Chapter 81 — Continuation of the foregoing

Now, since these arguments lead to a false conclusion, as was shown above, (Ch. 79.) we must endeavor to answer them.

And, in the first place, it must be observed that whatever things have to be adapted and proportionate to one another are together multiplied or unified, each by its own cause. Therefore, if the being of one depends on the other, its unity or multiplicity depends also on it; otherwise it depends on some other extrinsic cause. Now form and matter need always to be mutually proportionate and naturally adapted, so to speak, because the proper act is produced in its proper matter. Consequently, matter and form must always agree in point of multitude and unity. Hence if the being of the form depend on matter, its multiplication, as also its unity, depends on matter. But if not, the form must be multiplied according to the multiplication of the matter, that is, together with matter and in proportion to it, yet not so that the unity or multiplicity of the very form depend on matter. Now it has been shown (Ch. 68.) that the human soul is a form independent of matter as to its being. Therefore, it follows that souls are indeed multiplied according as bodies are multiplied, and yet the multiplication of bodies is not the cause of the multiplication of souls. Therefore, it does not follow that the plurality of souls ceases with the destruction of bodies, as the first argument concluded.

From this the reply also to the second argument is clear. For it is not every difference of forms that causes a difference of species, but only that which is in respect of formal principles, or of a different kind of form, since it is clear that the form is essentially distinct in this and that fire, and yet neither fire nor form is specifically different. Accordingly, multitude of souls separated from their bodies results from the substantial distinction of forms, since one soul is substantially distinct from another; and yet this distinction does not result from a distinction in the essential principles of the soul, nor from a different kind of soul, but from the various coaptation of souls to bodies, because this soul is adapted to this and not to that body, and that soul to another body, and so on. And this coaptation remains in the soul even after the body has perished, even as the soul’s substance remains through being independent of the body in the point of being. For the soul is the form of the body according to its substance: or else it would be united to the body accidentally, and consequently the union of body and soul would result in one thing not essentially, but accidentally. Now it is as forms that souls need to be adapted to their bodies. Therefore, it is clear that these same various coaptations remain in separated souls; and consequently, the plurality of souls remains also.

The third argument given above has been the occasion for some who held the world to be eternal to fall into various strange opinions. For some granted the conclusion absolutely, and said that human souls perish altogether with their bodies. Others said that of all souls there remains some one thing separate that is common to all, namely, the active intellect according to some, or besides this the possible intellect, according to others. Others, however, held that souls remain in their multitude after bodies, but lest they should be compelled to admit an infinite number of souls, they said that the same souls are united to different bodies after a certain time. This was the Platonists” opinion, of which we shall treat further on. (Ch. 83.) Others again, avoiding all the above statements, said that it is not impossible for separate souls to be actually infinite in number. Because in things not ordered to each other to be actually infinite is to be infinite accidentally, and they hold that there is no reason not to admit this. This is the opinion of Avicenna and Algazel. We do not find it expressly stated by Aristotle to which of these opinions he adhered, although he holds explicitly the eternity of the world. The last of the above opinions, however, is not inconsistent with the principles laid down by him. For in Physics 3 (Aristotle, Physics 3.5, 205a10–206a10.) and On Heaven and Earth 1, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.5–7.) he proves that the actually infinite is impossible in natural bodies, but not in immaterial substances. Nevertheless, it is certain that this question offers no difficulty to those who profess the Catholic faith, since they do not admit the world to be eternal.

Again, if the soul remain after the destruction of the body, it does not follow that it must have been accidentally united to it, as the fourth argument concluded. For an accident is described as that which may be present or absent without the corruption of the subject composed of matter and form. Now, if this be referred to the principles of the composite subject, it is found to be untrue. For it is clear that prime matter is not subject to generation and corruption, as Aristotle proves in Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a25–34.) Therefore, it remains in its essence when the form departs. And yet the form was united to it not accidentally but essentially, since it was united to it in one being. Likewise, the soul is united to the body in one being, as we proved above. (Ch. 68.) Therefore, though it survives the body, it is united to it essentially and not accidentally. That prime matter does not remain actually after the form except in respect of the act of another form, but the human soul remains in the same act, is due to the fact that the human soul is form and act, whereas prime matter is a being in potency.

As to the statement put forward in the fifth argument—that no operation can remain in the soul when separated from the body—we say that it is false, since those operations remain which are not exercised through organs. Such are to understand and to will. But those operations do not remain which are performed through bodily organs, such as the operations of the nutritive and sensitive powers.

It must be observed, however, that the soul understands in a different way when separated from the body and when united to it, even as it has a different mode of existence, because a thing acts according as it is. For although the being of the soul while united to the body is absolute and independent of the body, nevertheless the body is like its lodging and the subject that receives it. Therefore in consequence, its proper operation, which is to understand, has its object in the body (namely, the phantasms), though not depending on the body as though it were performed through a bodily organ. Hence, as long as the soul is in the body, it cannot understand without a phantasm; neither can it remember except through the powers of cogitation and memory, by which the phantasms are prepared, as stated above. (In this chapter.) For this reason understanding, as regards this mode, is destroyed when the body perishes, as is remembering. On the other hand, the separated soul has its being apart from the body. Therefore, neither will its operation (which is to understand) be performed in dependence upon certain objects existing in bodily organs, which are the phantasms; but it will understand by itself after the manner of substances wholly separate from bodies as to their being, of which we shall speak further on. (Ch. 96.) From which substances, moreover, it will be able to receive a more abundant inflow as from things higher than itself, so as to understand more perfectly. We have a sign of this in the young. (Juvenibus. The Ferrari manuscript and the majority of the manuscripts, in fact, read viventibus, i.e., in the living, or in the soul while still united to the body.) For the soul, the more it is withdrawn from being occupied about its own body, is rendered more apt to understand certain higher things: therefore, the virtue of temperance, which withdraws the soul from bodily pleasures, above all makes men apt in understanding. Moreover, men while asleep and not using their bodily senses, and when there is no disturbance of the humors or vapours to hinder them, are influenced by higher beings so as to perceive certain future things that surpass the purview of human reasoning. This is much more the case with those who are in a faint or an ecstasy, insofar as they are the more withdrawn from the senses of the body. Nor does this happen unreasonably, because, since the human soul, as shown above, (Ch. 68.) is on the boundary line of corporeal and incorporeal substances (as though it were on the horizon of eternity and time) approaches to the higher world by withdrawing from the lower. Therefore, when it shall be wholly separated from the body, it will be perfectly likened to separate substances as to the manner of understanding and will receive their influence abundantly.

Accordingly, though our act of understanding as regards its mode in the present life ceases when the body perishes, another and higher mode of understanding will take its place.

Remembrance, however, since it is an act performed through a bodily organ, as Aristotle proves in On Memory and Recollection, (Aristotle, On Memory 2.1, 450a27–31.) it cannot remain in the soul after the body unless remembrance be taken equivocally for the understanding of those things which the soul knew before: for the soul must remember what it knew in life, since the intelligible species are received indelibly into the possible intellect, as we have shown above. (Ch. 74.)

With regard to the other operations of the soul, such as to love, to rejoice, and the like, we must beware of equivocation. For sometimes they are taken for passions of the soul: and thus they are acts of the sensible appetite in respect of the irascible and concupiscible faculties, together with a certain bodily transmutation. And thus they cannot remain in the soul after death, as Aristotle proves in his book On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4, 408b18–31.) But sometimes they are taken for a simple act of the will that is without passion. Therefore, Aristotle says in Ethics 7 that God rejoices by one simple operation, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.14, 1154b26.) and in 10 Ethics that in the contemplation of wisdom there is wonderful pleasure, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a23–25.) and in Ethics 8 he distinguishes the love of friendship from the love that is a passion. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.5, 1157b25–1158a1.) Now, since the will is a power that uses no organ, as neither does the intellect, it is clear that these things, insofar as they are acts of the will, remain in the separated soul. (Cf. bk. 1, cc. 89–102.)

Hence it cannot be concluded from the foregoing arguments that man’s soul is mortal.