Chapter 100 — That separate substances know singulars

Since in the intellect of a separate substance the images of things are more universal than in our intellect, and more efficacious as a medium of knowledge, it follows that separate substances, through the images of material things, know material things not only according to their generic or specific nature, but also according to their individual nature.

For seeing that the species of things in the intellect must be immaterial, they cannot, as existing in our intellect, be the principle of knowing singulars, which are individualized by matter: because the species of our intellect are of such limited power that one leads to the knowledge only of one. Therefore, just as the image of the generic nature cannot lead to the knowledge of genus and difference, so that the species be known thereby, in like manner the image of the specific nature cannot lead to the knowledge of the principles of individuality, which are material principles, so that the individual be known by it in its singularity. On the other hand, the image in the intellect of a separate substance is able to lead to the knowledge of both the specific and the individualizing principles, since it is of a more universal power (being at the same time one and immaterial), so that through it the separate substance is able by its intellect to know not only the generic and specific natures, but also the individual nature. Nor does it follow that the form through which it knows is material; nor that such forms are infinite according to the number of individuals.

Further. Whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can do in a higher way. Hence the lower power works by many instruments, whereas the higher power works by one only. For the higher a power is, the more is it consolidated and unified; but on the other hand, the lower power is disunited and multiplied. Hence we observe that the one power of the common sense apprehends the various kinds of sensibles which the five external senses perceive. Now the human soul is lower than a separate substance in the order of nature: and it is cognizant of universals and singulars through two principles, namely, sense and intellect. Consequently, a separate substance, being higher, knows both in a higher way by one principle, namely, the intellect.

Again. The order in which the intelligible species of things reach our intellect is contrary to the order in which they reach the intellect of a separate substance. For they reach our intellect by a process of analysis, and by abstraction from material and individualizing conditions, so that it is not possible for us to know singulars through them. On the other hand, they reach the intellect of a separate substance as by a process of synthesis, since it has intelligible species through its likeness to the first intelligible species, namely, the divine intellect, which is not abstracted from things, but productive of them. Now, it is productive not merely of the form but also of the matter, which is the principle of individuality. Therefore, the species of the intellect of a separate substance represent the whole thing not only the principles of its species, but also the principles of its individuality. Consequently, we must not deny separate substances the knowledge of singulars, although our intellect is unable to know singulars.

Further. If (according to the statement of philosophers) the heavenly bodies are moved by the separate substances, since separate substances act and move by their intellect, they must know the movable that they move: and this is some particular thing, for universals are immovable. Their positions, which are changed by their movement, are also singular things, and cannot be unknown to the substance which moves them by its intellect. We must, therefore, say that separate substances know singulars connected with these material things.