Article 19 — Whether the sensitive powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body

Nineteenth, it is asked whether the sensitive powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body. (Parallel texts: ST I.77.8; I-II.67.1; SCG II.81; In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 3, a. 3, qa. 1–2; d. 50, q. 1, a. 1; Quodlibet X, q. 4, a. 2; Disputed Questions on the Virtues, q. 5, a. 4, ad 13.)

Obj. 1: It seems that they do, because the powers of the soul are either essential parts of it or natural properties of it. (See above: q. 12, ad 1.) But the essential parts of a thing cannot be separated from a thing so long as the thing itself remains in existence, and neither can its natural properties be separated from it. Therefore, the sensitive powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body. (Cf. ST I.77.8, obj. 2.)

Obj. 2: But it might be said that the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul as in their root.

On the contrary, for a thing to exist in something else as in its root is for it to exist in that thing potentially, that is, virtually and not actually. Now the essential constituents of a thing and its natural properties must exist in it actually and not just virtually. Therefore, the sensitive powers do not remain in the separated soul merely as in their root. (Cf. ST I.77.8, resp.; Quodlibet X, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3.)

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in the book The Spirit and the Soul that when the soul leaves the body it takes with it sense and imagination, and the concupiscible and irascible appetites which belong to the sensitive part. (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 15 (PL 40:791–92); cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 19, a. 1; ST I.77.8, obj. 1.) Therefore, the sensitive powers remain in the soul when it exists in separation from the body.

Obj. 4: Further, a whole from which any of the parts are missing is not a complete one. But the sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Hence, if they did not exist in the separated soul, the separated soul would not be a complete whole.

Obj. 5: Further, as a man is such because of his reason and intellect, so also is an animal such because of its sense, for “rational” is the constitutive difference of “man,” “sensible” the constitutive difference of “animal.” Therefore, if sense is not one and the same, it will not be one and the same animal. Now if the sensitive powers do not remain in the separated soul, the same sense will not be present in man when he arises from the dead as is present in him now, because whatever lapses into nothingness cannot be brought back into existence as numerically the same thing. (Cf. ST Supplementum, q. 79, a. 1, obj. 4. The argument is taken from Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.11, 338b16.) Therefore, when a man rises from the dead he will not be the same animal. This is contrary to what is said, whom I shall see on my side, and my eyes shall behold, and not another (Job 19:27). (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Job, ch. 19.)

Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12 that the punishments which souls suffer in hell are similar to the dreams of people asleep, that is to say, according to the sensible likenesses of corporeal things. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 32 (CSEL 28.1:426–27; PL 34:480–81); cf. ST I.77.8, obj. 6.) But such dreams of people asleep result from the imagination, which belongs to the sensitive part of the soul. Therefore, the sensitive powers exist in the separated soul.

Obj. 7: Further, it is evident that joy belongs to the concupiscible appetite, and anger to the irascible appetite. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, lect. 8.) Now there is joy in the separated souls of good men, and sorrow and anger in the souls of evil men, for in hell, there men will weep and gnash their teeth (Matt 8:12). Consequently, since the concupiscible and irascible appetites belong to the sensitive part of the soul, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3, it seems that the sensitive powers remain in the soul when it is separated from the body. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.9, 432b5–7; cf. ST I.77.8, obj. 5.)

Obj. 8: Further, Dionysius says that the wickedness of the demons is irrational fury, love of concupiscence, and a wanton imagination. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 23 (PG 3:723–26).) But these belong to the sensitive powers. Consequently, there are sensitive powers in the demons and, therefore, even more so in the soul when it is separated from the body. (Cf. ST I.59.4, obj. 1; Aquinas, On Evil, q. 16, a. 1, obj. 3.)

Obj. 9: Further, Augustine says that the soul senses certain things without the body, namely, joy and sadness. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 32 (CSEL 28.1:426–27; PL 34:480–81).) But whatever belongs to the soul itself without the body exists in the separated soul. Therefore, sense exists in the separated soul.

Obj. 10: Further, it is said in the Book of Causes that sensible things exist in every soul. (The Book of Causes, proposition 13 [14].) But sensible things are sensed because they are present in the soul. Consequently, the separated soul senses sensible things, and thus sense exists in it.

Obj. 11: Further, Gregory says that what our Lord relates about the wealthy reveler in Luke 16 is not a parable but a fact. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 40 (PL 76:1301–12, esp. 1305); see also Ambrose, Exposition on the Gospel of Luke, bk. 8, ch. 13 (CCSL 14:302; PL 15:1768); Luke 16:19–31.) Moreover, it is said there that when the rich man had gone to hell, no doubt so far as he was a separated soul, he saw Lazarus and heard Abraham speaking to him. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 19, a. 2, s.c.; Quodlibet X, q. 4, a. 2, obj. 2.) Therefore, the separated soul sees and hears, and thus sense exists in the separated soul.

Obj. 12: Further, things that are the same so far as their act of existing and substance are concerned cannot exist without each other. Now in man the sensitive and rational soul are the same so far as their act of existing and substance are concerned. Hence, it is impossible that sense should cease to remain in the rational soul when it exists in separation from the body.

Obj. 13: Further, when that which ceases to exist is brought back into existence again, it is not numerically the same thing as it was when it first existed. But if the sensitive powers do not remain in the separated soul, they must cease to exist. Consequently, they will not be numerically the same at the resurrection; and thus, since the sensitive powers are the acts of bodily organs, neither will the organs be numerically the same, nor will the whole man be numerically the same. This is incongruous.

Obj. 14: Further, rewards and punishments are in conformity with a man’s merit or lack of merit. (Cf. Deuteronomy 25:2; Aquinas, Quodlibet VIII, q. 9, a. 1, s.c.; On Truth, q. 26, a. 6, obj. 14.) Now what a man merits or fails to merit is to a great extent the result of the activities of his sensitive powers, for we either give in to our passions or curb them. Therefore, justice seems to demand that the acts of the sensitive powers exist in separated souls which are either rewarded or punished.

Obj. 15: Further, a power is nothing more than a principle of action or passion. Now the soul is the principle of sensitive operations. Therefore, the sensitive powers exist in the soul as their subject. Hence, it is impossible that they should cease to exist in the separated soul, for accidents lacking contraries are corrupted only by the corruption of their subject.

Obj. 16: Further, according to the Philosopher, memory exists in the sensitive part of the soul. (Aristotle, On Memory and Recollection 2.1, 450a10–14; ST I.77.8, obj. 4.) Now memory is present in the soul when it exists apart from the body, as is apparent from what is said to the rich reveler by Abraham, remember that you in your lifetime have received your good things (Luke 16:25). Consequently, the sensitive powers exist in the separated soul.

Obj. 17: Further, virtues and vices remain in souls when they exist apart from the body. But some virtues and vices exist in the sensitive part of the soul, for the Philosopher says in Ethics 3 that temperance and fortitude belong to the irrational part of the soul. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.10, 1117b23–24.) Therefore, the sensitive powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body. (Cf. ST I-II.67.1, obj. 3.)

Obj. 18: Further, it is related of the dead who are brought back to life, as we read in many histories of the saints, (Source unknown.) that they said they saw certain imaginable objects, for example, houses, camps, rivers, and things of this kind. Therefore, when souls exist apart from their bodies they use imagination, which belongs to the sensitive part of the soul.

Obj. 19: Further, the senses assist in intellectual knowledge, for, if anyone is deprived of one sense, he is deprived of one kind of knowledge. (Cf. ST I.84.3 and 4, resps.; I.111.3, ad 1 and 2.) Now intellectual knowledge will be more perfect when the soul is separated from the body than when it is joined thereto. Therefore, sense will be required to an even greater extent by the intellect of the separated soul.

Obj. 20: Further, the Philosopher says in On the Soul 1 that if an old man were to receive the eye of a youth, he would see just as well as a youth. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4, 408b20–22.) From this it appears that, although the organs are weakened, the sensory powers are not weakened. Therefore, neither are they destroyed when their organs cease to exist. Consequently, it seems that the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul. (Cf. ST I.77.8, obj. 3.)

On the contrary (1), the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2, when he speaks of the intellect, that this alone is separate as the perpetual is separate from the corruptible. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 413b24–27.) Consequently, the sensitive powers do not remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body.

Furthermore (2), the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals 16 that the operations of some powers do not exist without the body, nor do these powers themselves exist without the body. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 2.3, 736b21–24.) But the operations of the sensitive powers do not exist without the body, for they are performed through bodily organs. Therefore, the sensitive powers do not exist in the soul without the body.

Furthermore (3), Damascene says that nothing is bereft of its proper operation. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 23 (PG 94:950–51).) Hence, if the sensitive powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body, they have their proper operations. This is impossible.

Furthermore (4), a power which is not exercised is purposeless. Now in the activities of God nothing is done without a purpose. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.9, 432b21–22; 3.12, 434a31.) Therefore, the sensitive powers do not remain in the separated soul, for they cannot be exercised. (Cf. Aquinas, Quodlibet X, q. 4, a. 2, obj. 3.)

I answer that the powers of the soul do not belong to the essence of the soul but are natural properties which flow from its essence, as can be learned from the preceding questions. Now an accident is corrupted in two ways: (Cf. Aristotle, On the Length and Brevity of Life, ch. 2, 465a19–26; On Generation and Corruption 1.7, 324a5–9.) first, by its contrary, as cold is corrupted by heat; (Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.2, 329b19–30.) second, by the corruption of its subject, for an accident cannot remain when its subject is corrupted. Consequently, what does not have a contrary accident or form is destroyed only by the destruction of the subject itself.

Now it is evident that there is nothing contrary to the powers of the soul. Therefore, if they are corrupted, they are corrupted only by the corruption of their subject. Consequently, in order to discover whether the sensitive powers are corrupted when the body is corrupted, or whether they remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body, we must accept the principle of this investigation so that we may learn what the subject of the aforementioned power is. Now it is evident that the subject of a power must be that which is capable of doing something in virtue of its power, for every accident designates its subject. (Cf. Aristotle, Categories 5, 2a27–33; 3a15–17.) Furthermore, an agent or a patient is nothing more than a thing which can act or undergo some change. Hence, whatever is the subject of an action or undergoes a change must be the subject of a power, the power itself being a principle. And this is what the Philosopher says in the book On Sleep and Sleeplessness, namely, that an action belongs to the thing to which the power belongs. (Aristotle, On Sleep and Sleeplessness 1, 454a7–8.)

Now there has been a diversity of opinion about the operations of the senses. For Plato held that the sensitive soul has a proper operation in virtue of its own nature, for he maintained that the sensitive soul is a self-mover, and that it moves the body only inasmuch as it is moved by itself. (According to Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ch. 6; Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 12 (PL 40:788); Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 24 (CSEL 28.1:416; PL 34:475); cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 1, lect. 10.) Thus, there is a twofold operation in sensing: one by which the soul moves itself, and another by which it moves the body. Wherefore, the Platonists defined sense as the movement of the soul through the body. (Cf. Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation on Genesis, bk. 3, ch. 5 (CSEL 28.1:67; PL 34:282); bk. 12, ch. 24 (CSEL 28.1:416; PL 34:475); On the Trinity, bk. 11, ch. 2, para. 2 (CCSL 50:335; PL 42:986).) For this reason, certain followers of this position distinguish two operations in the sensitive part of the soul, namely, certain interior operations by which the soul senses inasmuch as it moves itself, and certain external operations inasmuch as it moves the body. (Cf. Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), The Spirit and the Soul, cc. 15, 30 (PL 40:791, 800).) They also stated that there are two kinds of sensitive powers: some which are principles of acts within the soul itself, and which remain together with their activities in the separated soul when the body is corrupted; others, which are principles of external acts, and these are present in the soul and the body simultaneously and cease to exist when the body corrupts.

But this position cannot be held, for it is evident that anything whatever operates so far as it is a being. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Sense and What Is Sensed, tract. 1, ch. 9; Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 5; bk. 3, lect. 1.) Therefore, those things which exist of themselves, operate of themselves as individual substances. On the other hand, forms which cannot exist of themselves, but are called beings inasmuch as something exists by them, do not operate of themselves but are said to act inasmuch as their subjects act through them. For just as heat itself is not a thing having existence, but is that by which something is hot, so heat itself does not heat anything, but is that by which a hot thing heats something. Therefore, if the sensitive soul could operate of itself, it would follow that it would subsist of itself and thus would not be corrupted when the body is corrupted; but then the souls of brute animals would also be immortal. This is impossible, yet Plato is said to have conceded this. (Plato, Phaedo 76a–e; cf. Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ch. 2; Augustine, City of God, bk. 10, ch. 30 (CCSL 47:307; PL 41:310); Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 1, lect. 10.)

It is evident, then, that no operation of the sensitive part can belong to the soul alone in such a way that it can be exercised by the soul alone; but such operations belong to the composite because of the soul, just as the act of heating belongs to the hot thing on account of its heat. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4, 408b11–19.) Hence, the composite sees, hears, and senses all things, but it does this through its soul. Consequently, the composite is capable of seeing, hearing, and sensing, but it performs these because of its soul. Hence, it is clear that the powers of the sensitive part exist in the composite as their subject but come from the soul as their principle. (Cf. Aquinas, Compendium theologiae, bk. 1, ch. 89.) Therefore, when the body is corrupted the sensitive powers cease to exist, although they remain in the soul as in their principle. This is what the other position maintains, namely, that the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul as in their root. (Cf. ST I.77.8, resp.; I-II.67.1, ad 3.)

Reply Obj. 1: The sensitive powers do not belong to the essence of the soul, but in fact, are natural properties of the composite as their subject and of the soul as their principle.

Reply Obj. 2: Powers of this kind are said to remain in the soul as in their root, when it exists apart from the body, not because they are actually present in the soul, but because the separated soul is virtually such that, if it is united to a body, it can again cause these powers in the body, and life as well.

Reply Obj. 3: We do not have to accept this authority because this book has a false author in its title. For it was not written by Augustine but by some other person. (Alcher of Clairvaux.) Moreover, that authority can be explained as saying that the soul draws with it powers of this kind not actually but virtually.

Reply Obj. 4: The powers of the soul are neither essential parts nor integral parts, but potential parts. However, some of these belong to the soul in virtue of itself, and others belong to the composite.

Reply Obj. 5: Sense is spoken of in two ways. One way is as the sensitive soul itself which is the principle of powers of this kind, and in this way the animal is an animal by sense as by its proper form. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 413b2.) For in this way “sensible” is taken from sense inasmuch as it is the constitutive difference of “animal.” Sense is spoken of in another way as the sensitive power itself, which, since it is a natural property, as has been pointed out, is not a constitutive part of the species, but is the natural effect of the species. (Above: ad 1.) Therefore, sense does not remain in the separated soul in the latter way, but sense does remain in the first way spoken of, for in man the essence of the rational soul and that of the sensitive soul is one and the same. Consequently, nothing prevents a man who rises from the dead from being the same man numerically, for in order that something be numerically the same, it is enough that the essential principles remain numerically the same. However, it is not necessary that the properties and accidents be numerically the same.

Reply Obj. 6: Augustine seems to have revoked this in his Retractions. (Augustine, Retractions, bk. 2, ch. 24 (CCSL 57:109–10; PL 32:640).) For he says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12 that the punishments of hell exist by reason of imaginary vision, and that this place of hell is not corporeal but imaginary. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 32 (CSEL 28.1:426–27; PL 34:480–81).) Whereupon this view was withdrawn to conform with the reason that if hell is not a corporeal place, why is it said that hell is underground. And he reproves himself for this, saying, concerning the damned, it seems to me that it should be taught that they are under the earth rather than question why they are believed to be or are said to be under the earth, as if this were not so. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 33 (CSEL 28:428; PL 34:481).) However, what he said about the place of hell has been retracted, and all other things which pertain to this seem to be retracted.

Reply Obj. 7: In separated souls there is neither joy nor sorrow so far as these are acts of the irascible and concupiscible appetites which belong to the sensitive part of the soul, but so far as the movement of the will, which is in the intellective part, is signified by these. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4, 408b10–15; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 1, lect. 10; SCG II.81.)

Reply Obj. 8: Because human evil is a result of one of three things, namely, a wanton imagination, from which is the principle of error, a love of concupiscence, and irrational anger, Dionysius describes the evil of the demons in likeness to human evil; not that it is to be understood that there is imagination in the demons, or irascible and concupiscible appetites which are in the sensitive part of the soul, but that in them there is something proportionate to these as becomes their intellective nature. (According to Augustine, this was the opinion of Apuleius: City of God, bk. 9, ch. 6 (CCSL 47:255; PL 41:261); cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 4, lect. 19.)

Reply Obj. 9: We must not understand by these words of Augustine that the soul senses something without a bodily organ, but that it senses something without sensible bodies themselves, for instance, fear and sorrow. Again, it senses other things through the body itself, for example, heat and cold.

Reply Obj. 10: Whatever exists in another, exists in that thing according to the mode of the recipient. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 12.) Consequently, sensible things do not exist in the separated soul according to a sensible mode, but according to an intelligible one.

Reply Obj. 11: Nothing prevents us from speaking of certain facts metaphorically, for, although the story related in the Gospel about Lazarus and the rich man is a fact, still it is said metaphorically that Lazarus saw and heard, just as it is also said metaphorically that he had a tongue.

Reply Obj. 12: The substance of the sensitive soul remains in man after death. However, the sensitive powers do not. (Cf. ST I.77.8, resp. (at the end).)

Reply Obj. 13: Just as sense, inasmuch as it is called a power, is not the form of the whole body but the sensitive soul itself (moreover, sense is a property of the composite), so neither is the power of vision the act of the eye, but that of the soul itself as the principle of such a power, just as it may be said that the visive soul is the act of the eye as the sensitive soul is the act of the body. Moreover, the power of vision is a property consequent on this. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412b18–19; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 2; above: q. 10, ad 10.) Therefore, it is not necessary that there be a different eye for the resurrected individual, although there is a different sensitive power.

Reply Obj. 14: Reward does not correspond to merit as rewarding, but as that on account of which some reward is given. Consequently, it is not necessary that all the acts by which someone merits reward should be brought back into existence again when the reward is actually given. It is sufficient that they exist in the divine memory. Otherwise, it would be necessary for the saints to die a second time, which is absurd.

Reply Obj. 15: The soul is a principle of sensing, not as a thing that senses, but as that by which a sensing thing senses. Consequently, the sensitive powers do not exist in the soul as a subject, but come from the soul as a principle.

Reply Obj. 16: The separated soul does not remember through the memory which belongs to its sensitive part, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Sense and What Is Sensed, tract. 2, ch. 1.) but through that which belongs to its intellective part, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11, para. 18 (CCSL 50:330–31; PL 42:983); cf. ST I.77.8, ad 4.) inasmuch as Augustine considers this to be part of the image. (Namely, the image of God in us; Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 8, para. 11 (CCSL 50A:435–36; PL 42:1044); bk. 15, ch. 3, para. 5 (CCSL 50A:465–66; PL 42:1060).)

Reply Obj. 17: The virtues and vices which belong to the irrational part of the soul remain in the soul only in principle, for the seeds of all the virtues are found in the will and the reason.

Reply Obj. 18: The soul does not understand in the same manner when it exists apart from the body as it does when it exists in the body, as is evident from the preceding articles. (Above: qq. 15, 17, 18.) Therefore, concerning those things which the separated soul apprehends in the manner proper to it without phantasms, this knowledge remains in the soul after it returns to its former state. Having been joined to the body again, the soul now understands in a manner befitting it, that is, by turning to phantasms. And, for this reason, things grasped intelligibly are narrated imaginatively.

Reply Obj. 19: The intellect requires the aid of the senses because of the imperfect kind of knowledge which it has, that is, inasmuch as it receives species from phantasms. But this is not true with respect to the more perfect mode of knowledge possessed by the separated soul, just as a man requires milk in infancy but not when fully grown.

Reply Obj. 20: The sensitive powers are not weakened absolutely because their organs are weakened, but only accidentally. Consequently, they are corrupted accidentally when their organs are corrupted.