L. 1 - Boethius' Preface

Boethius' Preface

You ask me to set out and to explain a bit more clearly the obscurity of the question from our hebdomads that involves the way in which substances, in that they are, are good, although they aren’t substantial goods.

You say that this ought to be done because the method used in writings of this sort isn’t familiar to everyone. Well, I myself am your witness how vigorously you treated these matters before.

But I think about the hebdomads for myself, and I keep these speculations in my memory, rather than sharing them with any of those people whose impertinence and insolence permits nothing to be analyzed without joking and laughter.

Accordingly, don’t be opposed to obscurities stemming from brevity; since they are the faithful guardian of the secret they have this advantage: they speak only to those who are worthy.

Therefore, as is the customary practice in mathematics and also in other disciplines, I have first put forward terms and rules, in accordance with which I shall work out all that follows.

A common conception of the mind is a statement that each person approves upon hearing it.

There are two kinds of these. One kind is common in such a way that it belongs to all men—for example, if you were to propose: "If you take equals away from two equals, the remainders are equal," nobody understanding it would deny it. The other kind belongs only to the learned even though it comes from such common conceptions of the mind, as for example: "Incorporeal objects are not in a place" and the like, to which the learned give their approval but not the common multitude.

5. Thus Boethius, following this exhortation, produced for us a book about his conceptions, called On the Hebdomads, that is, on investigations, since "ebdomada" in Greek means "to investigate."

6. In this book, Boethius does two things.

First, he begins with a preface;

second, he proceeds to the treatment of his task, at: being and that which is are different [22].

Concerning the first he does three things.

First, he shows what his endeavor is about [7].

Second, how it is to be treated, at: you say that this ought to be done [8].

Third, he provides the order in which he is to proceed, at: therefore, as is the customary practice in mathematics [12].

7. Now Boethius is writing this book for John, a Deacon of the Roman Church who had requested him to discuss and explain a certain difficult problem from his hebdomads (that is, his own investigations), through which an apparent conflict is solved. For it is said that created substances, insofar as they are, are good. Yet it is also said that created substances are not substantial goods; this is rather said to be distinctive of God alone. But what is suitable to something insofar as it is, seems to be suitable to it substantially. Hence if created substances are good insofar as they are, it seems to follow that they are substantial goods.

8. Then when he says, you say that this ought to be, Boethius shows us how he wants to approach his task, that is, not clearly but obscurely—and on this score he does three things.

First, he shows that he intends to speak obscurely [9].

Second, that this approach is customary for him, at: but I think [10].

Third, that he should adopt this approach, at: accordingly, don’t be opposed [11].

9. Thus Boethius says first that John, to whom he is writing these things, had requested them to be written because the way of the matters to be written about here is not familiar to anyone not stirred by the same desire for them as is he himself. Boethius attests that John had vigorously treated them before, that is, either understanding perspicaciously or desiring feverishly.

10. Then when he says, but I think, Boethius shows this approach also to be customary for him. He says that he was used to meditating upon these matters for himself, that is, to compose or think up certain hebdomads (that is, investigations or conceptions) which he was keeping in his memory, contemplating them, rather than let share in them one of those people who permit nothing to be analyzed (that is, ordered or put together) without joking and laughter due to their impertinence and insolence (that is, extravagance and shallowness). For they are scornful when someone has put together or set in order some discourse not for the sake of play but for serious business.

11. Then when he says, accordingly, don't be opposed, Boethius concludes from the previous statements that he ought to undertake an obscure discourse the more gladly since John had himself requested such a discourse. He says accordingly because you did this so that the method of our writings not be accessible to all. Don’t be opposed (that is, hostile) to obscurities stemming from brevity, that is, to the obscurity of the present book, which is joined with its brevity. For things are more likely to be obscure in virtue of the fact that they are said briefly. Moreover, when obscurity faithfully guards a secret, it brings along the benefit that it speaks only to those who are worthy, that is, to the intelligent and diligent, who are worthy to be admitted to the secrets of wisdom.

12. Then when he says, therefore, as is the customary practice in mathematics, Boethius shows us the order in which he is to proceed—obviously, through those things that are known per se: and concerning this he does two things.

First, he sets out the order in which he is to proceed [13].

Second, he acquaints us with the things from which he intends to proceed, at: a common conception of the mind [14].

13. Thus Boethius says first that he intends to put forward at the beginning certain principles known per se, which he calls terms and rules: terms because it is in such principles that the resolution of all demonstrations comes to their stopping-point; rules because it is through these that a person is directed towards knowledge of the conclusions that follow. From such principles Boethius intends to derive conclusions and make known all matters which are thereafter to be discussed, as happens in geometry and other demonstrative sciences. These are called disciplines since through them disciples come to have knowledge from the demonstration their teacher sets forth.

14. Then when he says, a common conception of the mind, Boethius acquaints us with the principles known per se:

first, by definition [15];

second, by division, at: there are two kinds of these [16].

15. As for the first, we should consider that principles of this sort, which are terms, since they are rules of demonstration, are called common conceptions of the mind. Boethius thus defines a common conception of the mind as follows: a common conception of the mind is a statement that each person approves upon hearing it, that is, one that anyone at all accepts as soon as he hears it. Other propositions which are demonstrated by means of these are not accepted immediately on the hearing itself. Instead, some propositions must come to be known through others. Now this cannot proceed to infinity. Accordingly, we must arrive at some propositions that are immediately known per se. Accordingly, they are called common conceptions of the mind; they commonly enter into the conception of any given understanding, because the predicate belongs to the account of the subject, and so as soon as the subject has been named and what it is has been understood, it is immediately obvious that the predicate is present in it.

16. Boethius now divides the aforementioned principles, saying that there are two kinds of the aforementioned common conceptions of the mind.

17. Some conceptions of the mind are common to all men, such as this: if you take equals away from equals, the remainders are equal.

18. But the other kind of conception of the mind is common only to the learned, and it is derived from the first conceptions of the mind, which are common to all men. For instance: things that are incorporeal are not in a place. This statement is accepted not by the layman but only by the wise.

The reason for this distinction is because a common conception of the mind or a principle known per se is some proposition in which the predicate belongs to the account of the subject; if what is signified by the subject and the predicate is the same, it enters into the knowledge of all people, and consequently such a proposition is known per se to all. For example, everyone knows what it is to be equal, and similarly what it is to be subtracted; hence the aforementioned proposition is known per se to all. Similarly for "every whole is greater than its part," and the like.

But only the understanding of the wise reaches to the apprehension of an incorporeal thing. For the understanding of laymen does not go beyond imagination, which is limited to corporeal things. Hence things that are distinctive of bodies—for example, being circumscribed in a place—the understanding of the wise immediately removes from incorporeal things. The layman is not able to do this.