks why God is called omnipotent. (Parallel texts: ST I.25.3; SCG II.22, 25; III.13.1; In I Sent. 42.2.2; In III Sent. 1.2.3; Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 1; Quodlibet V, q. 2, a. 1; Quodlibet XII, q. 2, a. 1; Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 6, lect. 1‒2. See below: q. 5, a. 3.)

Obj. 1: It would seem that he is called omnipotent because, simply speaking, he can do all things. For he is called omnipotent in the same way as he is called omniscient. Now, he is called omniscient because he simply speaking knows all things. Therefore, he is called omnipotent because, simply speaking, he can do all things.

Obj. 2: If he is called omnipotent not because he can simply speaking do all things, then the distribution implied is not absolute but only in an accommodated sense. But such distribution is not universal but is determined to something. Therefore, the divine power would be determined to something and would not be infinite.

On the contrary, as stated above, (Q. 1, aa. 3, 5.) God cannot make an affirmation and denial be true at the same time, nor can he sin or die. Yet these things would be included in the above distribution, if it were taken absolutely. Therefore, it must not be taken absolutely, and consequently God cannot be called omnipotent because he can do all things absolutely.

Obj. 3: Again, it would seem that he is called omnipotent because he can do all that he wills. For Augustine says in the Enchiridion: he is called omnipotent for no other reason but that he can do whatever he wills. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity 1.96 (PL 40:276).)

On the contrary, the blessed can do whatever they will; otherwise, their will would not be perfect. And yet they are not called “omnipotent.” Therefore, the fact that God can do whatever he wills is not sufficient reason for calling him “omnipotent.”

Further, the will of a wise man is not for the impossible; therefore, no wise man wishes to do anything but what he is able to do. And yet not all the wise are omnipotent. Therefore, the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 4: Again, it would seem that he is called omnipotent because he can do all that is possible. For he is called omniscient because he knows all things knowable. Therefore, there is equal reason for calling him omnipotent, because he can do all things possible.

On the contrary, if he is called omnipotent because he can do all things possible, this is either because he can do all things possible to him, or because he can do all things possible to nature. But if it is because they are all things possible to nature, then his power would not surpass that of nature, which is absurd. But if it is because they are all things possible to him, everyone would be called omnipotent since everyone can do what is possible to himself. Moreover, such an explanation is by way of circumlocution, which is unfitting.

Obj. 5: Again, if God is called omnipotent and omniscient, why is he not also called omnivolent?

I answer that, in attempting to assign the reason for God’s omnipotence, some have accepted things that do not pertain to the account of omnipotence but that are more the cause of omnipotence, or that pertain to the perfection of his omnipotence, or to the account of his power, or to the way in which he has power.

Thus, some have said that God is omnipotent because he has infinite power. These assigned not the account of omnipotence but its cause; for instance, a rational soul is the cause of a man, not his definition.

Some have said that God is omnipotent because he cannot undergo anything, nor is he capable of defect, nor can anything act on him, and so on, all of which pertain to the perfection of his power.

And some said that he is called omnipotent because he can do whatever he wills, and this from himself and through himself; but this pertains to the way in which he has power.

Now, all these accounts are insufficient because they set aside the accounts of operations as regards their objects, which accounts omnipotence indicates. And therefore, we reply that one must take one of the three paths touched on in the objections, and they speak of the connection to the objects. (See q. 1, a. 7, obj. 2–4.)

Accordingly, as stated above, God’s power, considered in itself, extends to all those objects that do not imply a contradiction. (See q. 1, a. 5.) Nor does the objection stand that refers to things which imply a defect or bodily movement, since the very possibility of such things is not possible to God. (See q. 1, a. 7, obj. 2.) And as regards things that imply a contradiction, they are impossible to God as being impossible in themselves. Consequently, God’s power extends to things that are possible in themselves, and such are the things that do not involve a contradiction. Therefore, it is certain that God is called omnipotent because he can do all things that are possible in themselves.

Reply Obj. 1: God is called omniscient because he knows all things knowable. Now, false things are not knowable and therefore he does not know them. But things impossible in themselves are compared to power as the false are compared to knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: This account would stand if the distribution were confined within the genus of possible things in such a way that it did not extend to all possible things.

Reply Obj. 3: Concerning the other account of omnipotence, one should say that to be able to do whatever he wills to do is not a sufficient account of omnipotence, though it is a sufficient sign of omnipotence. It is in this sense that we must take the words of Augustine.

Reply Obj. 4: To the third account we reply that God is called omnipotent because he is able to do all things that are absolutely possible; hence, the objection does not proceed correctly as regards things possible to God or to nature.

Reply Obj. 5: To the last question we reply that in things done through will, power and knowledge are determined to the work done by the will, as stated in Metaphysics 9; (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.2, 1046a36–b28; 9.5, 1048a25–b36.) hence the power and knowledge in God are described as not universally determined, as when he is called omniscient and omnipotent. But the will, which determines them, cannot be for all things but only for those to which it determines his power and knowledge; hence God cannot be called omnivolent.