Chapter 70 — That according to the words of Aristotle we must say that the intellect is united to the body as its form

Now, since Averroes endeavors to confirm his opinion especially by appealing to the words and proof of Aristotle, (Ch. 59.) it remains to be shown that, according to Aristotle’s opinion, we must say that the intellect as to its substance is united to a body as its form.

For Aristotle in the Physics (Aristotle, Physics 8.5; see above, bk. 1, ch. 13.) proves that it is impossible to go on to infinity in movers and things moved. Hence he concludes that we must come to some first moved thing, which either is moved by an immovable mover, or moves itself. Of these two he takes the latter (namely, that the first movable moves itself) for this reason: that what is by a thing itself always precedes that which is by another. Then he shows that a self-mover is of necessity divided into two parts, one of which is mover and the other moved. Consequently, the first self-mover must consist of two parts—the one moving, the other moved. Now every such thing is animate. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.2, 284b30–285a1.) Therefore, the first movable (namely, the heaven) is animate according to the opinion of Aristotle. Hence in On the Heavens 2 (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.2, 285a27–b4.) it is expressly stated that the heaven is animate, and for this reason we must ascribe to the heaven differences of position not only in relation to us, but also in relation to itself.

Let us then inquire with what kind of soul the heaven is animated, according to Aristotle’s opinion.

In 11 Metaphysics, (It is actually Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7.) he proves that we may consider, in the heaven’s movement, something that moves and is wholly unmoved, and something that moves and is also moved. Now that which moves and is wholly unmoved moves as an object of desire: nor is there doubt that it is desirable by that which is moved. And he shows that it moves not as desirable by the desire of concupiscence, which is the desire of sense, but as desirable by intellectual desire: therefore, he says that the first unmoved mover is desirable and intellectual. Consequently, that which is moved by it (namely, the heaven) is desiring and understanding in a more noble way than we are, as he proves further on. Therefore, the heaven is composed of an intellectual soul and a body, according to Aristotle’s opinion. He refers to this when he says in On the Soul 2 that in certain things there is the faculty and act of understanding—for instance, in men, and in any other like or more noble things, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.3, 414b16–21.) namely, the heaven.

Now it is clear that the heaven does not have a sensitive soul, according to the opinion of Aristotle, since it would have various organs, which is not in keeping with the heaven’s simplicity. In order to point this out, Aristotle goes on to say that those corruptible things which have intellect have all the other powers, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.3, 415a8–10.) so as to imply that some incorruptible things (namely, the heavenly bodies) have intellect without the other powers of the soul.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the intellect comes into contact with the heavenly bodies through phantasms: but we must say that the intellect, by its substance, is united to the heavenly body as its form.

Consequently, since the human body is the most noble of all lower bodies, and by the equability of its temperament is most like the heaven, which is free of all contrariety, it follows that in the opinion of Aristotle, the intellectual substance is united to the human body not by any phantasms, but as its form.

As regards what we have said about the heaven being animate, we have not said it as though we asserted it to be in keeping with the teaching of faith, to which it does not matter whether we state it to be so or otherwise. Hence Augustine says: nor do I consider it as certain whether the sun, moon, and all the stars belong to the same company, i.e., of the angels, although some think them to be bodies endowed with light, without sense or intelligence (Enchiridion, 58).