Chapter XXVIII. Conformity of this doctrine with the mind of st. thomas

ALL the holy Doctor’s texts just quoted in explanation of what this motion is and what it is not, sufficiently prove that this doctrine which we have just set forth is truly his own. By way of synthesis, and to save the reader the trouble of summarizing these texts, we shall draw attention here to the leading ones and certain others that are of importance. The necessity of giving a precise answer to certain objections obliges us to repeat ourselves to some extent.

“Determined effects proceed from God's own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.”” 1 There we have the eternal predetermining decree, which is an elective act of the divine will, and this is followed up by the command of the divine intellect. Now the divine motion assures the execution of this decree in time. It is in this sense that it is said to be predetermining.

A little further on St. Thomas states this objection: “But the will of God cannot be hindered. Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.” * This is the ever recurring objection against the divine predetermining decrees. St. Thomas replies: “From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.” The divine predetermining decree, far from destroying the liberty of our

¹ choice because of its ineffable efficacy, causes it in us by reason of this transcendent efficacy which belongs only to God and which extends even to the free mode of our choice; for this mode, which is the dominating indifference of willing as regards a good with an admixture of non-good, is still being, and it is thus included in the adequate object of divine power; whereas the disorder of sin cannot be included. As St. Thomas remarks: “And just as by moving natural causes God does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary, but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them.” *

On the infallible efficacy of the predetermining decrees and of the divine motion St. Thomas writes as follows: “The operation of an angel merely disposes a man to choose; whereas the operation of God gives completion to his choice. . . . Man does not always choose what his guardian angel intends. . . . Hence the guardianship of the angels is sometimes frustrated ... whereas divine providence never fails.” * And again he writes: “Accordingly, by knowing His essence God knows all things to which His causality extends. Now this extends to the works of the intellect and will. . . . Therefore God knows both the thoughts and affections of the mind.” * He does not know our affections independently of His causality, but in His causality that extends even to our most intimate affections. Does this include even our free choices? Undoubtedly. Concerning this St. Thomas writes: “Therefore all movements of will and choice must be traced to the divine will: and not to any other cause, because God alone is the cause of our willing and choosing.” è It is a question of our elections or free choices as elections and not merely as actions; for it concerns their free determination

which God knows in so far as He causes it in and with us, as was said in the preceding text."

Let us again refer to the objection St. Thomas states about Damascene, who wrote: “God foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all.” * He replies: ‘‘Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue. Whence predestination is not excluded by him.” ° St. Thomas says the same in another of his works: “The saying of Damascene (second book of De orthod. fide, c. 30), that God foreknows but does not predetermine the things which are in our power, is to be understood as meaning that the things which are in our power are not subject to the divine predetermination in such a way as to be necessitated thereby.” 1°

Sylvester of Ferrara had pointed out, long before Bannez, that “Gregory of Nyssa in his book (De homine) and Damascene (second book of De orthod. fide) seem to say that what is within us is not subject to divine providence, But St. Thomas replies that this means nothing else than that the divine determination does not impose necessity upon what is within us.” »

Father Synave, O.P., wrote not long ago: “What St. Thomas thought, indeed, about this question is beyond doubt, for he said that ‘what is within us is not subject to divine providence as if necessitated by it.’ St. Thomas admits, therefore, a divine non-necessitating determination: the wills and choices of man are submitted to the determination of divine providence, though this determination does not impose necessity on them. It is not right to say that, according

8 De orthod. fide, Bk. II, chap. go.

10 Contra Gentes, III, go (end). 11 Com, in Contra Gentes, LI, go (end).

to the constant usage of St. Thomas, the idea of necessity is necessarily implied in the verb ‘to determine.’ It is not correct to say that the expression ‘not of necessity determining’ is equivalent to ‘not determining.’ . . . May we at least assert that ‘to determine of necessity to one thing’ is but a clearer and more forcible way of saying ‘to determine to one thing’? No more so. Another text, as precise as the preceding, will show us that this equation of the two expressions is as false as the preceding, it being but a variant of the former by the addition, in the two terms compared, of the expression ‘to one thing.’ Replying to St. John Damascene who affirms that ‘what is within us is not predetermined by God but comes from our free will,’ St. Thomas says: ‘Damascene’s statement is not to be understood as meaning that all which is within us, that what is subject to our choice, is excluded from the scope of divine providence; but it means that all these things are not so determined to one thing, as in the case of those beings that are not endowed with free will.’ =

“Human acts, in that they depend upon our choice, are therefore truly determined to one thing. If these acts were not so determined, St. Thomas would have said that they are not determined by divine providence to one thing, as those beings that are not endowed with free will. But one will have noticed that the phrase contains the word ‘so’ to which the negative particle at the beginning of the sentence belongs, so that it reads: ‘they are not so determined to one thing by divine providence, as those beings are that are not endowed with free will.’ The determination to one thing of free acts is not accomplished in the same way as the determination to one thing of acts that are not free. Now we know the nature of the determination to one thing of acts that do not depend upon free will. Everyone agrees that it is a necessitating determination. It is therefore a case of recognizing a twofold determination to one thing: a non-necessitating

12 De veritate, q.5, 4.5 ad 1um, and a necessitating determination. The former pertains to free acts, and the latter to those that are not free.” #8

In another article Father Synave confirmed this interpretation with an argument that is quite conclusive. “If the word ‘determine’ implies necessity,” he says, “why does not St. Thomas accept St. John Damascene’s formula? . . . The result of that would be to make St. Thomas speak to no purpose. Lest it make no sense, the negative phrase of St. Thomas: ‘What is within us is not submitted to the determination of divine providence as if it received from it a necessitating trait,’ is to be taken as meaning that what is within us is submitted to the determination of divine providence, although this determination does not impose necessity upon it. There is no need of copious gloss, or even of any gloss, so as to reach this obvious meaning. . . . Words are words. It seems to me, in accordance with the most elementary laws of criticism, that we must accept this expression, ‘determination of divine providence’ as clearly established; if it conflicts with a system or a preconceived view of determination, we should either reform the one or abandon the other.” 14

We have proved this at length elsewhere,** and we must likewise take note of the following famous text of St. Thomas: “Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.” 15

Non ex necessitate must be translated here by not of necessity, as it must throughout this tenth question.” The non

does not belong to determinat, but to ex necessitate. To understand it otherwise would result in a faulty translation throughout this question. Thus, in another place we read: “Therefore the will is not moved of necessity to either of the opposites.” ** And again: “It will not of necessity tend to this particular good.” ° Also the following replies to objections: “If it (the object) is lacking in any respect, it will not move of necessity. . . . But other things without which the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end.” *°

All these texts prove that there is no doubt about the mind of St. Thomas. For him there is no necessitating predetermination; he admits, as regards our free acts, a non-necessitating divine predetermination. This is made still clearer from the state of the question in the famous article just quoted, in which it is determined with marvelous precision in two of the opening objections, these being the same as those always brought forward by the opponents of Thomism. They are as follows: “Every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite. But something impossible follows from the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it; because in that case God's operation would be ineffectual.” 21

St. Thomas replies to these objections, without referring in the least to the divine foreknowledge of our consent by means of a knowledge that would make us think it approaches either proximately or remotely to the scientia media of Molina. On the contrary, he insists upon the transcendent efficacy of the divine causality, for he writes: “In reply to the first objection we must say that the divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He

20 Ibid., ad 1um et ad gum; cf. ibid., a.g, sed contra, et ¢ 21 Ibid., a.4, obj. 1a et ga.

moves (and here we have election as a voluntary act), but also to its being done in a way which is fitting to the nature of that thing (and here we have the free mode of this election, which is produced by God in and with us, when He moves us to a particular salutary act in preference to a certain other, and this in virtue of the intrinsic efficacy of His motion, which man positively does not resist). And therefore it would be more repugnant to the divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature, than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.” 22

In like manner, St. Thomas again affirms the intrinsic efficacy of the divine motion against which the objection was raised; but he replies that under the influence of this motion which man positively does not resist, he retains the power to resist. He could resist if he so wills; but under the influence of this most powerful and gentle motion he never wills to resist. In reply to this objection, he says: “We must say that if God moves the will to anything, it is incompossible with this supposition that the will be not moved thereto, because in that case God’s operation would be ineffectual (as stated in the objection). But it is not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily.” * In order to grasp the exact meaning of St. Thomas’ replies, we must not separate them, as is so often done in this case, from the objections he is seeking to solve.

There is no possibility of doubt. It is a case here of nonnecessitating predetermination. Under the influence of this most powerful and gentle motion the Virgin Mary infallibly and freely uttered her “hat” for the fulfilment of the mystery of the incarnation, which had infallibly to be fulfilled. Under the influence of this motion St. Paul was freely converted when on his way to Damascus, and the martyrs remained

firm in the faith and in their love for God in the midst of their torments. At least this is the way St. Thomas understood it. To put a different construction upon these texts would be to drain them of their metaphysical contents. The terms would cease to have any meaning.

The expression “‘non-necessitating predetermination” is found even several times in his works, as we have pointed out, especially in his commentary on St. John’s Gospel, apropos of the hour of the passion, which is pre-eminently Christ’s hour. All these expressions signify a decree of the divine will that is non-necessitating but predetermining premotion assuring the infallible execution of this decree, and this in a different way both for good and bad acts, for God is the cause of only the reality and goodness of our acts. As for moral disorder, whenever it occurs, He permits it, though in no way causing it, either directly or indirectly. This disorder comes solely from the deficient cause and is not included in the adequate object of indefectible Omnipotence, just as sound is not included in the object of sight. The expression, predetermining and non-necessitating “physical premotion,” is therefore quite in conformity with the mind and even the terminology of St. Thomas.

It has been alleged at times that certain texts of the holy Doctor can be interpreted in the opposite sense. Goudin, O.P., pointed out: (1) that when St. Thomas denies predetermination, the context shows that he then has in mind necessitating predetermination as Damascene understands it. (2) When St. Thomas says that the will determines itself, he is speaking of secondary causes; and it is clear that the deliberation is ordained to the determination of choice, which is a free act of the will. This is affirmed by St. Thomas in the famous text which we shall examine in the next chapter, it reads as follows: “God moves man’s will, as the

universal Mover to the universal object of the will, which is good. And, without this universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that which is true or apparent good. (Certainly it is so in the order of secondary causes. That is why man deliberates, and thus sin is possible, which answers the objection put by St. Thomas.) Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on.” 35 In the following question it is stated that this divine motion to will something determinate is not necessitating, because this infallibly efficacious influx extends even to the free mode of our choice: “It is incompossible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply.” *

3. When St. Thomas says that God at times moves the will without implanting anything in it, he means, without producing in it an infused habit.*"

4. Finally, St. Thomas has drawn a distinction between a general motion to universal good and a particular motion for this particular act, an act, for instance, of contrition. It remains true as he said: “that no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God.” ** The notion of physical, predetermining, and non-necessitating premotion is therefore quite in agreement with the teaching of St. Thomas. We can assure ourselves of this by reading his earliest commentators, those who wrote long before Bannez. A

25 Contra Gentes, ITI, go (end), a text previously quoted. See also De veritate, q.22, a.6, in which he spoke of a determination to one thing by a natural inclination or by way of nature, which is most certainly necessitating, and is therefore quite different from that which concerns us here; cf. loc. cit., la lae, q-9, a.6 ad gum: cf. Ia Hae, q.109, 2.6: q.111, a.2, G.112, a.3.

compilation of their texts was made by Father Dummermuth, OP?

20Cf. S. Thomas et doctrina praemotionis physicae, 1886 (“De mente S. Thomae,” pp. 23-181; “De vetere schola S. Thomae,” pp. 427-557: especially Capreolus, pp. 454-82; Ferrariensis, pp. 482-95: Cajetanus, pp. 495-506). How the earlier Jesuit theologians interpreted the mind of St. Thomas, such as Toletus, Molina, and Suarez, may be read pp. 685—754-

See also Dummermuth, Defensio doctrinae S. Thomae de praemotione physica, Responsio ad R.P.V. Frins, S.J., Louvain and Paris, 1895. An examination of the texts of St. Thomas, objects of the controversy and the doctrine of the first Thomists, pp. 317-401; cf. Father Guillermin, O.P., “Sufficient grace,” in the Revue Thomiste, 1902, pp. 75 £. (five articles). Cf. Dr. J. Ude, Doctrina Capreoli de influxu Dei in actus voluntatis humanae, p. 158. There are various reasons given in proof that Capreolus taught physical predetermination. Dr. J. Ude relates that he had undertaken to write this work because he thought Capreolus was rather opposed to physical predetermination; but an examination of the texts of this great commentator of St. Thomas made him see that the opposite was the case. Cf. Father N. del Prado, O.P., De gratia et libero arbitrio, 1907, I, 141-253: “De natura physicae praemotionis juxta doctrinam sancti Thomae, et de diversis perfectionis gradibus in physica praemotione.”

Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., articles on non-necessitating predetermination in the Revue Thomiste, 1924, pp. 494-518; in the Revue de philosophie, 1926, pp- 379-98: 423-33; 659-70; and in 1927, pp. 303-24; by the same author, “Le dilemme: Dieu déterminant ou déterminé,” in the Revue Thomiste, 1928, pp 193-210; also “God, His existence and His nature,” II, 529-62. Father Synave, O.P., “Prédétermination non-necessitante et prédestination nécessitante,” in the Revue Thomiste, 1927, pp. 72-79; 240-49, a reply to Father d'Alès; by the same author, in the Bulletin Thomiste, 1928, pp. 358-68, a criticism of the work by Father d'Alès: Providence et libre arbitre, 1927, in which are re-assembled the articles which we answered in the Revue de philosophie, 1926-27. Cf. Garrigon-Lagrange, “La grace infailliblement efficace et les actes salutaires faciles,” in the Revue Thomiste, November, 1925, March, 1926.

See also R Martin, O.P., “Pour Saint Thomas et les thomistes contre le P. Stuffler, S.J.," in the Revue Thomiste, 1924-26, a series of articles. Cf. Ven. Carro, O.P., “El Maestro Pedro de Soto y las controversias theologicas en el siglo XVI" (Salamanca, Vol. X, 1931). By the same author, “De Soto a Banez,” in the Ciencia tomista, 1928, pp. 145-78, and in the Angelicum, 1932, fasc. 4, pp. 477-81. CÉ. M. J. Congar: “‘Praedeterminare et praedeterminatio chez S$. Thomas,” in the Revue des Sc. phil. et théol., August, 1934, p. 363.

Footnotes

1. Ibid., a.8, obj. 2a. 283 ↩