Chapter 83 — That the human soul begins to exist with the body

Since, however, the same things are found to have both a beginning of being and an end of being, it may seem to some one that, since the human soul has no end of its being, neither has it had any beginning of being, but always has been. And seemingly this can be proved by the following arguments.

For that which will never cease to be has the power to be always. And that which has the power to be always can never be truly said not to be, since a thing’s duration in existence extends as far as its power to exist. Now of everything that has begun to be it, is at some time true to say that it is not. Therefore, that which will never cease to be at no time begins to be.

Further. The truth of intelligibles is not only incorruptible, but is eternal for its own part, because it is necessary, and whatever is necessary is eternal, since not to be is an impossibility for that which necessarily is. Now it is from the incorruptibility of intelligible truth that the soul is proved to have incorruptible being. (Cf. ch. 79.) Therefore, by similar reasoning, from its eternity we can prove the eternity of the soul.

Moreover. A thing is not perfect if it lack several of its principal parts. Now it is clear that the principal parts of the universe are intellectual substances, to which genus human souls belong, as shown above. (Ch. 68.) Consequently, if every day as many human souls begin to exist as men are born, it is evident that many of its principal parts are added to the universe every day, and that it lacks many such parts. Therefore, it follows that the universe is imperfect: which is impossible.

Furthermore, some argue from the authority of Sacred Scripture. For it is stated that on the seventh day God finished his work which he had done, and he rested from all his work which he had done (Gen 2:2). But this would not be so, if he made new souls every day. Therefore, new human souls do not begin to exist, but they have existed from the beginning of the world.

For these and like reasons some, supposing the world to be eternal, have said that as the human soul is incorruptible, so has it existed from eternity. Hence those, namely the Platonists, who maintained that human souls in their multitude are immortal, held that they have also existed from eternity, and are united to bodies at one time, at another separated from them, this vicissitude depending on certain fixed periods of years. (Cf. Plato, Timaeus 42a–43a; Phaedrus 245c-250c.) On the other hand, those who maintained that human souls are immortal in respect of some one thing which remains over from all men after death held that this same one thing has existed from eternity; whether it be the active intellect alone, as Alexander said, or, besides this, the passive intellect, as Averroes asserted. (Cf. ch. 80.) Also, this is apparently the meaning of Aristotle’s words, since, speaking of the intellect, he says that it is not only incorruptible, but also perpetual. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a17–18.)

Some, however, professing the Catholic faith, yet imbued with the teachings of the Platonists, have held a middle course. For, since, according to the Catholic faith, nothing is eternal besides God, they maintained not that human souls are eternal, but that they were created with or rather before the visible world, and yet are united anew to bodies. Of those who professed the Christian faith Origen was the first to hold this opinion, (Origen, On First Principles [Peri archon], bk. 2, ch. 9; see above, ch. 44.) and afterwards several followed him. In fact, this opinion survives to this day among heretics, of whom the Manicheans agree with Plato in asserting the eternity and transmigration of souls.

But it can be easily proved that the foregoing opinions are not founded upon truth. For we have already shown above (Cc. 59, 76.) that there is not but one possible or active intellect for all. Hence it remains for us to proceed against those opinions which state that there are many human souls, but that they existed before bodies, either from eternity or from the formation of the world. This would seem unreasonable for the following reasons.

For it was shown above (Ch. 68.) that the soul is united to the body as its form and act. Now although act is naturally prior to potency, yet in one and the same subject it is posterior to it in time, since a thing is moved from potency to act. Therefore, the potentially living (Cf. Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 3.3.) seed precedes the soul which is the act of life.

Again. It is natural to every form to be united to its proper matter. Otherwise, that which is made of form and matter would be something beside nature. Now that which is becoming to a thing according to nature is ascribed to it before that which is becoming to it beside nature, since what becomes a thing beside nature is in that thing accidentally, whereas what is becoming to it according to nature is in it essentially, and that which is accidental always comes after that which is essential. (Aristotle, Physics 8.5, 256b3–b6.) Therefore, it is becoming to the soul to be united to the body before being separated from the body. Therefore, it was not created before the body to which it is united.

Moreover. Every part that is separated from its whole is imperfect. Now since the soul is a form, as proved above, (Ch. 68.) is a part it is a part of the human species. Consequently, as long as it exists by itself apart from the body, it is imperfect. But the perfect precedes the imperfect in the order of natural things. Therefore, it is not becoming to the order of nature that the soul should have been created apart from the body before being united to the body.

Moreover. If souls were created without their bodies, we must inquire how they came to be united to those bodies. For this was either by force or by nature. If by force, it follows that the union of soul and body is unnatural, since whatever is the result of force is against nature. Therefore man, who is composed of both, is something unnatural, and this is clearly false. Moreover, intellectual substances are of a higher order than heavenly bodies. Now nothing violent or contrary is to be found in heavenly bodies. Much less, therefore, is there in intellectual substances.

On the other hand, if souls are united to bodies naturally, it follows that as soon as they were created, souls had a natural desire to be united to bodies. Now the natural appetite is immediately brought into act unless there be an obstacle (as instanced in the movement of heavy and light bodies), for nature always works in the same way. Consequently, from the very moment of their creation they would have been united to bodies unless there were something to prevent it. But everything that hinders the realization of the natural appetite does violence to it. Therefore, it was by violence that at some time souls were separate from bodies. Now this is unreasonable: both because in such substances there can be nothing violent, as we have proved; and because the violent and the unnatural, since they are accidental, cannot precede that which is according to nature, nor can they be consequent upon the whole species.

Further. Since everything naturally desires its own perfection, it is for matter to desire form and not vice versa. Now the soul is compared to the body as form to matter, as was shown above. (Ch. 68.) Therefore, the union of the soul and body answers to the desire not of the soul, but rather of the body.

If, however, it be said that both are natural to the soul (namely, union with the body and separation from the body) according to different times, this seems to be impossible. Because changes that occur naturally in a subject are accidental, such as youth and old age. Hence if union with and separation from the body are natural changes as regards the soul, union with the body will be an accident of the soul: and consequently the man resulting from this union will not be a being in himself, but an accidental being.

Further. Whatever is subject to alteration according to a difference of time is subject to the heavenly movement, which the whole course of time follows. But intellectual and incorporeal substances, among which are separate souls, are above the whole order of bodies: hence they cannot be subject to heavenly movements. Therefore, it is impossible for them that, according to a difference of time, they should be naturally now united or now separated, or desire naturally this at one time, and that at another.

If, however, it be said that they are united to bodies neither by violence nor by nature, but by deliberate choice: this is impossible. For no one wishes to come to a worse state except he be deceived. Now the separate soul is of a higher state than when united to the body, especially according to the Platonists, who say that through being united to the body it forgets what it knew before and is balked in the pure contemplation of truth. Therefore, it is not willingly united to the body except it be deceived. But there cannot be any cause of deception in the soul, since according to them it is supposed to have all knowledge. Nor can it be said that its judgment in a particular matter of choice, proceeding from its universal knowledge, is upset on account of the passions, as happens in the incontinent. Passions of this kind are not without a bodily alteration, so that they cannot be in the separate soul. It remains, therefore, that if the soul existed before the body, it would not be united to the body of its own will.

Further. Any effect resulting from the concurrence of two mutually independent wills is a casual effect (for instance, when a person intent on buying meets his creditor on the market place without the latter having agreed with him to go there). Now the will of the begetter, on which the begetting of the body depends, is not dependent on the will of the separate soul which desires to be united. Since, then, the union of soul and body cannot take place without the concurrence of both wills, it follows that such union is casual, so that the begetting of a man is not from nature but from chance. This is clearly false, since it results in the majority of cases.

And again, if it be said that the soul is united to the body not from nature, nor of its own will, but by divine ordinance, this also seems inadmissible if souls were created before bodies. For God fashioned each thing according to a manner becoming its nature: hence it is said of each creature, God seeing (Vulg., saw.) that it was good (Gen 1:4), and of all together: God saw everything that he had made, and it was very good (Gen 1:31). Consequently, if he created souls separate from bodies, we must say that this manner of being is more becoming their nature. Now, it is not in keeping with the ordinance of the divine goodness to bring things down to a lower state, but rather to raise them to a better. Therefore, it could not have been by divine ordinance that the soul was united to the body.

Further. It is not in keeping with the order of divine wisdom to raise up lower things to the detriment of higher. Now bodies that are subject to generation and corruption obtain the lowest place in the order of things. Therefore, it was not becoming the order of divine wisdom to raise up human bodies by uniting preexisting souls to them, since this could not be done without detriment to the latter, as proved from what has been said.

Origen took note of this, and since he maintained that human souls were created from the beginning, he said that they were united to bodies by divine ordinance, but as a punishment. For he was of opinion that they had sinned before bodies were formed, and that according to the gravity of their sin they were enclosed in bodies more or less noble as in so many prisons.

But this opinion cannot stand. For punishment is something contrary to a good of nature, and for this reason is said to be evil. If, therefore, the union of soul and body is something penal, it is not a good of nature. Yet this is impossible: for it is intended by nature, since it is the end of natural generation. Moreover, it would follow that to be a man is not good according to nature. But nevertheless it is said after the creation of man: God saw everything that he had made, and it was very good (Gen 1:31).

Further. Good does not result from evil except accidentally. Consequently, if it was appointed that the soul should be united to the body on account of a sin of the separate soul, since this union is a good, it follows that it is accidental. Therefore, man was made by chance. But this is derogatory to divine wisdom, whereof it is said that it arranged all things by measure and number and weight (Wis 11:21).

This is also clearly opposed to the teaching of the Apostle. For it is said of Jacob and Esau, that when they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or bad . . . it was said that the elder will serve the younger (Rom 9:11–12). Therefore, before this was said, their souls had not committed any sin: and yet this was said after their conception, as appears from Gen 25:23.

When we were treating of the distinction of things, (Ch. 44.) we adduced against the position of Origen several arguments, which may also be employed here. Therefore, omitting them, let us pass on to others.

Again. We must admit that the human soul either needs the senses, or not. Now experience would seem to make it clear that it needs the senses, because whoever lacks a certain sense has no knowledge of the sensibles that are known through that sense. Thus one born blind has neither knowledge nor any understanding whatever of colors. Moreover, if the soul does not need the senses in order to understand, we should not find in man any relation between sensitive and intellective knowledge. Yet we observe the contrary: for sensation leads to memories, and these lead us to take observation of things, whereby we arrive at the understanding of the universal principles of sciences and arts. (Cf. ch. 76.) Accordingly, if the human soul needs the senses in order to understand, the human soul must not have been fashioned (Ch. 57.) without the necessary assistance of the senses, since nature fails no thing in what is necessary for the accomplishment of its proper operation—thus it supplies with fitting organs of sense and movement those animals which are animated with the powers of sense and movement. But the senses are inoperative without corporeal organs, as shown above. Therefore, the soul was not made without the organs of the body.

If, however, the human soul does not need the senses in order to understand, and for this reason is said to have been created apart from the body, we are compelled to say that before being united to the body, it understood by itself all scientific truths. In fact, the Platonists granted this, (Cf. Plato, Timaeus; Meno.) when they held that ideas—which in Plato’s opinion are the separate intelligible forms of things—are the cause of knowledge: hence the separate soul, since there was no obstacle in the way, received full knowledge of all sciences. We must therefore say, since it is found to be ignorant when united to the body, that it forgets the knowledge it had previously. The Platonists grant this also, and allege as a proof of this that however ignorant a man may be, if he be questioned methodically about things that are taught in the sciences, he will answer the truth: thus if a man has forgotten some of the things which he knew before, and some one suggests to him consecutively the things which he has forgotten, he recalls them to his memory. Hence it also followed that to learn is nothing else than to remember. Accordingly, it follows as a necessary consequence of this opinion that union with the body hinders the soul from understanding. Now nature does not unite a thing to that which causes an obstacle to its operation; rather, it unites it to that by which its operation is rendered more prompt. Consequently, the union of body and soul will not be natural, and so man will not be a natural thing, nor will his generation be natural. These statements are clearly false.

Further. The last end of anything is that which it strives to obtain by its operations. Now man by all his well ordered and right operations strives to attain the contemplation of truth: for the operations of the active powers are so many preparations and dispositions to the contemplative powers. Therefore, the end of man is to arrive at the contemplation of truth. For this purpose, then, was the soul united to the body: which is to be a man. Therefore, it is not through union with the body that the soul loses knowledge; on the contrary, it is united to the body that it may acquire knowledge.

Again. If a man who is ignorant of the sciences be questioned about matters pertaining to the sciences, he will not answer the truth except as regards universal principles of which no one is ignorant, since they are known to all in the same way and naturally. Afterwards however, if he be questioned consecutively, he will answer the truth about things closely connected with the principles, while bearing those principles in mind; he will continue to do so as long as he is able to apply the force of those principles to the matters on which he is questioned. From this, accordingly, it is clear that knowledge is caused anew in the person questioned by the first principles, and not by the remembrance of a knowledge he had possessed before.

Further. If the knowledge of conclusions were as natural to the soul as knowledge of principles, all would have the same opinion about conclusions as they have of principles, since things that are natural are the same for all. Now all have not the same opinion about conclusions, but only about principles. It is therefore clear that the knowledge of principles is natural to us, but not the knowledge of conclusions. Now from that which is natural to us we acquire that which is not natural, even as in external things we make with our hands all the products of art. Therefore, we have no knowledge of conclusions save that which we obtain from principles.

Again. As nature is always directed to one thing, of one power there must be naturally one object (for instance, color is the object of sight, sound of hearing). Therefore, the intellect, since it is one power, has one natural object, of which it has knowledge essentially and naturally. And this object must be that under which are comprised all things known by the intellect, just as under “color” are comprised all colors, which are essentially visible. Now this is no other than being. Therefore, our intellect knows being naturally, and whatever is essentially comprised under being as such; on this knowledge is based the knowledge of first principles, such as “nothing is at once affirmed and denied,” and the like. Consequently, these principles alone are known naturally by our intellect, while conclusions are known through them, even as through color the sight knows both common and accidental sensibles.

Further. That which we acquire through the senses was not in the soul before (its union with) the body. Now, knowledge of principles is caused in us from sensibles, for had we not perceived some whole by our senses, we should be unable to understand that a whole is greater than its part (just as a man born blind is unable to have an idea of colors). Neither, therefore, had the soul any knowledge of principles before (its union with) the body: and much less of other things. Consequently, Plato’s proof of the existence of the soul before its union with the body cannot stand.

Again. If all souls existed before the bodies to which they are united, it would seem to follow that the same soul is united to different bodies according to the vicissitudes of time. In fact, this is an evident consequence of the opinion of those who hold the eternity of the world. For, if men have been begotten from eternity, it follows that an infinite number of human bodies have been begotten and corrupted during the whole course of time. Therefore, we must say either that an actually infinite number of souls preexisted, if each soul is united to a single body, or—if the number of souls be finite—that the same soul is united at one time to this, at another time to that body. And the same would seem to follow if we suppose that souls existed before bodies, but that generation was not from eternity. For although it be supposed that the begetting of men has not always been, one cannot doubt that it can be of infinite duration, because each man is so formed by nature that, unless he be accidentally hindered, he is able to beget another even as he himself was begotten of another. Yet this is impossible if, supposing a finite number of souls, one soul cannot be united to several bodies. Therefore, several who have asserted the existence of souls before bodies maintained the transmigration of souls. But this is impossible. Therefore, souls did not exist before bodies.

That one soul cannot possibly be united to different bodies is proved thus. Human souls do not differ specifically from one another, but only numerically, or else men would also differ in species from one another. Now numerical distinction arises from material principles. Consequently, the distinction among human souls will have to be taken from something material. Not, however, as though matter were part of the soul: for it has been shown above (Cc. 50–51, 68.) that the soul is an intellectual substance and that no such substance has any matter. It remains, therefore, that in the manner indicated above, (Cc. 80–81.) the distinction and plurality of souls must be taken from their relation to the different matters to which souls are united. Consequently, if there are different bodies, they must have different souls united to them. Therefore, one is not united to several.

Again. It has been proved above (Ch. 68.) that the soul is united to the body as its form. Now forms must be proportionate to their respective matters, since they are related the one to the other as potency to act: for the proper act corresponds to the proper potency. Therefore, one soul is not united to several bodies.

Moreover. The power of the mover should be proportionate to its mobile: for not every power moves every movable. Now it cannot be said that the soul, even were it not the form of the body, is not its mover, for the animate differs from the inanimate by sense and movement. Therefore, different souls must correspond to different bodies.

Again. In things subject to generation and corruption, the same identical thing cannot be reproduced by generation: for, since generation and corruption are movements towards substance, in things that are generated and corrupted the substance does not remain the same, as it does in things that are moved locally. Now, if the one soul is united successively to various generated bodies, the same identical man will be reproduced by generation. This is a necessary consequence for Plato, who said that man is a soul clad with a body. (Cf. ch. 57.) It also follows for all the others, because, since the unity (like the being) of a thing follows its form, it follows that those things are one in number whose form is one in number. Therefore, it is not possible for one soul to be united to several bodies: and from this it follows also that neither were souls before bodies.

The Catholic faith declares itself in agreement with this truth. For it is said in the Psalm: he who fashions the hearts of them all (Ps 33[32]:15), namely, because God fashioned a soul for each one separately, and neither created them all together, nor united one to different bodies. Hence it is also declared in the book De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, 14: we affirm that the souls of men were not created from the beginning together with other intellectual natures, nor all at the same time, as Origen pretended.