Chapter XXXII. The divine motion and the physical act of sin principle

Ir is certain that God is in no way the cause of sin, either directly or indirectly. He cannot be the direct cause of sin by inclining His will or a created will to it, for sin is the result of the rational creature turning away from God, its ordained end. Neither can He be the indirect cause of sin by neglecting to keep us from it, as the captain of a ship who, by his negligence, is the cause of the shipwreck, when he is not at his post watching, as he can and should be doing. Undoubtedly it happens that God does not grant certain persons the help that would keep them from sin; but that is in accordance with the established order of His wisdom and justice. He is not bound to do so. He does not owe it to Himself to keep creatures that are by nature defectible from ever failing to do their duty, and He can permit them to fail in view of a higher good. Thus He permits the sin of persecutors that the constancy of the martyrs may be made manifest.

This divine permission of sin is in no way its cause, either directly or indirectly; it allows this to happen. It is but the indispensable condition. If God did not permit it, did not allow it to happen, there would be no sin. This divine permission of sin, especially in the case of the first movement by which the first sin is committed and by which the just person separates from God, is not a punishment, as the withdrawal of divine grace is the result of a transgression. Every punishment presupposes a transgression, and this latter would not¹ be unless it were permitted by God. This divine permission of sin, which implies the non-conservation of a certain created liberty in good, is not a good; but it is not an evil, for it is not the privation of a good due to us; it is only the negation of a good not due to us. Philosophy teaches that privation means more than negation. God did not owe it to Himself to preserve Lucifer or Adam in a state of innocence from every transgression. He permitted Lucifer rather than a certain other angel to consent to a movement of pride in the will, and in punishment for this transgression He withdrew His grace. It is important to note here against Calvin that the withdrawal of God’s grace means more than His simple permission of sin; for this withdrawal is a punishment, as St. Thomas points out.? Now every punishment presupposes a transgression, and every transgression presupposes a divine permission as the indispensable condition for its existence. However, the permission of a second sin is a punishment for the first.

THE DIVINE CAUSALITY AND THE PHYSICAL ACT OF SIN

This granted, it is not so difficult to understand the relation of the divine causality or physical premotion to the physical act of sin. St. Thomas writes clearly on this subject as follows: “The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived from the first Being, as Dionysius declares (De div. nom., c. V). Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act: and every being in act is reduced to the first Act, God, as to its cause, who is Act by His essence. Therefore, God is the cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect is from a created cause, the free will, as² falling away from the order of the first Agent, God. Consequently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever movement there is in the limping. Accordingly, God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect.” *

The divine concurrence in the physical act of sin of which St. Thomas speaks here is not merely a simultaneous concurrence, as later on Molina contended, like that of two men drawing a boat. It is a case, indeed, of two partial causes (the partialness being of cause and not of effect, as Molina says), which means that the two causes are co-ordinated rather than subordinated in their causality. For St. Thomas, the secondary cause acts only when premoved by the first; whereas neither of the two men drawing the boat moves the other. If it were merely a simultaneous concurrence, God would not be the cause of the physical act of sin as an action; for the cause does not merely accompany the effect, but precedes it at least by a priority of nature and causality. If therefore this divine concurrence is not merely simultaneous, it is a premotion, so say the Thomists, and even, since we must be precise in meaning on this point, it is a predetermining though not necessitating premotion. But the predetermination is not to be applied here in the same way as in a case of a good and salutary act.

For a proper understanding of this, we must remark that this divine motion presupposes in God an eternal decree, which is positive and effective as regards the physical entity of sin, and permissive as regards the deficiency. This deficiency, as we have seen, is the result of a defectible and deficient cause. Independently of this twofold eternal decree on God's part, sin was merely possible, but it was not either a

conditional or absolute future. For instance, if from all eternity God had not permitted it, the sin of Judas would not have happened; it would have been merely possible. But God having permitted it from all eternity to happen in this particular manner, place, and time, it had to happen freely and infallibly at this particular time and not before, with its particular kind of malice and not any other.* Therefore the sin of Judas presupposed an eternal decree, positive as regards the physical entity of the act, permissive as regards its deficiency. It is the same with every sin that happens in time. To this eternal decree there corresponds a divine motion by which God is the first Cause of the physical act of sin as a being and an action. This divine motion can be predetermining but in a different manner from that which concerns the good and salutary act; for it depends upon an eternal decree that is not only positive and effective, but also permissive. This can be better explained by pointing out that the divine motion as regards the exercise of the act presupposes the objective motion or the object as proposed. If this latter is defective, in so far as it does not come from God, but is the result of an evil instigation or of concupiscence, then God cannot even counsel the physical act of sin, for this objective advice could not exclude the malice of the act. In the case of a good act, on the contrary, the objective motion prerequired is good and always comes from God, at least as first Cause. The objectivity of the defective motion having been established, there intervenes a certain lack of consideration of his obligation on the part of the one who is about to sin, a lack of consideration permitted by God but by no means caused by Him; and the lack of consideration is at least virtually voluntary, for it is the deed of one who could and ought to consider the divine law, if not always, at least before acting. It is only after this, according to a priority of nature if not of time, that the divine influence intervenes to incline the will

to the physical act of sin, an influence which, as in the case of a good act, causes the will to choose freely and in no way compels it.

It is the common teaching, too, of the ‘Thomists that God does not determine anyone to the material or physical act of sin before the created will, by reason of its weakness, has determined itself in a certain way to the formal element in sin. The objective motion precedes by a priority of nature the efficient motion. We cannot will a nothingness, but only a proposed object; and as regards the act of sin, the defective objective motion, which is accompanied by the lack of consideration of one’s duty, precedes the divine motion that inclines the will to the physical act of sin. In other words, God moves the will to the physical act of sin only when it is already badly disposed by reason of its weakness. Thus Jesus said to Judas, who was disposed to commit sin and took pleasure in it: “That which thou dost, do quickly.” * The Lord neither ordains nor counsels, but permits the accomplishment of the premeditated crime.’ Unless he permitted this evil, though disapproving of it, it would not happen.

The lack of consideration of one’s duty just mentioned by us, to which St. Thomas especially refers apropos of the sin in the angels,’ is it truly voluntary and culpable? It certainly is; for, as St. Thomas again explains,’ the fault arises from the fact that we begin to will and to act without taking the Jaw into consideration, which we could and ought then to consider. Moreover, as the will is by nature inclined to what is truly good, it could not be inclined toward apparent good which is an evil, without being previously turned away, at least virtually, from true good, causing us not to consider this latter when the need of doing so presents itself. There is in this a resistance to sufficient grace which virtually con-

tained the offer of efficacious grace, as the fruit is contained in the flower. On account of this resistance, God can freely deprive us of efficacious grace, a privation that is a punishment and that follows by a priority of nature the lack of voluntary consideration which is the commencement of sin, whereas the simple divine permission preceded it.® We discussed this point of doctrine at length elsewhere."

Such is the common teaching of the Thomists, as can be gathered from their commentaries on St. Thomas."

Finally, we must note that predetermination to the physical act of sin as explained, is not something of primary importance in the Thomist doctrine relative to the divine decrees and motion; it is merely of secondary importance and a philosophical conclusion, What is of primary importance in this doctrine is that the divine decrees relative to our salutary acts are efficacious of themselves and not because of our consent foreseen by God. Of primary importance is the principle of predilection, which may be stated thus: “Since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” 1? Everything else is of secondary importance. Besides, this truth is related closely to the interior life. Along with the dogma of creation from nothing, it is the foundation of Christian humility. If we but reflect upon this truth and its scope in the interior life, then it becomes the means of dispelling all pride.

OBJECTIONS

Let us examine merely the principal objections raised against premotion with regard to the physical act of sin.

11Cf. In Summam theol., la, q.19, 2.8; Ia Hae, q.79, a.2. See especially John of St. Thomas, In Iam, q.19, disp. 5, a.5 f.

1. It has been said that he who moves efficaciously and determinately to the act of sin, is the cause of sin. Now, according to the Thomists, God moves in this manner. Therefore He is the cause of sin.

The major would be true if this efficacious motion could not account for the being of the action without at the same time accounting for its malice. In fact, as the Thomists say, the divine motion excludes all malice. This is what St. Thomas himself says."*

2. But it is insisted that God moves one to the act, as it proceeds from the will. Now the act of sin, as it proceeds from the will, is bad, for malice is not excluded. Therefore, according to this teaching, God moves one to the bad act as such.

The Thomists reply: God moves one to the act as it proceeds effectively from the will, but not as it proceeds defectively from it; for the deficiency depends solely upon a defectible and deficient cause.

Little does it matter that the physical reality of the sinful act and its moral disorder or its malice be inseparable; for this malice cannot be included in the adequate object of divine omnipotence. There is nothing more precise and more precisive, if we may so say, than the adequate and formal object of a faculty, It is that which puts within the reach of the faculty solely what concerns this latter to the exclusion of the rest. Thus, in a fruit, only color is the object of sight, and not the smell or sweetness of the fruit; and as the smell of a fruit is not included in the object of sight, so moral disorder or malice is not included in the adequate object of the divine indefectible power. Even if by an impossibility God were to will it, He could not be either the direct or the indirect cause of sin, which means the moral disorder to be found in the act. Again, in like manner, in all that is true and good, the intellect attains truth and not good, although these are not really distinct; far more so then, the divine causality is able

to attain the physical entity of sin without extending to its malice, which is of another order.

3. Again, it is objected that in Thomism the sinner is not responsible for his defection; for the sufficient grace which he receives gives him only the power to keep the commandments but not actually to do so, as God demands. Certainly, sufficient grace of itself does not enable us to keep the commandments, but it is sufficient in its own way, just as one says: bread is sufficient for one’s sustenance, yet it must be digested. The natural power of the intellect is sufficient for acquiring a knowledge of certain truths, yet it must institute a methodical inquiry into them so as to acquire this knowledge. Christ’s passion was sufficient for our salvation, yet its merits had to be applied by the sacraments or in some other way."*

Moreover, sufficient grace virtually contains the efficient grace that is offered to us in it, as the flower contains the fruit. Even the most rigid Thomists, such as Lemos and Alvarez, say that God in giving sufficient help offers us in it that which is efficacious. The fruit is offered in the flower, yet it must not be destroyed by the hail, if the fruit is to develop. Likewise, efficient grace is offered to us in the suffcient; but we must be careful not to resist this latter, a resistance that would come solely from us, not from God, and that could deprive us of the proffered efficacious grace. It is also the common teaching of the Thomists that every actual grace which is efficacious as regards an imperfect salutary act, such as attrition; is sufficient as regards a more perfect act, such as contrition. If it is not followed by culpable resistance on our part, the efficacious grace of contrition will be given to us.

This efficacious grace is thus within our power, though certainly not as something that can be produced by us, but as a gift that would be granted to us if our will did not resist sufficient grace. Thus the Council of Trent teaches that “God,

unless men be themselves wanting to His grace, as He began the good work, so will He perfect it, working in them to will and to accomplish.” +$ Sufficient grace that solicits our conversion may well go further than this. We have good reason for saying so, if we think of what our Lord did to prevent Judas from being lost. This was evidently Judas’ own fault. The greatest outrage that can be committed against God is to think that He is not good enough to forgive. God never commands what is impossible, and He tells us to do what we can, and to ask of Him the grace to accomplish what of ourselves we are unable to effect.

4. There is just one more objection. It is contended that for man not to resist sufficient grace, but consent to it, efficacious grace is required, according to the Thomists’ teaching. Therefore, if man resists, it is because he did not receive the efficacious grace necessary for consent. If, in fact, the bestowal of efficacious grace is the cause of one’s not resisting, which is a good, then its non-bestowal is the cause of one’s resisting, which is an evil. This is an application of the axiom: if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation. Sunrise is the cause of day, and sunset is the cause of night.

The Thomists say that the reply to this must be that this axiom holds good in the case of a unique cause, such as the sun, which is either present or absent, but it does not hold good in the case of two causes, one of which is absolutely indefectible and the other defectible. Thus the bestowal of efficacious grace is the cause of the salutary act,-even of the non-resistance to grace which, since it is a good, must come from the Author of all good; whereas the fact that grace is not bestowed is not the cause of the omission of the salutary act. This omission is a defect that proceeds solely from our defectibility and by no means from God. It would proceed from Him only if He were bound, if He owed it to Himself, to keep us always in the performance of good, and not permit a defectible creature sometimes to fail. Now He can permit this for a greater good, such as the manifestation of His mercy and justice. Thus it is true to say that man is deprived of efficacious grace because he resisted sufficient grace, whereas it is not true to say that man resists or sins because he is deprived of efficacious grace. He resists by reason of his own defectibility, which God is not bound to remedy. God is not bound to cause a defectible creature never to fail. “Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is only in Me.” ** Man who is powerless of himself alone to perform the salutary act, finds his sufficiency in himself for failure.”

5. Some still insisted asking how we can claim that at the moment the first sin is committed, by which a just person separates from God, efficacious grace is refused because of a previous defection or an accompanying resistance? This resistance, far from preceding the divine refusal of efficacious help, follows it. Hence the sinner is not to blame.

According to the teaching of St. Thomas, it is not necessary that the first human defection precede the divine refusal of efficacious grace by a priority of time; a priority of nature suffices. In this we have an application of the principle of the mutual relation between causes, which is verified in all cases where there is the intervention of the four causes; for causes mutually interact, though in a different order. St. Thomas invokes this general principle to prove that in the justification of the sinner, which takes place in an indivisible instant, the remission of sin follows the infusion of grace in the formal and efficient order, whereas liberation from sin precedes the reception of sanctifying grace in the order of material causality. As St. Thomas says: “The sun by its light acts for the removal of darkness, and hence on the part of the sun, illumination is prior to the removal of darkness; but on the part of

the atmosphere to be illuminated, to be freed from darkness is, in the order of nature, prior to being illuminated, although both are simultaneous in time. And since the infusion of grace and the remission of sin regard God who justifies, hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is prior to the freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part of man justified, it is the other way about, since in the order of nature the being freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of justifying grace.” 1°

Now if justification is thus explained by the mutual relation between causes, then it must be the same for the loss of grace, which is the reverse process; for the rule is the same for contraries. As John of St. Thomas shows,'* the moment man sins mortally and loses habitual grace, his deficiency, in the order of material causality, precedes the refusal of God's actual efficacious grace and is the reason for this. From another point of view, however, even the first deficiency presupposes God’s permission of sin, and would not result without it. But, in opposition to justification, sin as such is the work of the deficient creature and not of God. Therefore it is true to say that purely and simply (simpliciter in the Scholastic sense is the opposite of secundum quid), sin precedes God’s refusal of efficacious grace. In other words, “God forsakes not those who have been justified, unless He be first forsaken by them.” * He withdraws habitual grace only because of mortal sin, and actual efficacious grace only because of a resistance, at least initial, to sufficient grace.

It concerns us here to note carefully against Calvin, as we did at the beginning of this chapter, that the withdrawal of divine grace spoken of by St. Thomas,*" means far more than merely God’s permission of sin; for this divine withdrawal is

a penalty.** Every penalty presupposes at least a first defection. This defection could not happen without God's permission, which is not at all its cause, but only its indispensable condition. The Thomists say that we thus avoid the contradiction and, instead of doing away with the mystery, we thus safeguard it.

CONCLUSION

The chiaroscuro effects of this sublime doctrine are incomparably greater than those we admire in the works of the greatest artists. On the other hand, it is absolutely clear that God cannot will evil, that He cannot be in any way either directly or indirectly the cause of sin. We are even far more certain of the absolute rectitude of the divine intentions than we are of the rectitude of our own best intentions. Consequently it is equally certain that God never commands the impossible, for that would be contrary to His justice and goodness. He wills, therefore, to make it really possible for all to keep His commandments and be saved.

On the other hand, it is absolutely beyond doubt that God is the author of all good, that His love is the cause of all created good, even of our good and salutary consent, for otherwise, what is of preference in created things would fall outside the scope of the divine causality. It follows, as St. Thomas says, in accordance with St. Augustine, that “no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” * This law applies equally to the state of innocence as to the present state, and to every act, either natural or supernatural, easy or difficult, merely begun or continued. This principle of predilection that dominates all these problems, virtually contains the

whole doctrine of predestination and the efficacy of grace to which our Lord refers when He says: “No one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father.” **

How are these two great principles intimately to be reconciled, which taken separately are so certain: namely, the principle of the possibility of salvation for all mankind, and that of divine predilection? The answer is to be found in St. Paul’s words: “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God.” * We must always come back to this answer, for there is no created intellect, either human or angelic, that can perceive the intimate reconciliation of these two principles before being admitted to the beatific vision. To perceive this intimate reconciliation, in fact, would be to perceive how infinite justice, mercy, and sovereign liberty are identified, without being destructive of one another in the eminence of the Deity, in God's intimate life, in that which is absolutely inaccessible and ineffable in Him.

Likewise, the more these two principles to be reconciled become evident to us, the more, by way of contrast, they appear to be obscure, with a light-transcending obscurity, the eminence of the Deity in which they are united. In this chiaroscuro of a higher order, it is of importance for us not to deny the clarity because of the obscurity, for that would be to disturb the arrangement of light and shade, for thus they are displayed to admirable effect. Let us leave the mystery where it truly belongs, and we shall increasingly realize that it must be, above all reasoning, above all speculative theology, the object of supernatural contemplation, of this contemplation that proceeds from faith enlightened by the gifts of wisdom and understanding. Thus it will begin to dawn upon us that what is more sublime in God is precisely what remains more obscure for us, or inaccessible on account of the feebleness of our sight. In this contemplation, grace, by

a secret instinct, tranquilizes us concerning the intimate reconciliation of infinite mercy, justice, and sovereign liberty, and it does so precisely because it is itself a participation of God's intimate life. What speculative theology has to say about the divine motion must lead us to this contemplation, the purpose of which otherwise in great measure will be lost. Then all becomes clear and we understand that the resulting obscurity is not that of incoherence or absurdity, but the obscurity that is the result of too great a light for our feeble vision.Ӣ

Coming back to predestination, let us recall in conclusion that the gratuity of predestination in the order of intention in which the end is willed before the means, is no hindrance, in the order of execution, to the means being realized before the attainment of the end. In this case merits are necessary in the adult as preceding eternal life by which they are crowned. In this order of execution, too, the Lord says to docile and generous souls: “Refuse me nothing, and thus My graces will be able freely to pursue their course. I will that thou refusest Me nothing, so that I may have nothing to refuse thee. Thou art mine forever.”

As we began this work by setting forth the stand taken by St. Augustine and his interpretation of Holy Scripture, so let us conclude with this beautiful and sublime passage that is found at the end of one of his works:

“But he that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord. . . . Let us not therefore be eager in our disputes and sluggish in our prayers. Let us pray, my beloved, let us pray that God give the grace even to our enemies and especially to our brethren and loved ones, to understand and confess that after the vast and ineffable ruin in which through one man we were all in-

26 A complete bibliography of the questions in this work would be of vast size. We have pointed out the principal works in the various chapters, and especially on p. 292. We have made special mention of the works of Fathers

Dummermuth, N. del Prado, J. Ude, and Guillermin, as also the more recent controversies that occurred between the years 1924 and 1927.

cluded, no one is freed from this except by God’s grace: and this is not rendered to those who receive it as being due to them on account of any merits on their part, but it is freely given to them as a pure grace regardless of preceding merits. There is no more illustrious example of predestination than Jesus Himself. . . . He who made Him of the seed of David a just man, who never would be unjust without a previous consent of His will, makes just those who are unjust, without any previous merit on their part, so that He may be the head and these His members. . . . He who made Him such that He never had nor will have His will turned to evil, makes in His members their good from being evil. And therefore He predestined Him and us, because, both for Him to be our head and for us to be His members, He foreknew not our previous merits but our future works. Those who read these things, if they understand the same, let them give thanks to God. But those who do not understand, let them pray that He may be their interior teacher from whose countenance shine forth knowledge and understanding.” **

Jesus was predestined to be the natural Son of God before the foreseeing of His merits; for these presuppose His divine person and therefore His divine filiation. Now He is the eminent exemplar of our predestination. Let us thank Him for belonging to His Church, for having received life from Him. In Him, with Him, and by Him, the elect will thank God eternally for the gratuitous gift of their predestination, which is the source of all their divine benefits, which will have been the means of leading them to eternal life. They will understand that when the Lord rewards their merits, He crowns His own gifts. They will fully understand what St. Paul meant when he said: “Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with spiritual blessings in heavenly places, in Christ. As He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy

and unspotted in His sight, in charity. Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto Himself, according to the purpose of His will. Unto the praise of the glory of His grace, in which He hath graced us in His beloved Son.” ** This is practically the same as what our Lord said: “My sheep hear My voice. . . . And I give them life everlasting, and they shall not perish for ever. . . And no one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father. I and the Father are one.” ? “Father I will that where I am, they also whom Thou hast given Me may be with Me. . And I have made known Thy name to them and will make it known, that the love wherewith Thou hast loved Me may be in them, and I in them.” * “And not for them only do I pray, but for them also who through their word shall believe in Me. That they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee. . . . And the glory which Thou hast given Me, I have given to them, that they may be one, as we also are one . . . and that the world may know that Thou hast also loved Me.” *

In conclusion let us repeat again what we said in the preface to this book. Cardinal Newman remarked that in the Middle Ages the mysteries of the faith were considered in the liturgy primarily from the point of view of infused contemplation and were given a poetic setting; later on they were viewed in the light of theological wisdom, and afterwards, from the sixteenth century, there has been at times a little too much of a tendency to view them in the inferior light of a prudence that forgets the sublimity of the divine plan and the depth of God's love, for it is only He who can thoroughly actuate our will and move it suavely and firmly.

The final effect of predestination is expressed by the liturgy in the hymn of vespers for the feast of the dedication of a

church in verses of unsurpassed splendor of diction. In this hymn the heavenly Jerusalem is described as being constructed of living stones, chiseled into shape by the Author of salvation, polished by bruises and blows, and fittingly arranged by the hands of Christ to remain for ever in the sacred edifice.

Jerusalem, blessed city,

Called the vision of peace,

That art built up in heaven,

Of living stones,

And with angel cohorts circled,

As a bride with thy attendants.

Many a blow and biting sculpture Polished well those stones elect,

In their places now compacted

By the heavenly Architect,

Who therewith hath willed forever That His palace should be decked.

Everywhere be glory and honor To God most high,

Equally to Father and Son

And the glorious Paraclete,

To whom praise and power Through everlasting ages.

INFALLIBLY EFFICACIOUS GRACE AND SALUTARY ACTS Easy TO PERFORM

WE reproduce here in substance a series of articles that appeared in the Revue Thomiste from November, 1925 to March, 1926, relative to a new opinion which was then proposed as being in agreement with that of the Thomists, Gonzalez and Massoulié¢. For a more detailed knowledge of this new opinion one may consult the two articles in the Revue Thomiste, only the substance of these being given here.

A NEW OPINION

We are asked to give our opinion of an interpretation that has recently been proposed of the Thomist doctrine on grace. This theory proposes to be a development of the opinion held by Gonzalez, Bancel, Massoulié, and Reginald concerning sufficient grace. Whereas the majority of the Thomists say that sufficient grace gives merely the power to perform the good act, the proximate power, the above-mentioned theologians maintain that it also gives an impulse to perform the good act. In their opinion, it is even a physical predetermining premotion, but a fallible one; for it does not infallibly overcome, like efficacious grace, the obstacles that may arise from temptation or free will itself. It is said that this opinion differs from that commonly held by the Thomists only for the purpose of explaining better the sinner’s responsibility and real power to do good and avoid evil.

Perhaps it will complete the Thomist theory as far as cul- pability is concerned, but if we wish to extend its application to the order of good, to salutary acts easy to perform, it seems to us that it has serious difficulties to contend with. We should like merely to remind our readers here that this opinion of Gonzalez has already been explained at length and defended by the lamented Father Guillermin, O.P., who weighs its advantages and disadvantages, and who understood it in a far different sense from that proposed to us at the present day." We should like to insist on this difference, in that it perhaps will enable us the better to discern between what truth there may be in this new interpretation and what is still very debatable.

They readily admit that a slight modification of the doctrine commonly admitted by the Thomists on the distinction between efficacious grace and sufficient grace will necessitate modifications in other points of doctrine, such as foreknowledge, providence, predestination, and reprobation. They seek, however, to persuade us that the proposed modifications cannot change, indeed, the substance of the Thomist doctrine, but are merely concerned with some unimportant details that would seem to be the result of a too rigid interpretation of the doctrine, and this seems particularly to have been verified in the case of Lemos and Alvarez. The tree would be the same, but the leaves different.

It is suggested that we return to the opinion held by Gonzalez, Bancel, Massoulié, and Reginald, according to which sufficient grace gives not only the proximate power to perform a good act, but also an impulse that actually inclines one to the performance of the good act. We said that this sufficient grace, according to these authors, is a fallibly physical predetermining motion that inclines one to the performance of the good act, but it differs from the infallibly efficacious grace in that it does not overcome the obstacles that may present themselves.

There would seem to be a tendency to go so far with this theory as to say it often happens that this sufficient grace (impulsive) is actually the cause of salutary acts easy to perform, such as attrition or a prayer that is still imperfect. Consequently, infallibly efficacious grace would not be necessary for these salutary acts easy to perform, but only for the difficult ones such as contrition, which is entirely distinct from attrition.

These salutary acts easy to perform necessarily presuppose, so they say, only a fallibly divine motion, and anterior to this a fallibly divine decree, too. As soon as the majority of the Thomists read this objection, there arises in their minds this thought: But how can God know infallibly from all eternity in a fallible decree the free act of attrition that will be performed in time by a certain sinner in certain determined circumstances? Let us observe that the question concerns not only the predestined, but also those not predestined, who in the course of their lives will make acts of attrition.

Shall we say that God infallibly knows this free act of attrition in so far as it is present in His eternity that embraces all time? But this free act is present in His eternity rather than its contrary only because of a divine decree; otherwise it would be there on the same grounds as necessary truths and thus we fall into the error of fatalism. ‘The foreknowledge of the act either does or does not precede the decree; there is no other alternative. Hence if the divine decree concerning the future act of attrition is fallible, God cannot have infallible knowledge of this free act except by having recourse to the Molinist theory of the scientia media. Now the new opinion absolutely sets aside the scientia media because of the implied contradictions. The divine knowledge, since it is the cause of things, cannot be passive with regard to conditionally free acts of the future.

It truly seems, according to this proposed new interpretation, that it may happen that with the same sufficient (im- pulsive) grace, that this particular sinner may perform an act of attrition and that a certain other may not, so that he who does so would not receive more help than the other. How can this conclusion be reconciled with the teaching of St. Thomas, who says: “He who makes a greater effort does so because of a greater grace; but to do so, he needs to be moved by a higher cause”? ? Likewise St. Paul says: For who distinguisheth thee? What has thou that thou hast not received? * St. Thomas also says: “The first cause of this diversity is to be sought on the part of God, who dispenses His gifts of grace variously.” * If two sinners are placed in the same circumstances, and one of them without being helped more than the other refrains from placing an obstacle to grace, which the other places, and performs the act of attrition, which the other fails to perform, does not the former by this act distinguish himself from the latter? And if he performs the act of attrition without the infallibly efficacious grace, why would he not, without this grace, perform the more difficult act of contrition? Greater and less do not diversify the species. Who can say when the more difficult act arises that would demand the efficacious grace? ë Are we not thus led to the acceptance of a teaching which would have to contend with the principal difficulties of Molinism for salutary acts easy to perform, and with all the obscurities of Thomism for the difficult ones? °

To one reading this new theory the following objection

5 The similarity they seek to establish between the general motion and sufficient grace, and between the special motion and efficacious grace, seems to us contrary not only to the generally accepted interpretation among the Thomists, but also to the text of St. Thomas in his De veritate, q.24, a.14, to which these Thomists appeal in proof of their theory. Cf. Billuart, De gratia, diss. 3, a.2, no. 8.

® Cf. del Prado, De gratia et libero arbitrio, III, 423. Also Schiffini, quoted on the same page. As for the opinion held by St. Alphonse, it is conceived from the moral and not from the metaphysical and ontological point of view, from which St. Thomas argues in the development of his doctrine on grace. They are on different planes.

immediately presents itself: For the acceptance of this theory it suffices, so they say, to admit that infallibly efficacious grace is not necessary so that one avoid for some time putting any obstacles in the way of that grace sufficient for salutary acts easy of performance. But the fact of not putting any obstacle in the way at the moment when the act of attrition is of obligation, would mean that this act is performed without efficacious grace.

Besides, the objection raised against foreknowledge would always be applicable. How can God in a fallible decree foresee infallibly that a particular person will not put an obstacle in the way of grace, without receiving greater help than a certain other who will do so? At least we must admit that in the latter case there is a permissive decree permitting the resistance or failure. And then in the former case in which there is no resistance, is not the divine decree infallibly efficacious, if God decides to grant a physically predetermining motion that inclines the will to act, and this without a concomitant permission of any actual failure? This would bring us back to the common teaching of the Thomists.

It will serve a useful purpose to recall how differently Father Guillermin understood this theory of Gonzalez, which he also defended, though disclosing its weak points.’

THF TRUE THEORY OF GONZALEZ, THE THOMIST

The proposition that infallibly efficacious grace is not necessary for salutary free acts easy to perform, far from being upheld by Father Guillermin in his exposition and defense of the theory of Gonzalez, was attacked by him, and, in his opinion, by Gonzalez and his successors.

Assuming by way of objection the teaching in support of this new theory nowadays proposed, Father Guillermin wrote:

7 On these weak points, see Hugon, De gratia, p. 356. We can scarcely conceive of a physical predetermining motion that is defectible,

“There is another objection: The created free will in this life is always defectible. But they say that it does not always have to fail, not always place an obstacle to the motion of sufficient grace that inclines the will actively to good. Why, then, at least sometimes would not the will perform the good act with the help only of sufficient grace that supplies all that is necessary for a good action? Thus it will happen, if not always, at least sometimes, that sufficient grace, according to the teaching of the Molinists, becomes efficacious without having undergone any intrinsic modification, and this for the sole reason that the free will has determined of itself to give its consent or at least not to put any obstacle in the way of the sufficient motion.” $

Father Guillermin’s reply is as follows: “Evidently from the fact that the free will always has the power to fail, we cannot conclude, therefore, it will always fail, always put an obstacle to the motion of grace. But in this case the following conclusion can be legitimately drawn. Since the defectible free will can always and in all things fail, if it so wishes, and put an obstacle, it will never, in any given circumstance, be absolutely and infallibly certain that it will not actually put an obstacle in the way of good, unless a preservative power certainly prevents this obstacle from being placed. Without this preservative or victorious grace over obstacles, it will be quite possible, even probable, that in a certain case no obstacle to the motion of sufficient grace will freely be placed; it will even be morally certain that, in a long series of acts, it will once or so happen that the free will puts no obstacle in the way. But in any particular case, for it to be infallibly certain that the free will, notwithstanding its defectibility, will perform a good act, again I say that it is indispensable for the will to receive a help from God that prevents or efficaciously removes every obstacle and every defection. Now God's plans cannot be the subject of uncertainty, and His

knowledge is such that He knows eternally all things, even free acts of the future, and knowing them, as the ‘Thomists say, in His divine causality, this knowledge cannot be purely conjectural. Sufficient grace which, in moving the will to good, does not eliminate all danger of hindrance or resistance, will not then be such as to afford a certain foundation for God's infallible foreknowledge. Only efficacious grace that causes the will to perform the free act without hindrance assures this foundation.®

“But it is not only to safeguard the infallible certainty of the divine knowledge that we conclude the intervention of grace efficacious of itself is of necessity for the effective performance of every good act; there is still another more direct and more immediate reason.*°

“It seems to us of necessity to grant that God’s action reaches all beings including all their modes, and according to all the conditions of their existence. St. Augustine pays this homage to God’s grace: ‘It is owing to Thy grace, and to Thy mercy that Thou hast dissolved like ice the sins which I committed. I impute it also to Thy grace, whatever other sins I have not committed; for what evil was there which I was not capable of doing. I confess that all have been forgiven me as well the evils I committed by my own will, as those which by Thy providence I committed not.’ *

“Likewise we can say,” continues Father Guillermin, “that with sufficient grace, and without efficacious grace which removes indeed possible resistance, it is not necessary for the free will to resist, and it is not impossible for the same effectively to perform the good act; but, when the resistance,

2 In this way Father Guillermin and the Thomists, whose theory he defends, avoid the scientia media. But how can one do so by conceding that infallibly efficacious grace is not necessary for the actual performance or even mere continuance in the performance of salutary and easy free acts, such as an act of attrition or of imperfect prayer?

10 It must be observed that this reason applies not only to difficult but also to easy salutary acts.

which is always possible for a defective will, does not oppose the motion of grace, this does not happen without a special intervention of divine mercy whose action directs and penetrates everything that takes place in the order of good... .

“God's decrees do not presuppose our choice. They precede it, and when there is question of performing a good act conducive to salvation these divine decrees are positively and actively the cause of the same. Moreover, an intervention, a divine protection that is entirely external, one that removes the occasions or diminishes the intensity of the temptations would not suffice; for, even with a more powerful sufficient grace and a weaker temptation, it can still happen that the will, since it remains free and liable to fail, resists grace and yields to the temptation. Only an interior action, efficaciously determining the free will, will infallibly remove the resistance and the choice of the contrary act. . . . Only efficacious grace has the power to overcome the obstacles.” +?

This is how Father Guillermin, in explaining and defending this theory of Gonzalez, proves that he escapes incurring the contradictions implied by the scientia media of Molina."

Not only Father Guillermin is of this opinion, but even Gonzalez.'* He replies to the same difficulty by saying: “Efficacious grace is necessary to make sure of the actual consent of our will, but it is not necessary so as to make sure that our will have the power to be free and unimpeded from eliciting the act if it so wishes. . . . That is said to be necessary for our consent without which in fact our consent is never given, although without it this can freely and without hindrance be

18 Father Guillermin also avoids (ibid., p. 27) the same for the foreknowledge of sin, by means of the classical distinction between the permissive decree as to the disorder inherent in the act of sin, and the positive decree as regards the physical entity of the act of sin, We see no advantage in distin- guishing between the decree as such and the decree as eternal, as a substitute for this distinction.

given, if we so willed.” ** Now the free consent in this case is verified not only in acts said to be difficult, such as an act of contrition, but also in free salutary acts that are said to be easy, such as an act of attrition or of imperfect prayer, and this applies to the continuation of these acts.

Bancel, too, maintains that efficacious grace is necessary for every free salutary act, although this latter is not repugnant to sufficient grace. Bancel writes: “Although, of course, if the grace is merely sufficient, it is absolutely certain that with this grace man will not act, yet that he act is not repugnant to the nature of this grace.” ?* Massoulié says the same when, defending the theory of Gonzalez de Albeda, he shows that it manages to avoid the inconveniences of the scientia media.” Gonzalez, too, explicitly says: “Fourthly, I say that of two persons equally tempted, in the case of one who consents to the promptings of the Holy Spirit, his will is always prepared for this by a greater intrinsic prevenient grace than the one who consents to the devil’s suggestions.” ?* It is the principle of predilection, that no one thing would be better than another unless it were loved more by God.'* “What hast thou that thou hast not received? For who discerneth thee?” #°

They appeal to certain texts of Gonet, which would contradict, so they say, what Lemos and Alvarez affirm about the necessity of infallibly efficacious grace for every salutary act easy of performance. But when we read the whole of these

16 Brevis univ. theol. cursus, Vol. Il, tr. 4, q.4, p. 381; quoted by Father Guillermin, Revue Thomiste, 1g02, p. 652.

17 Divus Thomas sui interpres, Vol. II, diss. 3, q.6, a.2, p. 213, Roman ed., 1709. P 18 Com. in lam, q.19, a.8, disp. LVII (1637), Vol. II, p. 97; cf. ibid., pp. 42, 54, 55, 60-67, 83, 86, 87. He always upholds the universality of the principle of predilection. Since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, ne one thing would be better than another (even because of an act easily performed), unless it were loved more and helped more by God.

texts in Gonet, we see that he speaks exactly as Alvarez does, and that he maintains that sufficient grace, which is the subject of dispute, is called sufficient not in reference to the imperfect act of attrition but to the perfect act of contrition. Then every difficulty is dispelled, for grace, said to be sufficient as regards contrition, is infallibly efficacious as regards attrition. And we find this to be the teaching of Lemos, Alvarez, del Prado, also Gonet, even of Massoulié and all the Thomists whom we consulted, verifying from their context the incomplete quotations appealed to from the writings of these authors.

For instance Gonet says: “Both kinds of help, sufficient and efficacious, are included in the expression auxilii Dei moventis; because each consists in a certain supernatural motion that applies the faculties of the soul to their supernatural acts; yet with this difference, that the sufficient help merely moves and applies the will to the performance of imperfect acts, thereby disposing and preparing the soul for more perfect acts. But the efficacious help moves and applies the will to the performance of perfect acts of contrition and charity that finally prepare and dispose the soul for sanctifying grace, which is the ultimate and most perfect form of the supernatural order. Hence it is the common teaching of the Thomists in agreement with Alvarez (De auxiliis, Bk. III, disp. 80) that every help that is sufficient for one particular act, is also at the same time efficacious for the performance of another to which by an absolute decree of divine providence it is ordained, so that it is unconditionally sufficient and conditionally efficacious.” 21

The last sentence of this quotation shows that this opinion

21 De voluntate Dei, Vol. II, disp. IV, no. 147. In like manner Father del Prado says that for every salutary act, even the one easy to perform, an in- fallibly efficacious grace is required, which can be called sufficient not in ref- erence to this act, but in reference to the following more perfect act del Prado, De gratia, III, 423. j ý — does not belong peculiarly to Lemos and Alvarez. All Thomists speak as they do.

Thus everything becomes perfectly clear. Grace said to be sufficient as regards contrition, is infallibly efficacious as regards attrition. It is therefore wrong to say that Gonet and other Thomists declare that imperfect salutary free acts do not demand for their actual performance an infallibly efficacious grace.

But even Massoulié is of the same mind as Gonet, for precisely when explaining and defending the theory of Gonzalez and showing that this same theory does not contradict the one held by Alvarez, he writes: “So grace is said to be efficacious as regards the imperfect effect which it effects, but inefficacious or sufficient as regards the ultimate and more perfect to which it disposes, since, of course, as we explained, it has less efficacy and power than is required for the eliciting of the more perfect act.” #?

If, then, we inspect the contexts from which the quotations of the various Thomists are taken, we do not find in them this doctrine, that infallibly efficacious grace is not necessary for the actual performance of easy salutary acts. They teach the very contrary of this.

The new interpretation cannot be reconciled with the general principles of St. Thomas. It goes against the principle of predilection: “For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” **

If the fact of resisting sufficient grace is an evil that can come only from us, then the fact of not resisting is a good that cannot be attributed solely to us, but which must come from the source of all good. According to the teaching of St. Thomas, if one of two persons rather than the other actually

makes an act of attrition, then the reason for this is that God from all eternity willed it by His infallibly efficacious and consequent will.*

From the very fact that these principles are of the metaphysical order, they are without exception. For anyone to say that they do not apply to easy acts, is to say that they no longer are absolutely universal principles. Hence they lose all validity and “are fit to be trodden upon by men.” Principles are principles; to deny their universal validity is to compromise everything.

The principle of predilection clarifies all these problems, and the subsequent obscurity pertains not to this life but to the next, in that it is the result of a light too great for our feeble vision. Thus we keep the sense of the mystery without seeking to explain it in too human a way.”

25 The unity of the doctrine and of the Thomist school on this subject was pointed out by us in the Revue Thomiste, March-April, 1926. “Infallibly efficacious grace and salutary acts easy to perform” was the title of the article for the April number. There one will find some important texts of Gonzalez, the Thomist, which are fully in agreement with the principles set forth by St. Thomas.

Tue OPINION OF FATHER BILLOT, S.J., ON THE DIVINE MOTION

A THEOLOGIAN who was a disciple of Father Billot, S.J., in reviewing the articles on predestination and premotion written by us,* which have been reproduced and recast in this work, wrote as follows:

“Father Garrigou-Lagrange has taken a very objective attitude in the exposition of the systems, quoting texts in support of his statements. Undoubtedly one or other of his conclusions will trouble a theologian who, adopting the theories of Molina or Suarez, claims nevertheless to be a follower of St. Thomas. Is not the repetition of the phrase appropriate here: A friend of Plato, but more a friend of truth? . . .

“When he reminds us of the teaching of the Church in recording the various opinions, evidently he assumes an objective attitude in doing so, but he also shows undisguised sympathy for the Thomism of the Dominican school. We cannot blame him for his preferences. We owe him a deep debt of gratitude for his splendid articles which, notwithstanding a certain long discursiveness of style and repetitions,’ constitute the finest historical and doctrinal synthesis which we have ever read on this grave problem of predestination. .. .

“The limitations of this article prevent us from vindicating Billot’s true point of view, which Father Garrigou-Lagrange³⁴ seems to have completely misunderstood in making out that the famous Jesuit believed in an indifferent premotion, as a result of which the free will would determine itself to act and would determine the divine motion to produce this or that particular free act. Such an opinion would have been repudiated (we say that it was expressly repudiated) by the cardinal, and we find no trace of it in his works. In spite of the seemingly contrary statements, Billot’s stand, even in the question of physical premotion, differs perhaps less than one might imagine from the thesis defended by Father Garrigou- Lagrange.” ®

At our request, L’Ami du Clergé, in one of its later issues (June 20, 1935, pp. 392-94), thus replied to this objection of ours: _

Objection. In reviewing the article on physical premotion,* the Ami of February 21 affirms that Cardinal Billot expressly repudiated the theory of an indifferent premotion attributed to him by the author of the reviewed article.

“I would be thankful to your collaborator if he would justify his assertion, which at first sight seems strange enough.”

Reply. In expressing our appreciation in writing of Cardinal Billot, we felt certain of arousing in the minds of some of our readers at least a sense of curiosity. Let us recall first of all what Father Garrigou-Lagrange wrote:

“Would the divine motion by which God would determine us to the performance of an indeliberate act, be an indifferent premotion, so that the free will of itself would determine itself and also the divine motion to this or that particular act? Certain theologians thought so, especially L. Billot.

“This theory and the scientia media mutually support each other, There would still be some reality that eludes God’s universal causality. There would be a determination that is independent of the sovereign causality. The nobler part in the work of salvation,

8 Cf. Ami du Clergé, February 21, 1935, pp. 114-20, 4 Cf. Dict. de théol. cath. 5 De Deo uno, part. II, chap. I, “De scientia Dei.”

the determination of our salutary act, would not come from the Author of salvation.” ¢

We said and we again say that Billot’s view, notwithstanding appearances, does not differ so much as one would think from that held by Father Garrigou-Lagrange.

1. Undoubtedly Billot defends the theory of the scientia media. But for anyone who reads without prejudice the thesis he dedicated to this subject, this theory is viewed, in accordance with the very sound Thomism of the author of this thesis, as a means of rejecting what he believes to be the Dominican theory which consists in a predetermination that takes away from the will the possibility of determining itself. Moreover, as Father Garrigou- Lagrange candidly admits, there is a similar sentiment in the opposite direction on the part of the Dominicans to use the term predetermination so as to discard the untenable theory of simultaneous concurrence or of an indifferent premotion.

2. The scientia media of Billot, in its final analysis, closely approaches the Dominican “knowledge of vision.” Billot, indeed, never taught that either a simple or a conditional future is known by God independently of the decree of His will.

Concerning conditional futures he writes as follows: “But, in fact, because we assert that conditional futures are known by God before any actual decree of His will, we do not exclude hypothetical decrees which God would have of moving the created will, and of bestowing all that is required on its part.” 7 Let us see now what a Dominican says. Father Hugon writes: “Manifestly . . . God knows nothing as certainly and determinately future, except in the decree of His will. And conditional futures are in some way future, not indeed absolutely, but conditionally. Therefore they are known not in God's absolute decree, for then they would be simple futures; but they are known in His decree that is conditioned by the object. But a decree of this kind extends both to the object and to the free or necessary mode of the same, so that a conditional future would not be posited by man unless he freely determined himself to do so under the influence of the divine motion.” 8 e Cf. Dict. de théol. cath., XIII, 36. T De Deo uno et trino, 1910, p. 213. 8 Tract. dogm., I, 212.

We should indeed like to know what difference there is, however slight it may be, between the Jesuit and the Dominican texts, both as to the doctrine and also, very much so, as to the way it is expressed.

3. Let us add that Billot always taught that everything of a positive nature in the determination of our free will depends upon the divine will and the divine motion. This is clearly seen in his argument in proof of the first Mover:

“That which is lacking in some perfection cannot be adequately sufficient to give to itself such perfection, because nothing is adequately sufficient to give to itself what it does not have. But what is mobile lacks the act of perfection to which it is brought. Nor can it be said that although it may be formally lacking in that perfection, yet it still has the same equivalently or virtually. For there is only one of two possibilities. Either it has equivalently as precontained in it whatever reality there is in the perfecton formally as such, and then there can be no movement to acquire such perfection, because a positive movement by which nothing positive is acquired is repugnant to reason. Or else it virtually has the perfection, that is, only in the first actuality, and then it is not of itself adequately sufficient for the second actuality, which by far exceeds the first; but it needs to receive this, and the need of receiving excludes the perfect sufficiency of giving, as the terms evidently denote.” ®

Can there be a clearer declaration of principles? Indifferent premotion would be implied in this “virtually,” this application of the will only in the first actuality. Now this is what Billot never admitted. Such an indifferent motion is a contradiction in terms. Billot was faithful to the Thomist conception of the divine motion to the second actuality of the will in his other treatises, most especially in those that closely concern the question of physical premotion.

Right away we have evidence of this in his treatise On Sin. The question at issue is to explain how, notwithstanding the dependence of whatever positiveness there is in our free acts upon the divine causality, God nevertheless is not the cause of sin. He

writes: “Immediately a difficulty presents itself; for if the substance of the evil act even as a moral entity is something positive, and if it is bound up with the very notion of sin, then one of two alternatives follows: either sin is from God or else not everything that actually exists depends upon the first Cause.” ?° Now Billot was absolutely against admitting the hypothesis of this latter alternative."

We find the same doctrine in his tractate on grace: “In theology the question comes up for examination concerning that motion by which the will passes from the first actuality of the salutary act to the second and deliberate actuality, and it posits the presence of that which for the will to act freely presupposes what has already been proved.” 12 The eminent theologian gives us a brief summary of his opinion on this question in the following passage: “We propose to declare with certainty how every being and every mode of being comes from Him whose essence is His existence; likewise how nothing brings anything into existence except in so far as it acts by divine power; likewise how God is the cause of operation in all beings, at the same time for each secondary cause retaining intact its specific and proper activity, and, in fine, we shall declare whatever pertains to the universal dependence of creatures upon God and their community of relativity toward Him.” 1? When Billot speaks of secondary causes determining God’s general motion, he speaks as St. Thomas did. It is not a question of determining an indifferent motion, but of explaining how in the secondary cause the divine motion, which is capable, because of its universality, of adapting itself to all created activities, is particularized and determined by reason of certain effects that are proper to certain secondary causes, “Existence is the proper effect of the first Agent,” says St. Thomas, too, “and all other agents act inasmuch as they act in virtue of the first Agent; but secondary agents, which are, as it were, particular ones and

10 De peccato personali et originali, p. 20.

11 For his solution of this difficulty consult L’Ami, 1928, p. 776, where we translated into French the complete text of the Jesuit theologian.

12 The reference is to the treatise De Deo Creatore, which unfortunately the eminent theologian never wrote. i

18 De gratia Christi, p. 37- which determine the action of the first Agent, produce as their proper effects other perfections that determine existence.” 14

Father Garrigou-Lagrange could have quoted an author who formally taught an indifferent motion in the secondary act. This was the case with Pignataro, who wrote: “This motion constitutes the will proximately disposed to make the choice.” The explanation follows, and is thus formulated: “That the divine motion is determined to one movement in those things which by nature are determined to one thing, I concede; that it is so in contingent things, I deny.” 15 There we have the motion that is undetermined as to its effect. But in that he would have been but a far echo of Billot who did not hesitate to declare the opinion of his confrére when it appeared in print as absolutely unintelligible. Undoubtedly Father Billot truly considered himself to be the opponent of the Dominican thesis; in truth, he had a wrong conception of it. But expressing himself in different terms, though retaining the mental attitude which his Jesuit training imposed upon him, he was in truth quite in agreement with the best of Thomists.

So writes the learned reviewer of the Ami du Clergé.

I shall reply here as I did in this same periodical. I am happy in coming to a better understanding from the texts just quoted that Cardinal Billot, “though retaining the mental attitude imposed upon him by his Jesuit training,” was more like a Dominican Thomist in his doctrine than at first sight he appeared to be. My conversations with him induced me to see considerable differences of meaning in the terms he employed and not sufficiently to perceive certain profound similarities in doctrine, which I am very happy to note. I noticed especially that he defends the theory of the scientia media, but it must be admitted that in his explanation of it, he seeks to approach as near as possible the teaching of Dominican theologians.

However, in the leading text quoted in the preceding

14 Contra Gentes, IIl, 66. The reference is to the unwritten tractate De Deo Creatore.

pages, which is taken from his dogmatic treatise, instead of reading: “We do not exclude hypothetical decrees which God would have of moving the created will, and of bestowing all that is required on its part,” 18 a Thomist would say: “which God has,” and not “which God would have.” Particularly so a Thomist would not add what we read nine lines further on: “Therefore God sees those (conditional futures) dependent upon the condition of His hypothetical motion which, however, cannot at all be predetermining, because thus the proper and specific mode by which free acts participate in the divine essence would be destroyed.”

You will say to me: “that is due to the mental attitude imposed by the Jesuit training” upon Cardinal Billot, who was preoccupied in rejecting, as you say, what he believed to be the Dominican theory. On this point he had a wrong conception of their teaching. And, this admitted, as for the rest it can truly be said that we are substantially in agreement.

That is why in this work, when speaking of the indifferent motion, I quoted Father Pignataro, S.J., in preference to Cardinal Billot, as exponent of this opinion.

A REPLY To SOME WELL-KNOWN OBJECTIONS AGAINST PREMOTION

WE here insert a manuscript bearing no date, which came into our hands some years ago, and which appears to be the work of a sound Thomist. He succeeds well enough in replying to some very well-known objections raised against the teaching of St. Thomas regarding the divine motion.

A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS ON DIVINE MOTION

St. Thomas says: “But if we hold that a sacrament is an instrumental cause of grace, we must needs allow that there is in the sacraments a certain instrumental power of bringing about the sacramental effects. ... But the instrumental power has a being that passes from one thing into another, and is incomplete; just as motion is an imperfect act passing from agent to patient.” *

Farther on in the same article he says: “A spiritual power cannot be in a corporeal subject after the manner of a permanent and complete power. But there is nothing to hinder an instrumental spiritual power from being in a body, in so far as a body can be moved by a particular spiritual substance so as to produce a particular spiritual effect.” ?

But now it must be pointed out that this spiritual power is something transient in a material subject, for instance, in⁵ baptismal water, which remains material. This instrumental power (which is a motion) is of such a nature that it in no way intrinsically modifies the nature of the subject in which it is found: in the present case indeed it is spiritual, and yet the water does not become spiritual, but is elevated for the time being to produce a spiritual effect.

There is something similar to this, as St. Thomas says, in the very voice perceived by the senses “in which there is a certain spiritual power, inasmuch as it proceeds from a mental concept, of arousing the mind of the hearer.” * The same is the case with the pen of the author in writing something intelligible.

It seems now possible in a general way to understand that it is not the function of motion to modify in any way the nature of the subject in which it is found, but leaving the nature or faculty absolutely unchanged physically, all that the motion does is to actuate the same for its own operation. The motion will be either for a necessary or free operation, according as the agent is either necessary or free. For just as water when moved remains material, so the will when moved remains free; and the action of the will when moved is free and not necessary, because such is the nature of the will.

By this, however, we assert the fact, but we have not as yet the reason for the fact. Moreover, it seems that the reason for this is to be sought in the very nature of this peculiar entity called motion; for it is not properly being, but a becoming. Why indeed is water not spiritual, although it has a spiritual quality? It is because this quality is fluid, is in the process of becoming spiritual. Why does the will remain free and determinating, although it receives a determinated quality? It is because that quality is not determined to a mode of being, but is essentially fluid, or a becoming, in process of being determined. For it is nothing else but a plenitude of action or power or an activity by which the faculty that previously

was not actually eliciting its act is actually doing so. And just as the power in the pen causes it actually to produce its own action, namely, the writing, so this plenitude of action causes the will actually to produce its own action, which is this particular action rather than a certain other, or it chooses, because its proper action is election. And here we already have a vague idea how motion does not prevent but rather causes the freedom of the act.

It is very difficult to see how under the influence of this motion there is truly freedom of action, while on the one hand the motion is a requisite for action, and on the other that the will is not free to have it or not.

As for this it must absolutely be said that certainly the will has no choice concerning the motion; but this is not contrary to liberty. For this it suffices that the act be under the control of the will, but not the principle of the act. It is indeed absurd and a contradiction in terms for that which constitutes a principle to depend upon this principle. Therefore, just as it is absurd for what constitutes the will as such to depend upon this same will, so it is absurd for what constitutes the will in act as such to depend upon this same will. Now it is motion that constitutes the will in act, or as having power and active indifference in act. Therefore it is absurd for motion to depend upon the will and be under the control of the will.

In other words, so long as the will is considered without the motion, it has not this active indifference actually but merely potentially. Therefore it is absurd to think that previous to the motion it can exercise its active indifference, namely, by accepting or refusing this motion.

Actual liberty is to be sought only where the will is in act. Now the will is in act by means of motion. Therefore the will when moved, and not before it is moved, must be actually actively indifferent, and it must have its terminus, namely, its act, in its power.

But you will say: The motion itself is already determined to one thing; therefore the will when moved is already determined to one thing, and therefore is not actively indifferent.

Reply: I distinguish. The motion is determined as an incomplete being, or as determining, or as that by which the will determines itself, or as producing the determination, this I concede; that the motion is determined as a complete being, as a form, as ens quod, this I deny. I distinguish the consequent: That the will when moved determines itself to one thing, this I concede; that it is determined to one thing by a determination independent of itself, this I deny.

You will insist: How can the will receive from something external to itself a determination that must come essentially from itself?

Reply: I distinguish. It cannot receive from something external to itself a determination, namely, the act that must come essentially from itself; this I concede. It cannot receive from something external to itself that by which it effects its determination, that by which it determines itself; this I again distinguish. If this something external to itself is not the first Cause, then I concede this; if it is, then I deny this. On the contrary, this is of necessity required so that the will may be the principle of its act.

Still you insist: He who has the end within his grasp, has the means also. Now motion is the means required for the act. Therefore this must be within the reach of the will.

Reply. I distinguish the major. He must have within his grasp the means that pertain to the principle of operative power; this I concede. That he must have within his grasp the principle by which the agent is constituted as actually having power; this I deny. For one actually to have the power presupposes that one is already constituted as the principle. I contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequence. For just as, when we say that the will has dominion over itself, this means that it has dominion over its act and not over its faculty, so when we say that it actually has dominion over itself, this must be understood as meaning that it has dominion over its act, but not over that by which it is actually constituted as having dominion over its act, namely, over motion.

It therefore seems right to conclude that just as, when we speak of matter and form, of essence and existence, we must always correct by means of the intellect that imagination we have of specific being, which is the reason for all the difficulties presenting themselves against a real distinction in each case, so we must always correct the imagination that represents motion to us as being that is complete, determined, and predetermined; and once the imagination is given admittance, immediately inextricable difficulties arise. For what is determined cannot any more be determined; what is chosen cannot any more be the object of choice. But if we take note of the fact that St. Thomas always speaks of motion as a fluid being, as a being that is essentially in the process of becoming (not however as a relation), then all difficulties are easily solved, or rather, of their own accord disappear. These principles established, we may briefly sum up the teaching of St. Thomas as follows:

CATECHISM OF MOTION

1. Can God be the cause of free being?

R. Most certainly: for otherwise He would not be Being.

2. Can God be the cause of the created free action?

R. Most certainly: for otherwise there would not be either action or free action.

3. How can God be the cause of created free action, so that the action of the creature, however, is truly elicited by it?

R. By motion.

4. What is motion?

R. Motion is that activity by which I freely determine myself.

5. Can it be called premotion?

R. Certainly: because that by which I determine myself, that by which I actually exercise my liberty, is by nature prior to the exercise of my liberty; and yet it does not prevent my being free, but even causes me to be free.

6. Is that activity or premotion something that is caused by God?

R. I distinguish: as ens quo, I concede; as ens quod, I deny. For it is the subjection of the creature to God as regards action.

7. Does God determine the will by causing this activity?

R. I distinguish: He determines the will by taking away passive indifference, this I concede; by taking away active indifference, this I deny. This latter is even actually caused by this motion.

8. Is this activity or premotion something determined?

R. I distinguish: That it is determined as the principle of determination, as that by which I determine myself, this I concede; that it is determined, as the form which is the principle of action, as the impression received in the eye is the principle of vision, this I deny.

g) Can this activity be said to be indifferent?

R. I distinguish: That it is indifferent as the principle of indifference, or inasmuch as it causes this active indifference, this I concede; that it is indifferent as though needing a further determination, or as though the will under its influence is able not to act or to do something else, this again I subdistinguish: if this activity were not precisely that by which the will determinately chooses one particular thing, this I concede; if it is so, then I deny this or subdistinguish: in sensu diviso, I concede; in sensu composito, I deny.

10. Under the influence of that activity or motion the will can act only in one way. Therefore active indifference is taken away from this motion.

R. That the will when moved acts only in one way, this I concede; that it can act only in one way, I subdistinguish: because it is supposed by this activity already to have chosen freely one particular thing, this I concede; as though it does not always have the power of choosing something else, this I deny.

11. It is a contradiction in terms for God to determine the will to determine itself; for free determination must by its very nature originate from an intrinsic principle.

R. I distinguish: It is a contradiction for God to determine by introducing into the will some determination, namely, a determinate form, this I concede; by introducing that by which the will determines itself, this I deny. Nay rather, it is a contradiction in terms for the will to be able to be determined without a determination.

As for the reason adduced, I distinguish: that the determination, namely, the free act, must originate from an intrinsic principle, I concede; that by which the will determines itself, must so originate, this I deny. For just as that by which the will is constituted as such cannot originate from an intrinsic principle, so neither can that by which the will is constituted in act: it is absurd for the will to be able to produce some activity before it is constituted in act.

12. That by which the will determines itself must be within its power.

R. I distinguish: It must be within its power terminatively (the act, namely, to which the will determines itself), this I concede; it must be so formally, this I deny.

13. It follows therefore that the will stands in need of something which is not within its power, so that it may choose freely.

R. Certainly: since for the will freely to act it itself needs to be a free faculty; and for it to be freely the principle of its act, it needs to be the principle of its act; and for it freely to exercise its active indifference, it needs to be actively indifferent. All these things are not within its power, and yet no one says that for this reason the will is not free.

14. What is the cause of the determination cannot be said to be formally the previous determination. Therefore physical predetermination must be rejected.

R. I distinguish: The cause of the determination cannot be said to be determination as a form determining or determined, this I concede; it cannot be said to be determination or motion determining, this I deny. I distinguish the consequent: Physical predetermination must be rejected if the term means that a determinate form is introduced by God into the faculty, this I concede; if the term means a motion determining and predetermining, then I deny it must be rejected. It is not a question of a name but of a thing. If one does not care for the name, give it up. Nevertheless a false meaning must not be attributed to those asserting such a doctrine, even granted that the name may be the occasion of false interpretation.

15. Does the motion determine the will, or does it make the will determine itself?

R. It is in any case both. For God determines the will by giving it that by which it determines itself.

16. Can the will under the influence of this motion determine itself otherwise than God wills?

R. Yes: in just the same way as the will, when it wills, can determine itself otherwise than it wills.

17. It is contrary to the notion of liberty for any external agent to make me will what it may please this agent to will.

R. I distinguish: Unless such be the power of such an agent that it gives the will that by which it wills freely, then I concede the assertion; if the agent gives the will that by which the will chooses freely, namely, the motion, then IĮ deny the assertion. Certainly there can be no conception of liberty without motion. Hence the argument is reversed.

18. That God should decide my choice is unintelligible.

R. That God should decide my choice without giving me the principle of choosing, namely, motion, this I concede; if He does so, then I deny the assertion. We confess, however, that this is beyond the power of imagination; wherefore he who, as St. Thomas says, wishes to reduce intelligible things to sense perception, never will be able to understand motion.

19. What is meant by saying that God eternally predetermined my act?

R. It does not mean that God predestined or preformed the act that must be mine, so that afterwards somehow He imitates it in me; but it means that God, as the cause of free being, eternally decided to imbue me with that activity by which I am able to actuate or exercise my liberty, as He decided to move a necessary being to perform necessary acts. In such predefining or predetermining He most certainly knew that my act would be elicited freely by me.

20. Can God foresee my free act before He foresees the motion?

R. It is absolutely impossible. To foresee my act before foreseeing the motion would be like foreseeing the act of my will before the will itself is foreseen: which is absurd. The will is in act only by being moved.

21. If God were to foresee my act before He foresees the motion, would my act be free?

R. Not at all. Before God foresees the motion, He can foresee my act only as possible; because, before being moved, the will is not at all determined to one thing rather than another; and if it is determined, it is no longer free but necessary, for evidently the determination in which liberty has no part is necessary by natural necessity.

22. Can free will be retained by not admitting motion?

R. Not at all, philosophically speaking. For if, before the exercise of my liberty or of that which implies such exercise (which is motion) my act is supposed to be determined to one thing rather than another, evidently my act is one of necessity. Therefore, motion not admitted, the logical outcome is fatalism.

In conclusion we must say that the whole explanation of the difficulty in reconciling the divine motion with free will seems to proceed from a false notion of divine motion. For the divine action is conceived as being like created action. God, however, and the free will are conceived as two coordinated causes operating to produce the one effect. Once this view is taken, there is no possibility of any rational solution of the problem. Either free will is denied or else the divine action. It follows as a consequence of this that both are denied.

But, on the contrary, in the doctrine of St. Thomas, God and the free will are simply subordinated causes. The entire action is from God and also from the free will; and it is entirely from the free will because it is entirely from God. To withdraw the free will from the influence of the divine action is the same as to withdraw it from its own activity, and this is therefore the same as to destroy it. The divine motion, however, is precisely that by which the free will is subjected to the divine action that it may be constituted in act.

But no created intellect can by its own power acquire a knowledge of the divine action as it is in itself. Wherefore the obscurity in this doctrine is an argument in favor of its truth. Whereas in the other opinions the difficulty is fundamentally removed—for God would be acting only in a human and created way—yet those of the opposing camp have to contend with inexplicable difficulties and even absurdities in explaining, namely, how the free will and the divine foreknowledge are to be reconciled. And these difficulties or absurdities strike at faith itself when from the divine the transfer is made in a natural way to supernatural motion, or to grace.

So ends this manuscript.

All the preceding discussion is tantamount to saying with Bossuet that “God eternally wills all the future use of free will as to all the goodness and reality there is in it. Nothing is more absurd than to say a thing does not exist because God does not will it. Must we not say, on the contrary, that it exists because God wills it? And just as it happens that we are free in virtue of the decree which wills us to be free, so it happens that we act freely in this or that act, even in virtue of the decree which extends to all this in detail.” ¢

Briefly then, what is more absurd than to claim that the actualization of liberty destroys it?

4 Traité du libre arbitre, chap. 8.

APPENDIX IV

THE THOMIST ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF PREDETER- MINING DECREES AND Dr. H. SCHWAMM’s RECENT WORK

WE take the opportunity here to thank our former pupil, Julien Groblicki, for having written the following note, and it gives us pleasure to publish it. It concerns Dr. Schwamm's recent work already mentioned in this book.

In this present work the author sets out to prove what he unhesitatingly asserted in his two previous works,? after what Father Pelster, S.J. had written. It is that the doctrine of the present-day Thomists concerning the divine predetermining decrees, as the medium in which God knows contingent futures, is not to be attributed to St. Thomas but to the Subtle Doctor, and that he is the author of the same.‘ Although, to be sure, Scotus did not explicitly speak of the predetermining decrees, yet by his having presented the state of the question in a new light, and by his inquiry into the root cause of the contingency of things (contingency of the divine will) he necessarily and proximately prepared the way for this explanation.* The author endeavors to prove three things concerning this thesis:

I. John Scotus is the originator of this doctrine. Scotus presented the problem in a new light * (kernel of the prob-

1See supra, p. 278 note 77. The divine foreknowledge according to Duns Scotus and his first followers, Innsbruck, 1994.

2 Thomas von Sutton, O.P., “Ein Oxforder verteidiger der thomistischen lehre,” in Zeitschr. f. Kat. Theol., XLVI (1922), pp. 383 £.

lem) inasmuch as he showed the connection between God's will and His knowledge. Just as God in all His operations ad extra brings things into being by an act of His will, so also He knows all that actually exists by and in the determination of His will, or, according to modern terminology, in the decrees of His will. The decrees are what make contingent futures determinately true for God. The system of predetermining decrees had as a necessary and logical consequence to be evolved from this explanation of the Scotist solution. The disciples were not always in agreement in interpreting their master’s doctrine. Some indeed asserted that Scotus spoke not explicitly but virtually of concomitant or condetermining decrees,” so that Mastrius and many saw that the freedom of the human will is jeopardized by the theory of predetermining decrees, which were admitted by others and attributed to the Subtle Doctor.

II. Schwamm asserts that this doctrine is not to be found in the works of St. Thomas, nor can it be deduced from his assertions, nor can it be reconciled with his view of the eternal presentiality of all things before God.

III. The Scotist doctrine of predetermining decrees was adopted by the Thomists from Bannez. That he will prove this last point in his next work is clearly enough foretold by him at the end of the book.®

As for the first question, whatever may be said about it (concerning Scotus and his disciples) and the first disciples of St. Thomas—and this will be taken up by him in the work which he has in preparation—it is certain that the author entirely misunderstood the Angelic Doctor. Now I am not speaking of his method of procedure, in that he selected only one article for discussion,® giving but a passing mention to the other passages; nor do I say anything of the way in which

7 See pp. 330, 331, and in various places, 8 See p. 334. ®CE. 1 Sent, d. 38, q.1, a.5.

APPENDIX IV 373 he treats the problem. For when he comes to explain the opinion of St. Thomas which, as he sees it, “is irreconcilably in opposition” to that of Scotus, he says:

“But perhaps the first objection that presents itself, in seeking for the teaching of St. Thomas, is that these passages must be accepted as a starting point, in which he speaks more in favor of later Thomists. Is it necessary so as to justify oneself, as to the meaning of any author, concerning any question we wish to know, that we seek the explanation in those passages in which the author expressly wishes to answer the question?”

I pass this over, therefore, without comment, but I assert and prove that the author, in the single text from St. Thomas which he accepted, has still misunderstood the Angelic Doctor and explained him contrary to what he meant.

For he says that not only it cannot be affirmed that St. Thomas presupposes predetermining decrees, but that he “positively excludes them.” St. Thomas rejected, so Schwamm contends, even every explanation of this problem by referring to the divine causality as insufficient and impossible. And he deduces this conclusion from the Doctor’s words. He writes: “But there still remains a greater doubt concerning the secondary cause, because the first and necessary cause can coexist with the defect of the secondary cause, just as the action of the sun can co-exist with the barrenness of the tree. But God’s knowledge cannot co-exist with the defect of the secondary cause; for God cannot at the same time know that this particular person will run, and that he fails to run. To have certain knowledge of this, we must find, indeed, some certainty in the thing known.” 1°

And this, adds Schwamm, is St. Thomas’ “foundation” * for his further inquiry by which he seeks for the determination in contingent things that actually exist, but not in God.

Hence there can be no question of explaining the divine knowledge by an appeal to the infallibly efficient causality of the divine will. The statements of St. Thomas are evidently in opposition to any explanation of this kind.

CRITICISM

Dr. Schwamm'’s interpretation is false. For what St. Thomas posited in his objection, which he explained three times in this article, Dr. Schwamm accepted and proposed as the opinion of St. Thomas. This method of procedure is contrary to sound exegesis.

Moreover, Schwamm overlooks the conclusion in the first article of this same question, which is as follows: “the knowledge of good pleasure is the cause of things.” **

The whole article is but a solution of two objections which St. Thomas stated at the beginning of the body of the article." The first of these difficulties arises from the consideration of the divine knowledge, which is the cause of things. Therefore, it seems to impose necessity on things foreknown, and consequently it takes away contingency from things. In his reply to this, the Angelic Doctor does not deny that the divine knowledge is the cause of things and even the necessarily required cause. He fully admits the major of the argument. But he adds that God’s knowledge is not the sole cause, but that it includes secondary causes, on account of which the effects can be either contingent or necessary, dependent upon the nature of the proximate secondary causes.

For an understanding of the second difficulty, it is important to notice that it is one thing to inquire about knowledge in general as such, about the notion and definition of the same; and it is another thing to inquire about some particular knowledge, for instance, the divine knowledge. Knowl-

12 Cf, Summa theol., Ia, q.14, a.8, which concludes the same way.

18 Cf. I Sent., d. 38, q.1, a.5. The same solution is given in his reply to the first and second objections and is again given in the middle of the argumentative part of the article.

APPENDIX IV 375 edge as such, which, as the Angelic Doctor says in this article, is “certain cognition,” pertains to the notion of whatsoever knowledge. It does not pertain to the notion of knowledge as such, that it be the cause of the things known. This applies to divine knowledge precisely as such and according as it is joined to the divine will. Hence after having considered in the previous objection knowledge as the cause of things, which applies to it inasmuch as it is divine, in this objection he considers knowledge in general, according as it is ‘“‘certain cognition,” abstracting from the fact of its being the cause of things. That this is the intention of the Angelic Doctor is evident from his explanation of this difficulty which, as I said, he explains three times in this article. To conclude from this that St. Thomas denies the divine knowledge to be the cause of things, or that he thinks the previous explanation insufficient, is the same as asserting that abstraction is the same as negation. But who can say so? In considering universals, such as the nature of a lion or any animal, shall we deny these exist in the concrete with their individualizing principles? ™*

Hence whatever opinion one may have of the solution of the arguments and difficulties, whether they please one or not, whether one consents to them or not, it cannot be concluded from what St. Thomas said, as Dr. Schwamm did, that the Angelic Doctor rejects the explanation of the knowledge of contingent futures as being the cause of the same.

I think this is the meaning of the article, and it will appeal to anyone who “reads it with an upright mind,” as actually the immediate disciples of St. ‘Thomas said.

What I say concerns this text alone. There are, of course, very many others that Schwamm interprets in the wrong sense, and which are known to all."®

15 For my part, however, if I may be permitted to say anything in addition to this, the following texts are of the greatest importance: (1) De veritate, q-2, a. 12, sed contra, arg. 4: “God knows things inasmuch as He is their cause.

We have quoted many texts from St. Thomas which show that for him it was evident that, if God from all eternity knew with infallible certainty St. Paul’s conversion, it is because He willed it by “the determination of His will and intellect.” 16 If He had not positively willed it, there would be no reason for this contingent future rather than its contrary to be eternally present to the divine vision. Nor would He know future sins without a permissive decree.” Dr. Schwamm’s thesis is a challenge that can make an impression only on those who never read St. Thomas, or those who never seriously considered the dilemma: God determining or determined; there is no other alternative.

But God is not only the cause of necesary but also of contingent things. Therefore He knows both necessary and contingent things.” Cf. ibid., sed contra, arg. 6: “To know means to know the cause of a thing. But God knows the causes of all contingent things; for He knows Himself who is the cause of all things. Therefore He knows contingent things.” See also De veritate, q.-3, a.6. (2) Cf. Contra Gentes, 1, 68: “God knows the thoughts of the mind and movements of the will in their power and cause, since He is the universal principle of being.” Ibid., par. 2: “God's causality extends to the operations of our intellect and will.” Ibid., par. 3, “So by knowing His intellect and will He knows every thought and wish.” (3) Cf. Peri Hermeneias, Bk. I, chap. 9, lect. 14. What he says in this text about contingent things He also applies to the determination of the divine will; and this was written in the last days of his life.

17 See pp. 75-84, 97-101, 248-50, 267-92, 300-9. In these pages texts from St. Thomas have been quoted that refer to determining decrees,

18 See above, pp. 143, 148 f., 248 F. Let us not forget, moreover, that the inflwence of the divine motion upon the intellect and the will to cause it to will infallibly a determined thing is affirmed not only by St. Thomas, but also by Leo XIII in his encyclical Providentissimus Deus (Denz., no. 1,592), Which is as follows: “For by supernatural power He (the Holy Spirit) so moved and compelled them (the sacred writers)—He was so present to them—that the things which He ordered, and those only, they first rightly understood, then willed faithfully to write down, and finally expressed in apt words and with infallible truth, otherwise it could not be said that He was the Author of the entire Scripture.” Now if once, in this case of the inspiration of the Scripture, the infallible efficacy of the divine motion does not destroy liberty, then it does not destroy it in other cases. Cf, J. M. Vosté, De divina inspiratione et veritate sacrae Scripturae, Roma, Angelicum, 1932, pp. 46 fE.

Footnotes

1. Summa theol., Ia, q.22, a.2 ad 2um. 324 ↩

2. Ibid., Ia Iae, q.79, 2.3. ↩

3. Cf. Dict. de théol. cath. ↩

4. We could have eliminated these in the present work, but we thought it necessary to hark back frequently, as St. Thomas does, to these same principles, so that the deep meaning and universality of the same may be readily perceived by all. ↩

5. Summa theol., Illa, q.62, a.4, 2 Ibid., ad 1um. ↩