Chapter 19 — That in God there is nothing violent or beside nature

Hence the Philosopher concludes that in God there cannot be anything violent or outside nature. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.1.)

For whatever has in itself anything violent or beside nature has something added to itself, since that which belongs to a thing’s essence cannot be violent or beside nature. Now no simple thing has in itself anything that is added, for this would mean it is composite. Since, then, God is simple, as shown above, (Ch. 18.) there can be nothing in him that is violent or beside nature.

Further. The necessity of compulsion is a necessity imposed by another. But in God there is no necessity imposed by another, for he is necessary of himself, and the cause of necessity in other things. (Ch. 15.) Therefore, nothing is compulsory in him.

Moreover. Wherever there is violence, there can be something other than what belongs to a thing by its very nature, since violence is contrary to that which is according to nature. But it is not possible for anything to be in God that does not belong to him according to his nature, since by his very nature he exists necessarily, as shown above. (Ch. 15.) Therefore, there can be nothing violent in him.

Again. Everything that is compelled or unnatural is naturally apt to be moved by another, because that which is done by compulsion has an external principle, without any concurrence on the part of the patient. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b1–17.) Now God is altogether immovable, as shown above. (Ch. 13.) Therefore, nothing in him can be violent or unnatural.