Article 21 — Whether the soul, when separated from the body, can suffer punishment by corporeal fire

Twenty-first, it is asked whether the soul, when separated from the body, can suffer (The Latin word pati, “to suffer,” while also used specifically to signify pain and loss, still retains the more general sense of “to be acted upon” or “to undergo,” as does the related noun passio, “passion.”) punishment by corporeal fire. (Parallel texts: see above: q. 6, ad 7; ST I.64.4, ad 1; SCG IV.90; In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 3, a. 3, qa. 3; On Spiritual Creatures, a. 1, ad 20; On Truth, q. 26, a. 1; Quodlibet II, q. 7, a. 1; Quodlibet III, q. 9, a. 21; q. 10, a. 1; Quodlibet VII, q. 5, a. 3; Compendium theologiae, bk. 1, ch. 180.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it cannot. For a thing is acted upon only so far as it is in potency. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15–23; On Generation and Corruption 1.9, 326b30–33.) But when the soul exists in separation from the body it is in potency only so far as the intellect is concerned, because the sensitive powers do not exist in the soul, as we have shown above. (Above: q. 19.) Consequently, the separated soul can be acted upon by corporeal fire with respect to the intellect alone, namely, by understanding this fire. Now this is not punitive but is, in fact, delightful. Therefore, the separated soul cannot suffer punishment by corporeal fire.

Obj. 2: Further, an agent and a patient have the same matter, as is stated in On Generation and Corruption 1. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.7, 324a34.) But since the soul is immaterial it does not have any matter in common with corporeal fire. Therefore, when the soul exists in separation from the body, it cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, obj. 15.)

Obj. 3: Further, whatever does not make contact with a thing does not act upon that thing. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.6, 322b22–24.) Now corporeal fire cannot make contact with the soul, either by the last part of quantity, for the soul is incorporeal, or by contact of a power, because the power of a body cannot make an impression upon an incorporeal substance, but rather the reverse. (Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.6, 323a3–12; Physics 5.3, 227a10–15; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 5, lect. 5, n. 691.) Therefore, the separated soul cannot be acted upon in any way whatever by corporeal fire.

Obj. 4: Further, a thing is said to be acted upon in two ways: either as an object, as when wood is acted upon by fire; or as a contrary, as when something hot is acted upon by something cold. Now the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire as the subject of a passion, because in that case the form fire would have to arise in the soul, and, as a consequence, the soul would be made hot and would burn, which is impossible. (This argument is found in Bonaventure: In IV Sent., d. 44, P. 2, a. 3, q. 2, ad oppositum 2; cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, obj. 12.) In like manner, we cannot say that the soul is acted upon by corporeal fire as one contrary is acted upon by another: (Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.7, 323b30–324a9.) first, because the soul has no contrary; and second, because it would follow that the soul would be destroyed by corporeal fire, which is impossible. Therefore, the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire.

Obj. 5: Further, there must be some proportion between an agent and a patient. (Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.7, 323b30–34.) Now there does not seem to be any proportion between the soul and corporeal fire, because they belong to different genera. Therefore, the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, obj. 7.)

Obj. 6: Further, whatever is acted upon is moved. (For motion is the actuality of the potential as potential; cf. Aristotle, Physics 3.1, 201a10.) Now the soul is not moved, because it is not a body. Therefore, the soul cannot be acted upon by fire. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, obj. 14.)

Obj. 7: Further, the soul is nobler than a body composed of the fifth essence. (The fifth essence or fifth element, also called “ether,” is that element out of which the heavenly bodies were thought to be composed. Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.2, 269b13; 1.3, 270a13–21; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorology, bk. 1, lect. 2, n. 11; ST I.68.1, resp.; Quodlibet VI, q. 11, a. 1, ad 1.) But a body composed of the fifth essence is altogether unchangeable. Consequently, the soul is even more unchangeable.

Obj. 8: Further, Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12 that an agent is nobler than a patient. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 16 (CSEL 28.1:401–3; PL 34:466–67).) But corporeal fire is not nobler than the soul. Therefore, corporeal fire cannot act upon the soul. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, obj. 1.)

Obj. 9: (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, obj. 2.) But it was said that fire does not act upon the soul in virtue of what is proper and natural to fire, but inasmuch as it is the instrument of divine justice. (Cf. the position of Albert, Super Sent. IV, d. 44, F, a. 37, resp.; De resurrectione, tr. 2, q. 10, a. 5, resp.; Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, resp.; Compendium theologiae, bk. 1, ch. 180.)

On the contrary, it is characteristic of a wise builder to use suitable instruments for the end which he intends. Now corporeal fire does not seem to be an adequate instrument for punishing the soul, because this is not proper to fire by reason of its form; and it is by its form that an instrument is adapted to its effect, as an axe for chopping and a saw for cutting, for a builder will not act with greater wisdom if he should use a saw for chopping and an axe for cutting. Therefore, even less will God, who is most wise, use corporeal fire as an instrument for punishing the soul.

Obj. 10: Further, since God is the author of nature, he does nothing contrary to nature, as it says in a certain Gloss on Romans 11. (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 11:24, 6:150 (PL 114:508).) But it is contrary to nature for the corporeal to act upon the incorporeal. Therefore, God does not permit this.

Obj. 11: Further, God cannot cause contradictories to be true simultaneously. (Cf. Aquinas, On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 3; In I Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 2; SCG II.25.) Now this would occur if he were to withdraw from a thing a constitutive part of its essence; for example, if a man were not rational, it would follow that he would be a man and not be a man at the same time. Therefore, God cannot cause a thing to be deprived of any of its essential parts. Now to be unchangeable is essential to the soul, for this is proper to it by reason of its immateriality. Consequently, God cannot cause the soul to be acted upon by corporeal fire.

Obj. 12: Further, everything possesses the power of acting in accordance with its nature. Therefore, a thing cannot receive a power of acting which is not proper to itself but to something else instead, unless its proper nature is changed into some other nature; water, for example, will not heat unless it is changed by fire. Now it is not proper to fire by nature to have the power of acting upon immaterial things, as we have already shown. (Above: obj. 3.) Therefore, if God gives fire, as the instrument of divine justice, the power of acting upon the separated soul, it now seems that it is not corporeal fire, but fire of a different nature.

Obj. 13: Further, what is done by the divine power is in accord with the proper and true specific nature of a thing existing in reality. For when by divine power a blind man is given the power of vision, he receives sight according to the true and proper natural account of sight. Therefore, if the soul is acted upon by fire, as the instrument of divine justice, by virtue of the divine power itself, it follows that the soul really is acted upon in the true sense of “passion.”

Now passion is used in two ways. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5, 417b1–5; Topics 6.6, 145a3; Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, resp.) The first is to signify merely the reception of something, as when the intellect is acted upon by an intelligible, and a sense by a sensible. The second is to signify the loss of something on the side of the substance of the thing being acted upon, as when wood is acted upon by fire. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 11.)

Therefore, if the separated soul is acted upon by corporeal fire, in virtue of the divine power, inasmuch as the nature of passion consists merely in receiving something, it follows that the separated soul is receptive of corporeal fire in an immaterial and incorporeal way in keeping with the soul’s own mode, because whatever is received in something is received according to the mode of the recipient. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 12.)

However, a reception of this sort does not punish the soul but perfects it. (Cf. SCG IV.90.) Consequently, this will not be a punishment for the soul. Similarly, the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire so far as passion consists in the loss of something on the side of the substance being acted upon, because then the substance of the soul would be corrupted. Therefore, the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire as the instrument of divine justice.

Obj. 14: Further, an instrument acts as an instrument only by exercising its proper operation, just as a saw, by cutting, acts instrumentally in the production of a chest. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, resp.; Quodlibet III, q. 10, a. 1, resp.) Now fire by its proper natural operation cannot act upon the soul because it cannot make the soul hot. Consequently, fire as the instrument of divine justice cannot act upon the soul.

Obj. 15: But it has been said that fire acts upon the soul by a proper action inasmuch as it confines the soul in such a way as to imprison the latter. (The Leonine edition notes that during the debate, this argument might have been offered by a respondent in the room against the reply to the fourteenth objection found below, although it is not retained as such in the text revised by Aquinas. It can also be said to be an objection offered against the teaching found in On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, resp.)

On the contrary, if the soul is imprisoned by fire and detained by it, the soul must be united to fire in some way. However, the soul is not united as a form to fire, because then the soul would give life to fire. Nor is the soul united as a mover to fire, because then fire would be acted upon by the soul, and not vice versa. Now there is no other way in which an incorporeal substance can be united to a body, so it follows that the separated soul cannot be detained by fire, nor be imprisoned by it.

Obj. 16: Further, whatever is fettered by something cannot be separated from it. But the spirits of the damned are sometimes separated from the corporeal fire of hell, for the demons are said to be in this misty atmosphere, and the souls of the damned have occasionally appeared to certain individuals here as well. (Cf. Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 3, ch. 10 (CSEL 28.1:73; PL 34:285); ST I.64.4, s.c.) Therefore, the soul is not acted upon by corporeal fire as though imprisoned by it.

Obj. 17: Further, whatever is fettered to something and detained by it is thereby prevented from performing its proper operation. Now the proper operation of the soul is understanding; but the soul cannot be prevented from exercising this activity by being bound to something corporeal, because the soul contains its intelligibles within itself, as is said in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429b55; 2.5, 417b23; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 12.) Consequently, it is not necessary for the soul to seek these things outside itself. Therefore, the separated soul is not punished by being fettered to corporeal fire.

Obj. 18: Further, just as fire can detain the soul in this way, so also can other bodies, or to an even greater extent inasmuch as they are larger and heavier. Therefore, if the soul is punished only by being detained and fettered, its punishment should be attributed not only to fire, but even more so to other bodies.

Obj. 19: Further, Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12 that the substance of hell is not believed to be corporeal, but spiritual. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 32 (CSEL 28.1:426–27; PL 34:480–81).) Damascene also says that the fire of hell is not corporeal. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 4, ch. 19 (PG 94:1191–94); cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, obj. 5.) Therefore, it seems that the soul is not acted upon by corporeal fire.

Obj. 20: Further, Gregory says in Morals on the Book of Job (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 34, ch. 19 (CCSL 143B:1758–61; PL 76:737–39).) that the delinquent servant is punished by his master in order that he may be corrected. But the damned in hell are incorrigible. Therefore, they should not be punished by the corporeal fire of hell.

Obj. 21: Further, punishments are inflicted by means of contraries. Now the soul sinned by subjecting itself to corporeal things under the influence of passion. Therefore, it should not be punished by being united to corporeal things but rather by being separated from corporeal things.

Obj. 22: Further, just as punishments are allotted to sinners by divine justice, so also are rewards to the just. Now corporeal rewards are not given to the just, but spiritual rewards only. Consequently, if in Scripture any rewards of a corporeal nature are said to be given to the just, they are to be understood metaphorically; for example, it is said in Luke 22:30, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom. Therefore, corporeal punishments are not inflicted on sinners, but spiritual punishments only; and whatever is related in the Scriptures about corporeal punishments is to be understood metaphorically. Consequently, the soul is not acted upon by corporeal fire.

On the contrary, the fire by which the demons and the bodies and souls of the damned are punished is the same, as is evident from Matthew 25:41, depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels. (Matthew 25:41; cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 6, ch. 3 (PL 192:663).) But the bodies of the damned must be punished by corporeal fire. So likewise their separated souls must be punished by corporeal fire. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, s.c. 4.)

I answer that men have spoken in many ways about the suffering of the soul by fire. For some said that the soul did not suffer punishment by corporeal fire, but by a spiritual affliction which is referred to metaphorically in the Scriptures by the name of fire. This was the opinion of Origen. (Origen, On the Principles, bk. 2, cc. 10–11; cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, resp.; SCG III.145.) But, such as it is, it does not seem satisfactory, because, as Augustine says in City of God 21, we must understand that the fire by which the bodies of the damned are tormented is corporeal, as is also the fire by which both the demons and the souls are tormented, inasmuch as this conclusion is inferred from it. (Augustine, City of God, bk. 21, ch. 10 (CCSL 48:775–76; PL 41:724–25).)

Wherefore, it seemed to others that, although this fire is corporeal, nevertheless the soul does not suffer punishment by it directly, but by its likeness in the imagination; (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 32 (CSEL 28.1:426–27; PL 34:480–81); Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 9, ch. 7; Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, resp.; this is the position in Alcher of Clairvaux’s The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 30 (PL 40:800).) this is just as happens to people asleep who are truly tormented by the appearance of certain terrible things which they see themselves suffer, although the things by which they are tormented are not real bodies, but merely the likeness of bodies. But this position cannot be maintained, because we have shown above that the powers of the sensitive part of the soul, of which one is the imaginative power itself, do not remain in the soul when it is separated from the body. (Above: q. 19, ad 6.)

Therefore, it must be said that the separated soul is acted upon by corporeal fire itself. However, it seems difficult to determine in what way it is acted upon by fire. For some said that the separated soul suffers by the very fire which it sees. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 44, ch. 7 (PL 192:947); cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, resp.) Gregory mentions this in Dialogues 4, saying, the soul suffers by fire in the very things which it sees. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, bk. 4, ch. 29 (PL 77:365–68A; SC 265:100).) However, since the act of seeing is a perfection of the one seeing, every vision is delightful inasmuch as it is of this sort. Hence, nothing is painful inasmuch as it is seen, but inasmuch as it is apprehended as harmful. (Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, obj. 6.)

Wherefore, others said that when the soul sees this fire and understands that fire is harmful to it, it is tormented by this fact. (Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 44, P. 2, a. 3, q. 2, resp.) Gregory mentions this is Dialogues 4, for he says that the soul is consumed by fire because it sees itself being consumed by fire. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, bk. 4, cc. 29–30 (PL 77:365–68A; SC 265:100).) But then we still have to discover whether fire by its very nature is harmful to the soul or not. Indeed, if it is not by its very nature harmful to the soul, then it follows that the soul is deceived in that judgment wherein it apprehends fire as harmful. This seems unlikely, particularly so far as the demons are concerned, because they possess an extensive knowledge of the natural order by reason of their intellectual acumen. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, resp.) Therefore, it must be said that corporeal fire in virtue of its true nature is harmful to the soul. Hence, Gregory concludes in Dialogues 4 by saying, we can gather from the aforesaid Gospels that the soul suffers not only by seeing fire but by experiencing it. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, bk. 4, ch. 30 (PL 77:368A–69; SC 265:100).)

Therefore, to discover how corporeal fire can be harmful to the soul or to a demon, we must bear in mind that harm does not befall a thing inasmuch as it receives something by which it is perfected, but inasmuch as it is hindered by its contrary. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 11.) Hence, the suffering of the soul by fire does not consist simply in its receiving something as the intellect suffers by an intelligible and sense by a sensible, but in this: that one thing is acted upon by another by way of contrariety and as an obstacle. Now this happens in two ways.

Sometimes a thing is hindered in one way by its contrary as regards its very act of existing which it receives from some inhering form; and in this way something is acted upon by its contrary through alteration and corruption, as wood, for example, is consumed by fire. (Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.3, 317a33–319b5; 1.4, 319b31–320a1.)

Second, a thing is hindered by an obstacle or a contrary with respect to its inclination, just as the natural inclination of a stone is to tend downward, but it is hindered in this by some obstacle and opposing power so that it is brought to rest or is moved contrary to its nature. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 5.6, 230b10–20; 8.4, 254b20–23.)

However, neither of these ways of suffering punishment exists in a thing that lacks knowledge. For where sorrow and sadness cannot exist, the account of affliction and punishment is not found. However, in a being which possesses knowledge, torment and punishment are the natural effects of both kinds of suffering, although in different ways. For the suffering which is the effect of change by a contrary results in affliction and punishment by sensible pain, as when a sensible object of the greatest intensity corrupts the harmony of a sense. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a30–b3.) Therefore, when sensible things are of too great intensity, particularly those of touch, they inflict sensible pain, but when moderate they cause delight because then they are proportioned to sense. However, the second kind of suffering does not inflict punishment by sensible pain, but by that sadness which arises in a man or in an animal because something is apprehended by an interior power as being repugnant to the will or to some appetite. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation on Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 33 (CSEL 28.1:429; PL 34:482).) Hence, things which are opposed to the will and to the appetite inflict punishment, and sometimes even more than those which are painful to sense. For some choose beforehand to be whipped and to undergo severe physical punishment rather than be scolded or the like, which is repugnant to the will.

Consequently, the soul cannot suffer punishment by corporeal fire according to the first kind of suffering, because it is impossible for the soul to be altered and corrupted by suffering of this specific kind. Hence, the soul is not afflicted by fire in this way, namely, that it suffers sensible pain thereby. However, the soul can suffer by corporeal fire according to the second kind of suffering, inasmuch as it is hindered from its inclination or volition by fire of this kind. This is evident. For the soul and any incorporeal substance, inasmuch as this belongs to it by nature, is not physically confined in any place, but transcends the whole corporeal order. Consequently, it is contrary to its nature and to its natural appetite for it to be fettered to anything and be confined in a place by some necessity; and I maintain that this is the case except inasmuch as the soul is united to the body whose natural form it is, and in which there follows some perfection.

Moreover, the binding of a spiritual substance to a body is not brought about by any power which a body has for detaining an incorporeal substance, but is the result of the power of some superior substance which unites a spiritual substance to such a body—just as by the magic arts, and with divine permission, some spirits are bound to certain things by the power of superior demons, either by signs or imaginary visions or other things of this kind. It is in this way, through the divine power, that the souls and the demons are confined in their punishment by corporeal fire. Wherefore, Augustine says in City of God 21, if men’s souls, having been created incorporeal, are now in this life incarnate in bodily members, and shall one day be bound thereto forever, then why cannot we truly say, though you may marvel at it, that even incorporeal spirits may be afflicted by corporeal fire? Therefore, these spirits, even though incorporeal, shall dwell in tormenting corporeal fires . . . and, instead of giving life to these fires, they shall receive punishment from them. (Augustine, City of God, bk. 21, ch. 10 (CCSL 48:775–76; PL 41:724–25); cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26, a. 1, resp.; In II Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3; SCG IV.90.)

Thus, it is true that this fire, inasmuch as it detains the fettered soul, as a result of the divine power, acts upon the soul as the instrument of divine justice; and inasmuch as the soul apprehends that this fire is harmful to it, it is afflicted by interior sadness. Indeed, this sadness is greatest because the soul, which was born to be united to God through possession, meditates on the fact that it occupies a place below the lowest things in existence. Therefore, the greatest affliction of the damned will be caused by the fact that they are separated from God, and the second by the fact that they are situated below corporeal things, and in the lowest and meanest place.

Reply Obj. 1–7: As a result of this the solution to the first seven objections is evident. For we do not say that the soul is acted upon by corporeal fire in the manner of reception only or according to change by a contrary, as the preceding objections maintain.

Reply Obj. 8: An instrument does not act by its own power but by that of the principal agent. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 8.5, 256a4–13.) Therefore, when fire as the instrument of divine justice acts upon the soul, the dignity of fire is not considered, but that of divine justice.

Reply Obj. 9: Bodies are appropriate instruments for punishing the damned because it is proper for those who are unwilling to be subject to their superior, that is, to God, to be made subject to inferior things as a punishment.

Reply Obj. 10: Although God does not act contrary to nature, yet he acts in a way superior to that of nature when he does what nature cannot do.

Reply Obj. 11: To be incapable of being changed by a corporeal thing after the manner of an alteration is proper to the soul by reason of its very essence. However, the soul does not suffer in this way through the divine power, but as we have explained above. (Above: resp.)

Reply Obj. 12: Fire does not possess the power of acting upon the soul inasmuch as it acts in virtue of its proper power, as those things do which act naturally; it acts only in an instrumental way. Therefore, it does not follow that its nature is changed.

Reply Obj. 13: The soul is not acted upon by corporeal fire in any of these ways, but as we have explained. (Above: resp.)

Reply Obj. 14: Although corporeal fire does not make the soul hot, nevertheless it has another operation or relationship to the soul, which relationship bodies are naturally disposed to have toward spirits in order that bodies may be united to them in some way.

Reply Obj. 15: The soul is not united as a form to the fire which punishes it, because the soul does not give life to fire, as Augustine says; (Augustine, City of God, bk. 21, ch. 10 (CCSL 48:775–76; PL 41:724–25).) but it is united to fire in the way in which spirits are united to corporeal places: by contact of power, although they are not the movers of these. (Cf. SCG II.56.)

Reply Obj. 16: The soul is afflicted by corporeal fire inasmuch as the soul apprehends that fire is harmful to it as binding and confining it, as we have already pointed out. (Above: resp.) Moreover, this apprehension can torment the soul even when it is not actually confined by fire, simply because it sees that it is capable of being so confined; and, for this reason, the demons are said to bring hell-fire with them wherever they go. (Cf. ST I.64.4, ad 3.)

Reply Obj. 17: Although the soul is not prevented from performing its intellectual operation by being detained in this way, yet it is deprived of a certain natural liberty whereby it is wholly freed from being physically confined to a corporeal place.

Reply Obj. 18: The punishment of hell-fire belongs not only to the soul but also to the body. For this reason, this fire above all is said to be the punishment of hell, because fire is particularly capable of tormenting bodies. (Cf. Aquinas, Quodlibet VIII, q. 8, a. 1, resp.) However, there will also be other torments, according to this, on the wicked he will rain coals of fire and brimstone; a scorching wind shall be the portion of their cup (Ps 11:6 [10:7]). It is also appropriate to that inordinate love which is the principle of sin, so that as the empyrean heaven rewards the fire of charity, so does the fire of hell reward inordinate desire.

Reply Obj. 19: Augustine says this not by way of an answer but by way of an inquiry, or if he stated this as an opinion, he expressly revoked it afterward in City of God 21. (Augustine, City of God, bk. 21, cc. 2–3 (CCSL 48:759–61; PL 41:709–12); bk. 10 (CCSL 48:776; PL 41:724–25).) Or we can say that the substance of hell is said to be spiritual as to the proximate effect produced, namely, that fire is apprehended as harmful inasmuch as it confines and binds the soul. (Cf. Aquinas, On Spiritual Creatures, a. 1, ad 20.)

Reply Obj. 20: Gregory introduces this as an objection against certain people who believed that all punishments inflicted by God belong to purgatory and are not perpetual, which indeed is false. (Cf. SCG III.44; ST I-II.87.3, obj. 2; On Evil, q. 7, a. 11, resp.; Aristotle, Ethics 2.3, 1104b16–17; 3.1, 1114b17–25.) For some punishments are inflicted by God, either in this life or after this life, for correction and purgation; others, indeed, for ultimate damnation. Nor are such punishments inflicted by God because he delights in punishment, but because he delights in justice inasmuch as punishment is due to sinners. This is the way it is among men, because some punishments are inflicted for the correction of the one who is punished, as when a father chastises his son, whereas others are inflicted as a final condemnation, as when a judge hangs a bandit.

Reply Obj. 21: Punishments take place by means of contraries so far as the intention of the sinner is concerned, for the sinner intends properly to satisfy his will. Punishment is also contrary to the will itself inasmuch as punishment results from the divine wisdom, so that that wherein someone seeks to satisfy his will is turned into its contrary, as is said in the Book of Wisdom, that they might learn that one is punished by the very things by which he sins (Wis 11:16). Wherefore, because the soul sins by adhering to corporeal things, it is consistent with the divine wisdom that it be punished by corporeal things.

Reply Obj. 22: The soul is rewarded by enjoying things which are superior to it, but is punished by being subjected to things which are inferior to it. Therefore, the rewards of the soul are fittingly understood only when regarded spiritually; punishments, however, are understood to be corporeal. (Cf. Aquinas, On Truth, q. 26. a. 1, resp.; SCG IV.90.)