Article 18 — Whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows all natural things

Eighteenth, it is asked whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows all natural things. (Parallel texts: ST I.89.3, 8; SCG II.101; On Truth, q. 8, a. 4.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does not. For, as Augustine says, the demons know many things through experience over a long time, (Cf. Isidore of Seville, Sentences (De summo bono), bk. 1, ch. 10, para. 17 (PL 83:556C); ST I.89.3, s.c. 1.) and the soul does not possess experience as soon as it is separated from the body. (Augustine, On the Divination of Demons, ch. 3 (CSEL 41:603–5; PL 40:584–85).) Therefore, since the demon possesses a more penetrating intelligence than the soul, because the natural gifts of the demons remain clear and lucid, as Dionysius says, it seems that the soul does not know all natural things when it exists in separation from the body. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 23 (PG 3:723–26).)

Obj. 2: Further, the souls of men, when united to their bodies, do not know all natural things. Therefore, if souls existing in separation from bodies know all natural things, it seems that they acquire this knowledge after their separation from the body. But some souls acquire a knowledge of some natural things in this life. Consequently, after separation from their bodies, these souls will possess a twofold knowledge of the same things: one acquired in this life, another when they exist apart from the body. This seems impossible, for two forms of the same species do not exist in the same subject.

Obj. 3: Further, no finite power can extend to infinite things. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 8.10, 266a25, 266b5; Metaphysics 12.7, 1073a8–10; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 8, lect. 21, n. 1146; Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 1, lect. 15, n. 148; SCG II.59.) Now the power of the separated soul is finite because its essence is finite. Therefore, it cannot extend to infinite things. But natural things known by the soul are infinite: for example, the various kinds of numbers, figures, and proportions. Therefore, the separated soul does not know all natural things.

Obj. 4: Further, every cognition is brought about by the one knowing becoming like the thing known. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; On Evil, q. 16, a. 7, ad 6; Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 12.) Now it seems impossible for the separated soul to become like natural things, for they are material whereas it is itself immaterial. Consequently, it does not seem possible that the soul can know all natural things.

Obj. 5: Further, the potential intellect stands in the same relation to intelligible things as prime matter does to sensible things. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a10–14; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 5 and 17; Aquinas, On Truth, q. 10, a. 8. resp.) But prime matter receives only one form at a time. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.2, 1069b26.) Therefore, since the potential intellect, when it exists apart from the body, has only one order, because in that state it is not attracted to different things by the senses, it seems that the potential intellect is capable of receiving only one intelligible form, and thus of knowing only one natural thing instead of all natural things.

Obj. 6: Further, things belonging to different species cannot be like one and the same thing so far as species is concerned. But cognition is brought about by one thing becoming like another so far as species is concerned. Therefore, one separated soul cannot know all natural things, since they are diverse in species.

Obj. 7: Further, if separated souls know all natural things, they must have in themselves forms which are the likenesses of natural things. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 1, ad 5; a. 14, resp.) Now knowledge of this kind extends either to genera and species alone, or to individuals as well. In the first case, separated souls will not know individuals, and, hence, will fail to know all natural things, since individuals above all are seen to exist in reality. In the second case, since individuals are infinite in number, it would follow that an infinite number of likenesses exists in the separated soul. (Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.24, 86a5–7.) This seems impossible. Therefore, the separated soul does not know all natural things. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 11, obj. 13.)

Obj. 8: It has been said, however, that only the likenesses of genera and species exist in the separated soul, and that by applying these to singulars it is enabled to apprehend singulars.

On the contrary, the intellect can apply the universal knowledge which it has in its possession only to the particulars which it now knows. For if I know that every mule is sterile, I can apply this knowledge only to this particular mule which I know. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, bk. 1, lect. 38.) Now knowledge of the particular precedes the natural application of the universal to the particular; for an application of this sort cannot be the cause of our knowledge of particulars. (Cf. ST I.14.11, resp.; Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, lect. 2.) Consequently, particulars will remain unknown to the soul when it is separated from the body.

Obj. 9: Further, wherever knowledge exists, there is found a certain order of the knower to the thing known. Now the souls of the damned do not have any order; for it is said that “there,” that is, in hell, is no order, but everlasting horror dwells (Job 10:22). Therefore, the souls of the damned, at least, do not know natural things.

Obj. 10: Further, Augustine says that the souls of the dead can have absolutely no knowledge of things that come to pass here below. (Augustine, On the Care of the Dead, cc. 12–13, 15–16 (CSEL 41:643–55; PL 40:602–7); cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 11, obj. 12; q. 9, a. 6, obj. 5; ST I.89.7, obj. 1; a. 8, resp.) But natural things are things that come to pass here below. Therefore, the souls of the dead have no knowledge of natural things.

Obj. 11: Further, everything that exists potentially is actualized by that which exists actually. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 8.5, 257b6–10; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 8, lect. 10, n. 1053; lect. 8, n. 1030.) However, it is evident that, so long as it remains united to the body, the human soul is in potency with respect either to all things, or at least to most of the things which can be known naturally, for the intellect does not know all things actually. Therefore, if, after its separation from the body, the soul knows all natural things, it must be actuated by something. Now this is apparently none other than the agent intellect, by which all things are made, as is said in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a15.) But the agent intellect cannot actualize the soul with respect to all those intelligibles which it did not apprehend. Thus, the Philosopher, in On the Soul 3, compares the agent intellect to light, and phantasms to colors. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a14–17; 3.7, 431a14.) Now light does not suffice to make all visible things actually visible unless colors be present also. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 14.) Therefore, neither will the agent intellect be able to actuate the potential intellect with respect to all intelligibles, for, since phantasms reside in bodily organs, they cannot be present to the separated soul.

Obj. 12: But it has been said that, so far as all naturally knowable things are concerned, the soul is not actuated by an agent intellect, but by some higher substance.

On the contrary, whenever a thing is actuated by an external agent differing in genus from itself, such actuation is not natural. Thus, if something curable is cured by art or by divine power, the cure will be either the work of the art or miraculous; however, a cure will be natural only when it is effected through an intrinsic principle. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.9, 1034a9–31; Aquinas, On Truth, q. 11, a. 1, resp.) Now the proper and connatural agent, so far as the potential intellect of man is concerned, is the agent intellect. Therefore, if the potential intellect is not actuated by an agent intellect but by some higher agent, then the natural knowledge, of which we have been speaking, will not exist. Hence, no such knowledge will be had by all separated souls in common, because it is only with respect to natural things that all separated souls are united.

Obj. 13: Further, if the separated soul is actuated with respect to all naturally intelligible objects, the actualizing agent must either be God or an angel. Now, apparently, it cannot be an angel, because an angel is not the cause of the nature itself of the soul; hence, the natural knowledge of the soul does not seem to be attributable to the action of an angel. Likewise, it would appear incongruous if the souls of the damned received from God, after death, such great perfection that they were cognizant of all natural things. Therefore, it seems that separated souls do not in any way know all natural things. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 19, a. 1, obj. 13.)

Obj. 14: Further, the ultimate perfection of everything existing in potency lies in this, that it be actualized with respect to all those things to which it is in potency. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.16, 1021b11–24; 5.17, 1022a4–16; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 5, lect. 22; On Evil, q. 16, a. 2, resp.) But man’s potential intellect is in a state of natural potency only with respect to all natural intelligible objects, that is to say, all those things which it is capable of knowing by natural cognition. Therefore, if the separated soul apprehends all natural things, then apparently every separate substance, simply because of the separate existence which it enjoys, truly possesses its own ultimate perfection, namely, happiness. Therefore, if mere separation from the body suffices to confer this perfection upon the soul, then the other helps employed in the effort to attain happiness exist to no purpose. This seems incongruous. (Cf. ST I.89.3, s.c. 2.)

Obj. 15: Further, delight follows upon knowledge. Therefore, if all separated souls know all natural things, it seems that the souls of the damned enjoy that knowledge thoroughly, taking the greatest delight therein. This seems incongruous.

Obj. 16: Further, the Gloss on the text in Isaiah, Abraham did not know us (Isa 63:16), reads, the dead, even the saints, are ignorant of what the living do; they know not even what their own children do. (Glossa ordinaria, in Bibliorum Sacrorum cum Glossa ordinaria iam ante quidem a Strabo Fulgensi, collecta: nunc autem novis patrum, cum Graecorum, tum Latinorum expositionibus locupletata cum postilla Nicolai Lyrani (Venice: 1603), vol. 4, p. 507, at Isaiah 63:16; see also PL 113:1308; cf. Augustine, On the Care of the Dead, ch. 16 (CSEL 41:652; PL 40:606); Aquinas, On Truth, q. 9, a. 6, obj. 5; ST I.89.8, resp.) But the things that are done among the living are natural things. Therefore, separated souls do not know all natural things.

On the contrary (1): The separated soul apprehends separate substances. But the species of all natural things are found in separate substances. Therefore, the separated soul does know all natural things. (Cf. ST I.89.3, obj. 1.)

Furthermore (2), it might be said that he who sees a separate substance need not see all the species existing in its intellect.

On the contrary, there is Gregory’s saying, what is there that they, who see him who sees all things, may not themselves see? (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, bk. 4, ch. 33 (SC 265:116; PL 77:376); bk. 4, ch. 34 (SC 265:116; PL 77:376) cf. Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 12, ch. 13 (CCSL 143A:638–39; PL 75:994–95); bk. 12, ch. 21 (CCSL 143A:645; PL 75:999); Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 4, obj. 8.) Thus, they who see God see all the things that God sees. For the same reason, therefore, those who see the angels see those things that the angels see. (Cf. William of Auxerre (1140/50–1231 AD), Summa aurea, bk. 2, tr. 6, ch. 2, q. 2; cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 4, resp.)

Furthermore (3), the separated soul knows a separate substance so far as the latter is intelligible; for it does not see that substance by corporeal vision. But as the separate substance is intelligible, so also is a species existing in the intellect of that substance. Therefore, the separated soul apprehends, not only a separate substance, but the intelligible species existing in it as well.

Furthermore (4), the object actually known is the form of the knower and is one with him. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 430a3–5; 3.7, 431a1; 431b16–17.) Therefore, if the separated soul apprehends a separate substance, and if the latter is actually cognizant of all natural things, then apparently the separated soul would itself be cognizant of all natural things.

Furthermore (5), as is said in On the Soul 3, he who understands greater intelligible objects also understands lesser ones. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429b1–5.) Therefore, if the separated soul apprehends separate substances which are in the highest degree intelligible, as we have said above, (Above: qq. 5, 17.) then it seems to follow that it apprehends all other intelligible objects. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 4, obj. 17; ST I.89.3, obj. 2.)

Furthermore (6), if something is in potency with respect to many things, it is actuated with respect to all of them by an active principle which is all of them actually, just as a matter which is potentially hot and dry is made actually hot and dry by fire. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 25.) Now the separated soul’s potential intellect is in potency to all intelligibles. However, the active principle from which it receives an influx, namely, a separate substance, is in act with respect to all of these intelligible objects. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 7, obj. 4.) Consequently, the separate substance brings the soul from potentiality to act either with respect to all intelligible objects or to none. But this is obviously not with respect to none, for separated souls apprehend certain things of which they were not cognizant here below. Therefore, it actuates them with respect to all intelligible objects. Consequently, the separated soul apprehends all natural things.

Furthermore (7), Dionysius says that superior beings are the exemplars of inferior ones. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 9 (PG 3:823–26); cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 8, obj. 1.) Now separate substances are superior to natural things; hence, they are the exemplars of natural things. Therefore, it would seem that separated souls know all natural things in virtue of the intellectual vision that they have of separate substances.

Furthermore (8), separated souls know things through infused forms. But infused forms are said to be forms of the order of the universe. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 19, a. 2, resp.) Therefore, separated souls know the entire order of the universe and thus know all natural things.

Furthermore (9), whatever exists in an inferior nature exists in its entirety in a superior nature. Now the separated soul is superior to natural things. Hence, all natural things in a certain respect exist in the soul. But the soul knows itself. Consequently, it knows all natural things.

Furthermore (10), as Gregory says, the story of Lazarus and the rich man in Luke 16 is not a mere parable; it clearly related something that actually took place because the person involved, Lazarus, is explicitly identified by name. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 40 (PL 76:1301–12, esp. 1305); see also Ambrose, Exposition on the Gospel of Luke, bk. 8, ch. 13 (CCSL 14:302; PL 15:1768D); Luke 16:19–31.) Now it is recorded that the rich man in hell knows Abraham, whom he had not known before. Therefore, separated souls, even those of the damned, likewise know things which they did not know in this life, and so it seems that they know all natural things.

I answer that the separated soul knows all natural things in a certain respect, but it does not know them in an absolute sense. In proof of this, the fact should be borne in mind that the order among things is such that whatever exists in an inferior nature exists in a higher mode in a superior nature. Thus, whatever is found in things susceptible of generation and corruption (Namely, what is found in terrestrial bodies.) exists in a higher mode in heavenly bodies as in their universal causes. For example, hot and cold, and other things of this sort, exist in inferior bodies as particular qualities and forms, but exist in heavenly bodies as universal powers by which such qualities and forms are conveyed to those inferior bodies. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.7, 289a11–35; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 2, lect. 10, nn. 389–394.) In like manner, whatever exists in a corporeal nature exists in a higher mode in an intellectual nature. Thus, the forms of corporeal things exist materially and particularly in those corporeal things, whereas they exist immaterially and universally in intellectual substances. Wherefore, it is said in the Book of Causes that every intelligence is full of forms. (The Book of Causes, proposition 9 [10].)

Furthermore, everything that exists in the creature exists in a higher mode in God himself. For the natures and forms of things exist in creatures in many diverse modes, but in God they exist unitedly, in a simple and undivided way. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 10, ad 3.) This existence of things is expressed in three ways: (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5; On the Power of God, q. 4, a. 2, ad 8 and ad 25.) first, God said, let there be a firmament, by which is understood the existence of things in the Word of God. (Genesis 1:6–7.) Second, it is said, and God made the firmament, by which is understood the existence of the firmament in the angelic intelligence. Third, it is said, and it was so, by which is understood the existence of the firmament in its proper nature, as Augustine explains. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 8 (CSEL 28.1:43–45; PL 34:269–70).) The same applies to the other creations of God. For just as things flowed from God that they might subsist in their proper nature, so from the divine wisdom the forms of things flowed into intellectual substances so that those things might be understood. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 11, resp.)

Hence, it must be borne in mind that the mode in which a thing exists in the order of natural perfection is the mode proper to it in the order of intelligible perfection. Now in the order of natural perfection singulars do not exist on their own account but for the sake of something else, namely, that in them the species to which they belong may be preserved. This indeed is what nature intends. For nature intends to generate man, not this man. Or rather, it generates this man only because the species cannot exist unless the individual man exists.

Thus, the Philosopher, in his work On the Generation of Animals, states that in assigning the causes of the accidents of a species we must go back to the final cause. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 5.1, 778a29–b1; 778b10; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 25.) But the accidents of the individual, he says, must be reduced to the efficient or material cause, thus suggesting that only what pertains to the species as such falls under the intention of nature. Thus, knowledge of the species of things pertains to intellectual perfection, but not the knowledge of individuals, except perhaps accidentally.

Consequently, although this intellectual perfection is found in all intellectual substances, it does not exist in each of them to the same degree. For the intelligible forms of things exist in a more united and more universal mode in superior intellectual substances than they do in inferior intellectual substances where they are multiplied to a greater extent and are less universal according as they are further and further removed from the first simple being, (Namely, God.) and come closer and closer to the particularity of things. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 10, s.c. 2; On Evil, q. 16, a. 4, resp.) But thanks to their greater intellective power, superior substances perfect their intelligence through a few forms, so that they know the natures of things down to their ultimate species. (Cf. SCG II.100.) Now even if forms as universal as those existing in superior intellectual substances were possessed by inferior substances, the latter would not thereby attain that ultimate intellectual perfection which consists in knowing things down to their individual species, because inferior intellectual substances have an inferior intellective power. Hence, their knowledge of things will remain more or less universal and indistinct, and generality and indistinctness are the marks of imperfect knowledge. (Cf. ST I.89.3, resp.) For it is evident that the more active the intellect, the greater is its ability to acquire much from little. An indication of this is that things must be explained one by one to uncultivated people and to slow learners, and particular examples introduced for each single thing. (Cf. Aquinas, On Evil, q. 16, a. 4, resp.)

Now the human soul is obviously the lowest among all intellectual substances. Consequently, it is capable by nature of receiving the forms of things in the material order. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 10, a. 8, resp., where Thomas refers to Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 5 and 17.) Thus, the human soul is united to a body in order that the soul may receive intelligible species from material things through its potential intellect. Nor is its natural intellective power greater than that required for perfecting its knowledge through such forms. Hence, the intelligible light in which the human soul participates and which is called the agent intellect has as its function to actualize intelligible species of the type referred to.

Therefore, since the soul is united to the body, the soul’s vision is turned toward inferior things; from these it abstracts intelligible species proportioned to its intellective power, and it is in this way that the soul is perfected in knowledge. But when the soul is separated from the body, its vision is directed toward higher things alone, and from these it receives an influx of universal intelligible species. And although the species thus received have a less universal mode of existence in the separated soul than they enjoy in those higher substances, nevertheless the intellective power of the soul is not so efficacious that it can acquire a perfect knowledge of those intelligibles through this kind of species. That is to say, it cannot apprehend each one of them individually and determinately, but it can know them only generally and indistinctly in the manner in which things are known through universal principles. Moreover, separated souls acquire this knowledge all at once by an influx, and not successively by instruction, as Origen says. (Origen, On First Principles, bk. 1, ch. 6, para. 3.)

Consequently, we must say that separated souls know all natural things in a universal way by natural knowledge, but do not know each of them individually. This is not the case, however, with respect to the knowledge that the souls of the saints possess through grace. For as regards that knowledge the saints are made equal to the angels inasmuch as they, like the angels, see all things in the Word. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 11, ad 12; ST I.89.8, resp.; II-II.83.4, ad 2.)

The answers to the objections are now in order.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine, the demons know things in three ways: first, some demons know things that transcend their natural knowledge through the revelation of the good angels, such as the mystery of Christ and the Church and others of this kind; second, some demons know things that are naturally knowable by the native acumen of their own intelligence; third, some demons know the issue of future contingent events in individual cases through experience over a long time. (Augustine, On the Divination of Demons, cc. 3–4, 6 (CSEL 41:603–11; PL 40:584–87); On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 17 (CSEL 28.1:61; PL 34:278); cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 15, ad 7.) Now, as we have pointed out, knowledge of singulars does not pertain essentially to intellectual cognition as such. Consequently, the objection is irrelevant because here there is no question of such knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: In those souls which have acquired the science of certain natural things knowable in this life, there will exist a knowledge of those things which bears directly on the individual. Their knowledge of other things, however, will be universal and indistinct, so that they will not have acquired knowledge uselessly in this life. Nor is there any incongruity in their possessing both types of knowledge with respect to the same objects, since those knowledges are formally diverse.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument is beside the point. For we do not allege that the separated soul knows all natural things in their individuality. Hence, the infinity of species that is found in numbers, figures, and proportions, is not out of proportion to the soul’s cognitive power. But since that same argument would likewise apply to angelic knowledge, it must be said that the species of figures and numbers and things of this sort are not infinite actually but only potentially. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 11.10, 1066b24–25; Physics 3.5, 204b5–10; 206a4; 3.6, 206a16–19; 206b30; 207a8; 3.7, 207b10–15; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 11, lect. 10, nn. 2328–29; Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 3, lect. 10 and 12; On Truth, q. 2, a. 10, resp.; ST I.7.4, resp.) Nor is it improper that the power of a finite intellectual substance should extend to infinites of this kind. For an intellective power in a certain respect is itself infinite inasmuch as it is not limited by matter. This is why it can know the universal, which is also infinite in a certain respect inasmuch as it belongs to the universal by nature to contain infinites potentially.

Reply Obj. 4: The forms of material things exist in immaterial substances immaterially. Thus, immaterial things become like material ones so far as the intelligible nature of the latter’s forms is concerned, not so far as their mode of existing is concerned. (Cf. SCG II.99.)

Reply Obj. 5: Prime matter is related to forms in a twofold manner only, because with respect to them it is either in pure potency or in complete act. For natural forms have their own operations as soon as they exist in matter, unless there be some impediment, because a natural form is directed to one thing only. Thus, as soon as the form of fire exists in matter, it causes the matter to move upward. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 4.8, 214b14–15.) However, the potential intellect is related to intelligible species in a threefold manner: (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a10–22; 2.5, 417a21–30; Physics 8.4, 255a33–34; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 11.) sometimes, as before learning, it is in pure potency; sometimes, as when actually reflecting upon something, it is in complete act; sometimes, as when possessing knowledge in habit but not actually exercising it, it is in a state midway between potency and act. Therefore, an apprehended form, so far as it is apprehended actually, but not so far as it exists in the potential intellect “habitually,” is related to the potential intellect as a natural form is to prime matter. Hence, as prime matter is informed with but one form at a time, so the potential intellect apprehends but one intelligible object at a time. Nevertheless, it can know many things habitually in virtue of its habit of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 6: There can be a likeness between a thing and a knowing substance in two ways: either according to the thing’s real mode of existing—and in this way no likeness exists between things diverse in species and a knowing substance, since the latter belongs to one species only—or according to the thing’s intelligible mode of existing, and in this way there can be a likeness between things diverse in species and the soul, inasmuch as the knowing substance possesses diverse intelligible species, even though the soul itself belongs only to one species.

Reply Obj. 7: Separated souls know not only the species but also individuals, although not all individuals but only some. Consequently, it is not necessary that an infinite number of species exist in the separated soul.

Reply Obj. 8: The application of universal knowledge to singulars is not the cause of the knowledge of singulars but is a natural result of a knowledge of singulars. The problem of how the separated soul knows singulars will be treated later. (See below: q. 20.)

Reply Obj. 9: Since, according to Augustine in his work On the Nature of Good, the good consists in mode, species, and order, then so far as order is found in a thing, to that extent good is found there. (Augustine, On the Nature of Good, bk. 1, ch. 3 (CSEL 25.2:856–57; PL 42:553).) Now the good of grace does not exist in the damned but only the good of nature. Hence, in them there exists not the order of grace but the order of nature, and the latter suffices for knowledge of natural things. (Cf. Aquinas, On Evil, q. 16, a. 2, ad 17.)

Reply Obj. 10: Augustine is speaking of singulars which come to pass here below. The knowledge of such things, we have said, does not pertain to intellectual cognition.

Reply Obj. 11: The potential intellect cannot be rendered actually cognizant of all natural things by the light of the agent intellect alone, but only by some superior substance which is actually cognizant of all natural things. And if one considers rightly, he will see that, according to the Philosopher’s own treatment of the matter, the agent intellect is not active directly with respect to the potential intellect, but rather with respect to phantasms which the agent intellect makes actually intelligible. It is by the phantasms thus actualized that the potential intellect is actualized when, as a result of its union with the body, its vision is turned to inferior things. For the same reason, when, after its separation from the body, the potential intellect turns toward superior things, it is actualized, as by its own proper agent, by the actually intelligible species which exist in superior substances. Such knowledge, therefore, is natural.

Reply Obj. 12: Hence, the reply to the twelfth objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 13: Separated souls receive this sort of perfection from God through the mediation of the angels. For, although the substance of the soul is created by God immediately, nevertheless intelligible perfections come from God through the mediation of the angels, and not only natural perfections but also those which pertain to the mysteries of grace, as Dionysius shows. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 2 (PG 3:179–80); cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 9, a. 1, ad 9.)

Reply Obj. 14: The separated soul, having universal knowledge of natural intelligible objects, is not perfectly actualized. For to know a thing universally is to know it imperfectly and potentially. By such knowledge, therefore, the separated soul does not attain even natural happiness. Consequently, it does not follow that the other helps for the attainment of happiness are superfluous.

Reply Obj. 15: The good of knowledge which the damned possess is itself a cause of sorrow to them, inasmuch as they know that they are deprived of the highest good to which they are directed through other goods.

Reply Obj. 16: That Gloss refers to particulars which, as was said, do not pertain to intellectual perfection. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 9, a. 6, ad 5.)

Reply Sed Contra 1: To the first argument on the contrary side, it is to be said that the separated soul does not perfectly comprehend a separate substance. Hence, it is not necessary that the separated soul know all the things which are present by their likeness in such a substance.

Reply Sed Contra 2: Gregory’s statement is true as regards knowledge of that intelligible object which is God: an object which in itself represents all intelligible objects. However, it is not necessary that he who sees God should know all the things that God knows, unless that person should know himself as God knows himself. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 4, resp., ad 8 and 17.)

Reply Sed Contra 3: The species existing in the angel’s intellect are intelligible to the intellect of the one of whom they are the forms, but not to the intellect of the separated soul. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 19, a. 1, resp.)

Reply Sed Contra 4: Although the intellect is the form of an intellectual substance, it is not necessary that the separated soul, apprehending the separate substance, should apprehend the intellect of that substance, because the separated soul does not comprehend the latter.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Although the separated soul does in some way know separated substances, it is not necessary that it know all other things perfectly. For it does not know perfectly the separate substances themselves.

Reply Sed Contra 6: The separated soul is actualized with respect to all natural intelligible objects by a superior substance. However, it is not actualized perfectly but universally, as we have pointed out. (Above: resp.)

Reply Sed Contra 7: Although separate substances are in some way the exemplars of all natural things, it does not follow that all these are known when these natural things are known, unless the separate substances themselves are comprehended perfectly. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 8, ad 1.)

Reply Sed Contra 8: The separated soul knows through infused forms. But these are not forms of the order of the universe in an individual mode, such as superior substances possess, but only in a general mode, as was said. (Above: end of resp.; cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 11, resp.)

Reply Sed Contra 9: Natural things exist in a certain respect in separate substances and in the soul. However, the forms of natural things exist actually in the separate substances, whereas they exist only potentially in the soul inasmuch as they are knowable.

Reply Sed Contra 10: The soul of Abraham was a separate substance. Consequently, the soul of the rich man was able to know the soul of Abraham, just as it could know other separate substances.