Chapter IX. The scriptural background for the teaching of st. thomas

EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS

Ler us consider his exegesis on the two passages to the Ephesians. They are as follows: “Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with spiritual blessings in heavenly places, in Christ. As He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight in charity. Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto Himself, according to the purpose of His will, unto the praise of the glory of His grace. . . . In whom we are also called by lot, being predestinated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will that we may be unto the praise of His glory.” +

In his commentary on this epistle, St. Thomas makes three important remarks, afterwards referred to by all the Thomists.

1. He notes that when the Apostle writes: “Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of the children,” though we may understand these words as referring to adoptive sonship realized here on earth by sanctifying grace, yet it is far better to say they refer to the perfect likeness to God that will be realized in our heavenly home, in accordance with what St. Paul himself said: “We who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for

THE SCRIPTURAL BACKGROUND g1 the adoption of the sons of God.” ? Grace, indeed, is given in view of future glory and, according to the teaching of St. Thomas,’ God, all-wise as He is, wills the end before the means. Moreover, predestination only to the life of grace and not to glory, would be no more than predestination in name, since many of the reprobates are so predestined.

This remark of St. Thomas is retained in substance by several modern exegetes + who see in this text of St. Paul an immediate reference to the general election of Christians to a life of holiness, but in such a way that the principles declared on this subject apply as a consequence to the special election of this particular person rather than to a certain other. St. Thomas insists on these principles proclaimed by St. Paul.

2. He remarks that God has chosen us, not because we were saints but that we might become saints. His words are: “He chose us, not because we were saints, for we were not; but He chose us that we might become saints by leading a virtuous life and one free from vices.”

3. St. Thomas observes that, for St. Paul, God’s plan or His eternal décree is the reason why we are predestined, and not because He has foreseen our merits. Says St. Paul: “He predestinated us . . . according to the purpose of His will.” 5 A beneficent design is this, which is the result of His most pure love. St. Thomas particularly stresses this in his commentary, for he says: “That anyone, however, is predestined to life eternal . . . this is a grace given that is purely gratuitous . . . for no merits preceded it.” ° It is not a question merely of predestination to grace, but also of predestination to glory, which is the only kind that cannot be shared in common between the elect and the reprobates.

The holy Doctor again insists on this in connection with

verse eleven of this chapter: “In whom we are also called . . . being predestinated according to the purpose of Him.” “Therefore the reason why we are predestined,” says St. Thomas, “is not because our merits were foreseen, but the pure will of God is the reason for this; wherefore St. Paul adds that it is according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.” These final words, moreover, indicate that everything which happens depends upon God's will. There is nothing, therefore, in this text of St. Paul that points to the foreseeing of our merits as the reason for predestination.

EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS

St. Paul still more clearly expresses his mind, as St. Thomas views it, in the Epistle to the Romans, which directly and explicitly treats of predestination with glorification as its effect: “We know that to them that love God all things work together unto good, to such as, according to His purpose, are called to be saints. For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn amongst many brethren. And whom He predestinated, them He also glorified.” *

In explaining this text St. Thomas insists upon this, that everything in this life contributes to the good of those who persevere unto the end in God’s love. This means in the life of those predestined according to God’s purpose. He refuses to see in the words “whom He foreknew,” any reference to foreknowledge of merits, for, according to St. Paul, the merits of the predestined are the effects of predestination. He recalls the texts so often quoted on this subject: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” * St. Thomas holds,

therefore, that according to this text of St. Paul quoted in the previous paragraph,” everything that directs the predestined to eternal salvation is the effect of predestination. It is definitely formulated by him as follows: ‘‘Whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation is all included under the effect of predestination,” ° even the free determination to perform a salutary act.

In addition to this, St. Thomas holds that Christ’s predestination to divine sonship is prior to our Savior’s foreseen merits, since these merits presuppose the Person of the Word made flesh and therefore His divine sonship. Now Christ's predestination, as St. Augustine said, is the eminent exemplar of ours.

Concerning the ninth chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, St. Thomas recognizes that he treats in the beginning of this chapter of the call of the Gentiles to the grace of the Christian faith. In contrast to this, he treats of the unbelief of the Jews; but St. Thomas recognizes that this chapter also contains principles applicable to individual cases. Father Lagrange * is in perfect agreement on this point, and says: “It is beyond dispute that this call of the Gentiles is at the same time a call to salvation. We cannot help thinking of the fate of each; we transpose the terms of the proposition, we apply St. Paul’s principles to individual cases of salvation. It is purely a favor on God's part when He calls one to justification. . . . But God does not proceed in the same way toward those whom He calls and those who are not called. . . . According to St. Paul, man is truly the cause of his (positive) reprobation by reason of his sins: ‘For they stumbled at the stumbling-stone.’ ” 1°

This brings St. Thomas to explain verse thirteen. Giving a

12 Epitre aux Romains, p. 244. 18 Rom. 9: 32. i general scope to the words, “Jacob I loved,” he formulates the principle of predilection in these terms: “Election and love are differently ordered in God and in man. In man election precedes love, for man is incited to love from a consideration of good in the object loved; for this reason he chooses in preference this thing to the other and makes it the object of his love.” But whatever the Pelagians and Semipelagians may have said about it, there can be no such dependence or passivity in God. St. Thomas continues in the same strain: “But God's will is the cause of all good that is in the creature, and therefore the good by reason of which one thing is preferred to another by way of election is consequent to God’s will, which is concerned with His own good, and which has love as its province.” Therefore the conclusion of St. Thomas is: “Foreknowledge of merits cannot be the reason of predestination, since foreseen merits are the effects of predestination.” On the contrary, demerits, of which God can by no means be the cause, are the reason of damnation. St. Thomas finds this thought expressed in the famous scriptural text: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is only in Me.” *

Such is the mystery as St. Thomas, following St. Augustine, finds it expressed in the epistles of St. Paul. He does not seek to make it less obscure, for that would be to detract from its sublimity. But he brings forward the objection raised by human reason, as foreseen by St. Paul, and he stresses the more distinctive parts of the Apostle’s reply.

The objection raised by the Pelagians and Semipelagians against St. Augustine is not original, for it was already proposed by St. Paul when he asked: “What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God?” ** Is there injustice on God’s part in distributing so unequally His gifts to men who are equal by nature?

St. Thomas remarks that St. Paul did not reply to this ob-

jection by having recourse to the foreknowledge of merits as regards the elect, as if this were the reason for their predestination. He replied, maintaining it to be a mystery of revealed truth instead of representing it in an inferior light: “Is there injustice with God? God forbid! For He saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy. And I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth but of God that showeth mercy. . . . Therefore He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth.” 1° St. Thomas remarks that St. Paul affirms the principle of predilection by presenting it in a new form, finding it revealed in these words of God to Moses: “I will have mercy on whom I will; and I will be merciful to whom it shall please Me.” *? Thus our election depends neither upon our will nor upon our efforts, but upon God who shows mercy.

Concerning verses fifteen and sixteen, St. Thomas says again that the effect of predestination cannot be the reason for this latter. Now the good use of grace or merit is the effect of predestination. Therefore foreseen merit cannot be the reason for predestination. There is no other reason for this but the will of God. Now, he goes on to say, we cannot speak of justice or injustice in cases of pure mercy; such as, for instance, on meeting two persons, if we give to one and not to the other; or, if two persons have equally offended us, we pardon one and demand reparation from the other. The same is to be said with regard to sinners. God is merciful toward the one whom He restores to grace, and just toward the one whom He leaves in sin. He is unjust to nobody. The conclusion therefore of St. Thomas is that, according to St. Paul, foreknowledge of merits cannot be the cause of predestination, and by this he understands predestination to glory, which is the only kind worthy of this name; for predestination only to grace is com-

mon to the elect and many of the reprobates. Moreover, the merits that follow justification, since they are the effects of predestination that is peculiar to the elect, cannot be the cause of this latter. St. Thomas is among the clearest on this point, and we shall find him expressing himself still more clearly in that article of the Summa, the scriptural proofs of which we give in this chapter.

St. Thomas completes his commentary on the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans by examining the last objection St. Paul proposes. “Thou wilt say therefore to me,” he says, “Why doth He then find fault? For who resisteth His will?” ** This is how St. Thomas understands the objection: Why reprove the sinner for not having done what he was incapable of doing? To quote his own words: “It is useless to ask anyone to do that which is not in one’s power to do.” This is the well-known objection of the insufficiency of divine assistance.

The way to reply to this difficulty is by saying that God never commands what is impossible, and that He makes the attainment of salvation really possible for all who have to observe His commandments. Taken in this sense, we may say that He wills to save all; ° but, on the other hand, no one would be better than another, unless one were loved more by God. Affirming the principle of predilection and presenting it in a new form, St. Paul says: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor? What if God, willing to show His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of

mercy which He hath prepared unto glory . . . where is the injustice?” 2°

St. Paul's reply to this objection confirms all that precedes, as also does what he adds farther on when he asks: “Hath God cast away His people? God forbid! . .. As in the time of Elias. . . . There isa remnant saved according to the election of grace. And if by grace, it is not by works; otherwise grace is no more grace.” 7

In his commentary on the concluding portion of this ninth chapter in the Epistle to the Romans, St. Thomas remarks once more as follows: “Whatever good a man has, must be ascribed to the divine goodness as principal agent. For we read in Isaias: ‘And now, O Lord, Thou art our Father, and we are clay; and Thou art our maker and we are all the works of Thy hands.’ * If God does not promote man to better things, but leaving him in his weakness, makes the meanest use of him, He does him no wrong, so that he can justly complain about it.” Where is the injustice, if God permits the bad thief to die unrepentant, and if He pardons the other so as to declare in him the riches of His glory?

THE GRATUITY OF PREDESTINATION IN THE THEOLOGICAL SUMMA

In the Theological Summa,” St. Thomas only summarizes and systematically arranges what he said in his commentary on the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. The title of the article is: “Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?” This means, as explained at the beginning of the argument in the article: Whether God preordained that He would give the effect of predestination to

anyone on account of any merits? We find the same doctrine as set forth in this article in other works of St. Thomas, but it is expressed here in a simpler, sublimer, and more precise manner.

According to his accustomed way of procedure in the statement of the question, St. Thomas posits three difficulties, the principal one being the very same as that formulated by St. Paul when he asks: “Is there injustice in God?” * He gives at first, in the argument on the contrary, a general and negative answer. The Apostle wrote to Titus: “Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy, He saved us.” ? Now, as it is a fact that He saves us, so He has predestined us to salvation. Foreknowledge of merits is therefore not the cause or reason of predestination which, as St. Thomas defined it in the first article, means predestination to glory. After having formulated this negative and general response on the authority of St. Paul, St. Thomas explains it, recalling and refuting Origen’s error, the Pelagian and Semipelagian heresies, and an opinion held by some Scholastics. He formulates the following conclusions: (1) Pre-existing merits in a former life cannot be the reason for predestination; * (2) nor can it be because of merits acquired prior to justification; ** (3) nor can it be because of merits acquired after justification.

To prove this third conclusion, St. Thomas has recourse to a principle, the force of which was not realized by many of the later theologians. Of those who held the contrary opinion he says: “But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace in the life of the predes-

28 II Cor. 3:5, tined is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will be outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was shown above (q. 19, a. 8). Wherefore, that which flows from free will is also of predestination.” ° In other words, in the life of the predestined neither the good use of free will nor of grace can be given as the reason for predestination, for they are its effects. Why so? The reason is because we cannot distinguish between what is produced by the secondary cause and what is produced by the first cause; these are two total causes, not co-ordinated but subordinated. Not only does the whole effect come from both, as in the case of two horses drawing a heavy vehicle which one of them would not succeed in drawing alone; but, whereas one of these horses is not moved by the other, the secondary cause does not act except it be moved by the first Cause. On this point Molina very plainly separates from St. Thomas.* From this text just quoted we see that the Angelic Doctor considers even the free determination to perform a salutary act as coming entirely from us as a secondary cause, and entirely from God as first Cause, without which we would not determine ourselves to act. This is but the application of principles that have already been explained by him.* St. Thomas also writes farther on: ‘‘Whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination.” *?

In the continuation of this fifth article St. Thomas formulates a conclusion that to us seems accurately to express and

clinch several assertions of St. Albert and St. Bonaventure. He writes: “There is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another, a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God preordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He preordained to give grace to merit glory.” ** How are we to understand this last statement? According to all that has been quoted so far, and taking especially into consideration the refutation of the third error recorded in the preceding paragraph, we must understand this statement to mean that God decided to give to a certain person, for instance, to the good thief in preference to the other, that grace which is of itself efficacious, so that he may merit eternal glory to which He predestined him. By this St. Thomas does not mean that God decided to give the good thief a grace that will become efficacious by reason of the good consent of this latter This interpretation is excluded by what is said in the preceding paragraph: “there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause.” It is also excluded by the final conclusion in the argumentative part of the article, which is as follows: “In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatever is in man disposing him towards salvation is all included under the effect of predestination, even the preparation for grace.” *4

Various theologians of a later date," contrary to this, said that the free determination of the salutary act is neither the effect of the divine causality nor of predestination. Undoubt-

83 Tbid., q.23, a.5. 84 Ibid., q.23, a.5. 85 Molina, Concordia, q.23, a.4-5, memb, ult., ed. 1876, P- 546.

edly they granted that complete predestination does not depend on foreseen merits, understood in this sense, that it includes the first grace which we cannot merit; but they do not accept the interpretation of St. Thomas, who declares that everything in man which directs him to salvation, even the free determination of the salutary act, is the effect of the divine causality and of predestination. Their opinion is about the same as the one held by those to whom St. Thomas replied when He said that “there is no distinction between what flows from free will and what is of predestination; as there is no distinction between what flows from a second cause and from a first cause.” *

We see that these different conclusions from the argument of the fifth article, explain the general and negative reply of the argument on the contrary, which states that the foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predetermination. This applies to predestination to glory, which is the only predestination that answers the definition of it given in the first article; on the other hand, predestination to grace is set up in opposition to reprobation. We also see that this general answer and the conclusions explaining it are just so many corollaries of the principle of predilection, that one would not be better than another, unless one were loved more by God.

THE PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY

In the reply to the third objection of this same fifth article there are two final conclusions that present still more prominently the scope of this great principle. The conclusion before the last is: “God willed to manifest His goodness in men, in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, in sparing them; and with regard to others, whom He reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others.” This

general reason has its foundation, says St. Thomas, in the words of revelation as expressed in the Epistle to the Romans: “What if God willing to show His wrath (that is the vengeance of His justice) and to make His power known, endured (that is permitted), with much patience, vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, and that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy which He hath prepared unto glory (where is the injustice?).” ** Divine goodness, on the one hand, tends to communicate itself, and thus it is the principle of mercy; on the other hand, it has an inalienable right to be loved above all things, and is thus the principle of justice. It is fitting that this supreme Goodness be manifested in its two aspects, and that the splendor of infinite justice appear as the refulgence of infinite mercy. Evil is thus permitted by God only for a greater good, of which infinite justice is the judge, and which the elect are destined to contemplate in heaven.

Finally, in the last conclusion, St. Thomas visualizes no longer the good and bad in general, but each one in particular. He says: “Yet why He chooses sonte for glory and reprobates others, has no reason except the divine will.” ** St. Augustine had said: “Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.” * He has even shown how the foreknowledge of either future or conditionally future merits could not be the cause of predestination. This last conclusion, which is common to St. Augustine and St. Thomas, is a rigorous consequence of the principle of predilection. “Since God’s love is the cause of the goodness of created things, no one thing would be better than another unless it were loved more by God.” *° The last conclusion of the synthesis is reunited to the principle of this latter. St. ‘Thomas confirms it by an analogy taken from things in na-

88 Summa theol., Ta, q.23, a.5 ad gum; cf. De veritate, q.6, a.2. 89 Tr, 26 in Joan. 49 Loc, cit., Ia, q.20, a.3.

ture or from those made by human skill. It depends solely upon God’s will that this particular part of matter should receive one of the lowest forms, and that other one of the noblest. It likewise depends solely upon the artist's will that, among several equal stones, this particular stone should be put in this part of the wall, and that in another. In the choice of the elect the sovereignty of the divine liberty is made manifest. If God, without any inconvenience to Himself, could have not created, not willed to raise us up to the supernatural order, not willed the incarnation, with far greater reason He could have not chosen Peter in preference to Judas. If He chose him, He did so most freely and because He loved him more. All this doctrine is included in the principle that one thing would not be better than another, unless it were loved more by God.

There remains the other aspect of the mystery, which St. Thomas most emphatically affirms in terminating his argument: “Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. . . . In things which are given gratuitously a person can give more or less, just as he pleases—provided he deprives nobody of his due—without any infringement of justice.” * God does not take away what is due to anyone, for He never commands what is impossible; on the contrary, however, by reason of His love He makes it really possible for all to observe His commandments, and He even grants out of His goodness more than strict justice would demand; * for He often raises men many a time from the grave of sin, when He could leave them therein.

CONCLUSION

We will conclude this exposition of the Angelic Doctor's doctrine by saying that St. Thomas, better than any of his

predecessors, has set forth clearly the principles underlying the true extreme and apparently contradictory aspects of this great mystery. He perceives only the more clearly the sublimity of the mystery. He has brought out into very bold relief the contrast between this light and shade in theological matters. On the one hand, we have the shining light of the two principles enunciated by him, one of which declares against predestinarianism, God's infinite justice, that He never commands what is impossible and makes it possible for all to be saved. The other principle, directed against Pelagianism, declares the free intervention of God's mercy, that one thing would not be better than another unless it were loved more by God. But just as these two principles, viewed separately, are certain and clear, so is their reconciliation an impenetrable obscurity. Why is this? It is because infinite justice, infinite mercy, and sovereign liberty are reconciled only in the eminence of the Deity, in the intimate life of God, in which they are identified without destroying one another. Now St. Thomas has shown that we cannot have in this life any positive concept of the Deity as such.*® We can know God only by what He has analogically in common with creatures; but what belongs properly to Him is known by us only negatively (as not finite being), or relatively (as supreme being). In this sense we say that the Deity is above being and above the one. Likewise, the divine paternity, filiation, and spiration are manifested to us only analogically by revelation. Hence the mystery, and especially the obscurity of the problem that confronts us. The intimate reconciliation of infinite justice, infinite mercy, and sovereign liberty is beyond the scope of speculative theology and its discursive method of procedure. By reason of its obscurity, it is the very object of faith (faith is of things unseen) and of contemplation, which is the result of faith enlightened by the gifts of understanding and wis- 48 Ibid., la, q.13, a.1.

dom: “O the depth of the riches of the knowledge and the wisdom of God!” 4t

Bossuet admirably expresses the Angelic Doctor’s thought. Writing on this subject, he says: “I do not deny that God in His goodness is moved to compassion for all men, nor do I say that He does not provide the means for their eternal salvation in the general dispensation of His providence. . But however great may be His plans for all mankind, He shows a certain peculiar regard and preference for a number of them known to Him. All those whom He regards in this manner bewail their sins and are converted in due time. . . . This is the will of the Father who sent Me, that of all that He hath given Me, I should lose nothing.** And why does He introduce us to these sublime truths? Does He do this to trouble and alarm us? . . . Our Savior’s plan is this, that by contemplating this glance He casts in secrecy upon those whom He knows, and whom His Father has given Him by a certain choice, and recognizing that He can lead them to their haven of eternal salvation by unfailing means, we should learn, first of all, to ask for these means, and uniting our prayer with His, say with Him: Deliver us from evil, or else say with the Church: Permit us not to be separated from Thee; when our will seeks to be its own master, permit it not; hold it in Thy hand, change it and bring it back to Thee. . . . There is another thing which our Savior wishes to teach us, and it is this; that we abandon ourselves to His loving kindness; not that there is no more need of action and toil on our part. . . ; but in doing everything to the best of our ability, we must above all give ourselves up completely to God alone, now and forever. . . . Let no one say to me that this doctrine of grace and of preference is the despair of good souls. What! For my

greater assurance, they think of throwing me upon my own resources, and thus rid me of my inconstancy? No, my God, I do not consent to this. My only assurance is in abandoning myself to Thee. . . . Help me, and I shall be saved.“ Heal me, O Lord, and I shall be healed.*® Convert me, and I shall be converted.” ** All this is quite in agreement with the teaching of St. Thomas on the formal motive of hope, which relies not on our efforts, but upon God’s power to help. 47 Ps, 118: 117.

48 Jer. 17: 14. 49 Ibid., 31: 18, cf. Médiations sur l'Evangile, La Cène, 2e. partie, 72e. jour.