Chapter XXIX. The different ways in which physical premotion operates

FATHER del Prado has discussed this question at length. He shows it to be the opinion of St. Thomas, by numerous texts taken from his works, that God moves our intellect and will in three ways: ¹ before the act of deliberation; (2) after this act; (3) by a movement of a higher order, St. Thomas noted these three ways in which the divine motion operates both in the order of nature and of grace.

In the natural order God moves our will: (1) to will happiness in general (or to wish to be happy); (2) to determine itself to choose this particular good by an act of discursive deliberation; (3) He moves it by a special inspiration that excels any deliberation, such as happens with the man of genius and with heroes, as Aristotle * remarked and also one of his disciples * who argued as Plato would have done.

Likewise, in a proportionate manner, in the order of grace, God moves our will: (1) to direct itself to its supernatural end; (2) to deterrnine itself to the use or practice of the infused virtues by means of a discursive deliberation; (3) He moves it in a manner that excels any deliberation by a special inspiration, and the gifts of the Holy Ghost render us docile to this movement.

Whether it be in the natural or in the supernatural order, the first manner of movement precedes the deliberation of the will as regards the means; * the second follows or accompanies it; the third mode excels it. St. Thomas has enumerated these three ways.° It suffices here to give in English the first of these texts which, though several seem to be ignorant of this, is explained by the following texts, especially by those that treat of grace, to which St. Thomas refers them.

“God moves man’s will as the universal Mover to the universal object of the will, which is good. (Thus man wills to be happy.) And without this universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason, to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall see later on.” ®

Having seen in what physical premotion does and does not consist, and what are its different modes, we must speak of the reasons why the Thomists affirm the necessity of its being admitted.

5 Ibid., Ia Mae, q.9, a.6 ad gum; q.68, a.2,3; q.109, a.1,2,6,9; q.111, 2.2; De veritate, q.24, 4.15.

6 Ibid., la Iae, q.9, a.6 ad gum; cf. q.109, a.2,6; q.111, a.2. Space does not permit us here to give all these texts. On the text just quoted and its relation to the others, see Father N. del Prado, op. cit., I, 236; 1I, 228, 256. Consult also the author’s “Perfection chrétienne et contemplation,” Vol. J, pp. 355770; cf. supra, p. 266 note ge.

Footnotes

1. De gratia et libero arbitrio, Vol. I1, 1907, chapter 7, pp. 201-25; 245-58. 2 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VII, chap. 1. 8 Eudemian Ethics, Bk, VII, chap. 14; cf. St. Thomas, Ia Iae, q.68, a.1. ↩