Chapter 9 — Of the order and mode of procedure in this work

Accordingly, from what we have been saying it is evident that the intention of the wise man must be directed to the twofold truth of divine things and to the refutation of contrary errors, and that the reason’s investigation can reach one of these, but the other surpasses every effort of reason. And I speak of a twofold truth of divine things not on the part of God himself, who is truth one and simple, but on the part of our knowledge, which has a variable relation to the knowledge of divine things.

Therefore, in order to deduce the first kind of truth, we must proceed by demonstrative arguments by which we can convince our adversaries. But, since there are no such arguments in support of the second kind of truth, our intention must be not to convince our opponent by our arguments, but to solve the arguments which he brings against the truth, because, as shown above, (Ch. 7.) natural reason cannot be opposed to the truth of faith.

In a special way, the opponent of this kind of truth may be convinced by the authority of Scripture confirmed by God with miracles, since we do not believe what is above human reason unless God has revealed it.

In support, however, of this kind of truth, certain probable arguments must be adduced for the practice and help of the faithful, but not for the conviction of our opponents, because the very insufficiency of these arguments would rather confirm them in their error if they thought that we assented to the truth of faith on account of such weak reasonings.

With the intention, then, of proceeding in the manner laid down, we shall first endeavor to declare that truth which is the object of faith’s confession and of reason’s researches, by adducing arguments both demonstrative and probable, some of which we have gathered from the writings of the philosophers and of holy men, so as to thereby confirm the truth and convince our opponents.

After this, so as to proceed from the more to the less manifest, we shall, with God’s help, proceed to declare that truth which surpasses reason by refuting the arguments of our opponents, and by setting forth the truth of faith by means of probable arguments and authority. (Book 4.)

Seeing, then, that we intend by the way of reason to pursue those things about God which human reason is able to investigate, the first object that offers itself to our consideration consists in those things which pertain to God in himself; the second (Book 2.) will be the procession of creatures from him; and the third (Book 3.) the relation of creatures to him as their end.

Of those things which we need to consider about God in himself, we must give the first place, as to the necessary foundation of this whole work, to the question of demonstrating that there is a God. If this is not established, the entire consideration of divine things is taken away.

God’s existence