Chapter 95 — The common cause of this unchangeableness in all souls after their departure from the body

This unchangeableness of the will in all souls after their departure from the body is to be traced to the end as its cause.

This may be proved as follows. As already stated, (Ch. 92.) the end in matters of appetite is what the first principles of demonstration are in speculative matters. These principles are known naturally, and any error that may occur about such principles must be traced to some corruption in nature. Hence a man who understands these principles aright cannot come to understand them wrongly, or vice versa, unless his nature be changed. For one who errs about those principles cannot be set right by more certain principles as would be possible if he erred about some conclusion. Nor is it possible for one who grasps these principles aright to be led astray by anything more certain. The same applies to the end, since everyone naturally desires the ultimate end.

And in consequence the rational nature desires happiness in general. But that it desire this or that thing as happiness and its last end depends on some special condition of nature. Hence the Philosopher says that such as a man is, such does he deem his end to be. (Nicomachean Ethics 1.8.) Accordingly, if this disposition which makes a man desire a certain thing as his last end cannot be removed from him, his will cannot be changed from its desire for that end.

Now these dispositions can be removed from us so long as the soul is united to the body. The desire for something as our last end is occasioned sometimes through our being disposed to it by a passion, which is of short duration; therefore, our desire for that end is easily removed. And this is especially evident in contingent matters. And sometimes we are disposed to desire something as an end, good or evil, by a habit. But this disposition is not easily removed, and consequently such a desire for an end has a firmer hold on us (and we have an example of this in the temperate). Nevertheless, an habitual disposition can be removed in this life.

It is evident, then, that as long as the disposition remains that causes the desire for a certain thing as the ultimate end, the desire for that end cannot be removed, because the ultimate end is desired above all, so that one cannot be turned back from the desire for the ultimate end by something more desirable. Now, so long as the soul is united to the body, it is in a changeable state; but not after its separation from the body. For a disposition of the soul is accidentally subject to change in accordance with some change in the body, because, since the body serves the soul in the soul’s proper operations, it is natural that while the soul is in the body it should be perfected by being moved to perfection. Hence, when it departs from the body, it will no longer be in a state of mobility towards the end, but of resting in the end. Consequently, the will, as regards the desire for the ultimate end, will be immovable.

Now the goodness or badness of the will depends entirely on the ultimate end, since whatever goods a man desires in relation to a good end, he desires well, and whatever he desires in relation to a bad end, he desires ill. Therefore, the will of the separated soul is not changeable from good to evil, although it is changeable from the desire for one thing to the desire for another, provided the order to the ultimate end be observed.

Hence it is evident that this immobility of the will is not inconsistent with free-will, the act of which is to choose, since we choose things that are directed to the end, but not the ultimate end itself. Therefore, just as it is not inconsistent with free-will that we desire happiness and shun unhappiness, in general, with an unchangeable will, so will it not be incompatible with free-will that the will be fixed immovably on a particular object as its last end. For just as now our common nature, whereby we desire happiness in general, adheres to us unchangeably, so too that special disposition whereby we desire this or that as our last end will remain in us unchangeably.

Now the separate substances (that is, the angels), are nearer to ultimate perfection than souls as regards the nature in which they were created, because they do not need to gain knowledge through senses nor to reach conclusions by arguing from principles as souls do. They reach the contemplation of truth at once through the ideas implanted in them. Consequently, as soon as they adhere to an end, due or undue, they abide in it immovably.

It must not be imagined that the soul ceases to have an immovable will after being reunited to the body. On the contrary, it will remain thus, because at the resurrection, as we have already said, (Ch. 86.) the body will be disposed according to the exigencies of the soul, and the soul will not be influenced by the body, but will remain unchangeable.