Chapter VI. The theologians prior to st. thomas

ST. ANSELM

IN his treatise De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis nec non gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio.: St. Anselm examines the question of predestination. We know from Eadmer ? that St. Anselm wrote this work toward the end of his life. The title indicates that the treatise is divided into three questions. We shall give a summary of the tenor and contents of the second question, De concordia praedestinationis cum libero arbitrio, which unfortunately is the shortest question in the treatise.

Chapter I. It is concerned with the problem arising from the agreement between predestination and human liberty. After giving the commonly accepted definition of predestination, the author stresses the difficulty of perceiving how this latter does not conflict with our free will. If God predestines both the good and the bad, then nothing is left to free will, and everything happens from necessity. If He predestines only the good, then free will would have for its scope everything that is bad. The two alternatives seem to exclude each other.

Chapter II. St. Anselm then investigates in what sense we may speak of the predestination not only of the good, but also of the bad. “God predestines the bad and their bad deeds,” he says, “when He does not correct them and their bad deeds. But more especially He predestines in the case of¹ those who perform good deeds . . . because in these He is the cause not only of their entity but also of their goodness; but in the case of bad deeds He is the cause of their entity, not of their badness.”

Chapter III. The author finally comes to the crucial point: in the accomplishment or in the effects of predestination, how is it that the divine action does not intervene alone, but is accompanied by man’s co-operation, without one of the factors eliminating the other? In replying to this, St. Anselm has recourse especially to affirmative statements. He says: “There is no justice in one who does not adhere to it freely.” Then he adds that “certain things . . . which are predestined, do not happen by reason of that necessity which precedes and is the cause of the occurrence, but by reason of that which follows it.” After this comes the distinguishing feature of the author’s doctrine. He remarks that God, when He predestines, does not do so by forcing the human will or resisting it, but He leaves it master of itself. And although our will makes use of its power, in the case of the good, however, nothing is done by it except as the result of God's grace; so that in the case of the bad, sin must be imputed solely to their will.

We understand the method of procedure adopted by St. Anselm. It is a very just but perhaps too restricted application of his previous exposition of the divine foreknowledge. God foresees infallibly the free acts of the future, at the same time leaving their contingency intact. Therefore He can predestine a person to perform these acts. It is possible that the effects of this predestination will or will not be realized in time, if we consider their cause, which is our free will. They are foreseen and ordained by God from all eternity, being irrevocable and necessary in virtue of a necessity of consequence. In this third and most important chapter of his treatise, the author shows clearly the necessity of our free co-operation with grace.

So we see that St. Anselm seeks the solution of the problem from the teaching of St. Augustine. Previous to this, however,

Scotus Eriugena and Gottschalk had interpreted the mind of the Bishop of Hippo. Something more definite might have been expected concerning the difficulties raised by them. But the texts already quoted show how tenaciously and unequivocally St. Anselm adheres to certain great principles. These principles he maintains along with almost all his predecessors and contemporaries. He holds that every good comes from God, that the free determination of a salutary act in all that constitutes it as such, is a good that comes entirely from God, just as it comes entirely from us as a secondary cause.* Another principle enunciated in the same passage is, that it does not happen independently of God’s action that this free determination of a salutary act comes or will come from this man rather than from a certain other, whom God will permit to fall into sin, the cause of which, however, will be solely because this other willed it.

PETER LOMBARD

The Master of the Sentences has the same view as St. Augustine about predestination and reprobation, for he says: “By predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself would do; but He foreknew also those things which He will not do, that is all evil things. He predestined those whom He chose, but the rest He rejected as reprobates, that is He foreknew they would sin and be condemned to eternal death.” © God predestined those whom He chose, and this suggests no passivity or dependence upon foreknowledge on the part of any determination of the created order. He did not choose the others, but foresaw and permitted their obduracy in sin, and for this they are deservedly condemned to eternal punishment. In like manner, he says: “Since predestination is preparation by God’s grace, or divine election, by

4 Cf. chap. 3: De concordia praedestinationis cum libero arbitrio, 6 Cf. I Sent., d. XL, 1.

which He chose those whom he willed before the foundation of the world, as the Apostle says (Eph. 1: 4): on the other hand, by reprobation is to be understood the foreknowledge of the wickedness of certain persons and eternal punishment prepared for them . . . and the former, that is their wickedness, He knows and does not prepare; the latter, that is, eternal punishment, He foreknows and prepares.” °

Predestination does not presuppose, therefore, the foreseeing of the merits. On this point Peter Lombard writes: “But if we ask why some deserve to be left in their obduracy and others to obtain mercy (or to be predestined), we find the reason for the former, but not for the latter; for there is no question of mercy being merited, for grace would cease to be grace if it were not freely given, but were bestowed on account of merits.” Peter Lombard then puts an objection which has its foundation in an opinion St. Augustine held shortly after his conversion. According to this opinion the reason for the election of some and the non-election of others would be because of certain merits very difficult to detect. But he replies that St. Augustine later on gave up this opinion.® Peter Lombard insists especially on this: That reprobation is not likewise the cause of evil, as predestination is the cause of good.

As for God's will to save all mankind, he considered it *® not only as St. John Damascene does, in its relation to God’s sovereign goodness, but also, with St. Augustine, in its relation to the divine omnipotence and the efficacy of prayer. On this point Peter Lombard writes as follows: “For who is so irreverent and foolish as to say that God cannot turn men away from willing what is evil to will what is good, if, when, and where He has so willed it.” 1° And therefore, he adds,

when we read that “God wills to save all men,” ™ we must not take this to mean that His omnipotence meets with an insurmountable obstacle in the malice of some persons; but with St. Augustine we must interpret this as meaning that no one is saved unless God willed it.

In addition to this, Peter Lombard firmly maintains that God never commands what is impossible, but makes it possible for all to observe His commandments; hence this includes the possibility for them to save their souls. In this sense he recognizes with St. Augustine that God wills the salvation of all those who are bound to observe the precepts, although there may be some difficulty in the case of children who die without being baptized.’* Thus we see that the two aspects of the mysteries are clearly affirmed by Peter Lombard.

ALEXANDER OF HALES

This theologian quotes the current definition of predestination among the Augustinians, and these presuppose no passivity or dependence on God's part. A little farther on,™ asking whether merits are the cause of predestination, he replies: “By the term predestination is meant the preparation of the divine helps, united to foreknowledge and its effects, namely, grace and glory, which latter will be given to the elect. Now merits are only the cause of the conferring of glory, and not of God's eternal choice, or of the conferring of grace.”

If Alexander says that “foreknowledge of the merits may be the reason for the conferring of grace and glory,’** he certainly does not mean this in the Pelagian sense, in that the sinner can merit justification, but he merely means that he can dispose himself for it under the influence of actual grace. This was the comment of the editors of St. Bonaventure’s

14 [bid., memb. 3, a.1. 15 Jbid., ad gum, works,** and they point out that Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and St. Albert the Great are in agreement on this point. The difficulties presented by this doctrine are cleared up by what Alexander says farther on in his theological treatise.”

ST. BONAVENTURE

He retains the Augustinian definition of predestination. In that it is the preordainment of the elect to glory, together with those helps that most certainly will enable them to attain it, preordainment presupposes election.’ This very election presupposes a gratuitous and special dilection, and this applies not only to God's antecedent will but also to His consequent will to save.’® Concerning election, St. Bonaventure writes: “There are two kinds of election. One is caused by the diversity and pre-eminence of the eligibles, and this is a consequence of the eligibles, as in the case of human election; the other accounts for the diversity in choosing, and this is divine election, which is concerned with different natures, not as they are but as they will be. Such election precedes and is eternal. Very numerous texts in St. Bonaventure’s works

17 Loc cit., q.30, a.1; q.31, membr. 3: Whether God loves equally every creature? Q.32, membr. 1: Whether among human beings God’s love is greater for the one whom He foreknew to be at the present moment in a state of grace, than for the one who is predestined, though he is at the present moment in a state of sin? He replies in accordance with the principle: God's love is greater for those to whom He wills a greater good; and one would not be better than another unless He had been loved more by God.

19 Ibid., a.3, q.1. In this article St. Bonaventure teaches clearly the principle of predilection. Like St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas, he holds that divine predilection, contrary to ours, is the cause of the greater or less goodness found in creatures and in the elect, Here we have the great and traditional principle, namely, that one would not be better than another, unless one were loved more by God.

20 [bid., a.3, q.1, no. 4. The editors of the Quaracchi edition of St. Bonaventure's works, in commenting on this passage (ibid.) state that “it is confirmed by the Council of Orange, canon twelve, which reads: God loves us such as we will be by the gift of His grace, not as we are by our own merit.”

refer to the principle of predestination.” There is therefore no passivity or dependence in God’s foreknowledge concerning a free and salutary determination of the created order.

Guided by the light of this principle, what answer does he give to the question whether foreseen merits are the cause of predestination? He answers* that predestination implies three things: an eternal design, and then its effects: justification and glorification. Now the merits of the elect are the cause of the subsequent glorification, but not of the eternal design which precedes them. As for justification this cannot be merited ex condigno, but only ex congruo, that is, by a merit improperly so called, in so far as God does not refuse sanctifying grace to the sinner who does what he can to obtain it. But in virtue of the principle of predilection previously enunciated by him, St. Bonaventure holds that of two sinners, one does not become better than another by disposing himself for conversion, unless he has been loved more by God and helped more by actual grace. This is the constant teaching of St. Augustine and, as we shall see, St. Thomas adopted it,’ so St. Bonaventure writes concerning salutary acts that the total effect is from the created cause and likewise from the uncreated will.?*

However, St. Bonaventure seeks to discover some motive for this choice on God’s part. If this particular man has been chosen in preference to a certain other, Peter in preference to Judas, is not this because of some suitable quality in him unknown to us, and not because of any merit on his part? He replies in the affirmative: “If coming to particular cases, we ask why He wills more to justify one than another, when evidently the two are equally eligible, we must say that there can be many reasons of congruence for this, so that there is no objective certainty. Therefore, since our knowledge is de-

21 Consult index of Quaracchi edition under the heading “Dilectio.” 22 Loc. cit, d. XLI, a.1, q.1.

pendent upon objective certainty, we can discover no certain reason for this, unless it be revealed by Him in whom there are no doubts but only certainties.” St. Albert the Great says practically the same.”

Contrary to this, in virtue of the principle of predilection, St. Thomas said: “Why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason except the divine will .. . as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in this part of the wall, and that in another.” ** Scotus held the same view as St. Thomas on this point, and affirmed God's sovereign liberty in the choice of the elect.?*

Is the reason given by St. Bonaventure to be taken as applying to the future merits of the elect, when he says that the choice is one of fittingness and not of merit? He says it would be rash to affirm this.?° In any case, he maintains the principle of predilection, which we have seen so emphatically affirmed by him. It is that one would not be better than another unless one were loved more by God (for divine love is not caused by the diversity of eligibles, but is the cause of them).

All these theologians, moreover, agree on this, that just as God would have suffered no inconvenience if He had not created, so there would have been no inconvenience to Him if He had placed Judas in preference to Peter among the elect, and granted him the graces that would have infallibly led him to merit freely eternal life and persevere unto the end. As St. Bonaventure says: “Although there can be others and more than are predestined, yet there never will be; and if there were, then they were from all eternity predestined. And therefore in this there can be no change.” * His conclusion is that

z0 Ibid., d. XL, a.2, q.2, no. 5. When St. Bonaventure says that there can be others and more, he is speaking of the certainty of salvation. He points out that since salvation, objectively considered, depends upon the use of free

God wills to save all men in so far as He has given all the human nature, and offers to all by Christ the grace necessary for salvation.**

ST. ALBERT THE GREAT

This doctor has discussed predestination and God's will to save all mankind in two of his works,** and his teaching on this subject is substantially the same as St. Bonaventure'’s.

He states positively that divine knowledge is the cause of things, and is not measured by them.** It does not, however, prescribe the characteristic trait of necessity for all things; for there may be, as Aristotle says, a necessity of consequence without a necessity of consequent, according to the following example given by Boethius: What I see must be; now I see Peter walking; therefore he must be walking, although he is doing this freely. Thus God has infallibly foreseen contingent events.** In like manner, God willed efficaciously from all eternity the conversion of the good thief, and he was infallibly converted without being in the least way compelled.**

He says, too, with St. Bonaventure, that predestination to glory presupposes election, and this latter presupposes divine predilection: “Love tends to show a preference between persons, and to love the one preferred in view of eternal life. Therefore love precedes election, and election precedes predestination on the part of Him who loves, elects, and predes- will, then it is to be classed among other uncertain and contingent events of life. But on God's part the number does not admit of either increase or decrease, since the certainty in question here depends upon His foreknowledge, which is not subject to error. (Tr.)

82 Cf. Com. on Sentences, 1, d. XLVI, XLVII; Summa theol., Ia, q.62, 64. This latter work was written in 1270 after the first part of St. Thomas’ theological summa had appeared.

85 Ibid., d. XLVI, C, a.1; d. XLVII, A, a.1 ad 1um. Also Summa theol., Ia, tr. 15, q-61, M. 2, 5, 8.

tines." This doctrine affirms the principle of predilection, that no created being would be better than another unless it were loved more by God.

What conclusion do we come to when we ask whether anything we do contributes as a meritorious cause of predestination? St. Albert answers this question.’ Subsequently he gives a clearer solution to this problem in his theological treatise. In this latter work he says: “It is of Catholic faith that the only cause of or good reason for predestination is the will and love of Him who predestines. . . . Furthermore, it is of Catholic faith that merit does not come before grace. . . .** However, St. Albert affirms that ‘What is added to grace, is an act that takes place in time and is measured by time, and cannot be caused; there can, however, be a reason that may make it appear reasonable: and this reason is not antecedent but concomitant. Hence the reason for this may be the knowledge of merits, because, to be sure, He gives grace to the one whom He well knows will make good use of it.” *

These concluding words remind us of one of Henry of Ghent's opinions quoted and discussed by Cajetan.*® But St. Albert attaches much less importance to them, saying: ““Sometimes God gave grace to one whom He knew would make a bad use of it, as in the case of Judas.” * Similarly he says: “Sometimes God gives grace to one whom He knows will make a bad use of it, on account of some useful purpose it will serve; thus He made use of the betrayal by Judas so as to accomplish the redemption of the human race. But He would not be a good dispenser if, without any thought of the advantage to be gained therefrom, He gave grace to one who will make a bad use of it.” +2

From these formulas enunciated in the foregoing texts we see that God gives grace either because of future merits, or for some other useful purpose. Thus St. Albert prepares the way for the much simpler formula which we read in the Summa of St. Thomas, which is: “God preordained to give grace to merit glory.” “*

St. Albert remains faithful to the principle of predilection, and he has given us a sufficiently clear formula of it. He says: “That is loved more which receives a greater good.” + And again he says: “In all things God loves the good that is from Him.” * No created being therefore would be better than another unless it were loved more by God. “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” * But, in any case, God never commands what is impossible and He makes it possible for all to keep His commandments.“

1931, pp. 371-86: “The will to save and predestination as St. Albert the Great views it.”

Footnotes

1. PL, CLVIII, 507-42. 2 Ibid., 114; Vita S. Anselmi. 8 Ibid., 519-21. ↩