Chapter 26 — That God is not the formal being of all things

From the foregoing we are able to refute the error of some who have asserted that God is nothing else than the formal being of everything. (ST I.3.8.)

For this being is divided into substantial and accidental being. Now the divine being is neither the being of a substance nor the being of an accident, as shown above. (Ch. 25.) Therefore, it is impossible for God to be the being by which everything is formally.

Again. Things are not distinct from one another in that they have being, since in this they all agree. If, then, things differ from one another, it follows that either being itself is specified by certain differences added thereto, so that different things have a specifically different being, or that things differ in that being itself is attached to specifically different natures. But the former of these is impossible, because an addition cannot be attached to being in the same way as a difference is added to a genus, as already stated. (Ch. 25.) It remains, therefore, that things differ because they have different natures, to which being is attached in different ways. Now the divine being is not attached to another nature, but is the nature itself, as shown above. (Ch. 20.) If, therefore, the divine being were the formal being of all things, it would follow that all things are simply one.

Moreover. The principle is naturally prior to that which flows from it. Now, in certain things being has something by way of principle: for the form is said to be the principle of being, and likewise the agent, which gives certain things actual being. Therefore, if the divine being is the being of each thing, it will follow that God, who is his own being, has a cause, and thus is not necessary being in himself. The contrary of which has been shown above. (Ch. 15.)

Further. That which is common to many is not something besides those many except only logically. Thus “animal” is not something besides Socrates and Plato and other animals except as considered by the mind, which apprehends the form of animal as divested of all that specifies and individualizes it. For man is that which is truly an animal, otherwise it would follow that in Socrates and Plato there are several animals (namely, animal in general, man in general, and Plato himself). Much less, therefore, being itself in general is something apart from all things that have being, except only as apprehended by the mind. If, therefore, God is being in general, he will not be an individual thing, except as apprehended in the mind. Now, it has been shown above (Ch. 13.) that God is something not merely in the intellect, but in reality. Therefore, God is not the common being of all.

Again. Generation is essentially the way to being, and corruption the way to non-being. For the term of generation is the form, and that of corruption privation, for no other reason than because the form makes a thing to be, and corruption makes a thing not to be. For, supposing a certain form not to give being, that which received that form would not be said to be generated. If, then, God were the formal being of all things it would follow that he is the term of generation. Which is false, since he is eternal, as we have shown above. (Ch. 15.)

Moreover. It would follow that the being of every thing has been from eternity: therefore, there would be neither generation nor corruption. For if there were, it would follow that a thing acquires anew a preexisting being. Either, then, it is acquired by something already existing, or else by something preexisting in no way. In the first case, since (according to the above supposition) all existing things have the same being, it would follow that the thing which is said to be generated receives not a new being but a new mode of being, and therefore is not generated but altered. If, on the other hand, the thing existed before in no way, it would follow that it is made out of nothing, and this is contrary to the essence of generation. Consequently, this supposition would wholly do away with generation and corruption: and therefore it is clearly impossible.

The sacred doctrine also refutes this error by confessing that God is high and lifted up (Isa 6:1), and that he is over all (Rom 9:5). For if he were the being of all, he would be something in all, and not above all.

Those who erred thus are condemned by the same sentence as idolaters who the name that ought not to be shared, (Vulg.: names.) that is, of God, to stone or wood (Wis 14:21). For, if God is the being of all, it would be no truer to say “a stone is a being” than to say “a stone is God.”

Now there are four things which apparently fostered this error.

The first was a wrong understanding of certain authorities. For they found Dionysius saying (The Celestial Hierarchy 4): the being of all is the super-essential divinity. From this they wished to conclude that God is the formal being of all things, not perceiving that this meaning is irreconcilable with the words. For if divinity were the formal being of all, it would not be above all, but in the midst of all, in fact something of all. Therefore, when he said that divinity is above all, he declares it to be by its nature distinct from all and placed above all. And by saying that divinity is the being of all, he declares that all things derive from God a likeness to the divine being. Moreover, he elsewhere expressly excludes their wrong interpretation where he declares (On the Divine Names 2) that there can be no contact with God, nor mingling of him with other things, as of point with line, or of the shape of the seal on wax.

The second cause of this error was defective reason. For, since that which is common is specified or individualized by addition, they thought the divine being, to which nothing is added, not to be some proper being, but the common being of all, because they did not perceive that the common or universal cannot exist without some addition, though it be considered apart from any addition. For “animal” cannot exist apart from the difference of “rational” or “irrational,” although we think of it apart from these differences. Moreover, although we think of the universal without an addition, we do not think of it apart from its receptivity of addition: for if no difference could be added to “animal,” it would not be a genus, and the same applies to all other names of things. Now, the divine being is without addition not only in thought, but also in reality; and not only is it without addition, but also without receptivity of addition. Therefore, from the very fact that it neither receives nor can receive addition, we should conclude rather that God is not common but proper being, since his being is distinct from all others for the very reason that nothing can be added to it. Hence the Commentator says (De causis, prop. 9) that the first cause, by reason of the very purity of its goodness, is distinct from others and, so to speak, individualized.

The third cause of this error is the consideration of the divine simplicity. For, since God is the extreme of simplicity, they thought that if we make an analysis of all that is in us, the last thing, being the most simple, must be God; for we cannot proceed indefinitely in the composition of the things that are in us. In this again their reason was lacking, that they failed to observe that what is most simple in us is not so much a complete thing as some part of a thing. But simplicity is ascribed to God as to a perfect subsistent being.

The fourth thing that might lead them into this error is the expression whereby we say that God is in all things, for they failed to perceive that he is in things not as part of them, but as the cause of things with nothing wanting to its effect. For we do not say that the form is in the body in the same sense as we say that the sailor is in the boat.