Chapter XIX. How shall we define predestination?

To destine means to ordain a thing or a person to something determinate. In this sense we say that a certain object is destined for the service of the altar and that soldiers about to give up their lives for the safety of an army are destined for death. In this sense the Third Council of Valencia (855), in its third canon, spoke of the predestination of the wicked to death in the following terms: “We unhesitatingly admit the predestination of the elect to life and of the wicked to death.” Then it immediately adds: “But God foreknew the malice of the wicked, and because it was their own and He was not the cause of it, He did not predestine it. The punishment, of course, following their demerit, this He foreknew and predestined.” t This means that God decided from all eternity to inflict the penalty of damnation upon the wicked for their sins, of which He is by no means the cause.

But the Scripture, the Church Fathers, and the theologians generally understand by predestination: the divine preordination of the elect to glory and the means by which they will infallibly obtain it. It is thus St. Augustine defined predestination, when he declared it to be: “The foreknowledge and preparation of those gifts whereby whoever are liberated are most certainly liberated.” * The first word of this definition, “foreknowledge,” was previously explained by St. Augustine in a work of his written about the same time, when he said that: “By predestination God foreknew those things which He was going to do.” ? It is not a question of a purely speculative knowledge that is previous to the divine decree, but of a practical knowledge that is subsequent to this decree.

Hence it follows that the certainty of which St. Augustine speaks is a certainty not only of foreknowledge but also of causality: “He foreknew those things which He was going to do.” St. Augustine had already said on this point: ““Therefore aid was brought to the infirmity of the human will, so that it might be unchangeably and invincibly influenced by divine grace.” * And he applied this definition to the predestination of the good angels who received more help than the others.’

St. Thomas in like manner defines predestination thus: “The type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind.” * And he states precisely that the certainty of this preordination is a certainty not only of foreknowledge but also of causality; he says: “The

number of the predestined is certain to God, not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of principal preordination.” ' St. Thomas develops this point in another of his works.®

From this it follows that predestination, since it is the efficacious ordination of the means of salvation to the end, is an act of the divine intellect which presupposes an act of the will. According to St. Thomas and the Thomists, it is a command that presupposes divine love and election.’ God, indeed, ordains for Peter in preference to Judas the efficacious means of salvation, because He wills efficaciously to save him, because He loved him with a love of predilection and chose him. St. Thomas expressly says: ““Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above (a. 1), is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end. But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love: love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation . . . ; election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others, since He reprobates some, as stated above (a. 3). Election and love, however, are differently ordained in God and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good that already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed

7 Ibid., a.7. 8 De veritate, q.6, a.3. 9 Loc. cit., la, q.23, a.4; De veritate, q.6, a.1.

by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.” +°

This text, which ranks among the most important ones of St. Thomas, proves especially three things: (1) That a predestination only to grace has but the name of true predestination, for it is common both to the elect and to many reprobates who, having once been justified, were afterwards estranged forever from God. (2) To speak of a predestination to grace that would not presuppose predestination to glory, is to forget that God wills the means only for the end, although on His part there are not two successive acts, the one referring to the end, and the other to the means. (3) If in us love follows election, in the sense that we cherish those whom we choose as lovable, which quality we did not cause but found in them; in God, on the contrary, election, since it is prior to predestination, follows love; for His creative and conservative love, far from presupposing lovableness in us, posits this in us, when He grants and preserves in us His natural and supernatural gifts.

This is an application in the highest degree of the principle of predilection: “Since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” ** That is why in the Scripture and Church Fathers, the predestined are often called the elect and beloved.!? The following text is worthy of notice: “Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom prepared from the foundation of the world.” 13

It follows, in fine, from the definition of predestination,

12 Matt. 20:16; 22:14; 24:22; Mark 13:20, 22; Rom. 8:33; Col. 3: 12; II Tim. 2: 10, 18 Malt. 25: 34.

as St. Thomas says, that it is, “as regards its object, a part of providence.” '* Providence, indeed, concerns the three orders of grace, nature, and the hypostatic union, all of which are ordained to the same supreme end, which is the manifestation of God’s goodness. But, whereas God’s general providence does not always attain certain particular ends, for these are not always efficaciously but only antecedently and inefficaciously willed by Him, predestination, to be sure, always and infallibly leads the elect to eternal life, which God efficaciously wills for them.

IS THIS CONCEPTION OF PREDESTINATION THE KIND WHICH SCRIPTURE SPEAKS OF?

This predestination by which God directs infallibly certain persons rather than others to eternal life is affirmed by revelation, whatever the Pelagians and Semipelagians may say about it. Our Lord Jesus Christ said to those who murmured at what He was saying to them, that “no man can come to Me, except the Father, who hath sent Me, draw him; and I will raise him up in the last day.” ** On several occasions He speaks of the elect,’* and He says that no one will be able to snatch them out of His Father’s hand. “My sheep hear My voice. . . . And I give them life everlasting; and they shall not perish for ever, and no man shall pluck them out of My hand. That which My Father hath given Me is greater than all: and no one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father.” *7 This shows that God not only knows beforehand who are the elect, but that He also loved them, chose them in preference to others, and that He keeps them infallibly in His hand, which means that they are protected by His omnipotence.

This is precisely St. Paul's point of view, for he says: “And we know that to them that love God, all things work together unto good, to such as, according to His purpose, are called to be saints. For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated. . . . And whom He predestinated, them He also called. And whom He called, them He also justified. And whom He justified, them He also glorified.” ** These are the infallible effects of eternal predestination. Let us note concerning the words “whom He foreknew” in the text just quoted that it is not said: at least those whose conditional merits He foreknew, and that this same expression, “whom He foreknew,” means “whom He knew beforehand with a look of benevolence,” and it applies not only to adults but also to the children who will die soon after baptism, so as to be unable to merit their reward. St. Augustine said on this subject: “By predestination God foreknew those things which He was going to do.” Later on St. Thomas understood this text to mean: “Those whom He benevolently foresaw, He chose and predestined,” and he saw the normal sequence in these acts, in which the final practical judgment is first; then comes election, and afterward command followed by its execution: in other words, vocation, justification, glorification.” These acts, in St. Paul’s judgment, presuppose a divine intention expressed by him in the passage just quoted, for he says: “Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the firstborn amongst many brethren.” **

Such is the divine intention that inspires all these acts; it is in conjunction with that of God's glory and the manifestation of His goodness as stated by St. Paul: “That He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which

19 De praed. sanct., chap. 10, no, 19; cf. De dono persever., chap. 18, no. 47. 20 Loc, cit., la, q.23, a.1, 4,

He hath prepared unto glory.” ?? Just as plainly did St. Paul refer to election, for he writes: “He (God) chose us in Him (Christ) before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy. . . .” * He insisted on the sovereignly free character of this election, saying: “In whom we also are called by lot, being predestinated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.” * St. Augustine, too, was able to write against the Semipelagians as follows: “No one who sought to avoid falling into error, could argue against this predestination which we defend in accordance with Holy Scripture.” 25

Moreover, evidently there is not anything done by God in time which was not preordained by Him from all eternity; otherwise He would begin to will something in time, or something would happen by chance apart from any intention or permission on His part, which is absurd. Now, it is God who, in time, brings certain persons to eternal happiness, which is beyond the natural powers of any created being to attain. He therefore preordained from all eternity to bring them to it, and this is predestination. It is therefore an established fact that predestination is beyond the possibility of any doubt. Furthermore, without predestination no one would attain eternal happiness; because every good comes from God, especially salvation and the culmination of this, which is eternal happiness; for this is of the supernatural order, and is absolutely beyond the natura] powers of any created or creatable being.

The Semipclagians raised the following objection: if there is an infallible predestination, then I am either predestined or not. If I am, whatever I do I shall infallibly be saved; if I am not, whatever I do I shall infallibly be damned. I can

therefore do whatever I please. St. Augustine replied at once to the Semipelagians, pointing out that if this reasoning were of any value, it would prevent us from admitting not only the fact of predestination, but also that of God’s foreknowledge, which is admitted, however, by the Semipelagians.® The Thomists replied in the same way to a similar objection raised against them by the Molinists.

Several saints went on further to remark that if there were any foundation for this Semipelagian dilemma, the demons by the natural vigor of their intellect would grasp the truth of this far better than we do and would no longer take the trouble to tempt us. There are even some saints who replied to the demon by turning against him this sophism, whereby he intended to plunge them into despair, and saying: “If I am not predestined, even without your efforts to have me lose my soul, I shall be lost; and if I am predestined, whatever you do, I shall be saved.”

The decisive reply to this objection is given by St. Thomas. He states that providence, of which predestination is a part, does not suppress the secondary causes and concerns not only the final effect, but also the means or the secondary causes that must produce this effect. God does not predestine, therefore, the adults to the end, that is, to glory, without predestining them to the means, that is, to salutary and meritorious good works whereby this end can and must be obtained by them.”

The Semipelagian sophism is as false as that of the plowman who would say: If God has foreseen that next summer I shall have wheat, whether I sow the seed or not, I shall have it. “Let us not deny what is very clear,” says St. Augustine, “because we do not understand what is hidden.” + In

truth, according to the dispensation of Providence that concerns the end and the means, without violating liberty, as wheat is obtained only by the sowing of the seed, so adults obtain eternal life only by the performance of good works. It is in this sense that Peter says: “Labor the more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election.” * Although election is eternal on God's part, yet in the order of execution, it is in time and by means of good works that this is effected in us. We must not confuse the two vistas of time and eternity. By God’s eternal predestination grace is given to the elect, not that they may let themselves get into a state of spiritual torpor, but it is given precisely for the purpose that they may work out their salvation. As St. Augustine says, it is given for them to act, not for them to remain inactive. Such are the principal consequences deduced from the definition and existence of predestination.

HOW SHALL WE DEFINE REPROBATION?

The term reprobation is commonly used in reference to our rejection of an error of judgment by the intellect, and in reference to the moral disorder which we reject by a judgment of the intellect and by an aversion of the will. In this sense the Scripture speaks of those whom God reprobated from all eternity. Thus St. Paul writes: “I chastise my body . . . lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway.” * The Scripture also makes use of equivalent words and expressions, such as: “cursed,” * “vessels of wrath and dishonor,” * “child of hell,” ** “son of

29 [I Pet. 1: 10. 301 Cor. 9: 27. 32 Matt. 25: 41. 82 Rom. g: 21 Ê 83 Matt. 23: 15.

perdition.” ** The fact that certain persons are reprobated has therefore the certainty of faith.

St. Thomas explains it by remarking that it belongs to God’s universal providence to permit for the general good of the universe the failure or deficiency of certain defectible creatures, otherwise spoken of as physical and moral evil. Thus Providence permits the death of the gazelle for the life of the lion, and the crime of persecutors for the heroic patience of the martyrs. Now intellectual creatures, since they are by nature defectible, are ordained to eternal life by divine providence. It pertains, therefore, to this latter to permit, for a greater good, that certain persons fail and do not attain this end. This is called negative reprobation, quite distinct from positive reprobation that inflicts the penalty of damnation for the sin of final impenitence.**

Nothing, however, happens that God from all eternity has not either willed, if it is a good, or has not permitted, if it is an evil. Now, according to revelation, certain persons are lost through their own fault and are eternally punished.** This would not happen, therefore, unless God from all eternity had permitted their failure to do their duty—of which, moreover, He is by no means the cause—and if He had not decided to punish them for it.

Is reprobation simply the denial of predestination? It implies the divine permission of the sin of final impenitence (negative reprobation), and the divine will to inflict the penalty of damnation for this sin (positive reprobation). If reprobation were simply the denial of predestination, it would not be an act of providence, and the penalty of damnation would not be inflicted by God. St. Thomas says: “As predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to

fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.” *7

Having defined predestination and reprobation, we must now seek their cause.