Chapter XXX. Reasons for affirming physical premotion

WE shall here consider these reasons in the following order: (1) in general; (2) with reference to the divine decrees concerning our salutary acts; (3) so as to explain the efficacy of grace.

GENERAL REASONS FOR ADMITTING PHYSICAL PREMOTION

1. The Thomists ultimately give two general reasons for affirming physical premotion; one of these is to be sought in God, the other in the secondary cause. Fundamentally the reason is the same, though viewed under two aspects.

First reason. God is the first Mover and first cause to whom are subordinated, even in their action, all secondary causes. Now, without physical premotion we cannot safeguard in God the primacy of causality or the subordination of secondary causes in their very action. Therefore physical premotion is the reason why all secondary causes are subordinated to God as first Mover and first Cause.

The major is certain both in philosophy and in theology. It would be rash to deny it. As, indeed, it is certain that God is the supreme Being, upon whom all beings as such immediately depend, it is equally certain that God is the supreme efficient cause to whom all secondary causes are subordinated even in their action. Subordination in action follows subordination in being, just as action follows being. To deny this major would be to deny the first two classical proofs for the existence of God as set forth by St. Thomas."

The minor becomes evident to us, if we take note of the fact that subordination of causes in their action consists in this, that the first cause moves or applies secondary causes to act, and that secondary causes act only because they are moved by the primary cause. St. Thomas states this clearly as follows: “Where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first: for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself.” * Now this is the very definition of physical premotion, which has a priority not of time but of causality over the action of the created agent. The Thomists confirm this argument by pointing out that neither simultaneous concurrence nor moral motion suffices to safeguard the subordination of causes.

2. Second reason, It finds its explanation in the indigence of the secondary cause. Every cause that is not of itself actually in act, but only in potentiality to act, needs to be physically premoved to act. Now such is the case with every created cause, even the free cause. Therefore every created cause needs to be physically premoved to act.

The major is certain. The classical proofs for God’s existence, such as St. Thomas understands them, have their foundation in this principle, and to refuse to admit this major is to say that the greater comes from the less, the more perfect from the less perfect; for actually to act is a greater perfection than being able to act. If, therefore, the faculty to act were not moved, it would always remain in a state of potency and would never act. St. Thomas, too, said: “Everything that is at one time an agent actually and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover.” °

The minor is no less evident. If a created cause were of itself actually in act, it would always be in act and never in potentiality. Our intellect would always actually know all the¹ intelligible things it can know, and our will would always actually will all the good things that will be willed by it. Moreover, this created cause, instead of being moved to act would be its own action; but, for that, it would have to be its very being, to exist of itself; for action follows being, and the mode of action the mode of being, as St. Thomas often says.* Therefore every created cause, that it may act, needs to be physically premoved by God.

The free cause is no exception; for its action, as being, depends upon the first Being; its action as action, upon the first Agent; and as a free action, upon the first Free.* Furthermore, the free cause is particularly indifferent of itself or undetermined whether to act or not to act, to will this or that, and for this reason it stands particularly in need of a divine motion to cause it to determine itself.* The stars obey God without knowing Him and they are powerless to disobey; that the human will may freely obey Him it needs a special divine motion or a grace that, without forcing it, will cause it actually and freely to make its choice.

The special Jaws that govern human liberty cannot be contrary to the universal laws of the real that govern the relations between created being and God. They cannot be an exception to these most universal laws, but are subordinate to them.

Such are the two reasons why Thomists generally affirm physical premotion. We say that they are two aspects of one and the same fundamental reason: on God's part, the primacy of His causality, and as regards the created cause, the indigence of this latter.

3. Insufficiency of the other explanations. These two reasons are confirmed by the insufficiency of the other explanations. The primacy of the divine causality and the

4 Ibid., Ia, q.54, a1. 5 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.79, a.2. 8 Ibid., Ia, q.19, a.3 ad 5um, subordination of causes are not indeed safeguarded, so the Thomists say, either by simultaneous concurrence or by the fact that God gave secondary causes the faculty to act.

a) Simultaneous concurrence does not move the secondary cause to act; and exerts no direct influence upon it, causing it to act; but this concurrence has only a simultaneous influence with it upon its effect, just as two men pulling a boat or two horses drawing a carriage. If it were otherwise, then this concurrence would not be merely a simultaneous but also a previous motion. It would have a priority of causality over the action of the secondary cause. By simultaneous concurrence God would be only the co-principle of our acts, but not the first Cause. There would be two partial and coordinated causes (at least of causality, if not of effect) and not two total and subordinated causes. Whereas for the Thomists the whole of the created action comes from God as the primary cause and from the created agent as the secondary cause."

b) Moral motion also fails to explain it. This can, of course, constitute the subordination of causes in the order of final causality, for the end morally or objectively moves by way of attraction; but it does not do so in the physical order of efficient causality, and it is with this that we are concerned. God, indeed, is first Mover and first Cause in this physical order of efficient causality, and not merely in the order of moral causality by way of attraction or end. If it were not so, then He would be the first Mover only as regards agents endowed with intellect, since only these are capable of being moved morally by having an object proposed to them which attracts them.

c) Finally, it is not enough to say with Durandus of St. Pourcain ê that God gave to secondary causes and preserves in them the faculty of action. St. Thomas excludes this opin-² ion as erroncous.® It was admitted by Pelagius and was not enough to declare him orthodox. Finally, it does not establish the subordination of causes in action but merely in being. Now action follows being, and the mode of action the mode of being. Dependence in action follows therefore dependence in being.

Furthermore, it is only God who can interiorly move our will to the exercise of its act, for He alone created and preserves it, and can move it according to the natural inclination He gave it for universal good. The order of agents corresponds to the order of ends, and therefore the most universal efficient cause can move to universal good which, as such, is realized in God alone.” Every other cause would necessitate, which means that it could not cause in us and with us that our acts should be performed freely.**

Suarez objected to this, saying that our will is of itself, if not formally at least virtually, in act, and that thus it can pass into act without a divine motion.?? It is easy to reply to this objection by saying that the virtual act is distinct from the action resulting from it. Is there, or is there not, a becoming in this? Is its action eternal, or, on the contrary, did it appear in time? This appearance is something new, and this becoming presupposes an active power which was not its own activity, which did not even act but was only able to act. And then, how does the virtual act reduce itself to the second act which it did not have? To say that it did so by itself, is to posit an absolute beginning, which is repugnant to reason; for the greater does not come from the less, being from nothing. The virtual act was therefore reduced to its second act by an eternal mover which, in the last analysis, must be its own activity and which cannot be the subject of becoming.

The reply to Suarez has often been that before the created

® Contra Gentes, III, 88.

will acts, its act is contained in it not virtually and eminently, as God contains creatures and as the divine intuition contains human reasoning; but it is contained virtually and potentially, which means that it can produce its act as a secondary cause acting under the influence of the primary Cause.

Moreover, it is not enough to say that God moves man to will to be happy, or to will good in general; for when our will afterwards wills some particular good, there is then a new actuality, which must depend as being upon the first Being, as free act upon the first Free, as ultimate actuality upon the supreme Actuality who is pure Act, and, if this free act is good and salutary, it must depend as such, not only by reason of its object, but also as to the exercise of its act, upon the source of all good and the Author of salvation. St. Thomas, too, said: “No matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God.” 1°

Such are the general reasons for affirming physical premotion. They become clear if we consider them with reference to what revelation teaches us concerning the divine decrees and efficacious grace.

PHYSICAL PREMOTION AND THE DIVINE DECREES AS THEY RELATE TO OUR SALUTARY ACTS

Physical premotion presupposes these decrees and the infallible execution of them. These decrees are admitted by almost all the theologians who do not accept the Molinist theory of the scientia media. This means that they are admitted by the Thomists, the Augustinians, and the Scotists, who in a general way grant the case of the dilemma: God determining or determined, no other alternative. In other words, if God has not from all eternity determined our sal-

18 Loc. cit., Ia Ilae, q.109, a.1, utary free acts, then He is passive or dependent upon His knowledge as regards the free determination made by a certain man if placed in certain circumstances (and it is only for God to place him or not in these circumstances). As regards this free determination which, as a free determination, does not come from God, He is not the author but merely the spectator of it. Now we can admit no passivity or dependence in the pure Act, who is sovereignly independent as regards everything created, as to contingent things, whether absolute or conditional.

In the opinion of the theologians just referred to, the existence of these divine predetermining decrees concerning our salutary free acts has its foundation not only in the notion which the philosopher perforce must have of God and His independence, but also in divine revelation as contained in Scripture and tradition.

1. Scriptural texts. We have the following prayer of Mardochai: “O Lord, Lord, almighty King, for all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will... . Thou art the Lord of all and there is none that can resist Thy majesty. . . . Hear my supplication and turn our mourning into joy.” 14 In the same book Queen Esther prays as follows: “Give me a well ordered speech in my mouth, in the presence of the lion (the king), and turn his heart to the hatred of our enemy; that both he himself may perish and the rest that consent to him.” ?* Further on we read: “And God changed the king’s heart into mildness,” ** and he issued an edict in favor of the Jews. From these words we see that the infallibility and efficacy of the decree of God's will have their foundation evidently in His omnipotence and not in the foreseen consent of King Assuerus. This makes St. Augustine say, when explaining these words: “By a most secret and most

efficacious power He converts and transforms the king’s heart from indignation to lenity.” +"

In the Book of Psalms we read: “He hath done all things whatsoever He would.” ?* Everything He wills not conditionally, but absolutely, He does, even man’s free conversion, as in the case of King Assuerus. Hence the “heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it.” 9° The same thought is expressed somewhat differently as follows: “As the potter’s clay is in his hand, to fashion and order it . . . so man is in the hand of Him that made him.” 2 Isaias announces various events that will happen against the pagan nations by means of human intervention, especially the ruin of Babylon, and he concludes as follows: “The Lord of hosts hath sworn, saying: Surely as I have thought, so shall it be. And as I have purposed, so shall it fall out. . . . For the Lord of hosts hath decreed, and who can disannul it? And His hand is stretched out, and who shall turn it away.” # The hand of God signifies His omnipotence; here again the infallibility and efficacy of the divine decree do not at all have their foundation in the foreseeing of human consent.

It is even declared that God gives the good consent: “And I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit within you; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh and will give you a heart of flesh . . . and I will cause you to walk in My commandments and to keep My judgments and do them . . . and you shall be My people and I will be your God.” #

Jesus also said: “Without Me you can do nothing,” ? in

the order of salvation. Speaking of deceivers, He said: “There shall arise false Christs . . . and shall show great signs and wonders.” ** Of His followers He said: “My sheep hear My voice. And I know them, and they follow Me. And I give them life everlasting, and they shall not perish for ever. And no one shall pluck them out of My hand. That which My Father hath given Me is greater than all; and no one shall snatch them out of the hand of My Father.” 25

Again, in like manner, every time Jesus speaks of the “hour” of His passion, He says that it has from all eternity been determined by a divine decree, and that before this hour no one will be able to lay hands on Him. God is therefore the master of the human will to such an extent that it cannot sin except at the time permitted by God from all eternity; also the kind of sin has been permitted without God being directly or indirectly the cause of it. Thus we read in the Gospel: “They sought therefore to apprehend Him; and no man laid hands on Him, because His hour had not yet come.” % Of this hour the Evangelist writes: “Jesus knowing that His hour was come . . . having loved His own . . . He loved them unto the end.” ** “Father the hour is come.” * We have observed that the hour appointed by Providence is not of necessity determined. Now this is the hour of Christ’s greatest free act. The act is one that had therefore been from all eternity the object of a divine positive predetermining decree. It is also the hour of the greatest sin, that of deicide. This act had been from all eternity the object of a divine decree that was not positive but permissive, so that this sin was not due to happen before this hour, or in any other way except that permitted by God.”

28 [bid., 17: 1; cf. Com. of St. Thomas on these texts of St. John. 29 Summa theol., IIIa, q.46, 2-2; 4.47, a.3,6.

Likewise, St. Peter on the day of Pentecost said to the Jews: “This same being delivered up, by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, you by the hands of wicked men have crucified and slain. Whom God hath raised up.” © It is also to be noticed that in this text “the determinate counsel, rj épupévy Bovàğ,” precedes foreknowledge: mpoyvore roô @eod. As St. Thomas says: “God by His eternal will preordained Christ’s passion for the deliverance of the human race.” 8

In like manner, St. Paul says of the resurrection: “Him God raised up the third day; and gave Him to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by God.” 3? He points out the effect of this upon the Gentiles as follows: “And the Gentiles hearing of it were glad . . . and as many as were ordained to life everlasting believed.” ** He refers to the divine predetermination in these words: “God hath determined for all mankind the appointed time and the limits of their habitation.” ** St. Paul relates that after his conversion, Ananias said to him: “Brother Saul, look up. And I the same hour looked upon him. But he said: The God of our fathers hath preordained thee that thou shouldst know His will and see the Just One and shouldst hear the voice from His mouth. For thou shalt be His witness.” ** And freely but infallibly St. Paul testified concerning our Lord.

Finally, it was St. Paul himself who said: “To them that love God all things work together unto good: to such as according to His purpose are called. For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated. . . . But when Rebecca had conceived . . . when the children were not yet born . . . that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works of Him

that calleth, it was said to her: the elder shall serve the younger. . . . What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God? God forbid! For He saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy. And I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” * In this text it is clear that the election, the eternal decree of the divine will, does not depend upon the foreseen consent of the human will. God’s sovereign independence cannot be more clearly affirmed.

Other passages are equally to the point: “If God, willing

. to show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy which He hath prepared unto glory,” ** where is the injustice? “But in all these things we overcome, because of Him that hath loved us.” ** “Hath God cast away His people? God forbid! . . . Of old He said to Elias: I have left Me seven thousand men that have not bowed their knee to Baal. Even so then, at the present time also, there is a remnant saved according to the election of grace. And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace. What then? That which Israel sought, he hath not obtained; but the election hath obtained it. And the rest have been blinded.” **

Similarly, St. Paul said: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” * According to St. Paul what distinguishes the just person from the impious one, what even begins to distinguish him, when the just person begins to be converted, that also he received. Long afterward St. Thomas said: “Since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” ** It is the

principle of predilection, which applies both in the natural and supernatural orders, and this for salutary acts either difficult or easy to perform. This principle is of absolute universality, and it supposes that God’s love for us is efficacious of itself and not because of our foreseen good consent, since God, the source of all good, is the primary cause of this good consent. This principle of predilection, so clearly formulated by St. Paul and so boldly affirming God’s sovereign independence, is balanced by this other principle, that “God never commands what is impossible, and makes it really possible for all adults to obey the commandments when these are binding on them,” as explained by St. Paul who says: “God will have all men to be saved.” #

How is this second principle reconciled with the principle of predilection? That is an inscrutable mystery. For this we should have to see the Deity and thus realize how infinite mercy, justice, and sovereign liberty, or God’s independence, are there reconciled. i

We read the same in St. Paul’s epistles: “As He chose us in Him [Jesus Christ] before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight . . . [and not because He foresaw our holiness]. Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto Himself, according to the purpose of His will, unto the praise of the glory of His grace [and not that of man’s free will], in which He hath graced us in His beloved Son. . . . In whom we are also called by lot, being predestinated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will. That we may be unto the praise of His glory, we who before hoped in Christ.” ** It is not a question here merely of the general election of Christians, for it is stated that one particular Christian is better than a certain other: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou

hast not received?” ** If God's love is the source of all good, no one thing would be better than another, unless it were loved more by God. Again St. Paul says: “For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” ** Therefore, so the Thomists think, the free determination of the salutary act comes, as from its primary source, from God, who is the first Free and the first Goodness, from God, who is the Author of salvation.

2. Theological argument. The same doctrine is set forth by St. Thomas when he speaks of the divine consequent or nonconditional will: “The will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner or antecedently he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.” *°

In this passage St. Thomas gives us the principle of the distinction between intrinsically efficacious grace (which infallibly assures the execution of the divine consequent will for salutary acts, whether these be easy or difficult), and sufficient grace (which corresponds to the divine antecedent will by which God wills to make it possible for all to keep the commandments and obtain salvation).

Why does St. Thomas think that everything which God wills by His consequent or unconditional will is infallibly fulfilled? The reason given by St. Thomas is not because God foresees our consent, but because “nothing may fall outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are

included.” “4 Only the good which God willed or the evil which He permitted can happen; for no secondary cause can act without His concurring in the act.

The Council of Orange had said: “Let no one glory in what he may seem to have, as if he did not receive it from God.” ** The Council of Trent also said: “For God, unless men be themselves wanting to His grace, as He began the good work, so will He perfect it [working in them to will and to accomplish].” *

In the opinion of the Thomists, not to admit predetermin. ing decrees in God with regard to our salutary acts, is to make it impossibie for one to solve the dilemma: God determining or determined, no other alternative. Thus we must admit a certain passivity or dependence in God as regards the free decision that a certain man would make if placed in certain circumstances, and that he wili make if actually placed in such circumstances. Is not God’s dependence upon man’s decision admitted by Molina in the following passage? “The scientia media on no account is to be called free, both because it precedes every free act of the divine will, and also because it was not in God’s power to know by this knowledge anything else than He actually knew. Furthermore, not even is it natural in this sense, as if it were to such a degree innate to God that He could not know the opposite of that which He knows by this knowledge. For if the created will were to do the opposite, as it truly can, He would have known even this by the same knowledge, but not that He actually knows it.” °° This means that it is not in God's power to foresee by the scientia media something else than what He knows by it; but He would have known something else by it if the created will, on the supposition that it were placed in certain circumstances, had made a different choice. Now, then, can we avoid saying that God’s

foreknowledge depends upon the choice which the created free will would make if it were placed in certain circumstances, and which it will make if actually placed in such circumstances? Evidently it follows as a logical conclusion for Molina that actual grace, which results in the salutary act, is not intrinsically efficacious," and that with an equal or even a less grace a particular sinner is converted, whereas a certain other with greater help is not converted.*? In the opinion of the Thomists, this cannot be reconciled with what St. Paul says: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” *

On the contrary, if we admit the divine predetermining decrees with regard to our salutary acts, namely, intrinsically and infallibly efficacious decrees, which cause even our acts to be performed freely, actuating our liberty, then it follows that actual grace, which is followed by the salutary act, must also be intrinsically efficacious, so as to assure the infallible execution of the decree which it presupposes. In the opinion of the Thomists,** actual grace can be intrinsically efficacious only on condition that it is a predetermining physical but nonnecessitating premotion, in the sense explained at the beginning of this third part. It remains for us to prove this.

PREDETERMINING PHYSICAL PREMOTION AND THE EFFICACY OF GRACE

It is of faith that God grants us efficacious graces which are not only followed by the good consent of free will, but which in a certain manner produce it: for efficacious or effective grace makes us act. The Pelagians and Semipelagians denied this. They did not refuse to admit that grace gives us the power to perform a good act, but they denied that it causes us to will and

do the act. The second Council of Orange explaining the words of St. Paul, “It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish,” * declares against the Semipelagians: “If anyone, that we may be cleansed from sin, contends that God awaits the consent of our will, and does not confess, however, that even our wish to be cleansed is effected in us by the infusion and operation of the Holy Ghost, such a one resists this same Holy Spirit . . . and the Apostle proclaiming for our benefit that it is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” °*

Now grace, which causes us to perform a good act, which works in us both to will and to accomplish, makes us do the good deed, is not merely virtually efficacious (in actu primo) in the sense that it gives us really the power to act in a salutary manner, for this power is already given by sufficient grace even when the salutary effect does not follow; but it is actually efficacious or effective, for, as the Council of Orange says: “As often as we do any good act, God works in us and with us that we may act.” ’ In these words we have the expression of Christian faith, and it is also of faith that under the influence of efficacious grace so conceived, man retains his liberty of action.*

In addition to this the Thomists and many other theologians interpreting these texts of the Scripture and the councils as implying divine independence, which they consider is compromised by the scientia media, see in this the affirmation that grace is efficacious of itself, and not because of our foreseen consent.

It is of importance to note here that the doctrine of intrinsically efficacious grace, which is admitted by almost all theo-

58 Denz., no. 177; cf. no. 182: “For as often as we do any good act, God works in us and with us that we may act”; also consult Denz., nos. 176, 179, 183, 185, 198, 195, see also Indiculus de gratia Dei, nos. 131-35, 139, 141 f.

logians who reject the theory of the scientia media, means far more for the Thomists than their explanation of predetermining physical premotion. Likewise, provided it is within the power of our will to move our hand as it pleases, it is of little consequence for us to know by means of what nerve centers it does so. Among the Thomists, Billuart pointed this out. He said in substance that the theologians explain in various ways the efficacy of grace; some by means of delectation and moral influence, others by physical predetermination, though they do not apply this to natural acts, or to the material element in sin. But, strictly speaking, these are philosophical questions, whereas grace efficacious of itself in virtue of God’s omnipotent will, independently of the creature’s consent and the scientia media, this we defend as a theological conclusion that is connected with the principles of the faith and proximate to the faith (proximately definable). If we exclude the Molinists, this opinion is held by almost all the schools. The Thomists perceive, indeed, that this statement of intrinsically efficacious grace is implied in the scriptural texts previously quoted concerning the intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees.® Similarly, they connect this doctrine with the principle of predilection, namely: “No one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” *

Now if we admit the fact of intrinsically and infallibly efcacious grace, how can we account for it except by saying that it is so by reason of the predetermining physical premotion in the sense just explained? It has been proposed, of course, to explain this efficacy by means of a moral causality in that the object attracts the will, and so some have spoken, such as Berti and Bellelius, of a victorious delectation, others of a multiplicity of graces that attract the will, or of a series of indeliberate and inefficacious good movements that incline the

60 Billuart, loc. cit., diss. 5, 2.6; in more recent times, cf. N. del Prado, op. cit., III, 150 ff.; E. Hugon, De gratia, p. 202.

will to make the salutary choice, and it has even been proposed to assign to this moral motion, in one or the other of the above mentioned modes, a physical but non-predetermining premotion,

It is the common teaching of the Thomists in the tractate on grace, that the explanations are insufficient. The fundamental reason they give is that God cannot infallibly move the will by means of a moral or objective motion. Now intrinsically efficacious grace is that by which God infallibly moves the will to make the salutary choice. Therefore intrinsically efficacious grace cannot be explained by simply a moral or objective motion.

The major of this premise rests upon the principle that by a moral or objective motion the will is reached only through the medium of the intellect by way of objective attraction, and is not infallibly drawn by this motion. Undoubtedly, God seen face to face would infallibly attract our will because He adequately satisfies its capacity for love. But every attraction, however exalted it may be. is unable fully to satisfy this capacity and is fallible; it leaves the will undetermined whether to consent or not, especially so with a weak will, with one that is hard and indocile to the divine call, so long as it is not intrinsically changed.

It does not solve the difficulty to say that this moral motion is accompanied by a celestial and victorious delectation. This latter, which is admitted by several Augustinians, such as Berti, cannot make the grace intrinsically and infallibly efficacious; for, often enough, it does not even accompany the motion, and when present does not infallibly produce its effect. Often enough it is ineffective, for some are converted who were not disposed precisely because they were drawn by a celestial delectation that is superior to earthly things; for they were drawn by reason of an inclination to good that is not always a victorious delectation, but is inspired by the fear of divine chastisements and other motives. Even saints perform many good works without experiencing this victorious delectation; and they are, at times, in a state of very great aridity, as for instance, is the case with those who are undergoing the dark night or passive purification of the soul. When this celestial delectation is present, it solicits undoubtedly our free will to act, but it does not infallibly attract the will; for it does not fully satisfy the capacity of the will for love, as would be the case of God seen face to face; for the will can incline us to think of something else.*? As a matter of fact, in his choice man is not always influenced by the greatest delectation that suddenly presents itself; he chooses what appears to him to be the best right at the moment, even for the sole motive that it is of obligation, without any previous delectation, and the superior delectation then follows the choice, just as joy follows the fulfilment of one’s duty.

The multiplicity of the graces of attraction would not give the salutary acts an infallible efficacy; for the will still remains undecided whether to consent or not, although it is ardently solicited or inclined to give its salutary consent. Thus the persecutors promised all the goods of this world to the holy martyrs, at the same time attempting to frighten them by the threat of al] the torments; but neither these promises nor threats of torments could infallibly influence their liberty of action. In like manner, inefficacious good movements incline the will to make the salutary choice, but they cannot infallibly cause this act; for they, too, leave our free will undecided. They do not effect the free choice, to say nothing of the fact that they often have to contend with great temptations and the fickleness of our free will in the performance of good.

Finally, an indifferent physical premotion that moves man to will to be happy, without inclining him infallibly to will this particular good, it, too, leaves our free will undecided. It does not effect the free choice of a certain good.

The Thomists, too, conclude that moral motion is certainly

required to dispose our will to make the choice, by proposing to it an object, a good that solicits or attracts it. But intrinsically efficacious grace that infallibly moves the will to make the free choice, must be the application of the will to the exercise of this act. Now this is not a moral motion, or one by way of objective attraction, but it is a physical motion. It must exert its effect immediately from within; on the will itself, and not through the intervention of the intellect. It must have a priority not of time but of nature or causality over the free act. It must, finally, bring the will infallibly to perform this particular free act rather than a certain other, and cause even this act to be performed freely. This means that it must be a predetermining physical and non-necessitating premotion, which can come from God alone, and from no created agent however superior; for only God can interiorly move the free will which He has ordained to universal good and which He maintains in existence. He alone by His unsullied contact can so move the will as not to destroy its liberty, and can reconcile His infallible motion with the free mode of our acts.

Theologians always granted the Thomists that it is because of this divine motion of itself efficacious, that the Virgin Mary freely and infallibly uttered her “fiat” on the day of the annunciation, that St. Paul was freely and infallibly converted on his way to Damascus, that the martyrs remained freely and infallibly faithful in the midst of most dreadful torments. But that is to concede the metaphysical principles of the doctrine, and, if they are metaphysical, they are applicable without exception to all salutary acts, whether these be easy or difficult to perform. The foregoing principles that have been formulated do not take into consideration the greater or less degree of difficulty.

On the other hand, the infallibility of the divine motion which is affirmed by the Jansenists and Quesnel ® in terms practically the same as those of St. Thomas, is the denial of liberty, as well as of sufficient grace and responsibility on the sinner’s part. The Jansenists consider grace of itself efficacious to be necessary by reason of the weakness of human nature and not because of the creature’s dependence upon God. They hold that in the state of innocence intrinsically efficacious grace was not necessary for the performance of a good act. It is necessary only since the fall because of the consequences of original sin, in that only freedom from coercion remains to us and not free will (freedom from necessity).

To sum up, intrinsically and infallibly efficacious grace, which in more precise language means predetermining and non-necessitating premotion, is required not only for salutary acts difficult to perform, but also for those that are easy; and this holds good either for the commencement or continuance in the performance of good works. “Since, indeed, God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another [by reason of an initial or final salutary act, by one that is easy or difficult to perform, in the beginning or for its continuance], if God did not will greater good for one than for another.” *

Footnotes

1. Ibid., la, q.105, a.5. 8 Ibid, Ia Ilac, q.9, a.4. ↩

2. Ibid., Ia, q.105, a.5 ad gum. 8 In Hum Sent., d.1, q.5. ↩