Article 20 — Whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows singular things

Twentieth, it is asked whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows singular things. (Parallel texts: ST I.89.4; SCG II.100; In IV Sent., d. 50, q. 1, a. 3; On Truth, q. 19, a. 2.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does not, because of all the soul’s powers, only the intellect remains in the soul when it exists apart from the body. Now the object of the intellect is the universal and not the singular, for science has to do with the universal, whereas the senses are directed to singulars, as is stated in On the Soul 1. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5, 417b22–28; 3.5, 1430a10; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 12.) Therefore, the separated soul does not know singulars but only universals.

Obj. 2: Further, if the separated soul knows singulars, it does so either through the forms which it acquired previously while it existed in the body, or through infused forms. Now it does not know singulars through forms acquired previously, for some of the forms which the soul acquired through the senses while it existed in the body are individual intentions, which are conserved in the sensitive part of the soul; but these cannot remain in the soul when it is separated from the body, because powers of this kind do not remain in the soul, as has been shown. (Above: q. 19.) Some intentions, however, are universal, that is, those which are in the intellect; therefore, these alone can remain in the separated soul. But singulars cannot be known through universal intentions. Therefore, the separated soul cannot know singulars through the species acquired while it existed in the body. Similarly, it cannot know singulars through infused forms, because such forms represent all singulars equally. Therefore, it would follow that the separated soul knows all singulars. This does not appear to be the case. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 19, a. 2, obj. 1.)

Obj. 3: Further, the separated soul is prevented from knowing a thing that is located in a different place from itself. For Augustine says in the work On the Care of the Dead that the souls of the dead are in a place where they cannot know in any way whatever the things that occur here. (Augustine, On the Care of the Dead, cc. 13, 15–16 (CSEL 41:647–55; PL 40:604–7); cf. ST I.89.7, obj. 1; above: q. 18, obj. 1.) But knowledge that is caused through infused species is not prevented because of a difference of place. Therefore, the soul does not know singulars through infused species.

Obj. 4: Further, infused species are related equally both to the present and to the future, for the infusion of intelligible species is not affected by time. (Cf. ST I.57.3, obj. 3.) Therefore, if the separated soul knows singulars through infused species, it seems that it does not know the present or the past, but only the future. However, it appears that this cannot be the case, because knowledge of the future belongs to God alone; for it is said, tell us what is to come hereafter, that we may know that you are gods (Isa 41:23). (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, obj. 1; On Truth, q. 8, a. 12, s.c.; On Evil, q. 16, a. 7, resp.)

Obj. 5: Further, singular things are infinite. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 11, obj. 13.) Infused species, however, are not infinite. Therefore, the separated soul cannot know singulars through infused species. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187b7.)

Obj. 6: Further, whatever is indistinct cannot be a principle of a distinct knowledge. But the knowledge of singulars is distinct. Therefore, since infused species are indistinct inasmuch as they are universal, it seems that the separated soul cannot know singular things through infused species. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 19, a. 2, obj. 2.)

Obj. 7: Further, whatever is received in a thing is received according to the mode of the recipient. (This principle, omne quod recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur, is often cited by Aquinas; it can be found in The Book of Causes, propositions 9, 19, 23; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:694–95); Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 4 (PL 63:848C; CCSL 94:96–97). See also Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 12.) Now the separated soul is immaterial. Therefore, infused forms are received in it immaterially. But what is immaterial cannot be the principle of a knowledge of singular things which are individuated by matter. Therefore, the separated soul cannot know singulars through infused forms.

Obj. 8: But it may be said that singular things can be known by infused forms, even though they are immaterial, because singulars are likenesses of the ideal exemplars by which God knows both universals and singulars.

On the contrary, God knows singulars through the ideal exemplars inasmuch as they are productive of matter, which is the principle of individuation. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 19, a. 2, resp.; q. 8, a. 11, resp.) But the forms infused in the separated soul are not productive of matter, because they do not create, for creation belongs to God alone. Therefore, the separated soul cannot know singulars through infused forms.

Obj. 9: Further, the likeness which any creature bears to God cannot be a univocal likeness, but only an analogous one. (Cf. ST I.4.3, ad 3; I.44.3, ad 1.) Now a knowledge that is acquired because of some analogous similarity is the most imperfect sort of knowledge, for example, if one thing is known through something else inasmuch as it conforms with it in being. Therefore, if the separated soul knows singulars through infused species, inasmuch as they are like the ideal accounts, it seems that it knows singulars in a most imperfect manner.

Obj. 10: Further, it was shown in a preceding article (Above: qq. 15, 18.) that the separated soul knows natural things through infused forms only indistinctly and in the universal. Now this is not to know them. Therefore, the separated soul does not know singulars through infused species.

Obj. 11: Further, those infused species through which the separated soul admittedly knows singular things are not caused immediately by God because, according to Dionysius, the divine law is to change the lowest thing through an intermediary. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, paras. 3–4 (PG 3:179–82, 182); The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, para. 4.) On the other hand, neither are infused species caused by an angel, because an angel cannot cause species of this kind, either by creating them—since it never creates anything, or by changing something—because this requires a communicating medium. Therefore, it seems that the separated soul does not possess infused species through which it may know singulars.

Obj. 12: Further, if the separated soul knows singular things through infused species, this can occur only in one of two ways: either by applying species to singulars, or by turning itself toward the species themselves. If the soul knows singulars by applying species to singulars, it follows that such an application is not made by deriving something from singular things themselves, because the separated soul does not have sensitive powers naturally disposed to receive species from singulars. Therefore, it remains that this application is made by premising something about singulars; and thus, the soul will not know singulars themselves, but only what it premises about them. However, if the separated soul knows singulars through the aforesaid species by turning itself toward them, it follows that it will know singulars only so far as they exist in the species themselves. But singulars exist only universally in the aforesaid species. Therefore, the separated soul knows singulars only in the universal.

Obj. 13: Further, nothing finite can be superior to infinite things. But singulars are infinite. Therefore, since the power of the separated soul is finite, it seems that the separated soul does not know singulars. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 8.10, 266a23–24.)

Obj. 14: Further, the separated soul can know a thing only by intellectual vision. Now Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12 that separated souls by their intellectual vision know neither bodies nor the likenesses of bodies. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 24 (CSEL 28.1:416–17; PL 34:474–75).) Therefore, since singular things are bodies, it seems that they cannot be known by the separated soul.

Obj. 15: Further, wherever the nature is the same, the mode of operation is also the same. Now a separated soul possesses the same nature as a soul that is joined to a body. Therefore, since the soul by its intellect cannot know singulars when it is joined to the body, it seems that it cannot know singulars when it exists apart from the body. (Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.18, 81b6; 1.25, 86a29.)

Obj. 16: Further, powers are distinguished by their objects. But the cause—in this case, the object—possesses that which it produces in a higher degree. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.3, 72a29–30.) Therefore, the diversity among objects is greater than that found among powers. But sense never becomes intellect. Hence, the singular, which is the object of sense, never becomes an object of the intellect.

Obj. 17: Further, a cognitive power of a superior order is less complex, with respect to the same cognizable object, than a power of an inferior order; for the common sense knows all things apprehended by the five external senses. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.2, 426b9–23.) Likewise, an angel, by one cognitive power, namely, by its intellect, knows both the universals and singulars which a man apprehends by his senses and his intellect. Now no power of an inferior order can apprehend the object of another power which differs in species from itself, just as sight can never apprehend the object of hearing. Therefore, a man’s intellect can never apprehend a singular which is the object of sense, although an angel’s intellect knows and apprehends both.

Obj. 18: Further, it is said in the work Book of Causes that an intelligence knows things inasmuch as it causes them or directs them. (The Book of Causes, propositions 7 [8], 22 [23].) But the separated soul can neither cause singulars nor direct them. Therefore, it does not know singulars.

On the contrary (1), (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 10, a. 5, obj. 3.) to form propositions belongs to the intellect alone. Now the soul, when still joined to the body, forms propositions, the subject of which is a singular, and the predicate of which is a universal: for example, when I say, “Socrates is a man.” But I cannot do this unless I know the singular and its relationship to the universal. Therefore, the separated soul really knows singulars by its intellect.

Furthermore (2), the soul is inferior in nature to every angel. Now the angels of a lower hierarchy receive illuminations about singular effects. In this way they are distinguished from the angels of an intermediary hierarchy, who receive illuminations according to the universal likenesses of these effects. They are also distinguished from the angels of a supreme hierarchy, who receive their illuminations according to the universal likenesses existing in their cause. (Namely, in God.) Therefore, since the more particular in nature a knowledge is, the lower is the order of existence of the substance possessing such knowledge, it seems that the soul knows singulars in a much more desirable way when it exists apart from the body.

Furthermore (3), whatever an inferior power can do, a superior power can do. (Cf. Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 4 (CCSL 94:98; PL 63:849B); Aquinas, On Truth, q. 2, a. 6, obj. 4; q. 8, a. 11, s.c. 4; SCG II.100.) Now sense, which is inferior to the intellect, can know singulars. Therefore, the separated soul can know singulars by its intellect.

I answer that when the soul exists apart from the body, it knows some singulars, but not all of them. Now it knows some of the singulars of which it first acquired knowledge while united to the body—otherwise it would not remember the things which it did in this life, and thus remorse of conscience would vanish from the separated soul. (Cf. Isaiah 66:24; Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 50, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 2; On Evil, q. 16, a. 6, ad 10; SCG IV.90.) It knows also those singulars of which it acquires knowledge after being separated from the body—otherwise, it would not be punished by the fire of hell and by the other corporeal punishments which are said to exist in hell. However, that the separated soul does not know all singulars by its natural knowledge is shown by the fact that the souls of the dead are not aware of things that occur here, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Care of the Dead, cc. 13, 15–16 (CSEL 41:647–55; PL 40:604–7).)

Therefore, this inquiry involves two difficulties: one common to intellectual nature as such, and one proper to human nature. The difficulty common to intellectual nature as such arises from the fact that our intellect does not seem to be capable of knowing singulars, but only universals. Therefore, since intelligence is the only cognitive power proper to God, to the angels, and to the separated soul, it appears difficult to see how they can possess a knowledge of singulars.

For this reason, some men made the mistake of denying any knowledge of singulars to God and the angels; but this is altogether impossible. (Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 12, comm. 51; Aquinas, On Truth, q. 2, a. 5, resp.; q. 8, a. 11, resp.; ST I.22.2, resp.) For if this position were adopted, divine providence would be excluded from things, the judgment of God concerning human acts would disappear, and the ministering of the angels would also be removed, for we believe that the angels are solicitous of the safety of man, as the Apostle says, are they not all ministering spirits sent forth to serve, for the sake of those who are to obtain salvation? (Heb 1:14). (Cf. Aquinas, Quodlibet VII, q. 1, a. 3, s.c.)

For this reason, some said that God, the angels, and separated souls as well, know the whole order of the universe through a knowledge of universal causes; for there is nothing in singular things that is not derived from these universal causes. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 8, cc. 6–7; Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 1; d. 38, q. 1, a. 3; On Truth, q. 2, a. 5, resp.) They offer the example that, if anyone should know the whole order of the stars and the heavens, and their measure and movement, he would know, by means of his intellect, all future eclipses, both their number, in what places they would occur, and at what time they would take place in the future. (The example comes from Aristotle: Posterior Analytics 1.31, 87b33–88a3; cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 8, ch. 6.) But this is insufficient for a true knowledge of singulars. For it is clear that, no matter how closely universals may be united, a complete singular never results from their union—just as if I say man, white, musical, and will have added whatever others are possible, a singular will never result from them; (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 2, a. 5, resp.; Quodlibet VII, q. 1, a. 3.) since it is possible for all these universals, which are joined together, to belong to many men. Therefore, anyone who knows all causes universally never knows expressly any singular effect as a result of such knowledge. Nor does one who knows the whole order of the heavens know this eclipse inasmuch as it is this, (That is, as a singular.) for although he knows that a future eclipse will occur at such a position of the sun and moon, at such an hour, and whatever else is to be observed in eclipses of this kind, yet it is possible for an eclipse of this specific kind to happen many times.

Therefore, others, that they might ascribe a true knowledge of singulars to the angels, maintained that knowledge of this sort is derived from singulars themselves. (This opinion is described in the work attributed to Adam Pulchrae Mulieris (fl. ca. 1225 AD), Liber De intelligentiis (Memoriale rerum difficilium), 27; cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 8, a. 9, resp.; a. 11, resp.; Cassiodorus, On the Soul, ch. 2 (PL 70:1286); Alcher of Clairvaux, The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 30 (PL 40:800); Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 50, P. 2, a. 1, q. 1, resp.) But this is quite incongruous; (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 19, a. 1, resp.) for, since the greatest difference exists between an intelligible mode of existing and a material and sensible mode of existing, the form of a material thing is not received immediately by the intellect, but is carried to it through a number of intermediaries; for example, the form of a sensible thing first exists in a medium wherein it is more spiritual than in the sensible thing itself; next it exists in a sense organ, and from there it is drawn into the imagination and the other inferior powers; and finally it is carried to the intellect. Now it is inconceivable that such means should play any role either in the knowledge of an angel or in that of a separated soul.

Therefore, it must be said, on the contrary, that the forms of things through which the intellect knows are related to things in a twofold manner. (Cf. Aquinas, Quodlibet VII, q. 1, a. 3, resp.) For some forms are productive of things, while others are derived from them; and forms which are productive of things lead to a knowledge of a thing inasmuch as they are productive of it. Thus, the artisan who gives the form to the thing made, or gives some disposition to matter, knows the thing made by the form of his art as regards that which he causes in the thing. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 1, a. 2, resp.) And because no human art causes matter, which is the principle of individuation, but receives matter already in existence, therefore the artisan—for example, a builder—knows the house in a universal way by its form, but he does not know this house as this house, except so far as he acquires knowledge of it through the senses. Now God, by his intellect, not only produces the form from which the universal account is derived, but also produces matter which is the principle of individuation. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 2, a. 5, resp.; q. 8, a. 11, resp.; SCG I.65; ST I.57.2, resp. (at the end).) Consequently, he knows by his art both universals and singulars; for, as material things flow from the divine art, with the result that they subsist with their proper natures, so also by the same art do the likenesses of intelligible things flow into the separate intellectual substances, and these substances know the things produced by God, through these likenesses.

Therefore, the separate substances know not only universals, but singulars as well, inasmuch as the intelligible species which are infused in them by the divine art are the likenesses of things as regards both their form and their matter. Nor is it improper for a form which is productive of a thing, even though the form itself is immaterial, to be the likeness of a thing as regards both its form and its matter, because a thing always exists more simply in a superior nature than it does in an inferior one. Therefore, although form and matter are diverse in the sensible nature, nevertheless that which is higher and the cause of both is related to both as one existing thing; and, for this reason, superior substances know material things immaterially, and diverse things unitedly, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 2 (PG 3:867–70).) However, intelligible forms that are derived from things are acquired by abstraction. Hence, they do not give rise to knowledge of the thing as such, but only to a knowledge of what is abstracted from the thing. Therefore, since the forms in our intellect, which are derived from things, are abstracted from matter and from all material conditions, they do not lead to a knowledge of singulars, but to a knowledge of universals alone. This, therefore, is the reason why separate substances can know singulars by their intellect, whereas, on the other hand, our intellect knows only universals. (Cf. ST I.86.1, resp.)

Now an angelic intellect and a separated soul are differently situated so far as the knowledge of singulars is concerned. For we explained in a previous article that the efficacy of the angels’ intellective power is proportioned to the universality of the intelligible forms which they possess; (Above: q. 18; cf. SCG II.100.) and, therefore, they know through universal forms of this kind all the things to which these forms extend. Therefore, just as they know all the species of natural things existing under their genera, so they know all the singular natural things contained under their species. However, the efficacy of the separated soul’s intellective power is not proportioned to the universality of infused forms, but, on the contrary, is proportioned to forms abstracted from things. For this reason, it is natural for the soul to be united to a body. (Cf. ST I.84.7, resp.; I.85.1, resp.) Therefore, it was said above that the separated soul does not know all natural things determinately and completely, even with regard to their species, but that it can know them in a certain general and indeterminate manner. (Above: q. 18.) Consequently, the infused species which separated souls possess are not sufficient for a knowledge of singulars to the point of enabling those souls to know all singulars as the angels do. Nevertheless, these infused species in the soul are limited to a knowledge of those singulars to which the soul is specifically ordered or inclined: for example, those things which act upon it, either things afflicting it, or things which leave impressions and traces upon it. For whatever is received is determined in the recipient in accordance with the condition of the recipient’s mode of being. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 12.) Hence, it is evident that the separated soul knows singulars—not all singulars, however, but only some of them.

Reply Obj. 1: In this life our intellect knows through species derived from things, which species are abstracted from matter and from all material conditions; therefore, it cannot know singulars, the principle of which is matter, but only universals. However, the separated soul’s intellect has infused forms through which it can know singulars, for the reason just given. (Above: resp.)

Reply Obj. 2: When the soul exists apart from the body, it does not know singulars by the species which it previously acquired while united to the body, but by infused forms. However, it does not follow that it knows all singulars, as has been shown. (Above: resp.)

Reply Obj. 3: Separated souls are prevented from knowing things that occur here, not because they exist in a different place, but because they do not possess a sufficiently efficacious intellectual power whereby they can know all singulars through infused species.

Reply Obj. 4: (Cf. ST I.57.3, resp., and ad 3; Quodlibet VII, q. 3, a. 3, ad 1.) The angels do not know all future contingent things, for they know singulars through infused species inasmuch as they participate in these species. Hence, future things, in whose species the angels do not yet participate, are not known by the angels inasmuch as they are future but are known only inasmuch as they are present in their causes. (Cf. ST I.89.7, ad 3.)

Reply Obj. 5: The angels who know all singular natural things do not have as many intelligible species as there are singulars known through these species; but they know many things through one species, as we have shown above. (Above: qq. 15, 18.) Separated souls do not know all singulars. Consequently, this objection does not apply so far as they are concerned.

[No Reply to Objection 6 is provided.] (Though Aquinas provided no reply to this objection, many printed editions include the following text, found originally in the Venice edition (1503) and derived from De veritate, q. 19, a. 2, and ST I.89.4: Ad sextum dicendum quod si species essent a rebus acceptae non possent esse propria ratio singularium a quibus abstrahuntur: sed species influxas cum sint similitudines idealium formarum, quae sunt in mente divina, possunt distincte repraesentare singularia, maxime illa ad quae anima habet aliquam determinationem ex natura sua; “Reply Obj. 6: If infused species were derived from things, they could not be the proper likenesses of the singulars from which they are abstracted; but the infused species, since they are the likenesses of the ideal forms which are in the divine mind, can distinctly represent singulars, especially those which the soul is somehow determined to know by its nature.”)

Reply Obj. 7: Although an infused species is immaterial and distinct, yet it is the likeness of a thing as regards its form as well as its matter, which matter is the principle of distinction and individuation, as we have shown. (Above: resp.)

Reply Obj. 8: Although intelligible forms are not creative of things, nevertheless they are similar to creative forms, not indeed because they create, but because they represent created things. For an artisan by his art can communicate something to the thing which he makes, although the virtue of the artisan which perfects the thing is not itself present to that thing.

Reply Obj. 9: Because infused forms are only analogously similar to the ideal accounts existing in the divine mind, it follows that these ideal accounts cannot be known perfectly through forms of this kind. However, it does not follow that the things of which these are the ideal accounts are known imperfectly by the infused forms; for things of this sort are not more excellent than infused forms, but rather the reverse. Consequently, they can be understood perfectly through infused forms.

Reply Obj. 10: The infused forms in the separated soul are limited to a knowledge of certain singular things because of the soul’s own disposition, as we have shown. (Above: resp.)

Reply Obj. 11: Infused species are caused in the separated soul by God through the intervention of the angels. Nor does this prevent some of the separated souls from being superior to some of the angels. For we are not speaking now of the knowledge of glory, in accordance with which the soul can be either equal or even superior to an angel, but we are speaking of that natural knowledge wherein the soul is inferior to an angel. Moreover, forms of this kind are caused in the separated soul by an angel, not in a creative manner, but as something actual brings something in its genus from potentiality to actuality. And because such action is not spatial, it is unnecessary here to examine a conveying spatial medium. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 13.) But the order of nature operates here in the same way as the order of place does in corporeal things. (Cf. Aquinas, Quodlibet IX, q. 4, a. 5, ad 2.)

Reply Obj. 12: The separated soul knows singulars through infused species inasmuch as they are the likenesses of singulars in the manner just described. (Above: resp.) Moreover, application and conversion, mention of which is made in the objection, accompany knowledge of this kind rather than cause it.

Reply Obj. 13: Singulars are not actually infinite but potentially infinite. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 11.10, 1066b21–25; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 11, lect. 10, n. 2327.) Nor is the intellect of an angel or that of a separated soul prevented from knowing an infinite number of singulars one after another, because sense can also do this. And our intellect, in this way, knows infinite species of numbers, for the infinite exists in knowledge only successively, and according as act is allied with potency, as the infinite in material things is also considered to be.

Reply Obj. 14: Augustine did not intend to say that bodies and the likenesses of bodies are not known by the intellect, but that the intellect is not moved in its vision by bodies in the same way as the senses are, nor by the likenesses of bodies as the imagination is, but by intelligible truth.

Reply Obj. 15: Although a separated soul is of the same nature as a soul which is joined to a body, nevertheless, because of its separation from the body, the soul has the character proper to superior substances, so that it can receive from them the infused intelligible forms through which it knows singulars, which it cannot do while it is united to a body, as we have shown above. (Above: qq. 15, 17.)

Reply Obj. 16: The singular, inasmuch as it is sensible, that is, so far as it is subject to corporeal change, never becomes intelligible; but it becomes intelligible so far as an immaterial form can represent it, as has been shown. (Above: resp.)

Reply Obj. 17: The separated soul receives intelligible species by means of its intellect, after the manner of a superior substance which knows by one power what man knows by two, namely, by his sense and his intellect. Thus, the separated soul can know both.

Reply Obj. 18: Although the separated soul does not direct or cause those things, nevertheless it possesses forms similar to those which do cause and direct; for a being that causes and directs knows what it directs and causes only inasmuch as it possesses the likeness of that thing.

We must also answer those arguments which are raised as contrary objections, because they are false.

Reply Sed Contra 1: When the soul is joined to the body, it does not know singulars by its intellect directly, but by a certain reflection; (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 2, a. 6, resp.; ST I.86.1, resp.; Quodlibet XII, q. 7, a. 1; Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, lect. 2.) that is, inasmuch as it apprehends its intelligible, it turns back to consider its act, the intelligible species, which is the principle of its operation, and the origin of its species. In this way it proceeds to consider phantasms, and the singulars of which they are the phantasms. But this reflection can be completed only with the cooperation of the cogitative power and the imagination, which are not present in the separated soul. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 13.) Hence, the intellect does not know singulars in this way.

Reply Sed Contra 2: The angels of an inferior hierarchy receive illumination regarding the natures of singular effects, not through singular species, but through universal likenesses by which they can know singulars by reason of the efficacy of their intellectual power, wherein they surpass the separated soul; and although the likenesses perceived by them are universals absolutely, yet they are said to be particular in comparison to the more universal species which superior angels receive.

Reply Sed Contra 3: Whatever an inferior power can do, a superior power can also do—not in the same way, however, but in a more excellent manner. Consequently, those things which the senses perceive materially and singularly, the intellect knows immaterially and universally.