Chapter 5 — That those things which cannot be investigated by reason are fittingly proposed to man as an object of faith

It may appear to some that those things which cannot be investigated by reason ought not to be proposed to man as an object of faith, because divine wisdom provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature. We must, therefore, prove that it is also necessary for those things which surpass reason to be proposed by God to man as an object of faith.

For no man tends to do a thing by his desire and endeavor unless it be previously known to him. Thus, since man is directed by divine providence to a higher good than human frailty can attain in the present life, as we shall show in the sequel, (Book 3.) his mind had to be bidden to something higher than those things to which our reason can reach in the present life, so that he might learn to aspire and to tend by his endeavors to something surpassing the whole state of the present life. And this is especially true about the Christian religion, which alone promises spiritual and eternal goods, for which reason it proposes many things surpassing the thought of man. But the old law, which contained promises of temporal things, proposed few things above human inquiry. It was with this motive that the philosophers, to wean men from sensible pleasures to virtue, took care to show that there are other goods of greater account than those which appeal to the senses, the taste of which things affords much greater delight to those who devote themselves to active or contemplative virtues.

Again, this truth needed to be proposed to man as an object of faith so that he may have truer knowledge of God. For we only know God truly when we believe that he is far above all that man can possibly think of God, for the divine essence surpasses man’s natural knowledge, as stated above. (Ch. 3.) Thus, by the fact that certain things about God are proposed to man which surpass his reason, he is strengthened in his opinion that God is far above what he is able to think.

Another advantage results from this, namely, the checking of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some who presume so far on their wits that they think themselves capable of measuring the whole nature of things by their intellect, namely, thinking all things are true that seem so to them, and false which do not. Accordingly, so that man’s mind might be freed from this presumption and seek the truth humbly, it was necessary that God should propose to man certain things far surpassing his intellect.

Yet another advantage is made apparent by the words of the Philosopher. For when a certain Simonides maintained that man should neglect the knowledge of God and apply his mind to human affairs, and declared that a man ought to relish human things, and a mortal, mortal things, the Philosopher contradicted him, saying that a man ought to devote himself to immortal and divine things as much as he can. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177b31–1178a1.) Hence he says (Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals 1.5, 644b22–645a10.) that though we perceive but little of higher substances, yet that little is more loved and desired than all the knowledge we have of lower substances. He also says (Aristotle, On the Heavens and the Earth 2.12, 291b24–28.) that when questions about the heavenly bodies can be answered by a short and probable solution, the hearer rejoices greatly. All this shows that however imperfect the knowledge of the highest things may be, it bestows very great perfection on the soul.

And consequently, although human reason is unable to fully grasp things above reason, it nevertheless acquires much perfection if at least it hold things, in any way whatever, by faith.

Thus it is written, matters too great for human understanding have been shown you (Sir 3:25), and: the things that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God: but to us God hath revealed them by his Spirit (1 Cor 2:10).