Summa Contra Gentiles Book II Chapter 1 — Connection of the foregoing with the sequel Chapter 2 — That the consideration of creatures is useful for building up our faith Chapter 3 — That the knowledge of the nature of creatures avails for refuting errors against God Chapter 4 — That the philosopher and the theologian treat of creatures in different ways Chapter 5 — Order of the things to be said Chapter 6 — That it becomes God to be the source of being to other things Chapter 7 — That in God there is active power Chapter 8 — That God’s power is his substance Chapter 9 — That God’s power is his action Chapter 10 — In what way power is ascribed to God Chapter 11 — That something is said of God in relation to creatures Chapter 12 — That relations said of God in reference to creatures are not really in God Chapter 13 — How the aforesaid relations are predicated of God Chapter 14 — Continuation of the foregoing Chapter 15 — That God is the cause of being to all things Chapter 16 — That God brought things into being out of nothing Chapter 17 — That creation is neither movement nor change Chapter 18 — How to solve the objections against creation Chapter 19 — That in creation there is no succession Chapter 20 — That no body can create Chapter 21 — That it belongs to God alone to create Chapter 22 — That God can do all things Chapter 23 — That God does not act of natural necessity Chapter 24 — That God works according to his wisdom Chapter 25 — How the Almighty is said to be unable to do certain things Chapter 26 — That the divine intellect is not confined to certain determined effects Chapter 27 — That the divine will is not confined to certain effects Chapter 28 — How there is anything due in the production of things Chapter 29 — Continuation of the foregoing Chapter 30 — How there can be absolute necessity in created things Chapter 31 — That it is not necessary for creatures to have been always Chapter 32 — Arguments of those who wish to prove the eternity of the world from God’s side of the question Chapter 33 — Arguments of those who would prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of creatures Chapter 34 — Arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of the making Chapter 35 — Solution of the foregoing arguments, and first of those taken from the standpoint of God Chapter 36 — Solution of the arguments produced on the part of the things made Chapter 37 — Solution of the arguments taken from the making of things Chapter 38 — Arguments by which some endeavor to prove that the world is not eternal Chapter 39 — That the distinction of things is not from chance Chapter 40 — That matter is not the first cause of the distinction of things Chapter 41 — That the distinction of things is not on account of a contrariety of agents Chapter 42 — That the first cause of the distinction of things is not the order of secondary agents Chapter 43 — That the distinction among things does not result from some secondary agent introducing various forms into matter Chapter 44 — That distinction among things did not result from the diversity of merits or demerits Chapter 45 — What is in truth the first cause of the distinction of things Chapter 46 — That for the perfection of the universe it was necessary that there should be some intellectual creatures Chapter 47 — That intellectual substances are capable of willing Chapter 48 — That intellectual substances are of free will in acting Chapter 49 — That the intellectual substance is not a body Chapter 50 — That intellectual substances are immaterial Chapter 51 — That the intellectual substance is not a material form Chapter 52 — That in created intellectual substances there is a difference between being and what is Chapter 53 — That in created intellectual substances there is act and potency Chapter 54 — That composition of substance and being is not the same as composition of matter and form Chapter 55 — That intellectual substances are incorruptible Chapter 56 — In what way it is possible for an intellectual substance to be united to the body Chapter 57 — The opinion of Plato concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body Chapter 58 — That the nutritive, sensitive, and intellective faculties in man are not three souls Chapter 59 — That man’s possible intellect is not a separate substance Chapter 60 — That man derives his species not from the passive, but from the possible intellect Chapter 61 — That the aforesaid opinion is contrary to that of Aristotle Chapter 62 — Against the opinion of Alexander about the possible intellect Chapter 63 — That the soul is not a temperament, as Galen asserted Chapter 64 — That the soul is not a harmony Chapter 65 — That the soul is not a body Chapter 66 — Against those who say that intellect and sense are the same Chapter 67 — Against those who say that the possible intellect is the imagination Chapter 68 — How an intellectual substance can be the form of the body Chapter 69 — Solution of the arguments by which it was proved above that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body as its form Chapter 70 — That according to the words of Aristotle we must say that the intellect is united to the body as its form Chapter 71 — That the soul is united to the body immediately Chapter 72 — That the whole soul is in the whole body and in each part thereof Chapter 73 — That there is not one possible intellect in all men Chapter 74 — Of the opinion of Avicenna, who asserted that intelligible forms are not preserved in the possible intellect Chapter 75 — Solution of the arguments which would seem to prove the unity of the possible intellect Chapter 76 — That the active intellect is not a separate substance but part of the soul Chapter 77 — That it is not impossible for the possible and active intellect to concur in the one substance of the soul Chapter 78 — That Aristotle’s opinion concerning the active intellect was not that it is a separate substance, but rather that it is part of the soul Chapter 79 — That the human soul is not corrupted when the body is corrupted Chapter 80 — Arguments to prove that the soul is corrupted when the body is corrupted Chapter 81 — Continuation of the foregoing Chapter 82 — That the souls of dumb animals are not immortal Chapter 83 — That the human soul begins to exist with the body Chapter 84 — Solution of the foregoing arguments Chapter 85 — That the soul is not made of God’s substance Chapter 86 — That the human soul is not transmitted with the semen Chapter 87 — That the human soul is brought into being through creation by God Chapter 88 — Arguments for proving that the human soul is formed from the semen Chapter 89 — Solution of the foregoing arguments Chapter 90 — That an intellectual substance is united as a form to no other than the human body Chapter 91 — That there are some intellectual substances which are not united to bodies Chapter 92 — Of the great number of separate substances Chapter 93 — That there are not several separate substances of one species Chapter 94 — That the separate substance and the soul are not of one species Chapter 95 — How we are to understand genus and species in separate substances Chapter 96 — That separate substances do not gather their knowledge from sensibles Chapter 97 — That the intellect of a separate substance always understands actually Chapter 98 — How one separate substance understands another Chapter 99 — That separate substances know material things Chapter 100 — That separate substances know singulars Chapter 101 — Whether separate substances know all things at the same time by their natural knowledge
