Chapter 67 — Against those who say that the possible intellect is the imagination

The opinion of those who held that the possible intellect is not distinct from the imagination (Averroes, On the Soul, bk. 3, ch. 5.) was akin to the foregoing. But this is evidently false.

For imagination is also in other animals. A sign of this is that in the absence of sensibles they shun or seek them, which would not be the case did they not retain an imaginary apprehension of them. But intellect is not in them, since they offer no evidence of intelligent action. Therefore, imagination and intellect are not the same.

Further. Imagination is only about things corporeal and singular, since the fancy is a movement caused by actual sensation, as stated in On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.3, 428b10–15.) But the intellect is about universals and incorporeal things. Therefore, the possible intellect is not the imagination.

Moreover. It is impossible for the same thing to be mover and moved. Now the phantasms move the possible intellect, as sensibles move the senses, as Aristotle states. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a14–16.) Therefore, the possible intellect cannot be the same as the imagination.

Further. It is proved in On the Soul 3 (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429b4.) that the intellect is not an act of a part of the body. But the imagination has a determinate bodily organ. Therefore, the imagination is not the same as the possible intellect.

Hence it is said: who teaches us more than the beasts of the earth, and makes us wiser than the birds of the air (Job 35:11). By which we are given to understand that man has a cognitive power above sense and imagination, which are in other animals.