Chapter XV. Predestination as explained by the congruism of st. robert bellarmine and suarez

THEsE theologians admit, as the Molinists do, the scientia media, and deny, as they do, the intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees and of grace; but they agree with the Thomists, the Augustinians, and the Scotists in this sense, that they recognize the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, which they declare to be previous to foreseen merits not only as they are future, but even as they are conditionally future. In accordance with this congruism, God makes use of the scientia media only after He has predestined one to glory, for a distribution of the so-called congruous grace and so as to assure Himself that it will be efficacious in certain determined circumstances. In this way the principle is saved that God wills the end before the means, and a greater effort is made in this system than in Molina’s to recognize the validity and universality of the principle of predilection.

EXPOSITION OF THIS DOCTRINE

Let us see just what congruism teaches: ¹ on the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory; (2) on congruent grace; (g) on the scientia media.

1. The absolute gratuity of predestination to glory is distinctly the teaching of St. Bellarmine.* His purpose is to prove, like the Thomists and Augustinians, by means of Scripture, tradition, and theological reasoning, the proposi- tion that no reason can be assigned on our part for divine predestination, which means that predestination to glory is absolutely gratuitous, or previous to any foreseen merits. St. Bellarmine excludes as a reason for predestination to glory, not only all merit in the strict sense, but also all congruous merit, whatsoever use of free will or of grace, and every indispensable condition.?

He proves? this doctrine from Scripture, which teaches that God has elected certain persons,‘ and efficaciously so, that they may infallibly get to heaven.* Texts in proof of this are: “This is the will of the Father . . . that of all that He hath given Me, I should lose nothing”; * “No man shall pluck them out of My hand . . . no one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father”; * “Whom He predestined, them He also called

. and justified . . . and glorified.” * He also proves that God’s choice of the elect was entirely gratuitous and previous to any foreseeing of their merits. Texts in support of this are: “It hath pleased your Father to give you a kingdom”; ° “You have not chosen Me, but I have chosen you, that you should go, and should bring forth fruit”; 1° “There is a remnant saved according to the election of grace. And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace.” #

St. Bellarmine also interprets like St. Thomas and the Thomists the following text of St. Paul: “As He chose us . . that we should be holy, . . . according to the purpose of His will.” 1? “In whom we also are called by lot, being predestinated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things

according to the counsel of His will.” 18 Finally he adds ** that the elect were chosen gratuitously but independently of any foreseeing of their good works, according to the teaching of St. Paul, who says: “For when the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil, that the purpose of God, according to election might stand . . . there is a remnant saved according to the election of grace.” ** St. Bellarmine shows ** that these principles of St. Paul apply not only to the election of nations, but also to individuals chosen for eternal life. To those who object that in St. Paul’s text '’ foreknowledge precedes predestination, for he says: “Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated,” St. Bellarmine replies that it is not a question here of the foreknowledge of merits, for which there would be no foundation in St. Paul’s epistles, and which would be in contradiction to several of his texts, but the meaning is: “whom He foreknew by the knowledge of approbation, whom He loved, whom He willed, those He predestined. . . . For to know and to foreknow in the Scripture are frequently taken to mean the knowledge of approbation, as is evident from the following text: ‘God hath not cast away His people, which He foreknew’ ” (Rom. 11: 2). This is the exegesis of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and is retained at the present day by Fathers Lagrange, Allo, Zahn, Julicher, and others.

Finally, St. Bellarmine proves that, according to the teaching of St. Augustine, St. Prosper, and St. Fulgentius, no reason can be assigned on our part for predestination to glory. He writes: “No reason can be assigned on our part that God should predestine us to glory. . . . Not only do these holy

18 Loc. cit., chap. 13; cf. Matt. 7: 23; Gal. 4:9; I Cor. 8:3; 13:12; II Tim. 2:19; Ps, 1:6.

Fathers (Augustine, Prosper, and Fulgentius) affirm this, but also the more learned of their predecessors, whom the rest subsequently followed, record this opinion as pertaining to the Catholic faith, and they reject the contrary opinion held by the Pelagians. I shall mention some of their works, so that if any perchance are of the opposite opinion, they may realize, from the judgment of these most holy Fathers, how manifestly they err on this point.” 1° He mentions in particular two works, one by St. Augustine,” and the other by St. Prosper.” In addition to this he remarks,” as St. Augustine does, that the Fathers who lived previous to the rise of the Pelagian heresy touched but incidentally upon this question of predestination. He quotes, however, St. John Chrysostom who, on the words: “For who distinguisheth thee?” comments as follows: “Therefore thou hast received what thou hast, neither this only or that, but whatever thou hast. For these are not thy merits, but God’s gifts.” ** Finally, he points out that the fathers previous to the time of St. Augustine, especially the Greek Fathers, often took predestination as meaning the will to give glory after this life, and that they scarcely spoke of it except by way of exhortation, and therefore they had in mind the order of execution, in which merits precede glorification; whereas in the order of intention the case is the reverse. God, in the order of intention, wills the end before the means, glory before grace and merits; but in the order of execution He wills glory as the reward of merits. God wills to give glory gratuitously in the order of intention; but in the order of execution He does not will to give it gratuitously, and this is contrary to what the Protestants say. In this Bellarmine speaks exactly as the Thomists do, and like them he remarks that after the rise of the Pelagian heresy it was necessary to con-

21 Prima responsio ad objectiones Gallorum.

sider predestination no longer merely in the order of execution, but also in that of intention, so that everything in the affair of salvation may be attributed to God, as the Fathers previous to the time of Bellarmine had said when commenting on St. Paul's words: “For who distinguisheth thee?”

Thus St. Robert Bellarmine saw in the absolute gratuity of predestination the very teaching of Scripture and its great interpreters. This accounts for the fact of his admitting St. Augustine's definition of predestination, which states that it is “the foreknowledge and preparation of those gifts of God whereby they who are liberated are most certainly liberated.” ** In support of this definition, in which the foreknow]edge refers not to merits but to the divine gifts, Bellarmine appeals to the scriptural text: “No man shall pluck them out of My hand.” **

Suarez says the same. He writes as follows: “I say first: On the part of the one predestined, there is no cause for predestination inasmuch as this refers to eternal predestination to glory or to perseverance or to sanctifying grace or to supernaturally good acts, although for such effects, in that they are bestowed in time, in the order of execution, some cause or reason can be assigned on man’s part, as in the case of glory which, in the order of execution, is given on account of merits. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, (Ia, q. 23, a. 5), with which Cajetan and other modern Thomists agree. Undoubtedly it is Augustine’s opinion.” ** Since election to glory is previous to foreseen merits, it follows for Suarez as for the Thomists, that non-election, or negative reprobation, is also previous to foreseen demerits.

We see that on this point of the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory there is a considerable difference between the congruism of Suarez and of Bellarmine, and the Molinism

24 De dono persever., chap. 14, NO. 85. 25 John 10: 28. 26 De auxiliis, Bk, III, chaps. 16-17; De causa praedest., Bk. II, chap. 23.

such as especially Vasquez, Lessius, and the majority of Molinists understood it to mean. The Thomists always took care to note this difference.” Billuart adds that among the theologians of the Society of Jesus, several agree with Bellarmine and Suarez on this point, such as Toletus, Henriquez, Ruiz, Typhanus.

In recent times Father Billot,” although he disagrees with Suarez on the question of negative reprobation, also admits the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, this being the only kind—and he says so with good reason—that merits the name of predestination; for predestination to grace is common to the elect and to many reprobates.

The difference between congruism and Molinism is less, as we shall see, when it is a question of congruous grace; and still less is this difference when it is a question of the scientia media.

2. Congruous grace. The nature of this grace is well explained in a decree made famous by the general of the Jesuits, Father Aquaviva. By it, six years after the meetings of the Congregatio de Auxiliis, in December, 1613, he ordered the theologians of the Society to teach congruism, “an exposition and defense of which was given,” he said, “in the controversy entered into by the Congregatio de Auxiliis, as being more in agreement with the teachings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas.” “Henceforth let our fathers,” says this decree, “always teach that efficacious and sufficient graces do not differ merely in actu secundo (completed act), because the one obtains its effect by the co-operation of the free will and not the other; but they differ also in actu primo (first movement), in this sense, that, the scientia media presupposed, God Himself, with the fixed intention of producing good, designedly chooses those determinate means and employs them in the manner

27 Cf. Billuart, De Deo, diss. IX, a.4, sec. 2; and more recently del Prado, O.P., De gratia et libero arbitrio, 1911, UI, 347. 28 De Deo uno, 1926, pp. 289, 291.

and at the moment when he knows that the effect will be infallibly produced; so that, if He had foreseen the inefficacy of these means, God would have made use of other means. That is why, morally speaking, and considering it as a favor, there is something more in efficacious than in sufficient grace even in actu primo. It is in this way that God causes us to perform the act instead of giving us the grace which enables us to act. The same kind of reasoning applies to perseverance, which undoubtedly is God’s gift.”

From this we see the difference between Molinism and this type of congruism. In Molinism, God gives the grace which He knows to be efficacious; in this type of congruism, God gives the grace because He knows it will be efficacious. Hence even congruous grace becomes infallibly efficacious only by the consent of the human will, and this is foreseen by means of the scientia media. Therefore the Thomists asked whether the principle of predilection is truly safeguarded.”

3. The scientia media as viewed by Suarez. Whereas Bellarmine *° explains the scientia media as Molina does, by having recourse to the supercomprehension of causes, Suarez in opposition to Molina writes as follows: “That God knows our future free acts in their proximate causes because of His perfect comprehension of our free will . . . this we must reject . . . for this simply means the end of freedom . . . and is repugnant to it.” ** In other words, the scientia media explained as Molina wants it to be, by the theory of the supercomprehension of our free will if placed in certain circumstances, makes Suarez say, as the Thomists do, that it leads to determinism of the circumstances.

But does Suarez have better success in explaining this scientia media, which he wishes to retain in substance? God, he says, previous to any decree, infallibly foresees condition-

29 Consult Pohle-Przuss, Grace, pp. 260-66, for a critical estimate of this congruism., (Tr.)

8. De scientia futurorum contingentium, chap. 7.

ate futures in their objective or formal truth. Of two conditional contradictory propositions, such as: “If Peter were placed in these circumstances, he would sin and he would not sin,” the one is definitely true and the other is definitely false. It is impossible, indeed, for both to be true or both to be false. Therefore the infinite intelligence that penetrates all truth, sees certainly which of the two is true and which is false.

Suarez, the Thomists reply, forgets that Aristotle ®? has shown that of two contradictory propositions which are particular ones and which concern a contingent future event, neither is positively true or false. If it were otherwise, as Aristotle remarks, the truth would be in determinism or fatalism, and our choice would not be a free one. The Stoics, as Cicero relates,** intended to prove determinism precisely by the argument that, of two contradictory propositions, one is necessarily true. Therefore, between the two propositions, A will be, A will not be, the necessity of one of them, at the moment I am uttering it, excludes the possibility of the other. From all eternity is the flow of imperishable truth. From this it would follow that creation is no longer a free act, and the divine will would be subjected to the logical fatalism of the Stoics.

THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES OF THE CONGRUISM OF BELLARMINE AND OF SUAREZ

In this theory the principle of predilection is certainly much better safeguarded than in Molinism. Concerning the question of the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, it follows faithfully St. Paul’s interpretation given by St. Augustine and St. Thomas. But, in the opinion of the Thomists, this theory still limits the universal validity of the principle of predilection and stamps it with the seal of relativity, in that

82 Perihermenias, Bk. 1, chap. 9. See St. Thomas, commentary, lect. 1g. 88 De divin, I, 55.

it retains the main structure of Molinism, which is the scientia media or the denial of the intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees and of grace. It remains true, then, according to this conception of the scientia media, that human effort makes grace efficacious instead of being the result of the efficacy of this grace; so that if two men or two angels are equally helped by God, it may happen that one of them becomes better than the other, though this one was not helped more, and did not receive more than the other. Undoubtedly congruism is right in saying that congruous grace is from the moral point of view a greater gift than the other, but it is none the less true that its actual efficacy is due solely to the subsequent consent of the human will, as foreseen by the scientia media. And then we have a recrudescence of all the difficulties of Molinism, which seems to posit a dependence in the divine foreknowledge as regards the creature, a passivity in pure Act, and leads on our part to determinism of circumstances.** Neither can it be said that previous to any decree God foresees a certain conditionate future, for instance, Peter’s infidelity, in so far as this conditionate future is present to Him from all eternity; for it is not independently of God's decree that this conditionate future rather than its contrary is present to Him from all eternity; otherwise it would be present to Him as a necessary truth, and thus we have again determinism.

As for what directly concerns predestination, the Thomists as a rule point out that congruous grace, since it is not infallibly efficacious of itself, is not an infallible means of leading the elect to glory, as St. Augustine’s definition would demand, which states that it is “the foreknowledge and preparation of those gifts of God, whereby they who are liberated are most certainly liberated.” ** Congruous grace, since it is infallibly efficacious, not because God wills it but because man wills it, does not express adequately—as Bellarmine himself

84 Cf. del Prado, O.P., De gratia et libero arbitrio, 1911, III, 362-68. 35 Loc. cit., chap. 14, NO. 35.

admits—the meaning of the scriptural text: “No one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father.” ** No more does congruous grace, since it is not infallibly efficacious of itself, seem to express adequately the meaning of St. Augustine in the following text: “God effects with the very wills of men what He wills and when He wills. Undoubtedly the human heart is inclined as it pleases His omnipotent will. . . . The wills of human beings are more in God’s power than in their own.” ®© And again when he says that efficacious “grace is not spurned by the hard of heart; for this very purpose it is bestowed, that the hardness of heart may first be taken away.” 38 i

Certainly St. Augustine ® called efficacious grace congruous; but his later works just quoted by us, show that at least he came finally to the conclusion that it is a question here not of extrinsic but of intrinsic congruousness, and this latter is grace infallibly efficacious of itself.

These difficulties in the congruism of St. Robert Bellarmine and of Suarez made other congruists admit the necessity of grace intrinsically efficacious at least for difficult acts. This was the stand taken in the eighteenth century by the congruists of the Sorbonne.

87 De correptione et gratia, chap. 14.

Footnotes

1. Cf. De gratia et libero arbitrio, Bk, II, chaps. 9-15. 153 ↩